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A list of Gabriel Marcel's works is given in the 
Bibliography. For convenience in quotationg the customary 
foim of abbreviation is employed, after a first mention in 
full, to indicate the titles of the works most frequently 
quoted. . Thus, JM = Journal Metaphysique; 
EA = Etre et 
AVoir; RI = Du 116fus a l'Invocation; HV = Homo Viator; - 
A= Position et Approches concretes du Mystere ontologique; 
CD = Les Conditions dialectiques de la philosophie de 
llintuition; TP = Tragique et Personnalite; ET = Note sur 
1'Evaluatiog tragi el etc. - 
CkIAPPER I 
INTRODUCTORY 
T.: U'ij ', 13A(, kZGYiJUND OF CONTEMPORARY TRENCH Tr'j'k. CUGHT 
The tendencies in modern and contemporary French thought 
tAat foria the intellectual back(-, rround of IM. Gabriel Marcel's 
generation, which embarked on its philosophical studies in 
the early years ofthis century and grew to philosophical 
maturity during the Great War, are not only complex but 
widely sprung. For) they include not only the immediate 
influences, but others derived from a more distant nineteenth 
century context. The names of Lecluier ana Maine de Biran 
were, indeed, no less operative than those of Brunschvicg 
and 3ergson. For a proper comprehension of a thinker like 
I;, Llarcel, Whose thought has always been sensitive, some 
mio: -ht say over-sensitive at times, to intellectual and 
spiritual climates, a sketch o4 these tendencies in their 
broad sweep is an essential preliminary. Ana for this 
purpose -we shall take into our survey all those currents and 
tAiiikerz, predecessors and conteýmporaries izi th vfn om 
affinities or contrasts vdll have to be stressed in the course 
Of Our Q: ýmose, and, as is proper and essential when dealing 
wit-ý' One Wao is a literary rather than an academic philosopher, 
vie shall include literary thirikers as well as the philosophers 
proPer. 
ýhc first important current in mpdcrn French thought is 
2. 
tne Idealistic. And this current itself,, provided it is 
stressed that the two overlap at many points, having their 
common ancestry in traditional French Cartesianism, may be 
divided into two fairly distinct forms each of Which has its 
roots in the 19th century: the first neo-Criticist ýLnd neo- 
Kantian, the second developing from the "Spiritualist" school 
of Laine de Biran. I 
TI'lis first for3: R goes back to Jules Lequier whose 
principal claim to the attention of the historian lies in the 
r 
fact of Iiis influence on Renouvier. Strictly speaking, his 
philosop! V developed/from Descaýrtes rather than Kant, although 
Fichte was an important factor therein., Lequier's viork, of 
which frapments only remain, is entitled La Recherche d1une 
2remiere verite. His thought has for its end to discover 
'Ile moyen d1associer le libre arbitre a la raison et au 
oavoir, avoc lesquels on a plut'Ot 11habitude de le considerer 
comme on 6tat do rupture (1). " It takes the form of an 
initial dilemma as between liberty and necessity. Loquier 
I 
exanines four possible hypotheses: necessity affirmed 
iiecessarily; liberty affirmed necessarily; necessityý 
affirmed freely and liberty affirmed freely. 11nd he finally 
chooses the last as beinrr the one which weighs least heavily. 
"Je ne puis affirmer ou nier l'une ou l'autre (la liberýe'l 
la no'cossite) quo par le iaoyen de l'une ou de l'autre. Je 
Pre-Lere la liberte et affirmer quo je llaffirme au 
I 10 a -vi- er , opilic analytique de linistoirel Paris, 
-'ý'rOu7i 701. IV (1897), p. 429. 
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moyen de la liberte". * Ainsit je renonce 
'a' imitc'r ceux qui 
cherclien-b ai' affirmer quelque chose qui les force d'affirmer. 
je renonce a poursuivre l'oeuvre dlune connaissance qui ne 
serait pas la mienne. Vembrasse la certitude dont_je suis 
llauteur (1). " 
Freedom is thus not demonstrated but affirmed, being 
the result of a Pascalian wager. ý It is moreover this 
affirmation that forms the basis of his "first truth" and 
enables him to posit freely his existence as a thinking 
being. How indeed can the je pense, be affirmedq involving 
as it does an objec"V , represented" and a subject "which 
repre. sents" , between which there is no, purely logical 
connection possible. "Pourtant ils sont unis, puisque 
jlexiste. Pexiste et je no saurais sans les unir affirmer 
I 
ma seule existence. Quel est cet intervalle do moi 'a moi 
que ilonferme en moi-meme?... Et bien, puisque ni 11objet ni 
llidee ne me livrent ce lien dq l1un 'a, l1autre quIen vain je 
ciierche et qulil me faut, je vais le trouver en le formant, 
et Puisqulil est nocessaire pour m1affirmer, je m1affirme 
Pour lo produire (2). " It is thus by an act of'freedom that 
I unite my sclf and the idea of - my self so as to posit the 
ý1) Ro-nouviers,, restatement of Lequier's dile=a in his Essais 
a critique e le _Sc. ncrale. 
Deuxieme Essai. Trait' do psycTolor, 
.. Poris, Colin, 
1912, iol. II, pp. 1, ý8-9- 
uicr, Recherche d1une premiere v6rite' *(11"raf, ; ments T)O, ', thulons), scdlit UE6_)_u__a: _, 186.5, p. 87 sqq, quot by Y. Pillon, " -V(, ) -L -on de 11 Id(,, alism6 au XVIIIc siZýcle: III. - Los 
3 Bp, ý: ie sur le spinozisme, Lljl=Je 
o p, I: L (JU 01 1899, P. 110. Of. also J. Grenier, 
j, A. 1`1 i1o sopAie do Jules Loquier, Paris, Editions "Les Belles 
f_j(ý-'_FG-r_ýý_! _ýT6_jpp. 62-3, ý 
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concrete livinC self. "Sans doute clest moi, clest ce que 
propremont j'appelle moi-meme: moi vivant, moi qui dois agir, 
qui de mon chef interviens entre moi et Ilidee de moi pour 
consommer mon existence en la voulant, en l1affirmant... 
Enfin je respire, je l1ai trouvee cette premiere ve'rite (l). 11 
This "first truth", or affirmation of the self as 
existing and free, is the type of all judgments of existence, 
synthetic in character, and all having their ground not in the 
clarity of evidence but in the freedom of willed belief. In 
this way Lequier establishes the ground of science in freedom 
and moral choice. 
lAs 
such, he is'the founder of the philo- 
sophy of liberty which develops in the French neo-Criticists 
of whom Charles Renouvier is the most important. 
Renouvier starts by affirming the contingeqt nature of 
judr,, ment, it being impossible to explain error on the basis 
of a necessary truth. Certainty is an act of freedom and 
willed choice. "La certitude West done pas et ne peut pas 
etro un e. absolu. Elle est, ce quIon a trop souvent oubli" 
Un 6tat ot un acte de 11homme... La certitude est done une 
c. royance, comme je lo disais d'abord (2). " An act of vrill 
therefore at the source of all jud6mentsq and philosophy 
'is dependent upon the choice of its initial principle or 
Principles. This enables Renouvier to deal with the 
, q-ntinomies of Kant. Reason and its concomitant law of non- 
coatr, adiction, he believes, can be rejected only at the cost 
dc-P'J. '/'cboloý, ic rationnelle2 lol. I, pp. 366; 367. 
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of depriving. science of its rationality; he therefore posits 
as the f irst truth the principle of non-contradiction trans- 
formed into the famous I'law of, number" and applies it to the 
treatment of the antinomied. He is obliged thereby to accept 
the theses and reject their contraries as being self-contra- 
dictory. That is to, posit the finite and relative and reject 
the infinite and absolute. The latter, moreover, are to be 
rejected not only as self-contradictory but as incompatible 
with th at freedom which is the sole ground of certainty. 
Renouvier's philosophy exhibits itself q therefore, as a 
philosophy of conting6nee, a pluralism and. ultimately a 
"Personalism! '. He posits God as a postulate of practical 
reason, but a finite and personal God, as required by the law 
of number and as being alone compatible with human freedom (1). 
4 
Octave Hamelin in his Essai sur les elements principaux 
do la re-orOSentation (1907) employs the same -neo-Critical 
method. He defines consciousness as "representatioV19 in 
s, hort as the system of relations (his "synthetic method", 
derived primarily from Hegel, aims at explaining these 
relations in terms of a dialectic of thesis, antithesis and 
synthesis and thus constructing the whole system of mind and 
its categories (2). ) But, in common with ITant and Renouvier, 
he does not consider consciousness as merely the locus of I 
relations: it is also the a(ýent whigh imposes the' latter upon 
Ibid., Vol. II, V. 260 sqq, (2) ýssai sur les elements yinciraux do A reqýAeMation, llari-s, p. 2. 
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tiip, data, of e3Terience and reduces them to the unity of 
ap-)erception. The foundation of consciousness or thought 
is thus will, vfaich supposes freedom. In a word, thought 
is identified with being and both with liberty and creative 
po,,,; er. "Il faut concevoir la pensdle comme une activite' 
croatrice qui produit a la fois 11objet, le sujet et leur 
syntlýbse: plus exactement ... la pensee est ce processus 
bilateral lui-meme., le developpement 'd1une re'alite' qui est 
% a la fois sujet et objet ou conscience (1). " 
This philosophy of liberty, neo-Criticist in inspiration, 
develops in contempbrary French thouC. -, ht as a philosophy of 
radical continEence, which found its first most powerful 
expression in Emile Boutroux's De la Contingende des lois de 
la nature (1913). Boutroux subjects the laws of nature to a 
searching scrutiny and discovers therein an irreducible 
element of continGency. ' Having established the purely formal 
nature of the principles of logic, he attacks the laws of 
nature themse; Lves and demonstrates the failure of the 
Principle of causality to apply exactly to the manifold of 
.0 experience; "elle nlappara*3**Ju- plus que'comme une verite' 
incomple 'he et relative, lorsque llon essaye de se representer 
1'entrelace-, ient universel, la peneýtration reciproque du 
Chan,; ement et de la permanence, qui constituela vie et 
1'existence reelle (1). " The principle of causality, the 
laW of conservation of energy, each and overyone of the laws 
(1) Ibid., D. 343. 
2) la C , ontin!; cnce, 8th ed., Paris, Alcan, 19159 pp. 27-8. 
i 
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of nature 11 en posant la de5termination et la permanence avant 
le changement et la vie... trahit 11intervention originale de 
llentendement (2: ). " In short, the contingence involved 
thorein is to be attributed to their ideal character and 
demonstrates the role of mind and freedom in their creation 
as against the claims of scientific determinism. 
It is still easier for him to prove his thesis-when 
applied to the biological 'and psychological sciences; but 
here he can go further and exhibit the spiritual and teleo- 
loGical nature of the 'lif e-process and from that J nf er the 
existence of a spirlýual and providential deity, sole ground 
of the contingence, manifest in nature and personality and 
de defined as 'Ila propriete, inherentd a llacte, volontaire, 
nlAetre dýtermine entierement, ni par des circonspances 
e, xterieures, 3ýi par la nature interne ou les actes anterieurs 
de laGen-b lui-mome (2)off 
The same contingence of scientific principles is demon- 
strated by Henri Poincare in his La Science et 11hylpothýes_ 
(1902), La Valeur de la science'(1905) and Science et Methode 
(1903). There he shows the scientific and mathematical 
principles to be "hypotheses" or conventions arrived at by 
inductive methoas-(3). The basis of these conventions is 
"commodity" in the sense - for he rejects the "nominalisnP of 
I bid. P. 27. 
. 
(2ý Zieller ot sm thoorie de 11histoire de la 2hilosophieg 
-oitilosoi ique, 18777 p. 11. 
In tiiisn he combats the logisticians. Cf. Science et 
. 3k. 117 Chps. III, IV and VI, where he--Crltici-ses the 
I 
loGic of Cantor, Couturat, Russell and Hilbert. 
a- 
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Lo jzoy - that, while derived from experinental laws, and not 
arbitrarY (1) , they are the creations of mind and decreed by 
it. They thus exhibit a contingence which must be attributed 
to the fact of human freedom. 
In the irviediately contemporary period the doctrines of 
Emile L-leyerson and Leon BrunschvicS carry the neo-Critical 
thesis to its conclusion. Meyerson sees in reason-a process 
aims at reducing the diverse of experience to rational 
I 01ý . 01 identity. The external world 'lest pour nous une, ver ee 
ol le. fait, une-. verite fortuite; nous vouclrlons llexpliquer, le 
concevoir comme une kerite de, raison, ve'rite' necessaire (2) oil 
He combats no doubt what he calls the positivism of Poincare 
and Mach. Science, he declares, is "rigoureusement realisteg 
. -I 
` 
creatrice d1ontologie" , in that respect similar to co=on- 
sense; its-notions are explicative of the real, being so to 
speak intermediary between mind and reality (3). None the 
less, in its attempts to reduce the multiplicity of the real 
c 
"Los principes sent des conventions et des definitions 
e-uiso I Coe Ils sent cependant tires de lois experimentales,... 
3ýlosophes out trop g" - alis " ils ont cru que les ,, uelques ph ener e: . 10 
principes otaient toute la science et par consecjýient que toute 
la science etait conventionnelle. 11 La Science ot 11hypo- 
tiiogo Papis, ', ý'Iarrniiarionj 19027 p. 16 -) on the contrary, =! ios-c-'experimeutal laws themselves are not conventions: they 
are ajpj)ro:?. ima: Uions to fact thereafter "erected into -principled' 
"on arloptant- des conventions telles que la proposition soit 
corta-itýaiiiont vraic". (Valcur de la Science, p. 239. ) 
(2) Idoaýj. tC' et r6'alito , 2n-d ed. , Paris, -. -&=ýLn, 1912, p. 270. Theory of Relativity, he writes: 
lic rclativIsmo, dirono-nous, cot un mathdmiatisme, et cc 3. 
Ost niotývn-, atiquo, appartonant a la fois a notre raison ot a la 
ni tout ' fait lo T1(-,, m; S-. n a Autre a i tout " fait 11 1 OU )-Luý'ot o,, t les doux h la fois, dFant la veritable substance 
n-l-, 110 r'. I( - -- - 
(La Deduction relativiste, Paris, VýYot, !, 
-, )I zz 6-. 
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to identity, mind comes up aGainst an irreducible element of 
irrationality: "Les conditions d1un. phenomene sont d1une 
multiplicite' strictement infinie, et des conditions complýte- 
ment identiques, ne peuvent jamais se retrouver dans la 
nature (1). " "Cette partie se r'efugie dtune part dans le 
r 1- ,ý 
divers sous, ses deux f ormes principales, a savoir la divers 
dans la temps, tel qiie la precise la principe ýe Garnot, et 
le divers dans l'espace, qui so manifeste par la discontinuite' 
atoraique, et celle des quanta, et dlautre part dans llinter- 
pr6tation quit seule, transf orme ce quIon deduit par les 
mathematiques en resultat physique (2). " Meyersonts 
philo. -ý, ophy 14 many respects continues, and, complete's Kant's 
Critique of Piire Reason, its ultimate stress being laid upon 
the limits of reason on the one hand and on the; other its 
essential role in the comprehension ana unification of 
experience. In spite then of its Realistic pretensions, it 
e 
has acted as a powerful statement of Idealism. I 
Leon Brunschvicg was undoubtedly the most important 
representative of contemporary French Idealism, his influence 
at the Sorbom-ie on the young philosophers of Maýcells genera- 
tion being undoubted. The latter's early reflection is 
coloured 'by tais influence, although his final position will 
be completely hostile to its standpoint. Brunschviog, like 
1.1ejerson, would reconcile, reason and exTerience. Each 
Du C'qc-i-Ancmcnt do la pensee, Parisi Alcan, 1931, Vol. I, 
ýduc, lon relativiste, p. 203. 
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without the other is but an empty f rame (1). The task of 
reason is to explain and interpret experience. But this it 
does not by virtue of any A priori principles or intuitive 
truths. It forges its principles proGressively, in contact 
-with experience and the problemsthe latter sets and, in 
applyinG them, reduces fact to unity: mind is "une fonction 
d1unification! ' and verification (2)- These principles are 
in essence"convenient" hypotheses. Hence a dynamic view 
of mind:, I'Llintelligence est une faculte"dlinvention 
perpetuelle, par laquelle tout le contenu de nos idees se 
-S transforme a chaque Instant (3). " And a w4olly idealistic 
conclusion: "Ainsi la re'alite de'llunivers nlest pas une 
rd'alite'absolument independante de l'esprit-. une telle 
realite est une cairýere: llesprit ne peut sortir, de soi. pour 
attdndre et determiner ce qui lui serait absolument etranger. 
t 
Il ne donne que ce qulil possede: clest en lui-meme, et par 
le soul developpement de son activite interne, que llesprit 
pout conferer llexistence veritablet co=e liee a son 
existence propre (4). 11 It is even tinged with religious and 
at loast spiritualistic feeling: "Nous sommes le'centre 
universel, le centre de la pensee qui donne a toute chose la 
ý1ý Cf. Hature ot Liberte, Paris, Flammarion, 1921. 
2 Je iaV% coml)are ijaianda's distinction between 'Ila raison 
con. stituce", the ensemble of rational principles evolved and in 1. -, crms of vfaich jud6ments are made, and 'Ila raison consti- tuat'itell vi-'aicii is tille activity of mind expressing itself in 
tao. -'o -)ri-riciple3 but transcending them. (Cf. Lalande's 
Gourý; c,, 3 at tlie ; 3orbonne, 1909-10, published in part in the 
ý140vtLcý, 
- 
des Cours ot Conferences, 1925. ) 
T). la vic Cie Desprit, Paris, Alcan, 1932, -p. 30., (4) lb--Ld. 9 p. 59. 
11. F 
. . 11 1% . 01 
verite et la beaute, qui marque a toute activite sa loi et 
son but: nous sommes 1'esprit (1). " Ile thus comes to view 
history in the liL4ht of a "progrgss of con'sciousnesdl ,a 
Gradual realisation in science, art and religion, of spirit, 
wherein mind attains ever greater awareness of its essential 
spirituality as pure-activity and freedom. I'Le sujet est 
celui qui juge, et juýer est un acte. Le sujet est activite" 
These various philosophies have this in common that they 
are philosophies of contingence and liberty developed largely 
from Kantism: in a certain sense they take over Kant's analysis 
of Pure Reaso4 and interpret or explain the limitations of 
Pure Reason in the light of the conclusions of Kant's 
Practical Reason. 
The second form which the traditional Idealist current 
has taken (although not always distinguishable from the 
precedin3 one) has its source in the Spiritualism of Maine de, 
Biran. It is characterised. by the fact that, while a 
philosophy of liberty, it is also and above all a philosophy 
of; Being: and no less by the employment of a metýod of 
"reflexive analysid' allowing, on the basis of an analysis of 
consciousness, the passaSe from psychology to metaphysics. 
Maine de Biran's first ph ilosophy develops from, and in 
zeaction to, the IdeoloCie of the early 19th century. As 
afC, jain, st- "3onsationalism he distinguishes, within the content 
Ibid. 1ý5- 
(2) La du juý-. -ement, Paris, jUcan, 1897, p. 236. 
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of. cons ciousness the purely affective, passive and organi- 
cally produced elements and the causal activity of the 
subject; between, in short, sensation and perception, the 
latter involving the active process of mind directed towards 
the ordering and interpretation of sensations and bringing 
with it the consciousness of self as spiritual causality or 
vvill. He thus substitutes for the Ca3tasian je-pense a je 
veux, "Si Descarýes a cru poser le premier principe de toute 
science, -la, premiere verite evidente par elle-meme, en disant: 
Je nonse, donc je suis chose ou substance pensante, - nous 
dirons mieux, et d1une maniere plus deterraine"e, avec ltevidence 
., e irrecusable de sens intime: Vagis, je veux, ou je pense en 
moi llaction, done je me sais cause, done je suis ou j1existb 
reelleTaent a titre de cause ou de force (1). " Between those 
10wo orders of reality and-experience - the realm of obscure 
pprceptions, of the affective, organic life ana the life of 
conscioýusness - there is an unsurmountable duality. To each, 
moreover, corresponds its own distinct sense, the llseiýz 
cencsthP-.,. ")ique; ' on the one hand and the "sens musculaire" on 
the otner. In his final philosophy, however, )ýo is led to 
distinL. -, uish yet another plane of realityg a hiGher order of 
reliLious e, -c-poriened involvinG the roliCious sense or sense 
of the Divine activity immanent vrLthin us. The Divine 
existence indecd is the object of an immediate apperception. 
"Zous no sommospas causer. ou sujet_, s reels de ce quo nous 
(1) 
-aville, Paris, 1859, Vol. IIIs 
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concovons ainti (la beaute' ideale dont les traits echappent 
a notre intelligence): clest 'co=e la presence d1une divinite' 
.. uperieure qui nous remue (1). " This religious e: ýTerience 
does not differ from the mystic state in Biran's vieiv: he 
speaks of 'Ila vue ou la possession de Dieu au dedans de nous- 
Momell and of 'Ices sentiments ineffables par lesquels notre 
wic so trouve'en contact instantane' avec la source de toute 
oe verite, de toute lumiere, par lesquels nous sentons Dieu avec 
11infini. Clest par ces mouvements inte'rieurs que Dieu'parle 
a notre ame-et se revele ou se manifeste (2). " 
The m-ialysis oi- consciousness thus yields to religious 
experience and reveals beyond the causal activity of the self 
a divine activity. God is the supreme cause or will under- 
lying all causal action. Psychology Gives way, to meta- 
physics, although between them no mediating logic can throw 0 
a bridGe. This divinity, moreover, is, like the self, a, 
person. Indeed the religious sense puts us in communion 
with a reLýion beyond the psychological consciousness, a realm 
of spiritual substances or persons sustained by the Divine 
P4rsonality, all interactinG the one upon the otlier as they 
do upon the self, within the depths of immanent experience. 
'2ho final vision of Biran is a Fluralism and Personalism. 
(Je shali not fail to be struck by the af-Cinities of this 
(1) gomr. entaire sur les h1editations hietaphysiques do Descartes, 
cd. ', 'isseranU, ilaris, Al wa, Vol. X1 (193-0), p. 10 . ed. Va-lette-Lionbrun, Paris, PIon, Vol. II 
2oprill 1820. ) 
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reliGious Personalism with Gabriel Marcel's philosophy of 
co=union). 
In Maine de Biran we find expressed a current of thought 
which seeks to transcend the individual mind and reveal an 
Absolute Thought as the very stuff and substance of3: eality. 
In the three philosophers, Ravaisson, Lachelier and Lagneau - 
all of great importance by reason of their influence during 
the early years of the century --this-tendency takes a still 
t 
clearer f orm. 
Jules Lachelier rejects Biran's division of experience. 
The ethode de r4fleAior2' he proposes aims at following out, 
"the dialectical progress-of, thought, i4 its passage from 
psychology to metaphysics. Its upshot is to reveal Will as 
the foundation of our being and consciousness. "Nous so=es 
donc volonte avant dletre sensation; ets si la volonte nlest 
pas, comme la sensation, une donnee directe et distincte. do la 
conscience, nlest-ce paý parce quIelle est la condition 
premiere de toute donnee et, en quelque facon, la conscience 
elle-m'eme'. 7 (1)" This proofq it, vill be seen, involves the 
classic distinction, common to all followers of ILIdine de Biran, 
between sensation, th e objective and phenomenal content of 
consciousness, and the active constituent which is the subject 
of those states. "Le dernier point dlappui de toute verite 
ot do toute existence, clost la spontancite absolue do 
llesprit (2). " He then proceeds to relate the spontaneity of 
et L`c*'taphysioue, Paris, Alcan, 1924, p. 138. 
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consciousness to the realm of final causes and to demonstrate 
the identity of Being and Thought as the sole and absolute 
reality in which all things participate in-their various 
grades of beinG. 
Jules Lagneau rejects similarly Biran's division of 
experience and affirms the possibility of a dialectic 
employing, the method of analyse reflexive whereby a transition 
can be made from psychology to metaphysics. Philosophy for 
hira is a "physioloGie de la ponsee".. It starts from the 
analysis of consciousness itself, and notably the psychological 
I conditions of judgmeht. The latter seems to him to involve a 
free affirmation of truth, not only, however, of its necessity 
but even more of its value. It is therefore indicative of a 
spirituality which is not only'will but moral efýort. 
Consciousness is the awareness of a self struggling to attain 
and affiria. the good within it: "Point de conscience sans 
activitC' volontaire et finalite, sans effort, sans lutte (1). " 
All thouGht, whether it be the search after knowledge or ýhe 
obedience to the moral law, is purposive, directed towards the 
realisation of Good and the ideal; it has for tliat. reason to 
be def ined not only as rationality but as love. 
C', onsciousness thus bears witness to the essence of the 
individual self as will and love. But at this Doint 
consciousness yields to reflexion. The former is limited to 
the ýDarticular and the individual; and can only posit the 
de Jules LaFneau rounis par les soins de ses disciple-, pari-, Union puur la 'Terite, 1924, p. 298. 
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being of self. But the dialectic may be pursued on the 
plane of reflexive analysis which reveals, as'. implicated in 
the self's thinking, a realm of Value and Good which transcends 
his finite status and can only find its ground in Universal 
Being and Thought. I'Le fond des choses et leur explication 
nlest pas, dans les phenomenes ou objets (necessaires),, ni dans 
les esprits ou sujets (limites), mais dans liesprit, ou sujet, 
absolu et un. La psychol*ogie dans sa source et son fond est 
la metaphysique, m'eme This Being is God, the Absolute, 
infinite vrill and lovd, the. ground, cause and end of all 
vrillinG, the stuff aýd reality of the self and all things. 
11 Felix Ravaisson, although chronologically prior to 
Lachelier and Lagneau, has also exercised a considerable 
influence on young French thirL,, ers even of the, pFesent day. 
He too finds behind the. activity of consciousness a Divine 
a 
creativity or love which is the foundation of all being and 
I 
manifests itself throughout the universe as an urge to order 
and harmony (2). 
1,11one of this latter group of philosophers can be claimed 
as contemp ., orary, yet 
their influence has been poýent. Not 
only did thej pave the wcýy for Bergson, but they profoundly 
(1 Id I p. 299. (2ý 
Iie" 
Giit- also mention in this connection Thomas Jouffroy 
who belon, -s to this current. Although he be-ins in true 
Cartesian manner by establishinG the self as cause, he refuses to identify it vdth the pure, reflective consciousness. In 
t -1,, X ' at he is a precursor of M,, Uistentialism, as well as by the iinpo. -tance lie attributes, like Vi, ý-, ny, to the problem of 
1. ) . L: 
erzoral dcstiny mid by the Pascalian urCency of his 
SPOCulations. 
17. 
affected religious thinking. The case of Maurice Blondel is 
one in point. E'larcel's first Idealism ovies much to them and 
his later thouCht too, although hostile to Idealism as a 
whole, preserves certain of their themes. It is indeed 
o. bvious that in their doctrine lies the germ of a "subjective 
realism! ' such as Marcel is to seek to realise (1) ]! is 
criticisms vrill bear upon their absolutist and monistic 
conclusions, their transcendentalism and equation of being 
with reason. 
The importance of this current in French thought derives 
from the fact that it'represents more fully than any other 
the French philosophical tradition vihicýi stems from the 
Cla-s, sicism of the 17th century. If all the 19th century 
thinkers discussed under this head pass naturally from 
philosophy to religiong it is because, even without realising 
it, they are foýlowing a mode of speculation established in 
France under the aegis of the Augustinian revival in the 17th 
century. This tradition is represented not only by Pascal, 
01 the Jansenists, qiaietists such as Fonelon, even the more 
orthodox Bossuet w1lio stands mid-way between Neo-Thomist and 
Aur-, ustinian theolocý, -j, but by Descartes and the Cartesians 
thei, iselves. The startinf, ý--point of Descartes' thought, 
(1) lZavaisson indeed describes the current as "un realisme ou 
POSitivisme spiritualiste, ayant pour principe 5d ggen: 5rateur la 
coy,,. sc: Leiico quo Ifesprit prend en lui-mcme dlune existence dont il recorijisat que toute autre existence derive et d6pend, et 
qui. autro que son action!. La Philosonhie en France 
wi Paris, Hachette, 1A, 1)., 275. ) 
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Augustinian in inspiration, is tha intuition of the self's 
spiritual existence and of the existence of a perfect God who 
is the source and sustainer both of his Imowledge and of his 
existence. The passage from philosophy to religion that 
forms the content of his doctrine is an explicitation of this 
single, althouCh complex, intuition given in the Cogito. 
The l7th century in general admits the same 'starting-point, 
and its thought is aimed at revealing beneath human causalityq 
exhibited as secondary, the Divine causality. Represented in - 
an extreme form by Malebranche's Occasionalism, the same 
viewpoint vivifies the speculations of the Classical age as 
a whole; in such a way that one might say that f or it the 
metaphysical and the theological 'are in intimate union., 
It is this same traditional standpoint which revives in 
I 
the 19th century current of thought just discussed. The 
latter simply marks a return to the French'tradition after 
the l8th century hiatus (a reading of Chateaubriand and Mme. 
do Sta6l and other pre-Romantics bears this out). The 
"philosophy of consciousnesdI, in so far as it develops- 
independently of theolof, -y, marks ýIin actual. fact ah arbitrary 
disjunction of the epistemolOGical or anthropological 
elements in the Cartesian tradition on the one hand, and the 
0 theolouical elements on the other. The thought of Blondel 
and Liarcel in tho 20th century, however much their terminology 
may differ, colitinues the relirgious anthropoloa of the 
ez: 3oriti, al classic French tradition. 
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This second current of Idealism is primarily a philosophy 
of Being and is to be distinguished from the "philosophy of 
consciousness" already sketched: the one is metaphysical and 
attempts to relate the being of consciousness to Universal 
Being,, the other primarily critical, content to indicate the 
nature of the being of consciousness and in many cases hostile 
to the search after essences. Although sharing a common 
philosophy of liberty, the one is an Ontology, the other more 
an Anthropology. 
In the contemporary period, this latter philosophy of 
consciousness is repzesented outside the field'of academic, 
philosopiV by several important I'ma. 'a"tres" of the last two 
generations. The first is Alain (the pseudonym of Edouard 
Chartier), a ýhilosopher by profession but more widely known 
I 
as a philosophical essayist. 
Alain is to a large extent the disciple of Lagneau. He 
accepts the Kantian thesis that knowledge is the product of a 
union between reason and its categories on the one hand and 
experience on the other: "Du moment ou jlavais compris quo 
touto connaissance est dlexperience, et enferme ainsi au 
contact dd 11objet tout llusage possible des formes, des' 
catcGorics, ot des iddes, tout eltait reGle'(1). " It is 
precisely the function of Understanding (Entenaament), as 
opposed to Reason, which sot's the f ormal conditions of 
to mark the double contribution of reason and 
(1) jUstoiro de mer, pensees, Paris, Gallimard, 19362 P. 131. 
0 
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experience and their union in knowledge and existence;.. "Ce 
quIon cherche, sous le nom dlexistenceg ce nlest nullement 
une presence de qualites, ni un. tissu gbometrique qui les 
Tout cela est de nous; et nous cherchons ce qui 
nlest point de nous. La necessite exterieure, objet et appui 
du travail, voila ce que nous appelons le monde (1). " But 
while. doing so, Understanding reveals the essential relativity 
of the idea. If t. he nature of the object is "inertia! ls that 
of the idea is its capacity for transformation. "Lloppositioný 
est le mouvement meme de la pensee et le seul moyen de donner 
du corps aux idees Any idea or'law which becomes "fixet, 
would destroy itself and become a "thing", necessity being the 
very definition of things. The essence of human consciousness 
is this duality. between subject and object, choipe and 
necessity; and not only would the fixation of the idea 
destroy týe idea as such but it, ývould deprive the world of 
things of its own autonomous type of, being. "Nous voudrions 
expliquer toutes choses d1apres une meme supposition. Or 
cola me"molpi on y arrivait, enleverait a ce que Je crois 'a 
11objet son caractere d1objet (3). " 
Knowledge has, in Alain's view, two moments. The f irst 
is the moment of doubts when mi4d refuses the evidence of the 
(1) Entretiens au bord de la mer, Paris, Gallimard, 1931, 
p, 0 75 --6 
(2 I. Ti stoire do mes pensees, P. 35. M 
P. 86. 
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senses; when it rejects the external necessity and appeals 
to its desire for rationality. Such is the very moment of 
consciousness itself, inseparable from a primitive exercise 
of freedom. "Car toute conscience est d1ordre moral, puisqulelle 
oppose toujgurs ce qui devrait 'ptre a ce qui est. ý.. Toute 
connaissance... commence et pe continue par des refus indignes, 
au nom meine de l'honneur de penser (1). 11 
The second moment is. the moment of'choice, where the t", 




This act of vvill is the sole foundation, of truth and the idea 
and it is the sole guarantee of the latter's adequacy to the 
real: I'Llesprit ne doit pas etre le moyen du vrai. Et 
puisque l'esprit est libre, ou mieux, se veut libre et se 
docrete libre, la regle de penser comme il faut est de penser 
comme on veut (2). " Moreover, mind must never be duped by its 
constructions which are relative and have their justification 
in their "commoditYl; so that doubt must be constantly renevied 
and constantly, followed by a new affirmation and choice: "Clest 
A le doute renouvele, le doute hyperbolique, qui fait etre la 
droite la lathematics themselves he describýs as an 
exercice do volonte" , while the sign of truth is Ila recherche 
energique". 
It follows then 'that the beinG of consciousness,, t1lat is 
the t.,, I-De of being which aDpertains to man, is liberty, and a 
Ibid., P. 77. 
Ibid. I _p. 
167. 
3 --fd6osj Paris, Hartmann, 1932, p. 121. 
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liberty which can only be exercised within an irreducible 
duality involving a conflict of subject viith object, of 
internal freedom with objective necessity, and whose constant 
I 
renewal and exercise is the condition of that being, so much 
so that were this exercise of liberty once relaxed man would 
. 01 become a thing. "Car la conscience suppose une separation de 
moi d1avec moi, en, meme temps qu'une reprise de ce que llon 
juge insuffisantg qulil faut pourtant sauver. Toutes les 
apparences de la perception sont ainsi niees et conservees; 
et clest par cette opposition, intime que lton se re'veille.. ' 
DIOU ilai tire`toutýcourant que, sans la Iýaute ide"'e dlune 
mission do 11homme et sans le devoir de se redresser d'apres 
un modele, 11homme xilaurait pas plus de conscience que le 
chion 
-ou 
la mouche (1). "' In the exercise wid consciousness 
of his freedom consists, for Alain man's ideal nature and it 
has its-motive-power in the "Go'nerositell defined by'his masteb 
Ddscartes. 
Tho thou[, ýht of Paul Valery - undoubtedly the raost 
important literary representative of this current - is on 
similar lines. Valery's initial aim, as manifýst in the 
Introduction "a la miýthode de Leonard do Vinci and in th 
.e 
olrec avec i-jonsieur Teste is, to define "pure' consciousness". 
; TIC . It characteriýes consciousness in general is a perpetual 
a constantly vanishinG content, an incessant 
co-ostruction arid destruction oý, ', ýrelations. "Le caracte*re do 
do rins pens_des, p. 77. 
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11homme est la conscience: et celui de la conscience, une 
perp(: ýtuelle exhaustion, un detachement sans repos et sans 
exception de tout ce qui parelt , quoi qui parairsse (1). " 
Our ideas, the individual personality itself are such ephemeral 
constructs or "appearances". What Valery aims at in the two 
works mentioned is to 11 exhaust" the mind of them, so as to 
attain a pure consciousness of the permanent and irreducible 
element in mind which is the pure, essential self. 'This pure 
consciousness will reveal to us, beyond all particular 
op erations and contingent creations of the mind, the "common 
I 
origin of all operations of the mind"s the'pure self. reduced, 
as Valery says in his preface to Monsieur Testef to its "real 
propert -ieol. It is, like the CarteELan cogitog-an intuition 
of the thinking self, "pure p. resencell of mind tp thought. In 
the formula of Monsieur Teste: "Je suis etant, ot me voyant; 
me voyant me voir, et ainsi de suite. " This state o. f pure 
consciousness reveals the essence of mind as an active 
"capacity", 'Ila supreme pauvrete de la puissance sans objet, " 
the povier, of"lsubstitutiox2l, of constructinG relationst ideas 
or personality, although it itself is the subjeýtive ground 
which transcends each particular form. I'll nly a pas d1dcte 
11 du Genie qui ne soit moindre que- 11acte dletre (2). 11 1ý! onsieur 
[ 
Te. -, te is the hypothetical incarnation of this pure conscious- 
ness. He seeks to preserve his mind as a pure "sanctuary of 
Possib-i-litic-ol, molcing and uwaaking ideas while refusing to be 
(1) Introduction h la nothode", Paris, Gallimard, 1919, p. 33. (2) Ibid. ý7p. - 
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, 
shut up in any, seeking-to maintain intact his essential 
formlessness by a systematic"refus dletre quoi que ce soit". 
The analysis of pure consciousness enables Valeory, to', 
define the nature and conditions of consciousness and 
conscious activity in general. He finds these to consist in 
the creation, by the active effort of mind, of order, form and 
being out of the virtualities and chaoticýpossibiýities of. the 
unconscious. Self-consciousness itself is a product of, such 
an oporation. The mind, before consciousness, is a blind 
activity plus'a mass of virtualities with which it is merged. 
It applies its poweý to choose certain of these virtualities 
ana. realise them in an ordered personality; and by so' doing, 
the self distinCuishes itself from its construction; At sees 
itself as something constructed in time and, simultaneouslyl 
as something which. does the constructing, as'an active subject. 
In short it becomes self-conscious. This duality is the very 
condition of self-consciousness. 
The self-conscious activities involve a creation of being 
from non-being, the imposition of form upon the virtualities 
of 'Ile hasard" or, as he calls it in L'Idee fix6,11,1'Implexell. 
"Resoudre une-nebuleuseg" or, as Eupalinos puts it-'Ien6halmer 
une analyze a une extasell. It is in every way the exepcise, 
of choice and freedom: it is act. "Lle voici, dit le - 
constructour, je suis ilacte (1). f' 
'2he imposition of order is only possible throuGh lanGuage 
R, 
ou i'Architecte, Paris, Gallimardt 1924, p. 217. 
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and symbols. Scientists and poets are both "symbolic minds" 
creating a stable order of being and fixing it in symbols. 
Yet those constructions must never become "idees fixes"; the 
mind must constantly"negate itself", for consciousness is an 
instrument of "substitutions" or "transferences". Our. ideas 
are thus the product of and guarante, ed only by Will, They 
are only possible by virtue of an exercise of Will-power which 
brings with it consciousness of our being and activity in 
freedom. In short, the more, by the ever free act of mind, 
acting as an "instrument of precision", being is created from 
chaos, the more vie Atain to the ideal pure consciousness of 
self as active subject or, to employ the term of Gentile, as 
i 
"Pure Act";, and the more we may say: 'I'Vinvente , donc je suis 
This adaptation of Descartes, cogito may. be considered 
as t4e inner principle of Vald"rýyls pliilosophy. 
The final significance of the latter is in its denial of t-I 
Transcendentalism (2). He rejects* tho search after first 
causes and essences villich by thoir naturo are not amenable to 
precise relations and-therefore definition. Metaphysics, he 
says in Analecta, is a mere "infidelite, impuisýance du 
lanCaLr, oll. His is wholly a philosophy 'of consciousness intent 
(1) Cahier B 1910, Paris, Gallimardg 1930t P. 118. 
S2) , Jnon VM-12; i--ysý oaks of transcendence he speaks, as does 
caii-Paul Sartvo, of the created, order of bein(.,, evolved by 
choice from the realm ofpossibilities. "Ce labeur incessant 
par quoi lletre est relie une fois do plus - en lui g1t, le 
secret do la -.. -,eule eýE'-Výrit able philosophie qui est de creer un 
ordre tran3condant - je veux dire qui comprend tout, et de faire 
un monde - dtabsorber d1avance l1accidentel. 11 (Ibid. 9 P. 57. ) 
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on definintý the being of consciousness; and this he finds to 
consist in a duality whereby the mind distinguishes itself as 
subject from its objective conient, and in so doing creates 
conditions for its freedom to choose and reject its "essence". 
The life of consciousness, proper to man, implies thprefore 
the rejection of the. state of pure beinG-where the self is one 
with itself , eternal and necessary - that state symbolised by 
N Midi la-haut, Midi sans mouvement 
En soi se pense et convient a soi-meme. 
(Le Cimetiere marin. ) 
That type of self-sufficient and undivided being is precisely 
proper to things (as. 
; Alain too recognised). 
It is impossible here not to recognise in this philosophy 
of. Consciousness a source of Jean-Paul Sartre's Existentialism. 
The process of self-conscious activity aescribea by Valery is 
precisely that which Sartre has termed "neantisatior2l, whereby 
the 11 on-soQ' , whose 
'self-absorption excludes 11 alte'ritell I is. 
I 
transformed-iri: to the "pour-soil', the self becoming an object 
for the subject mind. It is interesting to note that although 
Sartre attributes a higher metaphysical status to being Ilen 
soil', his philosophy involves a rehabilitation oýC being "pour 
soil' inasmuch as it i's the condition of human'freedom, ýhe 
latter beinG possible only by the fact that a 111n4ant" inter- 
vencs betwoon the self's ideals and its acts. The central 
fact in S)artrels metaphysicsq as in Vale"ry's philosophyg is 
manl, s consciousness and liberty and their exercise in the 
cro, xtioii of a transcendent but continGent order of human 
Ii: 
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Ilessences, ". Alain and Valery have preceded Sartre in 
defining the specifically human type of being and existence 
in terms of consciousness and liberty in opposition to the 
beinG of "thincol. 
iast relate to this current also the moral philosophy 
of Ramion Fernandez whose influence was considerable in the 
great days of the Nouvelle Revue Francaise when he was a 
younwer inember of the hlareel-Riviere-Du Bos C; roup. ' It has UI 
this additional interest that we see a link forming between 
the Idealistic philosophy of consciousness and freedom and the 
contemporary Existentialism of the Jean-Paul Sartre. group. 
Fernandez, as a thinker distinctifrom the literary critieg 
was, vAlolly a moralist. His main interest Nv*as the study of 
mor4 values and the condition of their creation. His 
attitude was first of all critical q being directed against the 
sem, i-Bergsonism associated vrith Gide, RiViere and Proust and 
, 7hich proclaimed a war on moral law or any attempt at imposing 
form on the sDontaneity and formlessness of the essential self 
(1). In tAis, type ol amoralism Fernandez saw a species of 
Traiiscendentalisr,, i attributable to Christianity, in that the 
latter leads to the cult of a"pure" self in some sort trans- 
cend-in, - tirac and conscious effort, to be allowed to emerge 
froeýy vdthout the interventibn of any moral evaluation. 
113-1 'inti; Lition berC-sonienne correspond au moment qui pre"c'o"de 
1- 1 "Iction; ellc lie peuts ctre detachea des moments qui la 
Of- J, "cquos RiviLcre et Rmaon Fernandez, Moralisme et 
Poris, Correa, 1932. 
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suivent ot comme repliee sur elle-meme. Nous devons lui 
obeir et en respecter le mystere, mais au moment de llintuition 
hwaains. (1)" The characters of nous no so=, es quIa. moitie 
Proust and Pirandello, so Bergsonian in'their "dissolutenesdll 
are mere "permissionnaires d'e la vie"; for what is 
characteristically human is the creation of values and their I" 
maintenance in time$ all of which is dependent on a willed 
unification of the passive forces of feeling. "Ce qui, est 
pour moi essentiellement spirituel clest l'unification interne 
de l1experience concrete de chacun, 11dete, la contraction 
psychique qui permeý 'a 11individu d1accorder son activite' 
vivante a son activite intellectuelle, de faire la syntbýese 
des deux et, par suite, de progresser, de crottre en tant 
qulhomue vivant (2). " The essence of human activity is vrilled 
effort, to refuse what is not considered va; id for personality. 
"La resistance personnelle, le refus d"etre ceci. ou cela, 
le point de contact entre 11im ee clest la aGinaire et le r"l; 
la pretliere pierre dur'e de la personnalite -1 (3) Personality 
is therefore dependent on judgment or at least one with 
Judgment, for 'Ila personnalite nlest pas autre chos, e, en 
deriii0re analyse, que le fait do pouvoir, unc certaine 
perspective mentale eýtant choisic, etablir d'une fapn- 
continuo la dialectique de ses propres attitudes (4). " And 
this means t. qa-t the condition of the moral lif e as knoun to 
4 
(1 De la Pcrsonnalitýq Paris, Au Sans Pareil, 1928, p. 125. 
(2ý i,, espares, le =L-e, Paris, Gallimard, 1926, p. 148, n. l. 
(3) T-F-I-a-Y-Wý--onnalitej P- 35. 
(4) Ibid. ) p. 114. 
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man is the duality of consciousnessq the capacity of mind to 
vrithdravi itself from pure immediacy and from its state of 
self-absorption and, distinguishing itself from its states, 
to evaluate itself and in terms of its chosen values impose 
form on its formlessness, I'La pensee personnelle implique 
donc un dualisme psychologique, et la facon dont chacun 
compýend et respecte ce dualisme le situe dans ce quIon peut 
appeler une hiCrarchie de la personnalite (1). " Not of 
course that values should become fixed; they are, as for 
Alain and Valery, 'subject to revision and their ground is in 
human choice alone. 
/ 
In this sort of "moral expressionism! ' we find again the 
insistence upon the being of consciousness as alone 
characteristic of what is specifically human and as alone 
I 
bearing with it 9 by its duality, the conditions of liberty. 
In Fernandez's view, t. he life of the "pure" self exalted by 
the Bergsonians would be a life quite-beyond consciousness 
if their thesis were'earried to its conclusion; as indeed 
it is in Surrealism. 
'. 7ithout exaCýgerating the similarity, we mitht, again 
stress the points of contact between such an Idealism and 
the later Existentialism of Sartre -a similar definition of 
the beinG of consciousness and a siiailar. insistence on pure 
liberty as the basis and E.; uarantee of hLunan values, sole 
source of any noral ponstruction. It Luay indeed be noted 
(1) Ibid., P., 117. 
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that both Fernandez and Sartreq rejecting a -Driori values or 
Corms of value, end up in a sort of Nietzschean cult of action 
for action's sake, of gratuitous choice vLich, strangely 
enough, brings them,. if we substitute "instinct" for "will? [, 
to a standpoint thatl ethically speaking, is not much, 
different from that, of Gide and the Bergsonians (1). 
- 
The second current in modern French thought is the 
"philosophy of lifd? I whose chief representative is, of course, 
I 
Bergson. Thp preceding Idealistic current, in so far: as it 
is voloryLarist, does not separate will and rationality. 
Vitalism, on the contrary, interprets the force which- 
constitutes man's beinG in terms of instinct and feeling, as 
oppos-ed to the reason and the intellect vfnich arrests life 
and encloses it in concepts. 
(1),, In tilis voluntaristic ethics an important influence was 
Yrýderic 11auh, who combated all attempts to subject moral 
action to a priori or even a posteriori principle's. I'La regle 
morale ess7n'5aI-e=e, clest do-7-cTi-erener sa formule de vie.,, 
(L'ExnCrionce morale, Paris, Alcan, 1903, p. -l& .) The basis of moýýal: iýcy has to be souGht in an autonomous "moral experiences' 
consistinC of a prise de conscience of feelinGs with a view to 
discoverin,, ý rational mo vos for action. LloralitY7 says 
Brunschvieg, "ne consiste ni. dans la repr'sentation d1une  
res acterna, ni merie dons la d4finition d1une loi:. le veritable 
juý on e ,, c de 
'ZI n2me est s "tat dI &ae". (. -G'Exrýrience morale - salon Rau , iýev. Phil., Jan. - June, 19? -U, P. 7. ) dere a7ain wo moy coi-Toare the ethical views of such Exýistentialists as 
jartre an(f Comus Aho aim likewise at extractin; ý, motives for 
action from the consideration of states of mind themselves 
witAout reference to r,,, iven values. (For the clear connection betvieen "), artre cald Rauh cf. LIEýcne*riqnce morale, p. 67. ) 
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12ne founders of the life-philosophy in France are Guyau, 
Fouillee, and Ribot. They have their roots in the 
1ýositivism of 'Taine, althouSh by enlar(,; ing it and allying it 
with evolutionary and bioloGical theory they arrive at 
conclusions often opposed to its scientific determinism. 
Guyau (1854-1888), at a time vehen mechanism and determinism 
were the watchwordsq conceived in his "LlIrre'ligion de 
11 avenir" wid his "Morale sans obliGatiorV , an 11 ethics of 
lif ell waich would replace the traditional moral systems 
based on duty or law. The'source of morality is life in all 
its spontaneity. Life itself is evolution and constant 
denassement. Guyau follows it in its creation of new species 
and nea forms up to man and, in man, throu(; h the birth of ever 
hiýýher zapacities for feeling. At each stage of life, 
0 
indeed, are born qualitatively new emotions and, at the human 
level, eaotions bringing consciousness of this life within, 
with all such consciousness entails in pleasures and 
exaltations. Therein we have the basis for a new morality; 
in place of reli.:; ious precepts or moral laws man ifay find a 
notive for, his actions in the love of risk, in the perpptual 
renewal of feelinS; before him rises a possibility of 
infirdto- -'u-ranscendence towards unknom regions of exTerience. 
Alfred Vouillec (1638-1912) looks to psychology rather 
tiv: ui It is truc, that he combated Bergsonism and 
Pra, iiir. itism ana the irrationalist current in general.. Yet 
,; lis doctrinc of "idecs-forces" belonGs at bottom to the sa-me 
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vitalist mode of thouGht. He terms his philosophy an 
11 idealisme volontaristell t but what seems to constitute the 
II idea! ' for him, is not what belongs to it specifically qua 
Idea$ that is the properties of truth or falsehood, of 
clarity or confusion,, but' its emotive power; it i's by 
definition a state of consciousnessq or feeling in the. 
F,. eneral sense (1). 
His theory reposes on the thesis that all ideas are 
powers endowed with a dynamic force. Seen in this light, 
ideas form the groundwork of morality. , He shows, for example, 
in his "Liberte et d! eterminismell (1872) how the idea-of 
liberty-, indej)endently of whether man is f3zee or not, can be 
a positive force and become the equivalent of such liberty: 
by dint of believing he is free man acts freely pLnd is 
en(ýpwed with the power of resistance against external 
necessity. It is in the force inherent in ideas or feelings 
by virtue of the "identite fonciere entre la conscience et 
lletre" that lies the efficacy, of moral ideals. to Une ', 14 
conscience qui n1exercerait elle-m6me aucune action serait 
une inconscience et, au lieu de dire: sum slabimerait dans 
la norexistence. CI est ce qui fait que la causalite est ý 
11 
immanente au sum et au cogito, qui revient ainsi a u'n volo (2). 11 , 
In particular, the Kantian categorical imperative can be made- 
pro 'Ile su 'me persuasifl. 
ý1) Cf. D. Parodil Ija'Philosophie contemporaine en France, 
ilaris, jUcan, 1920, pp. 47--, -G. - 
(2) Esquisse dlune interpre'ltation du monde, Paris, Alcan, 
1913, PD. 3022-3. 
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Fou ee reconciles in some sort Idealism and Vitalism. 
Theodule Ribot is in essence a scientific Positivist and 
Naturalist. His importance lies in the recognition of an 
autonomous life of the feelings distinct from and prior to 
the life of reason. The sensibility - tendencies, emotions 
and passions - possesses a life of its own and. a quality sui 
L)eneris independent of any intellectual, symbolic elements. 
In his Problemes de psychologie affective (1910) he studies 
the forms of the affective life and shows that even pleasure 
itself, far from being, as the intellectualist psychology 
would have it, sensAtion, is in reality "un eve"nement 
psychologique sui generis, simpleg indefinissable, irreductible 
a tout autre (1). " He pays particular attention to the 
problems of memory, normal and pathological, aný is led to 
distinguish an auton6mous"memoire affective" characterised 
by the reviviscence of theemotion experienced anew, as such, 
in its integrity, thus opposed to the intellectual memory 
vidich is the repetition of the circumstances accompanying the 
original emotion: "une memoire affective pure, clest-a-dire 
distincte et independante des circonstances con6omi; tantes de 
llemotion, reproduisant 1'emotion elle-meme (2). " He goes 
on to show that there exists a veritable logic of feelings or 
I'logique affectivel, again independent of and prior to 
rational lo. ic, one governed by the principle of finality and 
(1) !, roolemes do r, )sycholoEie affective, Paris, Alcan, 1910, 
(2) La Lo, -4ique des sentiments, Paris, Alcan, 1905, p. 130. 
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expressive of the dynamism of life itself: "Le raisonnement 
rationnel tend vers une conclusion, le raisonnement emotionnel 
vers un but (1). " 
Needless to'say, in the development of the philosophy of 
ýife in France, the influence of Pragmatism and of Nietzsche 
(whose master was Guyau) were all-important. However, these, 
together with what was most significant in'the preceding 
doctrines, were qui9kly amalgamated in the, now classic 
philosophy of Bergson. Bergson's philosophy is too well 
known to require restaýement; moreover, 'the points where it 
ihterests a study ofzGabriel Marcel, in particular the 
doctrine of Time, will be taken up in'their proper plaýe. 
What is important here is to underline its prevailing tone 
and significance. Bergson proposes to substituVe for the 
method of objqctive analytical introspection a synthetic, 
method of intuition capable of grasping- the "immediate data 
of consciousnessil, that is the inn r essential self in its 
concrete flux and fusion which eludes the grasp of the former 
method limited to the inspection of its arbitrarily dissociated 
and atLised states. 
Intuition so defined reveals in the depths of conscious- 
ness, as co, -, stituting the very beinG itself, a duration. 
The latter is not decomposable into isolated states, but is 
a fusion of states, having-all the unity and continuity of a 
Melody. It is pure quality, refractory to analysis and 
(1) Did. I pl). 49-50. 
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quantitative measurement; any attempt on the part of 
intelliGence to introduce measurement and relation replaces 
the inner flux of life by an abstract representation of life 
and so falsifies it. Duration is synonymous with libertyq 
novelty, progress. Above all it is time, not the abstract 
time of conceptual thought, but the reccil time of experienceg 
I le temps vecu. Whereas the former, being essentially a 
spatialisation of time, is subject to measurement and spatial 
relation, therefore decomposable into discrete and homogeneous 
instants$ real time or duration is flux, interpenetration of 
moments, pure suceession and therefore absolute novelty and 
heteroE, -c-rieity. "Au-dessous de la duree homoGene, symbole 
extensif de la durde vraie, une psychologie attentive d4mele 
donc une dure/o dont les moments heteroGenes se pe'netrent; 
au-dessous de la multiplicite" nume , riýue des e/tats conscientst 
e une iaultiplicite qualitative; au-dessous du moi aux etats 
bien de"finis, un moi oU succession implique fusion et 
orGanisation (1). " 
. L, 'rom this identification of time and consciousness 
derives a conception of memory accordinG to whicý the whole 
of the past is seen as accumulated in the present. I'La duree 
est le progres continu du passe qui ronge l1avenir et qui 
(, -. oi-if le 'en avancant.. . En re'alite le passe" so conserve de. 
lui-mýe'cacj automaticluement. Tout entier, sans doute, il nous 
suit a bout- instant; cc que nous avons senti, pense, voulu 
our lor, domices iminediates do la conscience, 
1-1cmi-it 19ý09 p. 97. 
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depuis notre premiere enfance est la, penche sur le pre"Sent 
qui va sly joindre, pressant contre la. porte de la conscienca 
qui voudrait le laisser dehors (1). 11 In the "pure" 
perception of our self thus the whole of the past is 
effectively included, but, since life involves the subjection I 
to'what is useful, consciousness must needs select: IlLe 
z le . 11 me. canisme cerebral est precisement fait pour en refouler la. 
presque totalite dans llinconscient et pour nlintroduire dans 
la 'conscience que ce ce qui est de nature a eclairer la. 
situation presente, a aider llaction qui se prepare, a dormer 
. enfin un 
travail utile The pure present nonetheless 
is the wilole of the past with the addition of novelty;: it 
is essentially oriGinall a completely new moment, even, to the 
point of self-sufficiency: "Il est simple, et ýl ne peut pas 
/t avoir ee deja percu, puisqulil concentre dans son indivisi 
bilite tout le percu avec, enplus, ce que le present y ajoute. S 
Clest un moment original d'une nmmoins originale histoire 
Ber; -,; son finds in this doctrine a means, in his view, of 
reconciling modern determinism and free-vvill, An act may be 
termed free in so far as it is the projection of' the whole 
personality in the moment of action. It proceeds I'de ses 
ant6cedents par une e'v'olution sui generis, de telle- sorte 
J. If quIon retrouve dans, cette action les antecedents qui 
Ile. xpliquent, ot quIelle y djoute pourtant quelque chose 
(1) Ll.: jvolution creatrice, Paris, Alcan, 19289 P- (2 1 
(3ý 1-bid. ) 1). 7. 
10 
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d'absolument nouveaug etant on progres sur eux comme le fruit 
sur la fleur (1). 11 We shall' see later the significance of 
this doctrine of freedom. For the moment what is important 
is to underline the inner inspiration of Bergsonism. It is 
at bottom a pure Heraclitean philosophy, time being the very 
stuff of selves and things, and'litself pure devenir, flux, 
novelty and transformation. Moreover, it'has the character 
of a Vitalism, matter being defin'ed as I'deGraded energy'. 
The fundamental reality is Spirit, 6r the'Elan vital, ceaseless 
creation and evo 
of this reality, 
and repetitive. 
stuff of thinGs, 
retournee". 
lution; matter is but the "inverse movement' 
endrgy which "so defait", - becoming immobilised 
Duration, the stuff of'selves, is also the 
so that cosmology is but a "psychologie 
It is no doubt in its anti-intellectualism that Bergson's 
philosophy proved the most potent influence. - In the name of 
intuition, defined as feeling and instinct, it elaborates a 
I', 
critique of intelligence, presenting it as a secondary and 
derived facult-j vfnose function is to enable mind to handle F 
reality and subject it to the requirements of soýial utility, 
and which, to effect this, -substitutes for the flux of livinG 
experience concepts and relations, thus,, discontinuityl homo- 
r, reneity and imiobility. In his anti-intellectualism Bergson 
,.; ýoer iluch further than William James, who does not exclude 
Lritellectual relations from Pure exPOriOn 09 in that for him c 
(1) ot Memoire, Paris, Alcan, 19149 p. 205- 
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a relational clement, (temporal and spatial-in particular)--iz 
already present in that experience to be later disengaged and, 
elaborated by reflection proper. Boutroux, in a significant 
passar-og marks the opposition between the two thinkers on 
this point. "En outre, si la connaissance intellectuelle 
est, pour Bergson, derivee et non primitive, clest quIelle 
contient des elements qui, apparaissent comme e rangers aux 
donnees immediates et purement intuitives de la. conscience: 
cellos-ci, en effet, se reduisent a la duree en soi, degage"e, 
I\ 
non seulement de llespace, mais du temps lui-meme, Pour 
James, clest proprement le degre' de complexite et de richesse 
% 
de llexpe"rience qui en mesure le degre"dlauthentiqite.; 
Llexpe"rience absolument imme'diate et intuitive serait 
l1experience totale (1). " Here again we shall ? iave to come 
back to this fundamental factor, 
, of 
difference when discussing 
A1.1karcel Is temporal theories in the light of the paradoxes in. 
the Bercrsonian doctrine. Suffice to say at present that 
BerCson envisaGes a p2! Ee perception wherein subject and object 
are identified and prior to the relational consciousness. 
Thereby Barrs-sonism reveals its most significant ýharacteristics. 
Via can look ontit in two ways, either as a Naturalism or 
better still a "psychologism! l and subjectivism. But in both 
cases it is, in-the words of, Ber6son himself, a "new 
Positivism! '. It is, in other words, a philosophy of 
i-rmn, 1_nenco7 if only by the fact that it proclaims a pure 
(1) `oiiliiam JgTies, Paris, Colin, 1911, p. 90. 
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experience outwith spatial and even, as Boutroux notes, 
temporal relations proper, involving an absorption of the 
object in the subjective stream of consciousness. The proof 
is that intuition, for Bergson, - (loco not involve any 
dialectic of interiorisation: 
state of pure subjectivity. 
it is a pure i=ediacy or 
-Bergson's anti-intellectualism 
and his I=anentism are corollary. 
It is in religious thouGht first of all that the 
BerGsonian influence makes itself most clearly felt'. notably 
in the Modernist and Neo-Catholic movement. Already at the' 
end of the century slach thinkers as Olle-Laprune, Victor 
,, Giraud and Brunetiere'had laid siege to the fortress of, 
scientific determinism and, returning to Pascal, had re'- 
affirmed a mode of thought, operative in belief and faith, 
distinct from reason, and bearing'with it an emotional 
perz:, uasion or "certitude moraiel*` The, ceneration which grew 
up in this climate found in BerCsonista a more solid justifica- 
tion for their Catholicism. Edouard Le Roy is a notable 
oxampl e. % 
Lc, ýioy dol'ines mind in terms of creativity and spontaneity 
0' ccl3. nf--;, -,. )re-JoGical and prc-rational. Il est 1ý - 
essentiellement vie, dure"e, puissance do transformation et do 
% 
proýL. res, en un mot activite plastique ot liborte creatzice. 
Les Principos lociquos oux-rae'mes, a plus forte raison tous 
les, autr, ý, sj apparaissent aujourdýhai comie son oeuvre, 'p=- 
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certains c8te"s continiý; ents (1). 11 All principles and truths 
of reason are relative and subject to constant -transformation - 
in the liGht of the devenir of consciousness and the circum- 
stances of it3 action. Mind in its pure intuitive activityq 
prior that is to perception, operates by way of "dynamic 
schemas" e: ýTrcssive of its inner play and urge. "Nulle part 
J% il nly a perception sans l2reperceptiong clest-a-dire sans 
conscience pre"alablp dlun sclleMa intuitif , qui exprime en 
devenir, en -p. röfondeur, dynamiquement ce quo le discours des 
images explicites racontera plus tard en termes statiques, 
I 
com. -ine du tout f ait 6tale Bur un seul plan (2). " It is thought 
not yet formed, constituting a species, of "pre-logique"; - 
I'llacte non encore epuise, mals au contraire en pleine' 
generation. de resultats" - oragain a sort of I'musicalite du 
discours". 
Applied to religfong this philosophy leads to an extreme 
of Immanentism vAlich sees in dogma the changing symbols or 
intellectual expressions of the inner reality of mind. it Ce 
qui est invariant dans un dogme, clest 11orientation qulil, 
donne a notre activite pratiqueg clest la direction, suivant 
lawielle il iviechit notre conduite. Mais les theories 
ex-plicatives, les repre"sentations intellectuelles changent 
incessam, lent au cours des aGes selon les individus et les 
It ends up - by f indinr. -, the explanation of 
(1) 'I'aj, r 'La. N-bU-ion do Verite, Versaillesq L. Luce, 1906, p. 27. 
2 
-. -T 
-ce, intuitive, Paris, Boivin, 1929, Vol. I., p. 77., 
oo, no et critique, Paris, Bloua, 19079 Pp. 33-4. 
religion in man and his consciousness, dissipatinG transcendence 
and God Himself in the spiritualýdevenir. This tendency 
came to a head of course in Alfred's Loisyls"La religion 
(1917) videre the-religious sense differs little from Jean 
Jaures's historicism and humanitarianism, It is not 
surprising that the modernist movement'should have found. 
disfavour in the eye's'of the Church and- have been the object 
of papal condemnation in the f amcas Encyclical Pascendi, 
Dominici Glrer. -is of 8th September 1907. 
Other neo-Catholic thinkers takingýtheir inspiration 
f rom BerEson have h(ovever avoided extreme conclusions while 
remaining within the framework of an immanentist system. 
To this Group belongs one Who is perhaps the most important 
figure in modern religious thought in France and, - one Whose 
influence has, if anything, increased in the last few years, 
namely Caarles Peguy. Of him Bergson has said: 11il a connu 
ma pensee la plus secrete, telle que je ne l1ai pas eýTrimeej 
telle que j'au3zLs voulu. l1exprimer (l). 11 
The earliest influences upon Peguy were those of Jean 
JaurCs's Horselian Socialism (notably through the intermediary 
of Lucien Herr, the great librarian at the Ecole Normale who 
left his mark on a whole generation of French writers) and 
also t. iat of GeorLýes Porel. He was thorefore fully prepared 
for ti-ie i-,,. ipact of Ber-son upon him, tremendous in its effect. C, 
In 1-zeepinl); wit; i the latter's doctrine, PeC; uy disting-aishes 
(1) J. and J. Tharaud, Notre cher PeM-IX, Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 
1, )-2r, l Vol. II., pp. 265-6. 
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between 11 intuitiond' and "systems" , the latter mere 
conveniences" even* in the literal sense: Ils veulent avant 
tout une pliilosophie, un systeme de pensee, -un systeMe de 
connaissance ou on est assis. Ge qulils no=ent la bonne 
ordonnance de la pense , e, clest la tranquillite/ du penseur (1). 11 
He develops this distinction in terms of the Ilse faisa: nt" and 
the "tout fait". But he elaborates it in the form of a 
dualism both original and powerful. He sees life as a 
conflict bet-.. veen the living and the "tout fait", good and 
evil , 11 liabituddl and 11 contre-habitude" , 
body and spirit , sin 
and grace. The rehityq he declares-, is in neither of those 
oppos-Ites alone but in their inter-penetration. "Ce, qulil y 
a de redoutable dans la realite,. de la vie, ce niest pas la 
juxtaposition du bien et du mal, clest leur intprpenetrationg 
clest leur mutuelle incorporation, leur nourriture mutupllel 
et, parfois, leur etrange, leur mysterieuse parente'(2). " 
Here the Hegelian dialectic is the means of developing the 
BcrLf--sonian Philosophy in the sense of an Existentialism; 
leguy indeed illustrates the 'possibility of such a passage. 
Mnile the Hegel in question and the one which cýmes, to mind 
is the young HeGel of the Phenomenolor-yj of the "contrite b 
consciousnesOl I whose dialecticý, moves on the concrete plane t 
of life's conflicts before those have been transferred to the 
plane of ideal logic. 
(IýI- 
ote conjointe sur 1J. Descartes et la philosoDhie 
F- Vo X oeuvres coFmi teF, xaris, Gallimard$ II 
'o 246. (2) 
-. '(-, ccntcs Oeuvres de Zola, Oeuvres , Vol. 11 (1920) 9 p. 130. 
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ViewinG lif e as thus at tile intersection of the 
principles of life and death, of good and evil, PeGtrj is led 
to rehabilitate sin and suffe. rinG as fundamentals of human 
experience and, even more, as properly ontological valuesq 
for toGether they constitute the "point dlinhabitude", the 
point of rupture in life's mechanism allovring for the action 
of 6race and ultimate salvation. The role and function he 
attributes to "Aliserell are more or less those attributed by 
E-ierkegaard and later*Existentialists to dread, namely the 
I 
production of that "void" or break in necessity that opens up 
the 'possibility of4reedodl. 
Novert. 1aeless, Pe"guy remains within the limits of an 
Immanentism and one that is even ultra-Bergsonian. This 
becoinev apparent as he develops his series of contraries: 
I 
between the m,,,, stic and the politieg morality and grace (for, 
'Ila lettre tud' while grace is tile vivifying principleg the 
11contre-habituddl or 'Ila jeune enfant Espe'rance"); and 
finally between the I'moderr2l, symbolised by the rule of money, 
itself the symbol of -the "tout fait" , and the "ant i-moderr2l , 
represented by the Christian Middle AGes where all is simple, 
naive and spontaneous. Central to all triese is the 
op,, ositiý)n uct,; xcn ii-listory (Clio) and Tuexaor)r. History is 
the conversion of the livin[; present into the past, the 
, )a-, z;. *ýn,, alonLýside the events which are made to be lived. 
"L'hi, -)Uoj. rc COI. LSiStC ossentiollement a passer au lonG de 
. A. - 
VrI 
. I fcý rla-, Iont. La- iacirioire consiste essentiellement, otant 
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dedans llev4noment, avant tout 
*a* nlen pas sortir, ay rester, 
% le la et a le remontor en dedans... Llhistoire est paralle 
"" .4. llevenelaent, la memoire lui est centrale et axiale (1). " 
At the root of this thesis is a cult of the presentO pure and 
simplet independent of all relational elet. ients and grasped in 
a pure irrtuition. "Au lieu de considerer, le present lui-memes 
au lieu de considerer-le present present, on considerait en 
I realite un present passe, un present fige, et fixe, un pre"sent 
At 
arre e, inscrit, un present rendu determine. Un present 
historiclue (2). " 
I Peguy seems alýost to outstrip Ber6son in his deterjaina- 
I 
. 
tion to empty immediacy of the relational (including the 
prol)erl)r temporal distinctions like past and f uture) element. 
As doctrine carries to an extreme "instantaneisin! l the 
promises ixfacrent in Bergson's notions of a "purell perception. 
Tilereby it fails, in spite of its strenGth and originality, 
in spite of its strict preoccupation with concrete existencog 
to transcend the framework. of what is after all a psychologism. 
and vitalism, as witnessed by the reiterated appeal to "nature" 
and its intir: iations. 
'-co refer, in conclusion, to one or. two thinkers of a 
likc Borysonian inspiration, we might restrict ourselves to 
tlaroc of the more important in respect of their influence, 
-, r(-), aond, relyin-, upon Ward and 
T,, elmnan mid notably their L) 
(1) 
- 
Coluvrlls , Vol. VIII (1917), p. 285. 
i loiný, c ,ý, ioc. Cit. p.. 239. 
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distinction between "direct" and "reflexive" actsq contrasts 
the discursive lo,,, ic with the logic of intuition and faith, 
the latter a certain I'logique naturelle qulon essaierait on 
vain dlao-broindre ou do reduire aux reC; los d'Aristotelle 
. "Le parallele nlest pas entre comprendre et sentir, mais 
entre comprendre, raisonner, dlune maniere directe, impliciteg 
spontanee, et comprendre, raisonner d'une maniere reflexe et 
pleinement consciente (1). 11 In this way he hopes to present 
intuition and feeling as a'superior and primary form of 
reason. In his application, of this doctrine of intuition 
to relision he comes/naturally enough to make the mystic 
experience the whole essence of the latterg isolating the 
pure immediacy from the intellectual element in, religious 
experience., It is,, thus, he distinL. -uishes bet*een ascesiJ3 
i 
and prayer, the former active and involving methodq pre- 
occupation with external symbolsq the. latter passive in that 
the soul's energy is absorbed by, 
, 
the Divine enerGy. It La 
prie're est le mouvement du coeur,.. Elle est transmutation 
t de VaGir au patir, de l1ascese a llunion (2). 11 No doubt 
the two to(-, other are present in reliGious experienceg but it 
is the latter which is its pure essence, for it alone gives 
a reliE-,. lous character to the combination of its operations. 
Bremond moreover has applied his distinction (in which there 
is morc than a hint of Quietism) to the poetic experience in 
(1) L'Inquietude reliCieuse, Ie scrie, Paris, Porring 1924, 
Pý1 ý113. % (2) Introduction Ill la philoso2hie do la 2riereq Parist Bloud 
et Gajr, 1929, pp. 60-1. 
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his Priere et Poesie where he attempts in the same vi. V to 
isolate the moment of "pure poetr; yl 9 that is of contemplative 
emotion as distinct from the reflective operation, and to 
assimllate it to prayer. 
On a quite different plane of thought the Bergsonian 
philosophy of life found its ethical expression in two very 
different writers, Georges Sorel and: Andre Gide. Sorel ts 
"philosophy of violence" shows marked traces of both 
Nietzschean and Alarxist-influence. He views all intellectual 
knowledGe, whether it take the form of scientific principles 
I 
or political ideologies, as mere instruments of action and 
more especially as weapons in the service of a dominant class 
(cf. Les Illusions du, progres). It is action which is the 
4 
source of the moral lifeg although the moral life itself is 
for him subordinated to the collective-life. History is, 
seen as the product of'a more or less unconscious will to 
power immanent in class-consciousness. His Reflexions sur 
la violence (1907) apply the doctrine of action to Socialism. 
It is not, lie there declaresq by means of principles and 
proý, rammes that the proletariat may achieve powerý, but only 
by violent and. revolutionary means. Principles and theories 
can have their placeg not however as directives to action but 
as 11 myths" (of which the most important is the general strike), 
LýivinC poetic and emotive form to the urge which alone is the 
mainsprinG of action and historical reality. 
Andre Gide, toGether with Valey and Bergson himself, is 
0 
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undoubtedly the greatest influence in modern French thought 
and literature at large.., We shall have occasion to treat 
his thousht in considerable detail in the course of our 
expose"; it will suffice-for the moment to indicate its 
general tenor and place in the period. His philosophy of 
life can be classified with justice as "BergsoniarP. He is' 
intent on rejecting'all: attempts at imposing form or law upon 
the spontaneity of. the ever-changing and protean self. We 
must not "sacrifice truth to continuity, purity of line", 
but remain sensitive to t he urge of the inner devenir' 
accepting thereby alý apparent contradictions. ' Action should 
remain es. sentially "gratuitous", the immediate expression of 
the "naivetell of the real self i unencumbered, by the artificial- 
ity of conscious . motive or moral . 
law. - Gide I s. ogtlook carries 
to a logical conclusion the''Irealism of time' inherent in the 
Bergsonian philosophy. - The, cult of the miraculous instant 
divorced from its past-future context is, as we shall see in 
due course, the outcome of Bergson's peculiar and paradoxical 
theorj of duration, for the elimination of relational.. elements 
in temporal. experience c. an only deprive time of its very 
reality and isolate the present from the structure, in Which 
. 
it is embedded. The klat6mismll so visible in Gid6. is already 
implicit in BerGson's p1jil6sophy, however much it . Iýiay dif f er 
in its type from the atomism he set out to, and ind6ed di. d, 
destroy. 
In General, to sum up, the BerGsonian current exhibits 
48. 
itself as a doctrine of immanence. and., wbatever its Realistic 
pretensions, it hardly succeeds in transcending the limits of 
what French thinkers have come to term "psycholoGism! '. 
- 0, - 0- 
None the lessqýBergsonism stands as certainly the most 
potent movement in modern French thought, transforming the 
I 
domains of ethics arid religion as well as of esthetics and 
literary criticism. There is not a single French writer of 
value in the contemýorary period who does not bear the trace 
of its inf luence. The source of its, power is to be s; ought 
not so much in its conclusions as in the method of subjective 
enquir-, v it proposes for metaphysical exploratioil. And it is 
here that it has served as the startinG-point for the 
elaboration of a Realism and philosophy of transcendence*, 
whose gerias are undoubtedly visible in Bergsonism but are 
engulfed in, the general subjectivist and positivistic)eontext. 
The transition may be seen most clearly in the field of 
religious thoue; ht, and particularly in the philoýophy of 
Maurice Blondel (with whom may be associated for our purpose 
Paul Glaudel). It is true th#, Blondel's preliminary thesis, 
as propounded in L'Action (1893)ý is'predominantly concerned 
with a quite BerCsonian critique of scientifio and rational 
knowledt3e. The latterg we read,, is symbolical in character 
and ýicis value uniquely as the "auxiliaire do 11activit0' 
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pratique". All rational and scientific principles have 
their foundation in a decree of the will. This will, which 
is the sole reality, certainly transcends the realm of clear 
consciousness; it is a certainllmyste"rieux connul. "Avant 
at aprelsq au-dessous at au-dessus de la conscience de l1action, 
il ya qualque chose, a savoir at non le moins important de 
l1action. La consciýnce nlest pas toute'la science, pas 
I 
plus clulelle nlest. toute la personne (l). 11 
In this there is nothing which is not Bergsonian, but 
the development of the argument takes us beyond the Bergsonian 
positivism. For tAe inner reality of will is not to be 
knovm simply by a singleg simple and absolute intuition 
procuring, within the field of wholly immanent experience, a 
4 
fusion of subject and object. On the contrary,,, the essence 
of this will, týe true core of Being, immanent no doubt in 
consciousness, yet transcends the latter effectivelyg so that 
our being, and the whole realm of BeinG with which it is in 
contact, is separated from us by an immense interval. "Car 
le tout nlest pas do vouloir cc que nous sommesq clest dletre 
ce que nous voulonsg separes que nous sommes poi; r ainsi dire 
A 
de nous-memes par un immense abime (2). 11 
Two consequences follow from this view. In the first 
placeg transcendence is actively affirmed; the human agir is 
revealed as participatinG. in a divine and wholly transcendent 
-re "Llimpuicaunce 
do fait et do droit, qiýi stest re 'veloo 
(1) L'Actiong I'aris, Alcan, 1893, p. '141. 
(2) Ibirl-9 P- 135. 
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a notre effort volontaire et par lea exiG6ncep memes de 
notre action, traduit imperieusement Iýa ne"cessite ou nous 
soimnes d'affirmer un transcendant (1). " The, transcendent 
power of Divine grace is the source of, and is immanent in 
the consciousness ofj human actiong'the latter involving 
what he calls allrecours tacite a la cooperation de la cause 
premiere (2). 11 "'Dieu nous est plus intG'rieur que nous-memes! 19 
repeats Blondel after Ravais'son. Secondly, and more 
important still, ýit involves the substitution for the 
Bergsonian intuitive immediacy of a dialectical immediacy. 
The Beinrg, immanentAn consciousness, separated from'the 
seeker by an immense intervall-can only be grasped by'what 
Blondel terms a LLmethode dlimmanence", whereby"participation 
is secured progressively by a series, of continupus approxi- 
mations. This dialectic operates certainly within immediacyp' 
for Being is experienced immediately-at every stage or level 
of the dialectic with varying degrees of compulsion. (And 
by immediaej he means feeling, so that his'dialectic differs 
I A, 
from the still intellectual dialectic of the Idealists, such 
as Lachelier and even Ravaisson. ) But-it is'equall-y'certainly 
not Bergson's simple intuition. On: the contrary, it involves 
the view that in immediate experience there is a relational 
element and notably a temporal and even spatial relational 
content, implyinG a varyiar, lldistcuicW between BeinG and the 
self to be pro(, ressively narroýed although perhaps never 
(1) TilAction, Parisq Al6an, Vol. 11 (1937), P. 343. 
(2) Ibid. 9 p. 365. 
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wholly eliminated. 
Blondel thus defines what we might'call a I'dialectique ' 
d'approfond: Lssement" within immediacy workinG inside concrete 
existence at the point. of intersection between Transcendence 
I 
and I=anence, Time,,, and Eternity. He thus lays down the 
condition and the method'of an existentialist philosophy of 
religion. Moreovers he envisages the realm of transcendence 
as a universe of persons upheld by the activity of the Divine 
-person. "Tout 1.1ordre des choses West que llensemble'des 
moyens que*nous devots vouloir et empý'oyer pour realiser 
notre propre perso4e, en communion aý'rec ledýssein du tout et 
ia volonte' du Greateur (l). 11 He thi; 
's 
avoids the Absolutism 
of the Idealistsj whose dialectic ends up morwoften than not- 
in the vision of ah Absolute Unity. 
It is however true thatq at times, the tone is trans- 
cendentalist and Idealistiog as atýothers it is Bergsonian. .' 
Blondel hovers, in fact, between an Idealism pure and simple ' 
with a tendency to mysti 
, 
Ci6mg and a vitalist conception of 
the elan vital-with all its temptations of imnianentism. He 
is none the loss the contemporary French philosbpher with whom 
Gabriel T-Jarcel has most in common. It will be for him to 
elaborate, in'the light of the teachings of Phenomenologyq 
the dialectic of existence still not fully explicit in, 






This above-mentioned tendency of Blondells thought to 
merge into a Transcendentalism or into an Immanentism. is a 
very common feature in all those thinkers whose starting-point 
is Bergsonism, and is indeed bound up with the equivocal ý 
nature of that philosophy. For the "pre-perceptiod' or- 
intuition. of Bergsonisq according to, the way you look at itq 
either consciousness: of a temporal devenir and submission to 
its promptinGs, or, by the fact that it excludes all 
relations and therefore teýmporal relat ioi .i 
ý`I 
a t. ype of extra- 
temporal communion, 
This double tendency is seen most clearly in Marcells., 
two friends and contemporaries, Jacques 
I 
Riviere bt Charies 
Du Bos, of whom we shall speak in detail in a later chapter. 
13oth develop their religious thoughý on ýhebasis of 
Bergsonism, the former In the sense, of an Immanentism. 




tl) We may- couple with Blondell besides Claudelq two-religious 
Iiinkers of like inspiration$ Abbe LaberthonniCre (Essais do 
philosophie rel-iLvuse, Paris, Lethielleux,, 1903) and Auguste 
6abatier Wio affirms 'Ila coexistence mysterieuse et. r6elle d1une cause particuliere qui est moi, et d1une cause 
. ,. universelle qui est Dieu... ClestAle mystere meme d1OU sort la reliLf-ion avec une invincible necessitd. lt (Esquisso d1une 
pjiiloso,. )hic do la religiong 2nd, ed., Paris, Fis-chbacker, M7, 
p. 
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I A, few words must be said of the Neo-Thomist movement in 
Prance in so far as it plays its part in the reestablishmeAt 
of a Realism and philosophy of'transcendence., In its 
reaction aGainst the Kantian Idealiom it has affinities with 
the Phenomenological'school and, by the fact that Existential- 
ism itself is an offshoot of the latter, it has some bearir3g 
on our subject, 
The reinterpr%6t ation of Saint Thomas has taken varioua 
forms, the element of Realism being common to them all. 
Thus in Fathers SertillanGes and GarriCou-Lagraprýe there is 
a strong glement ofýBergsonism. While giving priority to 
the intellection of Being and the universal, they accept the 
i 
Bert--, sonian conception of nature as a dynamic prindj"A 
4 
tending to self-realisation although never suyeeedinG. in 
realising its being, and they use it to Justify the Scholastic 
I 
distinction between essence and existence. - Again, Father 
I, Jare'chal seeks to interpret Kant anew in the light of Saint 
Thomas. VlAile agreeing with the former that the object as 
known is phenomenal and Grasped in a synthetic unity by virtue 
of the application of the categories to aense-eýperienceq he 
sees In the activity of mind so directed to the oeizure'and 
comprehension of the real an activity of ýranscendence or, 
betterf an inherent intentionality. 
It is Jacques blaritain who has expressed most fully the 
Nco-Vioiaistic position. Ile claims indeed not to be re- 
interpretinr, Saint Thomas at all but applying his philosophy 
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anew to modern knowledge. lie is pr. incipally known for his 
attack on BerGsonism in Which he sees the preat enemy of the 
philosophia 2erbnnis, substituting as it does change and 
spontaneity for the traditional intellectual categories of 
substance and being, In the new philosop4y he sees "un 
I phenomeýdsme absolUl ancl a form of "intellectual nihilism! '. 
In other works he devotes*his attack to Descartes, victim-of 
the lopeche dianGelisme" and to Kant whog'followinG in his 
footsteps, has destroyed'the fundamental contact or unity of 
mind and being which it was the aim of the Christian philo- 
sophy to preserve aAd justify. He then goes on to develop 
anew the Thomistic theory of knowledge seen as a process 
whereby the mind,, starting ±rom the sensitive species Igiven 
in isense-knowledge, extracts the intelliGible species and 
Grasps the object in conceptual knowledge. 
In wrecent article Maritain has claimed that Thomism 
I 
is an existential philosophy, , Af not the existential 
philosophy. "Clest une pensee personnaliste, selon que le 
01 realisme philosophique de Sainýý, Thokas implique a chaque 
instarit 11acte do la personne humaino tout entiore, corps et 
A% 
amo, en face de 1'etre a ponetrer (1). " It is extremdly 
doubtful if that is so of the objective philosophy of Saint 
'Thomar. , although a case can be made out for other Scholastics 




such as Duns Scotus and Ockham (1). He also goes on to say: 
"Sa pliilosoj)hie est une philosophie non pas des essencesq 
mais. de llexistence; elle vit des intuitions naturelles de 
l1expe'rience, sensible et de llintelligence. 11 But this 
requires reservation. What Neo-(Phomism, gives is a theory 
of intentionality,. ýrealistic in its inspiration (mind being 
intentionally directed towards an object, Of knowledge)q but 
this does not alter the f act that the consummated act of 
knowledýe for Saint Thomas is intellectual or conceptual, 
therefore mediate býnd aLlso by thatý fa ct, 'bearing not upon. 
the particular andýthe individual butý upon the universal 
known in the particular. 
It is-therefore by its Realism that Neo-Scholasticism 
has played its part in the movement which culmýnated in 
PhenomenoloGy and the later"Existentialism. While speaking. 
of the Realistic trend-mention must be made of'a certain 
Neoplatonie current. It is representedg for example, by 
Julien Bendaq well-known as the author of La Trahison des 
clercs in which he casti , Sates Bergsonism and Modernism. 
His own doctrine aims at,, preserving the eternai ideal values, 
but the static conception'ý, behind it makes it a strange 
ý1) This is principally true of Duns Scotus who, ' by affirming 
. reedom and contingence on'the one hand tLnd the priority of 
the principle of individuation on the-other - the individual beinG the ultima realitasq comprising a haecceitas or positive 
qualities FLindividuation added to the universal 'quiddity or 
essence (entitas individdi est d1versa ab omni entitate . quidditativa) - transforms a phiiosop-DHy of essences-En7b. a 
P1'1iioEo_p1v R, existence. 
I. 
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survival from the pastj out ofý, touch with modern needs. 
The other representativeg stran6ely enoughý, Is Marcel Proustq 
too often presented as a Bergsonian., In actual fact his 
work describes the devouring and , ý, disrupting. action of time 
on beiriG, only to show the possibility of transcending 
temporal succession by means of an extra-temporal. intuition 
(effected by, memory conjoined with present, sensation) 
revealing the eternal essences of things and of the self. 
It forms a sort of Platonism where the Idea or Essence is 
to be taken not as a loSiClal universal but as a Generality 
endowed with power --ý/something like the idee-force of Fouille"e. 
However, we are now properly in the exýreme contemporai7 
period,, and it is not our aim in this introductory chapter 
to bring the thought of Marcel into parallel with that of I 
his contemporaries in any detail. 
\ We shall leave this to 
be done as the occasion requires* 
S 
jI 
Our survey has revealed various currents of thought 
often, overlapping but reducible to the following. An 
Idealism or philosophy of consciousness and liberty, hostile 
in general to metaphysics and transcendence. An Idealism, 
einploying an intellectual dialectic and, in its monistic, 
conclusions, positing an Absolute Spirit or Unity, immanent 
inýbut toanscendinL; finite consciousnessl'vdth which union is 
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achieved once the f inite and the temporal are transcended in 
the semi-mystic experience. A Bergsonian current which 
rehabilitates the concrete but remains tied to a "psychologism! f 
and doctrine of immanence, iviiere the reality, identified with 
the dev6nir of consciousnesst is grasped in a simp16, 
absolute intu-ition impermeable to any dialectic. A Thomistic 
Realism which rehabilitates the sense of being and trans- 
cendence but remains conceptualist at bottom. Lastly, the. 
I 
beginnings of a Subjective Realism, taking concrete experience 
as its startinG-point and its end but revealing within that 
experience a transcLdent; a transcendent which is other 
than-the extra-temporal Universal One, of-Idealism, rather a 
plurality of personal entities engaged in time; a trýns- 
cendent which is not the object of a simple intuition but 
the term of a dialectic of immediacy which elucidates and 
comprehends the temporal structure of. existence andq 
transcending the layers of this structure without ever wholly 
leaving it, reveals the eternal in and through time itself. 
It is this method and those conclusionsg implicit rather 
than explicit in thinkers such as Blondelq which Gabriel 
Alarcel will ibrinG to the full liGht of day; but he will do 
so with the help of the phenomenological and existential 
1)hilosophies, which provided him, in their, notion of 
situation" , vrith the medium for such a dialectics 
U- .. 0-0- 
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As a. conclusion to this chapter vie shall refer to some 
of the currents, and cross-currents of-the Existential 
philosophy as dýveloped in France, although here again 
parallels vrill be reserved for a later context.. 
The philosophy of Existence developed in France in thp 
years after the Great, 'V-Iar. 
hardly be termed a school. 
In its original form it can 
The central figure at this 
period is undoubtedly Gabriel'Marcelg whose thought evolves 
certainly on existentialist lines yet largely independently 
of the constituted German school. With him is linked a 
Group of philosophers whose organ becomes the Recherches 
philosopiiiques; and it is temptingg after the event, to 
talk of this Group as Existentialist. '* But although what 
links them is a common phenomenological method i3; tent on 
elucidatinr, the structure of concrete existence taken in 
its temporal and historical substanceg their actual: thought 
varies cohsiderably (1). We find Louis Lavelle and Rene 
Le Senne, the one the product of French Spiritualism, the 
other of the philosophy of consciousness: Gurvitch, largely 
influenced by Dilthey: E. Levinas, more obviouslý Existential- 
ist: while Sartre himselfq to judge by an article such as 
Transcondance de_l'Et7, o (2)t appoars simply as a Phenomeno- 
loCist, as indeed his thesis on L'Imaginaire also indicates. 
It would be more accurate-at this stage to talk of a 
(1) Jean Wahl's Vers le cbncret (Paris, Vrinj 1932) summarises 
In its title the comman ̀ Eendencies of the Eroup. (2) )ýechqrchcs_phi1osophiquesj Vjf 1936-7. 
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Phenomenological rather than of an Existentialist school, 
its members applying theýmethods propo*sed by Husserl to 
various domains of thought, but applying it in the interests 
of their own particular philos6phical outlook. 
It is durinG the year s of the late war that something 
of a French Existentialist'ý, school appeared$ centred on the 
philosophy of Sartrp.. By this time the i principal 
founders 
of Existentialism had made their influence felt. Jean Wahl's 
Etudes Kierkegaardiennes (1), was an epoch-ýmaking =3ýk in 
contemporary French thought. As for Jaspers and HeideGgerg 
whose thought had b4en made known in articles, -their ideas 
were now assimilated and began, ýto take form inthe wo ks of 
the younger writers. ' 
In sketching the cross-our ents of the movpment we might 
consider it under two headst first method and, second, content; 
for Existentialism in both a methodology and an ethical or 
ethico-reliGious doctrine. Lot us first-take the question 
of method and begin, as alwwls in this subject, from KierkeGaard. [.,, 
KierkeGaard's starting-point is a critician of Hegelian 
Absolutism and its claim to explain reality in ierms of logic 
and in terms of. an Absolute beyond the contingencies of time 
and individuality. He saw there the type of what he called 
"objectivd, thinkinG, in that it empties the thinker of all 
the individuality, passion and feeling which makes him an 
existinG, concrete self. ý In such thinkin8 he has become an 
(1) Paris, Aubier, 1938. 
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anonymous Cenerality, ana the object of his thouCht an 
abstraction without relevance to'his existing situation. ' 
In the place of this thinker he puts the 11subjectivO19 
"passiondtdl orlexistential" thinker; and proclaims 
existence to be priorý to essence. ' In short, it is only in 
existinG, feelingg suffering that-the individual may become 
aware of his'true self and being. ' 
It mu6t not b0houýhtj howevert, that this self*is 
identical with the 6mpiri'cal self of consciousness, 
Existence has a volume orweight:. the self is'engaged in 
time, it is "in the/world""I But selfhood is not exhausted 
ýy its immersion in time; * ýbeyond it, at the heart and: in 
the depth of timet lies its1hidden source, ibs eterna, and 
trariscendent being. ' Thellinwardness" of existential thinking 
is clirected to the grabping of this obscure core 'of selfhood. 
The method constitutes a dialectic, not the'logical dialectic 
of HeGel, but a dialectic which is one with the very process 
of existing, where, with ever deeper passionate and willed 
activity, the eternal self and the Divine Being are both made 
effective and revealed in'the individual's living. 
The German school of Existon'tialism'proceeds no doubt 
from Kierkegaard, but in point of mothod the iminediate 
determininG factor was the Phenomenology of Edmund Ifusserl. 
The intuitionary doctrine. of, lIusserl cinvisages a realm of 
being or essences, conceived as concrete entities rather than 
abstract Seneralitiesq made known to intuition in, a species 
-ý lk !, 
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of Ivisior2l after a suspension of the empirical consciousness 
and its replacement by the activities of the pure, ego or pure 
consciousness'. With this intuitionism is linked his doctrine 
of the intentionality of consciousness: 'Ile fait que toute 
conscience est non seulement conscience,, mais aussi conscience 
de quelque chose ,a yant un rapport a 11objet (1)11; that the 
spiritual lif e is everywhere characterised by a 11 sense" or 
direction. - We shall attempt later to show the relationship 
between certain aspects of Husserl's phenomenology, in 
particular the"phenomen8logical reductiod' and Dlarcells,, 
dialectic. F. or thi momentq let us note 
. how phenomenology 
affects existential'method. 
Husserl advocates a new way of treating reality, that is. 
by p4enomenological description: the intuition and description 
4 
of the realm of the transcendent an'd extra-temporal-essences 
which are : Lmplicit in every act of consciousnessl although 
made visible only in a type of inward vision which transcends 
the purely psychological The method may be applied to all 
domains of knowtedge and reality, for each has its own 
category of 11 eidetiv, essences capable of being ýrevealed in 
visionary experiencei Tho point of contact between 
Phenomenology and ExistentibLlism is in the sort of "subjective 
realism! ' it involves; 'Ile sentiment quo 1,19tre est quelque 
.. Jl) E. Levinas, La thelorie de 11intuition dans la phdnomeno- 
oL, ie do ifusserl', Parls, Alcan, 193U, p-. 66. ii'or Husseri-Ts definition R 11 entional ex eriences" cf. Ideas. General Introduction to Pure PhenomeTogpyg translated by ILE, Boyce Gibsoii-jljoriUon, ME anil Unw1nq--Y93lq'P- 119 sqq. 
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chose de consistant, qulil vaut et pese en quelque maniere, 
que le monde reel est ineluctýLblbi, que les 'relations 
intelliGibles' puisent toute leur signification dans les 
rapports quo, hommes concrets, nous entretenons avec la 
.4 realite" concrIe'te (1). 11 . For 
the intentionality or "sense" 
implicated in every, act of mind indicates-no mere external 
subject-object relationship but an immediate participation 
of mind in beinG (2). 
It was P,, Iax Scheler who applied this method to the ,4 
description mid elucidation of existence. To do this he 
replaced Husserlls/intellectual intuition (or better, vision) 
by an emotional one. it'was to be achieved by a similar 
transcending of the psychological enabling the existihS self 
to grasp the spiritual content of his livinG experience. 
It reveals the "eternal in mar2l 9 the eternal values and, 
purposes which are contained therein and are implicit in 
every intentional act of will, passion or feeling. Love, 
for example, he descýribed as a type of "intentional sympathy' 
directed towards persons; faith as, bound up with an emotional 
intuition of the divinee 
In short, the phenomenological "description" of existence 
1i n1c P, u 
,P 
with Kierkegaard's "subjective thinking! '. Both 
involve a subjective explorati6n, of existence, undertaken 
simultt-incously with the act of 6xisting and . leading to the 
SI) B. Lovinas, L'Oeuvre d'Eldmond-flusser19 Rev, Phil., 
an. - leob. I 194U, p. 35.. (2) O'E. Ibid., p. 46. 
I 
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revelation of the transcendent being immanent in willed and 
passionate'experienceg the "eternal in max219 implicated in 
his feeling and constituting the object or-end towards which 
his existence is dirýcted and of whose realisation his I 
existence is the means. 
With Karl Jaspers the phenomenological method as applied 
to existence takes on a more precise form. It is he who 
indicates in precise terms the conditions in which the method 
i 
can operate.. These are to be found in what he calls the 
"fundamental situationd' (Grenzsituationen)q that is the 
moments of supreme/existential experienceg such as love, 
faith, suffering, dread and, above all, the proximity: of death. 
I 
With Martin'Heidegger the method becomes fully conscious 
of its nature and means. Heidegger's avowed qim is the 
creation of an Ontologyq to establish a truth or idea of 
beinG. This explicitation of being will be secured by a 
description and elucidation of the human situation or Dasein - 
I 
die hletUhysick des Daseins als FundamentalontoloEie (1). 
This means that' the T construction of 
the idea of being proceeds 
32ari passu with the realisation of beinGj that is 9f or 
11oldeUgerg with the process of transcendence whereby the self 
comeo to "ex-sist" and transcend its "in-sistencell, in 
temporal succession. The self indeed is "in-the-world", 
en,,, a(, cd in a certain spat, io-temporal structure and amid- 
conditions viiii. ch dctermine its character as an existent. 
(1) jant uifldas Problem der 14qtg2hysick. chp. IV, sec. 0. 
64. 
These are the various "affective-situations", and it is by 
taking coE; nisance of them and at the same time dealing with 
them that the being of the self is both "unveiled" and 
"realised-I - das Dasein ist sein Da. "La situation-affective 
(Befindlichkeit) que nous fait sentir cette tonaliteo 
(StimmunE), non seulement nous de"Voile chaque fois 'a sa 
maniere l1existant en son ensemble, mais'ce de'voilement 
loin dle'tre un simple accident - est en meme temps 11historial 
essentiel dans lequel se realise notre realite-humaine (l). 11 
On the one handq then, existence is revealing 
(erschliessend) of being, and being revealed (Erschlossenheit)-.,. 
as such it is 11 ontological" truth, informative of the Pature 
of bein-;. On-the other handq this revelation of being is, 
for the existing selfq realisation of its being, - its being 
made "present" to it: and as such it is "ontic" truth (2). 
It is therefore pari passu with the striving after self- 
realisation and self-transcen. dence that Ontology or the 
science of being is constructed. I'Le depassement de 
l1existant slhistorialiseýdans ltesnence de la realite- 
humaine. Mais ce depassementg, clest la Metaphysique elle'- 
A 
meme In actual fact, the "ontological', often 
predominates over the 11ontiV1 in Heidegger, as compared with 
Jaspers or Scheler. Much of his analysisq particularly 
tfiat bearip on the being of 11nothinjj1 and its relation-to 
Icst-ce ue la metaphZsique? translated by H. Corbin, 
' I aris UaIiimcu, , 1957, p. 3Uý. (2) (; f. il. Corbin, op. cit. 9 Introd., p. 15- (3) que la metaphysi, qUe? p. 42. 
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neGation (inspired moreover by Hegel), is pure dialectic. 
'dhen we come to the French Existentialists, we find the 
same method applied: that is, the construction of an 
Ontology by way of an elucidation of existential experience', 
which is simultaneously an. act of existing and transcending. 
Gabriel Marcel-is concerned chiefly with the "ontic! ', 
and he follovis Jaspers in applying his dialectic, to funda- 
mental situationswhich become in his philosophy "concrete 
approaches" to being, where the self is both the thinker and ý 
the actor) and knowledge both self-revelation and self- 
realisation. His 
/method, 
original in itself, is not in any 
case influenced by Jaspers alone; it, has undoubtedly; for one 
of its sources the I'methode dlitnmenc4ý1 of Maurice Blondel. and 
F, enerally that "subjective realisid, developed ýrom Bergsonian 
intuition. 
The philosopIV of Louis Lavelleg in part existentialist, 
althouGh its predominant motif issues from French Spiritual- 
ism, in likewise characterised in its method by the refusal 
to separate existence from the idea of existence and his 
latest workq Introduction a lOntoloGie I (1) seeks to determine 
the categories of being"in and through the revelation of 
being Liven in existence4 
Jean-Paul S, --Artre chows more clearly the. influence of 
I1p. idcGgcr. He follows the cldpsic method, taking concrete, 
affective situations which"'are also modes*of self-realisation, 
! -ý-ooscs Universitaires do France, 1947. 
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elucidating the mind-body nexupq defining the tran scendence 
implicit in free activitYq etc. But his principal pre- 
occupation is with the "ontological" rather than the "ontic! '; 
he is even more intent than Heidegger on defining the-notion 
of beinG and the nature-of the being to be attributed to 
llnothinE_ý'. M. Joan Vahl speaks even of his two philosophies, 
his "existentialisme" or Ontology, 
^and his "existentiallismd' 
or ethico-existential doctrine proper (1). There isq 
indeedt we may agree with,, Wah1j'a certain discrepancy 
between the, two. 
It would be juitifiable, in our view, to attribute this 
ontological preoccupation with the idea and science oil being 
not only to the influence of Heidegger but equally tothe 
specifically French f1philosophy of consciousnesdl. Sartre's 
whole speculation is, built upon an' analysis (as much psypho- 
logical as-phenomenological) of the being of consciousness, 
characterised by the separation of subject*and objectq the 
self becoming a "pour-soilIq and, on the other handq the being 
of things, characterised by complete self-identity (en-soi); 
and it is from this analysis r6miniscent of Val: dry. and Alaing 
that he is enabled. to define theýýformer (the human reality) 
as liberty or the "project'19 the',, pursuit of a self-identity 
never secured. 
In this Sartre has a. predecessor in Rene Le Sennes.. who 
is or seems almost. independent of non-French ialuencesq 
(1) Tableau de la philopophie franýaise, Parisl Editions 
Fontaine, 1946, Appendice II, pe 221. 
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althou(ý, -h the method is phenomenological in the general sense. 
Ile analyses the conditions of value by way of a description 
'Idea de"marches transcendantales de ltesprit (1)11; and these 
he finds to reside in the "obstacle'19 fundamental factor and 
condition of human'consciousness and perception. Although 
the terminology is phenomenological, this analysis hardly 
goes beyond the limits of the "transcendental" psychology of 
the later French IPalists. In many ways, Le 8enneg in 
point of method, is a sort of intermediary between Sartre 
and the Germansq as Blondel is, for Marcel. I 
It is therefor4 apparent that French Existentialian is 
. 1, :I not, as might seem, a mere offshoot of foreign and especially 
German influence; on the contrary, it represents, inýmany 
respects, an adaptation of contemporary modes a-ad methods 
to th, ý substance and methodology of traditional French 
speculb. tion. 
Lot us turn now to the themes of Existentialism. The 
fundamental notion, common to all forms, is that of Ilengage- 
ment". Man is "in the world" , in time, yet conscious of an 
eternal selfq and with it a realm of eternal B'eýng - others 
and God it may be - transcendinG his temporal beinG. 
ExIsteAce is theref ore* a ]2r'oble , not something given, but 
Something to be striven f or. He can live on- the plane of 
anonymous, objective and empirical beinG, but he cannot-then 
be said to exist, to be realipiriC, his "authentio, self, He 




exists only by the realisation of the true being within him; 
and this realisation can only be achieved in time itself 9 by 
the introduction of eternity into time, of infinity into the 
finite. Existence is the intersection of Time and Eternity, 
the makins effective of the eternal realm in the full 
temporal present of purposive action and "passion ate" living 
wherein tho whole ranGe of past and anticipated future is 
immanent. It is therefore "ex-sistencell or "trans-scendencell 
accomplished within the concrete spatio-temporal structure 
in which the self is "in-sistent". 
lUerkegaard isithe first to-define this field of 
existence. In normal living man is a, mere anonymous cipher, 
I 
he acts and thinks as "the crowdli; he is the slave ot 
, temporal succession. The realisation of his"an , 
onymity and 
particularly of the dissolution of all his purposes in time's 
flow can give rise to despair ý, or clread, the sentiment of 
vanity or "nothinGness! '. Now, deeply experienced, dread 
becomes the "possibility of freedom". He can break the 
chain of necessity and assert himself as an existinr being: 
become aware of his eternal purposes and, in particular, of 
his relation to God throuGh Chriitst, he can now seek to 
realice his true destiny or "authentid life" by purposive 
willed action and faith: he thus substitutes for temporal 
succession the living pres ent bearinG in it all his 
I 
siGnificant past and future purpose. Ultim&tely, however, 
it noted, oxistence is for. KierkeGaard a "parado: el: it 
' .1 
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is action and self-assertion but suspended upon a blind act 
of f aith in an arbitrary Deity. 
The Existentialism of XierkeGaard contains two different 
I 
possibilities of development. On the one hand, his 
pessimism and irrationalism, coupled with the call to self- 
affirmation, may lead to an irrational cult'of will, where 
action is the positive product of a negative despairl on the 
other, his affirmation of a transeendent'Divinity as'the, end 
and purpose of existence and willed assertion, and throuEol 
communion with thom the self is put into relation with 
otherss lays the baAs of a doctrine of communion and 
transcendence. 
In modern Existentialist6q this double meaninG b6comes 
explicit (we leave out of account theolOGians proper such as 
Rarl Barth who develops the eschatological 'Content). Thus 
Llax Scheler and Martin Buber elýborate a philosophy of 
cornmunion that Gives primacy iný, existence to love through 
which the self participates in the realm of persons and 
above all corx. qunes with God the "Person of Pcroon8l'. So 
too Jasperog after repeatinG KierkeGaard's strictures on the 
, '. one", the anowjmous self of empirical living, and bringing 
out the despair associated with the latter, shows how in the 
"fundamental Oituations" of lovet suffering and sense of death 
the self may achieve its true nature by personal decision and 
I by the will to' self-realisation through communion. 
dith Jasperst however, a significant change occurp; for 
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the transcendent he envisages and to Which he gives the name 
of God is no longerg as with Kierkegaard, the Man-God but 
siraply the 110the3: ý' , an obscure indeterminate realm of being. 
The next step is taken by Heidegger who eliminates God as 
such, and leaves at the centre man alone and the problem of 
his self-creation. If he preserves the notiop of trans- 
condence it is in the sense of a general background of being 
constituting the mptive-power of man's urge to realisation. 
Heidegger accepts the general description of the "On&' 
and relates the latter to man's subjection to time (Geworfen- 
hej. L). His most itiportari: 
physical nature of dread. 
temporal succession. Man 
doomed to dissolution, and 
at the extreme, becomes the 
I t analysis deals with the meta- 
ýThis heýsees as bound up iyith. 
sees all his purposes and dims 
this is the origin o: ý dread which, 
sense of death and "nothingness". 
it is in that supreme despairg howeverg, that he finds the 
motive-powcr or "possibility" which allows him to pass from- 
anonymity to existence. For death is an absolute, it is, 
the one end in life which must come to pass. By living 
this sense to the full lie is freed from fate aný at, last 
infuses meaninU into his life and action. It is for him 
to make the "resolute decisiod' andq accepting his finite 
condition as irrevocable and essentially hisq assert him'self 
as creator and sole creator of his destiny. Thereby ha- 
tra-Tircends the temporal flow and, emerging from his 
"in-sistence" in time$ ""px-sists" as a- self in full 
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possession of its beinG. for, having recovered its one 
eternal purpose, his self has now become itscwn ground. 
HeidegGer's philosophy shows the point Where the 
influence of Nietzsche comes to play its part in Existential- 
ism. His is a philosophy of liberty, but of a liberty 
equated with despair: the very freedom it asserts is grounded 
in the sense of death and nothingness; indeed he defines it 
as a I'liberty'for aeath". And it is significant that he 
attributes, as Sartre will do, a reality to "nothingness". 
V-1hen we come to the French Existentialists, we find the 
same double. trend. 
/ 
On the one hand a'doctrine of trans- 
cendence, of communiono love and hopej essentially Christian 
in inspiration; and of this Gabriel klarcel is the supreme 
representative, although we-find it reprosenteditoo by such 
movements as the"Personalism! ' of Emmanuel Mounier and the 
Review Esprit (1); In this current, the influence of Scheler 
and Jaspers combines'with French Christian thought from Pascal 
to Blondel. On the other hand, we have the Existentialism 
of Sartre which shows the influence of Heidegger and Nietzsche 
coupled with that of the French philosophers of contingence 
such as Valor or of "experience" such as Frederic Rauh (2). ty 
Hes like HeideGger, will attribute a positive reality to 
tl) The Idealisr., i of Louis Lavelle is also a philosophy of 
ranscendence and communion, but, although it exhibits 
several C-XiStClLtialist traits, it is at bottom a philosophy 
of the. Xosolute wAich harks back to Malebranche. 
(2) Tlie inf luonce of Nietzsche is most directly apparent in tlicý 
' 
work of Albert Camus and particularly in 
LIE4 
ýMdrience in-'G(-'ýrleuro 
of (ýeorGes Bataille (Paris, Gallima-rUg 1943)o 
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- nothingness and despairg andý will see in them not only the 
very being of man but the grounds of his freedom. Moreoverg 
this freedom will be for him an unconditioned self-assertion 
viewed as a "pro-ject" or constant deýassement and creation 
of human values - an ethic resembling at times a do6trine t 
of action for action,, Os sake. 
It is not that, Sýrtreq any more than Heidegger, 
eliminates the notýon of transcendence, and indeed both 
stipulate that self-assertion involves communion with others; 
but such communiong we shall seeg is in reality a means to 
self-affirmation, tlL "other' only existing as a psychological 
state in the mind of, the subject. In actual factt trains- 
cendence signifies for them the mere "movement" or urge of 
will towards expansiong what we might call simply its' 
"'outwardness". The "sense" or "intention! ', implicit, as 
both Phonomenologists'and Existentialists declare, in 
conscious and therefore willed activity, has become divorced 
from ips object and the "movement of transcendence" has 
become the whole of transcendence. M. Wahl defines with 
the utiaost accuracy this sort of inverted transcendence when 
he says t1dat in HeideGger's philosophy"llidefe de transcendance 
pord son caractere religieux, et prend paradoxalement uno 
corte de caractere iramanent; clest une transcendance dans 
Pil"Imallence The result will be a philoso. phy of 
freedom, as. op]., osed to a philosophy of being in the 'positive 
(1) Pot. I. Le hirý-, toi-L ,c do 1'Existentialisinot Paris, Editions 
(, 'l,. ib J. ialntonwit, 19479 p. 3-3. 
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sense, coupled with a philosophy of negation; J"A 
0000 
VO ' 
This brief sketch of the currents and, cross-currents of 
I'V 
contemporary French'thought will, we hope, serve to illuminate 
many of the themes in Gabriel Marcel's do'etrine which we are 
about to discuss, and also place this doctrine as a whole in, 
the nexus of intellectual relationshipb'from which no 
philosopherg least, of all an Existentialist, should be' 
J, ý sundered. It may-Lso make clear that'the Existentialist 
movement in France is not only much more, coýmplex than would 
appear. to the uninitýatedq'but that its roots are, toýa 
greater extent than is realised, andwithout di0counting 
the obvious external, influences, in traditional French 
thought. 
., CHAPMR II 
POSE'UTIONS AND APPROACHES 
Known equally as, dramatist and, as philosopher, 
M. Gabriel Marcel is one of the most noted members of tho 
Croup of contemporary French thinkers, which ificludes 
Al. Louis Lavelle and'Al. IZeneLe Senne and'which is working 
for the renewal of bntology. But whereas they9 for the 
most part, continueýalong, the lines of traditional French 
spiritualism from Deýcartes and Malebraj3zhe to Maine de 
Birans Ravaisson and Jules Lachelier, and arrive at a 
philosophy of Being considered as Pure, Act, Gabriel Alarcel, 
le ss systematic and more intent on the elucidation of 
concrete Being, has evolved a philosophy akin to that of 
Kierkegaard and the Existentialists; nearest to Kierkegaard 
in that his metaphysids. has opendd up the way'to theology 
and religion and cannot'be separated from, his ardently 
qatholic standpoint (his conversion took place in 1929); 
in shortl a system of antinomies expressive of the 
opposition between the world of objective thought and the 
world of true Selfhood, concrete Being and Existence, access 
to which is provided in and through, what Jaspers terms 
I'limit-situations" (Grenzsituationen) and Marcel "concrete 
approaches" (M). 7)ro_ches concre "tes) such as love, death, etc., 
situations properly dramatic in that'conditions of'time are 
transcended rat-her than annulled'and self is revealed to self 
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in immediate participation., 
Mv Marcel has recently published a text (1) vvhich 
throws considerable light on the fundamental attitudes in 
his intellectual and moral make-ulJ determining his philo- 
sophical developmenti 
mind to knowledgp of subjective and phenomenal states. 
From the first, the "thought of, a supra-sensible world 
I, - ýi dominated in a certain sense his spiritual deveiopment'19 
Perhaps the "co'nstant-11 of his mentality has been what 
he describes as'lun, 6 . attitude hostile et pres que me J prisante 
en face de llempirýsmell. This admissi-oh. thus baldly stated, 
mubt-not be misread. ' 'Marcel's-whole thought is built upon 
a Realism. But what tr aditional philosophy defined as 
"experience! ' alway. 
ý 
seemed to him a mere abstraction: 
I'Llexperrience telle que llont conque la plupart'des philosophes 
so presentait a moi comme impureq comme profondement 
suspecte. 11 (p. *294. ) Mat Marcel rejected fropi the 
beGinning, was the traditional, empiricism which limits the 
by which he means to imply the capacity of mind to know, 
even within the limits of sense-experience prop; rly defined 
and analypedg the realities presented to experience. 
fir-hilosopher, ce fut done sans douto pour moi de'ýs 11origine 
transcender. " (Ibid. ) 
Impatient v4ith phenomenalism, Marcel was no less so 
,,. With T: ýanscendental Idealism which loses itself in a world 
ý'(I) Regard en arriere in Existentialisme Chr4tien, by various 
-aut Paris, Plong 1947., 
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of abstractions and substitutes an ideal self for the 
concrete self that aloýe seemed to Tvlarceý the valid'object 
of philosophical thinking. Not only Spinoza, to whose, 
I 
doctrine he was always"strangely refractory", sýnd Hegel 
failed to attract, him, / but Fichte too by the-Ilimpossibiliteg 
par lui-melme insuffisamm6nt reconnue, ou il me semblait*etre 
de passer du, moi abso lu au moi concretj 'a ce que je ne 
pouvais me tenir de, regarder comme le moi, veritable. 11 (P., 295-) 
On the contrary, Schelling seemed to point the way to a new 
empiricism such as might satisfy his "appetite for the 
concret0. # 
J 
A tort ou h raison, il me semblait discerner 
I au contraireq au 
terme de llimýaense periple I 
accompli par SchellinG, une lumiere qui peut-: 
8tre un jour eclairerait ma propre route. 
Nly avait-il pas un chemin ardu qui permettrait 
d1acceder & un empirisme superieur, et de faire 
droit a cette exigence de 11individuel et du 
. 
concret que Je portais-en moi? En d1autres 
terMes, l1e. x 
, perience, 
loin d16tre un tremplin, 
nletait-elle pas pour moi une terre promise? 
(Ibid. I pp. 295-6. ) 
It is indeed thýough the later Idealism of Schel1ing 
that 1.1arcel will accede to his own type of Realism and,., 
transcending the premises of the Schellingian doctrineq 
constitute the philosophy of f eeling that provides the new 
and hiGher empiricism of Which he speaks. 
This "appetite for the concretVI was undoubtedly pre- 
determined'in the young-Marcel by the infl 
* 
uence of his ecLtly 
I education., , His, fatherl, nourished on the Positivism of 
'2aine,, Spencer, and Renang-was altypical 19th cLtury agnostic. 
t: 
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His mother having died in his childhoodshis aunt replaced 
her as the head of the household. The latter, a most,, - 
remarkable and lofty-minded woman, of Jewish origin but 
later a protestant convert, seemed to have imbibed that 
harsh moralism and cult of law common both to the Hebrew 
and the Protestants, and displayed in a rigorism of moral 
judgment and in a depreciation of nature and instinct: 
Nourrie des poetes pessimistes du XIXe siedle, 
de Vigny'd Mme Ackermann, elle avait une 
conscience aigu8 et comme implacable du non-sens 
vital; impossible a ses yeux de faire confiance 
a la naturet qui, si meme elle nlest pas mauvaise 
dans son 4ond, ' est du moins radicalement I 
indifferefite a 11oppositiondu bien et du*mal. 
(Ibid. P. ý300-) 
Closed to religious feeling as suchq his aunt was no less an 
agnostic than his father, in Marcel's ýiew, dnd both combined 
to stifle the forces of feeling and disrupt the natural-, 
communion of his mind with reality: 
Certes, on pput dire qutun irreductible 
aGnosticisme religieux Vtait comnun a monpere, 
et a ma tante, mais il ntdtait pasaffecte du 
meme siGne. Esth4tique chez ltun, ethique 
. chez l1autret 
il composait autour de moi une 
atmosphere instable et aride dans laquelleg 
ý. sans mten'rendre Uan compte, je sais maintenant 
que jai toujours respirif difficilement. (Ibid. ) 
Hence a constant state of hypertension, made the worse by his 
being an only child; his every feeling and action supervised, 
he was'at every moment subjected to moral judgment and 
directed in accordance with abstract imperatives: f1mon- 
enfanceq dio-jel'a. souffert d'un etat d1hypertension, et 
comme de, harcelement, 'interieur qui 'a certaihes epoques 
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attcie; nit un-paroxysme intolgrable. 11 (Ibid., p. 301. ) Even 
worse, in Marcel's viewt was the system which, with 
its classificýtions and abstract methods of teaching, 
creates around the pupil an "univers desertiquel. 
'These influences, in combinationj says Marcel, produced 
in him a fear and sense of 
in nameless terrors!, 1 I'll& 
pour moi a la vie spolairo 
informule de llirrevocable 
The sentiment of deathq so 
death and its proximity, manifest 
agoisse continuelle qui eltait liee 
t 
starticulalt avec un sentiment 
et de la mort, all (Ibid. 9 P. 303. ) 
important in! 'his later-philosophy, 
is already at. this e4rly date, as, it will be throughoutq 
associated not so much with the idea of an end or. accoýplish- 
ment, but with that of an"absence"t eýcperienced whenever the' 
contact with, reality and life is replaced 'by a system of 
abstractions and objective judgmentsq whether moral or 
intellectual: 
pense pas, je le r" '* te , que 
ia protestation Je ne epe 
exasperee que dressait ma conscience contre le 
r6gime abstrait et inhumain du lycee puisse se i' 
separer de celle, infiniment moins distincte, 
mais aussi plus ýrofondej quIeveillait au fond 
de moi le monde a la fois sillonne dlimperatifs 
, 
poir invincible ethiques et ravage'par un derses 
dans lequel on entendait malgre tout me faire-vivre. 
I de plus quo Me voici force de consýater une foiS _7 
penser, formuler, juger, au fond, clest toujours 
trahir. (Ibid. j P. 304. ) 
On the other hand,, his mother, although dead,; -did not 
an influence: "Independarnment des rares cease to exerdise 
'k, imaL; es pro'cises que Jai pu conserver d'elle, elle mlest 
rcr-tee pre'sente , myste'rieusement elle a toujours e*te' avee 
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moi. 11 (Ibid. 0 P. 302. ) In this influence from beyond the 
grave is prefigured Marcelts belief in spiritual presences 
made known in experience both normal and supra-normalg and 
their power to influence and direct. Apart from that, 
however, the memory, of his mother seems to have acted, ' 
from the earliest timeg as type and symbol of a reality, 
real, concrete, immanent in experience by,, /way of feeling; 
immediately kn6mq, in contrast with the system of abstractions 
proposed to him. Thus from the beginningl' a "strange duality 
at the heart of my life, 19 a. "qecret polarity between the 
o 
invisible and the visible, 19 between appearance and reality 
(termsýhe employs at the early'stage oihis thought when 
Bradley's influen6e ih apparent), bet-ween knowl'edge of! reality 
in its concrete vital essence. and knowledge of qbstractions, 
which is simply the former, degraded into "objeetivityll. 
I 
This direct experience of realityg however, Marcel knew 
in his childhood, through, travel, and principally when in'his 
ninth year hip family lived in Stockholm where his father 
was minister plenipotentiary; or at various periods during 
vacations'spent in the Bavarian Alps and elsewhere in Europe 
He indicates, howevero the peculiar character of', this 
experience and of his"Opassion spontanee pour les voyages etý,, ' 
pour la geographie's -He'found satisfaction for his inner 
need of the concrete only, in his visits to places charged 
with all the novelty of the unknown; 'he despised. the familiar, 
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the family holiday on the Loire or at Mont St IvIichel. But 
this not through snobbery but by reason of the spiritual 
need within him. This need expressed itself in the desire 
for communion with the concrete in all its ever-new reality 
wilich alone the distant could satisfyq as opposed to the 
familiar, whose reality has been replaced by the stereotyped 
abstractions of the ýguide-book. At bottom, then, was 
1111horreur precoce du deflore, l'idee ing4nue et absurde que 
aussi le non-f oule'l ce qui est eloigne dans llespaceg cle. stý,. 
A le non-profane, avec quoiýllbqe contracte une alliance, intime 
J* et enivree, au lieu. 
/que le proche, le familier est denature 
et souille par la couche d'adjectifs s,, tereotypes dont le 
recouvre chaque visiteur. dominical. 11 ! (Ibid. 9 pý 30501 
This predilection is at the orýgin of Marce, lls later 
distinction between Being and HavLnE (approximating to the 
BerGsonian one between the vivant and the tout fait). In 
short, it represents something more than-a mere psychological 
need, rather a metaphysical one. ý3ut in it is explicit 
another tendency of his later thoughtg the notion of a 
reality become "present" to mind by a certain trýansoending 
of space as of time, substituting for the abstract spatio- 
temporal categories a here and now or spatio-temporal instant 
wherein the concrete reality is grasped immediatbly-o 
Plais jo ne, -crois pas' me tromper en reconnaissant ,i malgrý tout dahs cette disposition le souci 
m0taphysique do decouvrir 11intime au coeur du 
plus distant, clest-a-dire ou fond non point 
do triompher exterieurement do llespace par la 
vitesse, mais de lui arracher un. secret spirituel ý. j 
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qui reduirait a neant sa puissance de 
segregation. (Ibid. 9 P. 305-) 
It Le monde m1apparaissait alors, et m1apparal 
sans doute encore aujourd'huil comme le lieu 
indetermind'ou il sla6ira-it dletendre le plus 
possible la zone du chez-soi, de r&uire au 
maximum celle de l1abstraitement con? u, ou du 
confusement imagine, du connu par ou -dire, - 
clest-a-dire en fin qe compte du non-vdcu., 
II 
(Ibid. 9 P. 306. ) 
These new metaphysi i cal 
categories of the, " presence" and the 
spatio-temporal here and now or metaphysical "chez-soill 
will later be established in Etre et Avoir and'Du Refus'a' 
I l'Invocation and elsewhere, but before,, becoming'categorieb 
I 
they were experienc4s. (pp- 306-7. ) In such commini. 
i 
on 
with natural sites 1.1arcel satisfied his "appetite for the 
concrete" not in any ýantheistic ecstasyg for such paritheism' 
is repugnant to him in that it is incapable 11dellaisser 
subsister la vie personnelle dans sa ple"nitude concrete", 
I 
(Ibid., P. 308. ) Nature and human life have at all times 
appeared to him as the realm of. upersonal" entities, in the 
liGht of a Pluralism rather thanla Monism. - 
On the basis of these inner promptings, Marcel's 
approach to the problems of philosophy and metaýhysics could 
not fail to be existential. ' As he himself says, the 
traditional problem of the existence of the external worldg 
or of the self for that matter, was not the form which his 
enquiry took. To deny the reality of the world seemed-to 
him absurd; it '113 not there that the supreme question lies: 
La vraie question nIetait-elle'pas bien plutot 




quIon slessayait vainement de contester, et 
si en derniere analyseq elle n1excedait pas 
infiniment celle du pur spectacle que nous 
avons sous les yeux? (Ibid., p. 308. ) 
The problem is, Given a'self existing in a world of persons 
and things existing 9 to define the mode of their existence. 
It is existence itself which constitutes. the problem, it 
is possible to grasp those realities immediately in their 
inner existential essence or, by the process of abstraction', 
convert them into objects and endow them' with a purely ideal 
existence. At the*rootýof Marcel's philosophy is a Realism 
vihich rehabilitates s against Idealism the immediacy of 
sensation and feeling and their'intentional character: i 
Peut-etre rendrait-on assez exactement compte de 
ce qui fut ma preoccupation'metaphysique centrale 
et constante en disant qut, il stagisbait pour moi 
de decouvrir comment le suiet, dans s4 condition 
N mehe de sujetq slarticule une r4alite qui 
14 cesse dans cette perspective de pouvoir 6tre V, 
J. I representde comme objet sans jamais cesser pour 
cela d18tre h la fois exige'e et reconnue comme 
rdalit4. De telles investigations nletaient 
possibles qula condition de depasser un psycho- 
logisme qui se borne a definir et a caracteriser 
des attitudes sans prendre en consid5ration leur 
visýe,. leurintentionnalite coner6te (Ibid. 9 P. 318. ) 
His is a philosophy of Being, involving 11une conception 
I. excluant toute r41fication de lletre, main, en-maintenant 
llontologique en tant que telll. ý` (Ibid. ) 
It is with the conditions under which this ontological 
or transcendent is revealed and the existent brought to 
light that Vlarcells philosophy is concerned on the one hand, 
and with the nature of this "existent on the other. With 
reL-, ard to'the latter, the realm of existence wili'prove-to 
I 
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be a realm of personal relationships$ of entities, of 
"presenced, made known within the : tield of experience to 
the existing subject and acting as obscure and mysterious 
Influences upon each other and upon the subject-mind, 
Marcel will define this type of relationship as "participa- 
tiod', such as obtains in the domain of drama where the 
terms of the relation remain distinct*while mergingt 
Je vois distinctement aujourdhui que je tendais 
ainsi a 6ubstituer un type de rapport concret et 
dramatique aux relations encore tout abstraites 
d1inherence ou dlexte"rioritd entre lesquelles la 
philosophie traditionnelle pretendait me 
contraindýe AL opter. (P. - 317v) 
lie has stated that his early interest, in drama and, music, 
vias of great importance in deterininine'; 
this conceptiolý' of. 
a "supra-relational" participation. - (P. 297-4) 
For Tilarcel,. the conditions ne, cessary for the revelation 
of the transcendent and for the latter to act as a "presence" 
upon the self are to be found in certain existential 
"situations" such as loveg sufferingg death. Here we 
remain within the limits of so-called normal experience, 
but, as he proceeds, his conception-of such expepience is 
enlarged to include the supra-normal. 
The influence of his experiences in the 1914-18 war 
viero decisive from this point of view. In August 19149 he 
replaced Xavier Leon as head of a service of information 
orGanised by the French Red Cross, One of his tasks was 
to trace soldiers presumed lost; and he came up against 






seemed to him unquestionable. The study of those phenomena 
was to lead him to admit the-value of prophetic foresight 
-memory and and, telepathy and to elaborate a theory of 
anticipation vAUch, applicable both to supra-normal and 
normal experience, would establish their function as 
"indices ontologiqued'. His later conversion (in 1929) 
did nothinG, to dissuade him from these vi, ows: it simply 
brought him to interpret-, such experiences anew as the 
products of allgrace". 'And he has never ceased to call 
for a greater attention to be paid to them by metaphysicians: 
nly % ,ý pas 
de domaine ou nous ayons un interet 
plus evident a prolonger les recherches de j 
- 
Bergson... Je persiste d'autre part ý penserique 
la, ligne de 
, 
d4marcation, trapee entre le normal 
et le supra-normal est pour le moins incertdine, 
et qulil suffit de considerer le normal sous les 
'clartes insolites que dispense une m(ý#tation 
suffisamment insistanteýpour qulil apparaisse 
lui-meme comme supra-normal. (P-ý313-) 
Finally, it must be observed from the 'outset that 
Marcel's philosophy will be-thp-contrary of a Naturalism or 
an Idealism'(apart from an Idealistic first phase), by its 
insistence on the fissure in human existence. The revela- 
tion of-BeiriG't of the true self' and of other personal 
realities is no mere natural pheýomenon. Ilan is at every 
moment subject to the temptations of objectivity and 
abstraction Vaereby he transforms'both his self and other 
selves into ciphers and treats BeinG as a "pure spectacle". 
Sin, error and treason are fundamental to the human situation 
and can be overcome only at privileged instants of passionate 
B5. 
existence, by a willed adhesion to BeinG seconded by Orace. 
It is precisely the error of Absolute Idealism, th e Hegelian 
in particular,, to relegate all such irreducible factors to 
the realm of Appearance by an arbitrary process, of Logicq 
to caus6 all that is most concrete and particular in existence 
to vanish in the totality of an Ideal Essence: 
Bien enten(lu, le probleme de llerreurs-celui de- 
la fauteg de la souffrance, se posaient h moi 
de la-facQn la plus aigue. La pensde d1un' 
Bradley, I 4uand il pqrle de transmutation, ne 
slaxerce-t-elle pas exclusivement sur des 
-contenus qui peuvent en effet se pr6ter 'a ui4 
rajustement, comme les morceaux mal. assembles 
d1un. puzzlq, qulil est touj'ours possible en 
principe do regrouper correctement? Mais-nly 
a-t-il pa's justement dans une erreur, dans ue 
faut-e, quelque chose. qiýi'sera toujours 
irrdductible a un pur dldmenP de contenu? I 
298-9. 
Marcel has always remained faithful to the qonviction 
that existence is prior to logical essence and thatq in 
keepinG with Schelling's doctrine, metaphysical', thinking is 
one with religious thinking: "Ainsi. apparalt. " he writesq 
'Ila convergenceýabsolue du metaphysique. et du religieux'qui 
% se revele des mes premiers ecrits. " (p. 318. ) 
0-0-. 0 -0 
Up to the present we have attempted to relate some of 
the main themes of Alarcelts philosophy to the%personal 
attitudes determined by his early life, thus Justifying 
Marcel's statement-that'lle developpement de ma reflexion a 
86. 
ete F dans une larGe mesure une, pxplicitation. Tout me semble 
810tre passe comme si je nlavais reussi. que proGressivement a 
traiter. comme matiere a reflexi6n ce qui nlavait 
Ad dlabord 
pour moi*qulexperience vecuelle (P. 319. ) But a more 
important topic at this stage isý6nevhich concerns the form 
Marcelts thought taýes for its expression. 
It takes the form of an exploration of those 11soubasse- 
ments concrets" (1ý. ýor that realm of transcendence*and Being 
immanent in the self's consciousness, in which the self 
participates or is"engaged" in the mode Of sensation and 
feeling and whose. pýesence it seeks to, 'recover by the 
elucidation of the existential situations or I'mysteried, of 
living and suffering wherein the self' is privileged to be at 
once the, actor and the knower.,. Gabriel Marcellis attitude 
to philosophy is throughout intenselyýpersonal. ' Endowed 
with a rich inner life which he defines as I'llintimite"avee 
soQIj he proceeds not as the rationalist by, analysis and 
I discursive reasoning; his reflection cI onstitutes a 
I'dialectique d'amour", a dialectic whos4-aim is to maintain 
the continuity of the inner life, a dialogue of ýhe. se14 with 
the self, an elucidation of the various situations of Being, 
whose dynamism and polypal structure must not readily be 
divided up by processes of objective t, houg. 4t and introspection: 
J6 tends a croire que je ne peux parler de mon 
ame que dans la mesure prdeise et exclusive ou 
ce ; rapport dlcaaour dont 'la dialectique eat a 
la fois llemergence intellectuelle et A quelque 
deorC la ncfGatioxi sl6tablit entre moi et moi-meme. 
Zoulement lea mots trompent. nly a pas ici 
(1) 
--Refuo a 
l'Invocation, Paris, Gallimardq 1940, P. 15- 
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des termes et un rapport entre eux. Il ya 
un ensemble rdellement indecomposablo (qui est 
11intimite avec soit la vie interieure). (1). 
This fidelity towards the inner self, thia effort to 
maintain its continuity which will be shown later to be 
itself the principal mode of access to Being, characterises 
Marcel Is works, both ithe Journ'al MAaphysiSLue and its sequel 
Etre et Avoir. None of his other works are properly 
systematic either; each proceeds by antitheses, question 
and answer, to and fro' movements of reflection. As for 
the Journalg Charles Du Bos has drawn attention to its 
dynamic mid prospeettve character which reflects the inner 
continuity. He contrasts'the laýter with the discontinuity 
of Maine de Biran's Journal on the one'hand and the retro- 
spective and dreamlike character of Amiel's on týe other (2). 
Fidelity to the inner self is not, at least primarily, 
to be taken in its ethical sense as fidelity to a line of 
conduct or a line of thought. The continuity which Marcel 
seeks to maintaing although prospective, is not successive 
nor linear, but rather springs from an ever-widening 
exploration of the self. Fidelity, which he will later 
attcLqpt to elucidate in its ethical aspects, is in the first 
(1) Journrd Jactaphysique, Paris, Gallimard, 1927, P. 146, 
(2) Gabriel filarcel in Essais et Poýmes, Pariag Plon (Le Roseau 
(110r)-, -19,311 IT. U4-5- Of. IvIarcel's-Note on Amielq Nouvelle. 
Revue francaise, 1930. 
place a metaphysical methodq an attitude towards Being. 
Metaphysics is esscntially an exploration of Being, in and 
throuGh a L: iven situation or situationsq resultinG in ever 
deeper peneýrations into the mysterious and obscure centre 
of selfhood. It is in this sense that M. Joseph Baruzi. 
describes the Journal Me"taphysiqueas being less the search 
after a system'of thought than "a transmutation of thouGht 
itself, (1). Marcel sees the origin of this subjective 
type of reflection in Schelling's philosophy of libertyq 
which elevates on the ruins of Idealism, a methodoloL-,, y of 
the c'6ncrete: 
Par la notion tout ensemble'ponerete, intuitive 
et cependant trans-historique quIa eue Schelling 
d1une dialectique des P14 ssances de lletre, on 
peut se demander si, pr6voyant llindvitable echee 
d1une philosophie des catdGories quelle quIelle. 
soit, il n1a pas conqu un type de speculation 
extremement neuf et qui encore a 11houre actuelle 
parait a peu pres vierge, cela malgre les I 
tentatives d1un Secretan 
I 
par exemýle - une , 
nOtaphysique qui reconnaltrait lletre 'a la fagon 
d1un dramaturge qui explore en tatonnant une 
situation donnee et sent fremir sous sa pression 
les ondes lointaines qui llont creee et 
11-irriGuent. '(2). 
Marcel Indeed has preserved-all that is best in the 
dialectical method. Dialectic as opposed to the discursive 
tactliod of formal. logic consists not in the application of 
rules, but in a progressive movement of the mind with regard 
to the reality it contemplates, which enables it, An a series 
of acto of transcendencog to 
, 
rid the real of whatever edntra- 
1 -"7j"c* V oZ tho Journal 1,, -Aaphy-, Sique, Nouv. Rev. frang., 1928. I, ý2ý 
f7(o(, T--, GT 
"on 
pa libert-d huTmij no de 6caelliEL,, transl. - by G. 
PQ. IA-C-zer, 11ouv. itow. franq. , 1ý261 P. 510. 
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dictions present an obstacle to its possession, and not only 
to incorporate it in its own substance but to be itself 
inco'rporated (1). But whereas dialectic is applied by the 
post-Kantians for the most part to abstractions, Marcel's 
dialectic is at work, on concrete reality. It represents 
an attitude of mind,! with regard to the concrete reality of 
experience,, a process of successive explorations, thanks to 
which the subjectparticipates in ever deeper levels of 
reality. As does that of Pascal, the dialectic of Marcel 
presupposes a theory of orders, an infinite series qf planes 
of reality which it/is the task of intuition to explore by a 
continuous approfondissement transcending at each and, every 
level the objective, phenomenal and temporal element which 
resists the absolute participation in the-Transpendent: 
Vapprofondissement metaphysique ne 
pas essentielloment dans la suite d 
par lesquelles-11experience au lieu 
prolonGer en techniques, slintimise 






Uhat Marcel mearlt"39 thenj by Ilintimite* avec soil' is 
primarily a type of relatio, nship of self to self permittinGo 
by a dialectic of a2profondissementg or inwardlý progressive 
reflection, a Gradual transcending of the intervening 
(1) Of. B. BrChier: "Elle (la dialecticlue) est vie spirituelle 
plus encore que mOthode; ell, e nlest pas 1tapplication de 
r6!. -les (Ilabord posCes; ello est faito do ddiaarches toujours 
notivelles, do decisions do llesprit qui refuse d9arreter i3on 
6 lai i dos contradictions ap ot elle no rend son . parentoo; objet pensablo, on lo purCcqýiitý, de contradictions que pour 01 arriver a iinc veritable liboratýon opirituelle. 11 (Ilistoire 
-chUo. -, o)hlo allemande, 
2Ad ed., Parisq Vrin, 19339 P. -T16. ) 
21 r 'je c r 
go. 
objective wrappingg so as to expose the hard core of BeihS 
upon which the self looks out: 
Une recherche du type que je vise en ce moment 
sera commandere par un certain enGagement qui 
ne se laisse d1ailleurs pas tres facilement 
formuler; il ne suffit pas de dire'que clest 
un voeu de fidelite a l1experience; '116tude 
des philosophes empiriques nous montre A quel 
I er point ce mot dlexp"ience est imprercis et 
fluctuant. - La philosophie, clest bien une 
certaine fagon pour l1experience de se 
Itre, de slappr" -, 'mais a quel reconnal ehender 
niveau dtdlle-m8me? et comment se ddfinira' 
cette hi4rarchieg comment slordonnera-t-elle? 
Je Me bornerai a dire qulil-faudra distinguer 
des degres non seulement 
- 
dans, lleriucidationg 
mais dans'ýVintimite avee soi/et avec l1ambiance 
avec 11iinivers lui-meme. 77 (R. I. ppS' 24-5. ) 
It is at. bottom a type of ascesis;, as known and 
practised by the'Augustinian theologia 
I 
ns such a. 6 Pierrl de 
4 
Berulle, and one izhich can only be accomplished Py a. mind 
become "intimate with itself" and so exercising its power' 
of aelf-*-dendding that its awareness, or illumination by 
dialecti 
. 9, 
is contemporary with its gradual purification: 
Je dirai qulj. l ya au centre de la re"alite' ou 
de la. destinee humaine un indpuisable concret 
dans 
" 
la connaissance duquel on no proFresse pas 
par etapes, et en faisant la chaioneg cor=e clest 
le cas pour une discipline particulidre, quelle 
quIelle soit. A cot inepuisableg chacun de - 
nous no pout accdder qulavec le plus intact, 
avec le plus vierGe de lui-m6me. Leo diffi- 
culte's d'ailleurs sont immenses. Llexperience 
nous montre, en effet 
't 
quo ces parties vierges 
qui peuvent seules prandre contact avoc 116ýro 
sont d'abord recouvertes par une foule d'apports 
I et do acories; pe nlest que par un long et I penible travail de-deblayage, ou plus exactement 
do purificationg par une ascese pe'nible quo nous 
parvenons bL les degaGer; et cleat d'ailleurs 
concurromment a ce'travail quo se forge 
_11in.,. 3trument'dia, lectique qui fait corps avec la 
-gI 
. 91. 
pensee philosophi ue elle-m6me et dont pourtant-, 
celle-ci doit toulours garder le contrOle. 
(R. I. pp. 
000 
Gabriel Marcel, belongs to a generation, including 
Charles Du Bos and Jacques Riviere, inspired by an ideal 
of total-and absolute sincerity., Apart, 'from Bergson-and 
Pe'guy, this Deneration had for its mastmý Andre Gideq who 
was the first to'combine'the virtues in this one virtue of 
sincerity, 'Ila veriie esthetique de. l'Evangilel, and to 
propo. se, the, dialogue avec soi as the ziecessary-philos6phic 
and esthetic discipline. Francois Mauriac, indeed, says 
in his essay on the Novel, that sincerity toward? oneself 
is the virtue of his generation (1). And it is undoubtedlyý, 
Jacques Rivie're who represents most fully this ideal, and hisý 
definition of sincerity and of its dialectic findYits very 
application in Marcel's thought. "La since"rite est un 
perpetuel effort pour creer son &ae-telle quIelle est. Rien 
de plus menteur que le spontane, rien do plus d-tranger a moi- 
meme.. * 11 nly a pas quo les autres qui pensent an moi; au 
plus profond de moi une basse et continuelle meditation, - et 
dont je ne saurai rien si je ne fais effort pour la connaltre: 
clest mon ýmo. Elle est. faible et fomme idaale; elle, oxisto 
a peine; je la sons comme un monde possible at lointain (2). " 
(I L'c Roman, qt ed. 'q Parisq Artiowi du livre, 1928, p. 12. 
(4ý Jacques RivAre, Do la sinc4rit(r envers aoi-m6met Now. - Rev. franc., Jan. 1912, pp. 6-7. 
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It is quite in keepinG With this ideal that the J, ournal 
form should be found the most adequate mode of expression. 
The Journal intime, indeedt is the natural form for that 
dialogme'of self with self-which constitutes the medium of a 
bubjective reflection such as Marcel'sq or indeed of a pure 
philosophical thinking in general. philosophe, " says 
Jean Lacroix, "est par excellence llhoriýne 
, ýdu, 
dialogue!,, just 
as 'Ila pensee est ýin dialogue de 11&ie elle-m6me avec-elle- 
I 
meme (1). " 
To bring out fully the inner nature of Marcel's intro- 
spection and of his/dialectic it will be of value to compare 
them with some other important and classic examples of; the 
Journal Intime. And'firstq bbfore taking some examples 
from among his contemporariesq a vvord might be gaid by Way 
of comparison with the Journals of' Maine de B, iran and Amielq 
forg as Du Bos has suggestedg it is those names which 
inevitably come to mind When we read Marcel. 
What choxacterises Maine de Biran's Journal Intimeg-as 
Du Boo has pointed out, is the sense of discontinuity. No 
oile, has had a C; reater sensitivity to the dualitj upon which 
his philosophy is built and which opposes within the human 
mind the affective, passive'elements on the one hand and the 
active force of will on the (5ther. His own inner life is 
cIvir-acterised by the slaverj to those passive states of. mind 
eludinU. - the control of the will; ý and his Journal is the 





history of a self subjected to the inrush of 'Ila vie 
exterieurell tuid tossed about on the sea of sensational and 
organic impulses that break the continuity of the self and 
exclude the possibility of any spiritual realination. The 
entry of 6th Mayq 18159 testifies to this state of inner' 
disruption: "Je voudrais suffire a' tout, tout saisir, tout 
faire, tout'lire a- la fois; je vais pre"cipitamment dlun 
objet a l1autre, jq quitte ma lecture pour en. prendre une 
autreg je glisse sur tout et n1approfondis rien. Il semble 
que mon bien-etre intellectuel'et moral', la ve'rite que je 
cherche, le repos eý la satisfaction interieure de llesprit' 
vont so trouver dans chacun des livres, que je feuilletýe et 
% 
consulte tour a tour, -comme, s: L ces biens nletaient pas'en. 
moi et au fond de mon etre ou je devrais les chE)icherg en 
attachant une vue fixeg penetrantel soutenueg au lidu de, 
glisser si rapidement sur tout cc que d1autres ont penseq 
.1A-I, 
ou sur cc quo J'ai pense moi-meme en divers temps (1). 11 
In this respect Biran anticipates Proustlin his analysis 
of tizac Is devourinG power. His Journal introduces what we 
miCht call, borrowing theýphrase from Du Bos, the "pathe"Pique 
spirituel". The majority of Journaux Intimes are*character- 
Ised by this element of the pathetic, 'which robs them of the 
hio-rier tragic note symbolic of valid metaphysical experience; 
Journal Intime, ed. Valette-11,11onbrun, Paris, Plon, Val., Jý 
27), p. 149. Of. Aprilq 1821: "Nullite complete, 
absorption du, moi depuis la fin de ma-rs jusqulau 20 avril it ' 'ý I Ibid., Vol,, lyt-19319 p. - 253 Of. Marcel's review of t9he 
-ýirst volumol Rouv. Rqv., : franýý, 1927, 'pý. 685 
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for, at bottom, the pathetic is the external si6m of a mind 
riveted in its reflexion'to a "psychologisia! ', (when as in 
Biran, and later Proustg. this, psychologism is transcended, 
it is by virtue of a mode of 'dontemplation which takes us 
out of the Journal Intime forM', 'for it transcends wholly the 
realm of spiritual dialectic). 
I In Amiel's Journal this pathetic tak., Os a very precise 
and most significant form. The' tragedy'of Amiel liesq as 
Paul BourGet'has so well analysedg in the over-development 
of a povier of introspective analysis which corrodes and 
ultimately destroys4he will to action and even the sense or. 
capacity to grasp reality. "Mon esprit est le cadrelvide 
d1un millier d1imaGes effac'e**es... Il n''a plus le savoi'r. il 
est devenu methode. Il slest ethe'riseq algebrýse (1). " 
His self he only sees in spectacular manner as the fluid and 
ever-chanGinr, succession of states of mind. "Plus 11esprit 
est esprit, plus 11 est omnimode; le'proteisme est son 
privilege et sa mesure. 11 (9th Aug., 1880), (2). It is in - 
this perpetual passivity with respect to whatever affects 
.41 him, his 11 esprit de metamorphose", or 11, proteisme that the 
chief quality of ýWiells mind lies. lAmiel nletait pas un 
regard fiýe: tout 'a 11inverse il etaitýune temp4rature - un 
des barometres enregistreurs les plus delicats qui se soient 
jamais vus, dans le 
, 
domaine des sensations de 11 esprit. - 
(1) ,..,, Uo-Uod 
by J'aul BoUrget, Essais de ps; Zcholofrie contem- 
poraille, Parioq, Pl6n, 1924, voL-, 1: 1, P. P-69. '(Tj j-, 'raL-ncntn dlun Journal Int'meq ed. Bernard'Bouvierg Paris, 
; 3'uocl,: g 1927, Vol. II, p. 295. 
"1 
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Co=e le personnaGe de La Bruyere, -Iij se succede a lui-m6mel: 
I 
il nous dit sans cesse qulil n1existe pas de forme de vie 1, 
e. 
% 
qutil ne puisse epouser a volonte (1). " So that his type 
of self-teflexion or introspection does not enable him to 
grasp his true self. nor to construct his personalityl for 
the activity ot his will is constantly subjected to the 
passivity of, his affective life. Hence, his Journal. as 
Du Bos says, is not the instrument of any spiritual progress: 
"on ne surprend pas chez lui la moindre trace dune. modifica- 
tion dans la ligne interieure: plus exactement il nly a pas 
de ligne: Amiel coAtinue a marquer le pas jusquta la ; in (2). 11 
If now wo consider tile aim his Journnl r3ets itself, we 
discover tha: U , starting from an acpiration to self-kno' Wledgeq 
it ends up ihatype of arid self- cent emplati on. "Son Journal, " 
says BourGetj 'lest 11interminable monologue d1un Narcisse 
psycholouique (3) Vie find this cle, arly marked in the 
following passaSe where he defines the aim of his Journal: 
I'Le but a lui assignerg clest de n1avoir aucun but particulierg 
mais de servir a tout... Ain'si entendu, le Journal est le 
mod'e'le des confidents, reve' par les poe'tes comiques-et 
tragiques: il ne sait rieng ', est pret a toutq ecoute 
adx., iirabler,. ient, et pourtant sait consolerg conseiller et 
Gronder. 11 (10til Ma He conceives it simply ýy 
1855. ) 
(1) C'harles Du Bos, Journal (1ý21 -23), Parisq Correa, . 
1946, 
2 Ibid. 16. 
3 Op. cit., pp. 271-2. 
4 E'd 3ouvier V l I I t d , XLV . , o q n ro .9 P. . , 
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ý ik as a mearis of liberationg as a confidfnt able to calm and 
console for the f rustratibns of life. But this it does 
precisely becauseq substituting retrospective dreaminG foý 
action, it allows a type -of contemplation. I'Le journal 
clest le confidentq le consolateur, le medecin du solitaire... 
Glest une sorte de sommeil, conscient, ou cessant d'arir, de 
vouloir, de nous tendre, ndus-rentrons dans ltordre universel 
et nous cherchons 1ý paix. Nous echappons ainsi au fini. 
Le recucillement est comme Un bain de VaMe dans la contem- 
plation, ot le journal nlost'qie le recueillement, plume on 
main. " (28th Jan. 
ý872. ) (1). 
The already mentioned multiformity preciselyq according 
to Amiell by substituting the universal for the'particular, 
the absolute for the relative (ýve here see the T: Panscendental 
Idealist) procures this'release'ý, from the vicissitudes and 
A% 
suf f orings of the f inite lif e. ',,, ý"Je revions dc'moi-meme a 
lletat fluidej vagueg inde"termine-9 comme si toute forme e'tait 
une violerice et une defiguration... ma personnalite a le 
minimum possible dtindividualite. *". En 
Aant moins un hommog 
jo r-,, uis peut-otre plus prc*s de 11homraeg peut-etrý un-peu plus 
homme. En etant moins individu, jo suis plus especb. 11 
(14th Aut, 1.1869. ) 
this contemplation liberates from willedt purposive 
self-realisation and from the f inite particular individuality. 
Atid this is only posoible by dint of Amiel's retrospective 






attitude to his'self tbrouGhout the Journal. It involves 
the suppression of all sense of futlitY, so as to arrest 
time , as it were, and allow the present 
to englobe the past 
and the-self to view itself as in a sense complete and 
absolute. And this past raust itself be-felt as "tout fait". 
and as irrelevant to present and prospectiveactivity. Du 
Bos has observed rightly that "Amiel eprouve son ame comme 
un poids bien plutoftt que co=e, un elan (1). " And =ýany-,. _ 
passages of the Journal bear witness to this retrospective 
dialectic., and did Amiel not define his Journal well when 
je he wrote: "West le livre des souvenirsl et'llheure ou 
p 
lui rends visite est 11heure du recueillement. ", ý (30 Dec. 
1851. ) (2). 
At this levels we feel, dialectic ceases to be as such; 
it Vanishes in a species of contemplation or "dread' Which 
i-s the exact antithesis of a process of self-exploration, 
self-knowledge and above all self-realisation. At such a 
point it is meaningless to speak of "sincerity,;, which is 
properly an ethical virtue (3)- 
1) Op. cit., p. 26. ý2
Ed. ' Bouvier, Vol. I, Introd., p. XLIV. This retro- 
spective dialectic of Amiel's may be described othervrise, as 
a. movement of regression towards a point where all tem.,;. )oral 
distinctions vanisa and where personality itself is trans- 
cended. 
. Lný 
On Amiells Journal see also P. Mansell Jones, French J3 7-1 rospectives, Cam rdge University Press, 1937. -71y7vill 
be noticea=at the works of Senancour and I. -laurice de Guerin 
have not been given any special ihention. Their Journaux are 
, less interesting as examples of. dialectic than as media r 
cosmic experience. Cf. Albert Bef,, uin, L'Ame Romantique et 
le R8vej Paris, Cortiq 1946, Chp. XVII. 
II". 
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Vie miLýht turn now to two contemporary examples of the 
journal Intimet a study of. which ]provides further useful 
clýta for our -purpose. 
The ( first is that of Charles Du Bob, with whom, if on17 
by their conversion to Oatholicism'and co=on passion for 
the spiritual lifeg Marcel has much in common. In spite 
of Du Bos's declaraýion that he 
has"'gr6vai out of" Amielt 
II 
there is =ch of t4ý Amiel in him. 'Du B6s, however,, has 
known the mystic experienceg. the state of llexaltatio3V wheng 
. overcoming time and space, and 
transcending his contingent 
self, he enjoys fulz possession of that "second reality" 
/* which lies pure, eternal and uncorrupt beyond the senses-and 
the discontinuity of the-sensual life. I'Llexaitatiori de 4 
plus eIn plus pour moi constitue ltunique eirtat agant caractere 
secondeq domme je terminal et plenier... Cette realite 
ltappelle toujours, - cette vie superposde a la vie qxti lui 
est parallele, mais libe"ree semble-t-il de toutes ses lois 
et qui surtout paratt avoir des dimensions tellement autres 
ou la notion de temps mesurable, diespace eirconscrit, a l1air 
de choir et d'Atre apercue dans sa ch ute, aý* travers Je ne sais 
quelle brusque deoch. ir'ure; teýle est la region qutil faut a 
44 la fav-eur der, -recrudescences frequentes et toutes'ßpontane'Pes 
de 110"tat lui-memog explorerg eclairer (1). 11 
Froia these last'words it would seem that Du Bos, aims at 0 
constitutinG an exploration of this zone of'inner sel: r-ho0d; 
(1) Op. c: Lt. 0 pi 264. 
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in actual fact he did not accomplish his aim. He projected 
a book to be called Sondages, whose title indicates his 
purpose. The sort of introspection he envisaged'therein is 
referred, to in his Journal: it would aim at clarifying this 
experience of the Absolute. and attaining progressive aware- 
ness of self-hood at, ita deepest levels. It would therefore 
be necessarily retrospectiveg for the experience of self- 
possession outwith 
I 
time is conditional, as we have said, on 
the closing of time's circle. - Thus in, choosing the ýitle of 
his - bookq he tells usýq h6 rejected such possibilities as 
explorationt voyageý etc. 9 because they prospective 
rechercheq dAouverte, $ý action: 11tous 
les mots synonymes de. I 
voyaget, explorationg etc. 9 sont a rejoter parce qulilý 
donnent ltidee du, large et par 1a' meme'de lfaveýir'alors que 
ce sont cellos au contraire de la'descente en profondeur et 
du pasb'el qu1il importe. de cowniiniquer (l). 11 In short, such 
a I'dialectique d1approfondissement" as envisaged would be 
essentially retrospective. . Strýctly speaking, the attempt 
would have been'inevitably doomed to failure, for the absolute 
qua absolute (independently of the temporal and'willed effort 
towards this state) is not the subject Qf dialectic. For, 
6 
as Du Bos hiias6lf sawt such a state is essentially "trans- 
moral":, "je me repre"sente ltdtat mystique comne essentielle- 
ment trans-moral (2). tl As such# it transcends the realm of 
(1) Ibid. 9 p. 257. Hotice that the title "voyagdl rejected by Du Boo in precisely the term preferred by Marcel in his 
Homo Viator. 
(2) Ibid., 1). 263. 
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endsq of spiritual protýress'q of willed effort in time. if 
we take Du Boo's Journal as it stands we find it characterised 
by a disContinuity of the spiritual life. Du Bos remains 
"haunted by the mystic state (1). 11 Between'this ideal and, 
his normal spiritual life there is no mean; the latter is 
subject to a constant discontinuityg reminiscent of that of 
Amiel and particularly Maine do Biran. "Je lui disais en 
substance que jt eiýtais a la lettre e**Pouvarite" de la discon- 
tinuite" de mes e/tats inte"riours. Le mot de La Bruyere: 
.4 'Il se succe"de a lui-memel devient always more dangerously 
I true of me... Sentimentalement le moins (-ýXaduql des etres: 
rI 
everythinr, f-, iven-at onceg whence an immediate Jumping 61se- 
whcre. Et comme il en va de meme dans le domaine\de lle6pritg-, 
4 
comme penser essentiellement pour moi est sentir,, I cannot 
abide by anything (2). " 
In sho. rtq a subjection to the instant divorced from 
past or anticipated future and excluding all possibility of 
construction. And it is this latter experience which con- 
stitutes the introspective substance of the Journal - the 
"Pathetid, of spiritual discontinuity even to th: e, point of 
abuse. "Le danger sans doute - et'je ne pretends nullement 
i 
en 6tre e-xempt - clest un'. involoritairo abus du pathe , tique 
sp irituel (3) 
Du Bos is'a curiousý,,, example of an introspection which 
1 Ibid* 
2 Ibid., p. 403. 





hovers between a transcendentalism where the dialectique 
d'approfondiseement vanishes as a method of explorationg 
. and a "psychologismil where it does not yet come into play. 
In both cases, the conception of a dialectic which is at one 
and the-same time a type of rellexion and what Joseph Baruzi 
calls a "metaphysical effort" (1)9 giving full force-to the 
word effort (that is self-creation as well as self-revelation), 
is lost. 
It wouldq howeverg be unjust to consider onlyt as*we 
have been doing, the Journal (1921-23) and leave out of account 
the wider Extraite d1un Journal (1903-28) (2)9 especially as 
the latter cover the period of his conversion. Yet iý 'emig 
we thinkq be shown that the problem ha: s only changed il form. 
Here too the religious experience of communion is the jeentre 
around which his thought revolves, those "moments dle4panche- 
mentq aleffusion metaphysiqueq ... moments, ou l1allegre va-et- 
, vient 
de la pensee fait confluer, en Dieu le p6int do d6part ; 
et le point dtarrivee; - (3)" that state which is still 
beyond dialocticq Where DU Bos can, say., "Clest que Jo ne, 
pense pas, des pensees me viennent: tout'mýes"6 donne, et 
rien nlest conquis, (4), 11 But between th6se momenta 6iiiinmed q 
up in the apprehension "deus. -inestli, and the moral life, " ,4, 
", 
there still remains a gap# even if -the latter is no longer,, a 
(l)- Roview of Gabriel'AlarepVs Journal metaph ysique Ncu v. . Rev. f rang. f July, . 1928. ý2) Extrait1q, dI un Journal , (1908-ý 28) 9 
`Paýisq -Coýrga, 1931# _ , 1 auGment6e. 
(3) Ib f p. ý54. - (4) Ibido, 84., 
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state 6f intermittencee The duality is now between 
contemplation and a moral reflexion superimposed upon it. 
Become conscious of hib liability to be swept away in 
the gust8 of feelingg as he so-, wel: l described in his previous, 
Journa. 19 he has come to recognise 
ýhe necessity for him of a 
continual discipline and 11tensiod'. "Toute mon ethique est 
1 d1un mopaliste/franýais - je crois a llantipode, de ce consei 
. 
que clest, avarol 'Il faut rlisser la vieg non llappuyer*.. ý , 
' Peprouve chaque jour davantage le besoin de l1appuyerg et . i " 
surtout de la serrer (1)111 - Without iliat his Personality is 
subject to dissolutlong "La aetente slaccompagnei toujours 
s, * chez raoi d1un abandon et, comme dtuno p6rte totale de rýa " C 
personnalite reelle (2). 11 
It is here that dialectic, and introspectioý proper come 
into play. They, are, exercised upon the spiritual experience 
in order to provide therefrom the means for moral accomplish- 
ment. But, they come after: this experiencei "Une fois la 
- P" ", 
, conversion pleinement accomplieg clest une 
forme de saiAtete I ""'. 
qui se substitu6 a la pensget- plus'precisementg'jointe 
i 
6tre vie -quotidienneg la, desormais, et comme, adherente A . -no 
pensee est, toute acquige., pour... ce travail du modelage 'intime-; 
a 'plang de, ce,, trairail V introspection, telle que j "ai Ott son , 
eSSaye ej de ýla, definirq .. rest -dt uf1 point de; vue chretieni, =e , . , , , 
precieuse, .,. ',. And 4they, are, exercised, retr artisane (3) , 
11 , Ibid. `# 2- Ibidk*'1,. p6 113i, -'ý- 0 lbid, 'j 'pp 349-5 
103. 
spectively too upon the subjeetts acts; in this, says Du Bos, 
opposed to Amiel Is introspection. I'Llintrospection dd. type 
-AMielq clest-a-direg ant4rieure a tout acteg me parailt vaine; 
11introspection qui suit 11acte - bon OU mauvais, infinime' nt 
feconde., je, tend&de ýplus Je me- connaisq non point directement 
ýniplma croiro quo llon ne pout pas ae cOnnaltre directement, 
mais a la faveur de mes exaltations dtune partq de mes chutes 
aut ou de mes d4sastres. de ltý re; - et mon progres, clest de 'N 
teftir compte des daux termes 
In short, the role of 'ýthe spiritual, ' dialectic or 
I 'ion is declared distinct from theý religious mid meta- reflex 
physical e. -, periences it is'ýethlcal purely and simply. it 
j 
is not$ as it will be for Marcelq one 
ýdth the rzietaphy 
ap rofondisseriient. Du'Bos then still'exhibits ý duality as 
beti*ieen the religious'and-morýl. liýe, as between contemplation 
and reflexionj'and one which, lio expresses most revealingly 
when he'ivritds Ije suis ou en ýýtat diactivite" intellectuelle I r, (", 
Plus Ou moilis pre*4s de la surface, et accompagneet. de ceIý; 
'I 
onscienc R X-q11 
ou alýrs dans, liautomatisme Purýv'Vl, de' plus en plus rarement , ý1 '"', 4 
tirviunnent, les moments do bion-e'ýreAe ltincon66ie3lt 
epaissiosant, pour ainsi dire a orsonl3aliteg la stabilisent -, t 
et par la meme, 'la construisent par", en dessous 
Thus Du-Bosts'dialectic tends to operate in a'sort of 
void-" a m6ral void but. stjlf, -a: voidý'-- andý do*es, -, nýt be come - 
identified'"With, the activ6'j", cons tructive, forces of! his), 
'Ibid. 326-7 'J iI 
2ý Ibid. ', 
-jj 
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spiritual ex. perience. As, are su lt 0 his mor al 
whole in subject to a certain artificiality; 
life as a, 
an Yartif icial 
. 
that, could only be overcome ifq on the one handq the 
spiritualfexperience ceased to be more contemplationg and, 
.. on 
the other, his reflexion ceased to be merely retrospective; -1 
ifq in short, both were merged and took the form of a &adiAal, 
brinGinG into awareness and into efficacy,, within the 
structure of temporal effort and the moral life itself, of. -, 
the hidden, obscure, powers of, transcendence. The-dialogUe 
of Du Bos is, at bottomo, (and its grand P ur as well as its 
weakness lies thereiA) the dialogue of vision. The 
judGment he passes on Gide and-, himself" less valid of 
aide,, 
is penetr, ating-and. final., in its application to his ownjcase. 
'. ý 
4 
"Des etres comne vous ot moi,, -, esprite critiquest auto- 
critiques surtbut (jp,, me refuserýi toujours A voir, lq, des, 
defauts) --soht des etres, dO,,., dialogueq et,., non, -, des etreS e, 
There is finally. anothet manipulator of, the intro- 
spective methodq*using the Journal kormt whose importance is, 
E; reat for our study namely* Gide. Although bel6nging to the 
, -, --, -precediAg generation as, th'Almasterll of, "sincerity" hilýz e''. e1f, 
the author of. . a, 
Journalq., noý'to,. mention, such works, as Les 
CahiernAtAhdre Vlalterq,, etcaýqý--, which beiont-properl to the 
Journal, E; enrpq'I Gidel, qýiplqypý, ýa,,,, diblectic as' thorouebly etbical 
as A-larcel0s'g'--,,, iin,. the,, genso,, tha' it aims,,, at' selfrerea'tion "i 
, "Y' 
ý1 05a , 
through self-knowledge. Yet this dialectic involvesq to a 
Greater extent than any examples. taken heretofore, a 
"p. sycholoGis-mu vihoseýinner implications are most significant 
for the student of-the Journal Intime. 
Giaets . wholeýeffort isq in'the words of Edouard in 
Los Faux Monnayeurst to"agir selon la plus grande sincerite'19 
and for that to "redo"Couvrir audessous de lleltrp factice, le 
nalf". By destroying the artifical forms in which the self 
moulds itself by subjection to moral and'other, lawsg it, can, 
eL 
71, 
ý, 0-, I 
rediscover its essence, its purity as spontaneity and 
, Gratuitous choice, 
its inner dynamism. "Tout choix, 11 we 
read in the Nourritures Torrestres, 'lest effiayant Luýnd on 
y sonue.. 6 La necessitd de 11option me' fut tOUj6urs 
intolerable;, choisir mlapparaissait non tant el#e quo 
. repousser ce que 
je n1glisails pas... Jo ne faisais jamais 
que ceci ou cela (1). 10 Become an "esprit non prevenVI and 
wholly and absolutely*onets self: "Ouig 11homme devient ce 
qutil pre"tend e"tre; mais pretendre, e4tre ce qi; e llon nlest 
pas, cleat une pre"tention toute moderne; precisftml, ctest 
proprement la pre"tention chretienne. 'J'e ne dis pas quo 
llintervention de la vOlonte' neýpuisse rien dans la formation 1, ý"', 
ou la deformation de ltetre, mais le pal'on no croyait pas 
devoir etre different do ce`quOil dtait (2),, ý, Gidel however , 1"44 
once lie had rid himself , of. the '. Nietzschean 'influence so , 
(1) Tics 11ourritures terrestreq*ý'3rd ed. 0 Parisq Mercure do Prwico, 1597o IT. 16,77, * * (2) Nouveaux kGtextesiý*: Pýri6i,. '. Mercure'de'irirancel, 19110 P. 16. 
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apparent in his early workq interprets this state of childish 
nalvety in terms of New Testament teaching. If the first 
moment of liberation from artificial moral codes is the 
yieldinG to each and every desire'in all its'freshnessq at 
its deepest level of spiritual experience it becomes the 
cult of desire or rather the cult, of love independent of its, 
finite objectn. He prefers to pobsessionwhat he calls the 
clarGissement sans fin de 11objet do ltamo4i, (1)4" Of the 
I. Tourritures themselves he says: "J'ai Vair dty precher 
11he'donisme, mais les frandes'ames ne'sýy peuvent arreter; 
ce qui doit les uneri clest ltIdee non le plaisir. Ntimportel 
les ! Iourritures y menent; elles enseignent deJa une f6 ýme 
nouvelle de devouement (2). " The metaphysic of., desir6 
becomes a metaphysic of renunciation or, as M. J? an Hytýer 
puts it, 1111hodonisme se transforme en ascetisme voluptueux 
Gide's motto*- "naltre a nouveaU' - takes its full 
niLmificance in the light'of the Christian doctrine of 
spiritual rebirth. 
0 
Novi, Gicle's exploration of the self, does involve a 
dialectic and, as he himself says, no easy one., ' BAt its 
nature is extremely interestinG. It may be characteriS'ed 
in the first place, to use Alarcel's tenag as an "inotantane- 
icrOll for it ciabodies an effort to destroy all that is form 
(1) RCf1O. -CLOnS tsur quelaues points de litterature et de moralet Oeuvros compl6besq llaris-t =, tions de, la liouv-ýýev, ' 701- 11 (1953), P. 433* 
ý2ý hobtre a A. R. 
Aj 
Uctoberý310tr 1897s Ibid. 9 482.1 3 1Eýier'aj Oharlot# 1938o P. 20, 
-'T', 77 
: 
ll: "', ý""; 
"", ýý, ý', 
"Al 
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(in that rcminiscent of, Valery's Monsieur Teste)q and that 
means the systematic elimination of what is retrospective (1), 
and even properly prospective in the life and experience of 
the self (for the subtraction of the object from the desire 
is equivalent to this)t in such a way as to leave a self 
completely absorbed in the present of its desireq and at 
each and every instantg novel. - "Nattre 
'a nouveau. " 
It is true that at the moment of his short-lived passion 
for Rutcsian Communism and his attempt to infuse into his life 
social purposeq he writes: I'depuis deux ans a peu pres, ep 
reaction contre moi-'memeg J'ai soucý de situer dans, le temps 
iaes pensees (2). 11 But this effort tq "situate himsel It in 
a constructed web of duration was and'is c6ntrary to w at he 
calls his "anti-historkal nature". Any such attempt-appears I 
to him equivalent to the imposition of an artificial form 
upon the essential formlessness and heteroE; eneity of the self. 
The follovrin(; revealil-C passaGe, defines in a nutshell his 
1)instantancisidl : "Gesser de tenir ccýmpte de soi-memel durant 
des jours, des, seintiinesq des- mois. Se perdre de vue. . .. 'tTne , 
conscience trop continue 
'j 
jtai craint'souvent qtitelle 
rattachat trop loLdquemefit notre futur au passe, quielle 
3 empechalt le devenir 
Dds is a dialectie'which remains within the framework 
M. Hytier observes pe3? Zpicaciously that there is one theme Gide has never exploitedl amely that of repentance. (Op. 
cit., p. 23. ) 1 
12) Eouvelled; Paf-cs do Journal (1932-35)9 Paris, Gallimard, 
9360 p. 138. 




of_an Immanelltism; its value as a metaphysical exploration 
is limited, if by'that we imply transcendence on the one 
hand, and continuity of self-creation on the other. But- 
it. is even move: for it is less ethical, in its. nature than 
4. 
pstheticý M. Gouiran refers happily to Gide! s "instant 
esthetiquell: Gide himself speaks. of sincerity as 'Ila v4ritO" 
osthotique do 1'Evangile". And this quality of I' estheticimill 
is what typifies Gide's self-exploration. throughout. -Ve 
may aGree fully with . 11, Hytier when he 'declares Gide Is work 
is from beginning to end lyrical (1). It is the mo6t 
-important examiple o4lan esthetic.. 
introo ectiong. wholly 
removed from the metaýhysical, and, onto osicalýi3itrospe tion 
we have now to 
0-0-, 0, - 0 
A compa-bison of Marcel's Journal (using the term in its 
widest, isense) with the prec6diiig throws the most interesting, 
light on the natureýof his I'dialectique d1approfondissement". 
Generally speaking, as-we, have seeno'hislýýe of self-, 
.,, explorationý4ms at a progressive 
revelation of the trans- 
.,. cendent and 
its communicating,, world of transcendent persons. 
It is a, "mothod of i=anence" ,,, to, emp, loy Blondells -berm, one 
Vihich seeks to", explore the-, transcendent, at the core of 
immanance. ý, Vlhat' now 'are `ýthe; 'cOnditionsi according to*'. Marcel. 
(1) 0 pp 
ýo 4 
., I "ý 
-ý; W--ý 
1096 
of such a self-revelation? We raust refer here to a most 
interestinG text (1) where Marcel analyses the "sense of 
, depth" 
Ile there affirms that the 
ý, Isense of depth" involves 
ýference. In the first both a spatial and a. temporal rO 
placet it includes the n6tion, 6fýa I'lointaixYl, but where 
distance does not imply the sepa3ýation or'disjunction vrith 
which it is necessarily associateaýin abstractq conceptual 
space. "Ce lointain ntest pas eprouve par nous comme un 
ailleurs, -comme un slautre part"o. -Ae dirais bien plutot que 
clest un lltouý pred'. 
4. Ce lointain stoýfre 'a nous comme a 
11interieur d1un certain domaine dont" je, serais tente dý, 
I 
dire qulil est nostalgiquement no4tre (2). 11 
' In the second place, it includes a temporal reference to 
both past and future. Profundity 'is 11*comme une plongefe 
intuitive sur ce qui n'e peut e'tre atteint que grace a une- 
recherche qui so developpe dans la duree On the one . 
hand, the present of"deep" reflexion is retrospective: 
"Butre pas., -jc' et profondeur, 
il existo une affinite certaine. 
In some -aay the whole past of the self is effectiý, e in the 
1) ljo 3"entiment du profondq Journa- Metaphysique III 
Yontaine, no. 519 April Fr -TI946. 
'ýof course* 'is bound 2) UP- cit-9 P. 533. This conceptionq 9 , up with the notion of an Ilespace vect"t as opposed to con- ,, 
ceptual space; a distinction anticipated by Bergsong'as 
Idarcel underlines, but amplified by E; Minkowski. On the 
Importance. of. this concept in klarcelle philosophy seeýbelow, 
Chp- )rIIlp G L)ace2 Time and Existence, . (3) Ibid. 
1z; 'T" 
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present whether by repentance or otherwiEje (1). On the 
other hand, the present is prospective, for it bears in 
itself all the purposiveness of self-realisation. Yet 
again$ this future whi6h the dialectic of introspection 
anticipates is itself conjoined with the past: I'Llavenii? 
qui est ici anticipe nlest en aucun cas evoque, comme pure 
innovation par rapport aux donnees actuellesq'I thus differing 
from the element of prospectivity or futurity, such. as it 
exists in Gide's introspection. Indeed, past and future 
of the self meet within the present of del2th: - 'Ile passe' et 
ltavenirg ausein du *ofondq se rejoign6nt dans. -une zone qui 
e.,: 4, t a cc que J'appelle le present cc qAe lIIci absolu ebt al 
111ci continGent. 11 The present 
% 
of self-explorationg once 
.1 thi. -. han attained dept transcends then the disgontinuity 
of the self to states by containing 'within itself all its 
states, just as it transcends spatial separation; in shortg 
this present io the focal point wheie the transcendentg 
eternal, essential self 
"et cette zone ou le ma: 
coafondreq comme tout 'a 
I clest a Wen pas douter 
is revealed and realised in time: 
Lntenant et le alors tendent 'a se 
llhei; re le proche et le lbintain, 
ce que nous appelona-lleternite. li 
This-dialectic, therefore, is properly'metaphysicali 
L; url. ), -lssin(,, the framework of any "psychologisal ; it is a 
metho(I for' the discovery and realisation of "essences" 
1 04 (1) Marcul spaudmi of the 11 scris actif ou actuol du passel' as - buin(, orle of his characteristics. (Journal 1,14tap ique III 




"On serait conduit par la a entrevoir, que'le sentiment du 
profond est celui olu llessence meme est enGaG'eejII not in the 
sense of the 11 ided, but in the sense of', the obscure , veiled 
presence". The whole novement of dialectic is towards 
communion with this essenceg althouGh absolute identification 
with it is beyond our reach and, if attainedq would render 
all dialectic unnecessary: it is the light which illumines* 
I' 
the purpose iYhich motivates*., "Je diraij,, non sans hesitation$ 
que 11cosence est d"clairante bien plutOt quIelle'ne pout etre 
eclairýe, et a fortioril decrite. Ellp est foyer: clest 
elle qui est foyerg, let ctest pour autant quIelle est pres. ente 
a la conscience que celle-ci pout so traiter elleý-meme, comme 
nourco luminourio. " 
Marcel's self-reflection is an application I of the 
dialectic. His thought represents an ever-moving line; a 
construction in depth and breadth where at every stage past 
I 
and future emerge within the present. He speaks in his 
Rocard en arrie%re of"lancant a mon tour vers'mon propre ' 
passe un appel, insistant, dp maniere "a y rdeonnaltre les 
exigences lonGtemps informulees auxquelles mon oeuvro a 
tente do ropondre". (p. 291. ) Nothing could be truerýof 
his attitude to his past throughout his Work; he refuses, to 
treat itq asdoes Gide, as a non ontityq and even leas, in 
the manner of Yvaiel, as a dead weight. On the contrary., he 
seeks to 11 safe(, uard the spiritual reality of the past" for 
the past 11 loln d' etre un, dep6t au, f ond do niouý-memes 0, un 
dI 
lý12i 
d4pOt qui serait un objet, uný, linE; ot, demeure en nous comme 
un appel auquel nous avons a repondre conformement a ce que 
Aous sommes. 11 (p. 293. ) While, at the same timeg his whole 
thouGht is prospectiveg it is tiae'llexperience ang'oissanteq 
harassanteg d1un forage qui, se ý, bursuivait 'a la rencontre 
de... " (p. 292. ) 
The term "voyage" is, one verý dear to Marcel , for it 
expresses most, clearly,,: the nature'4 of spi: ýituality itself: 
"clest 111a. es prelcise"inentg qui ept, une voyageuse, clost do 
ll&mo, et d1elle seule, qulil ost pupremement vrai de dire 
qufCtreq clest etre eA route (I)-" And no term could 




of his introspection. Far from being'a type ofýegoticmj as 
so often for Amielg-or an estheticismg as for Gide, it is a 
metaphysical effort. Fpr self-knowledge, is one with self- 
realisation: the term prospective is synonymous with 
purposive. Self-knowledge is inseparableg in the mode. of 
introspection, from the willed effort of the self to secure 
and bring, to realisation the essence'pursued and glimpsbd; 
the dial, --ctic is not only knowledgeg but. at the shrae, time 
action. "Llexperience nous montre en effet quo ces parýies 
vierues qui peuvent, seules prendre contact avee 1164tre sont 
dfabord recouvertes par une foule dtapports, ot de*dcori. es; 
ce West quo par un long'et. p, "enible do deblayagog, ou 
plus exactement de purificdtionq par une asce"se penible''que7 




nous parvenons a lea degager;. et cle. st d1ailleurs concurremment 
a ce travAil que se forge 11instrument dialectique qui fait 
corps aveo la*pense"e philosophique elle-meme et dont pourtant' 
celle-ci doit toujour , 
o'garder le. contrOle (1)1,1, We may stor, ' 
to employ Pg. Lacroix, is good expression, that Marcel is at all 
times "contemporary 
jwith 
his 'own thought 
At the, same ti' e, by that'very fapt, //Marcells retro- 
spective reflecti oý exhibit a a, continuity lacking in most 
other f orme, - Not of. course a logica 11 
continuityq but still 
one which-, allowing for the failures an'd "'black-outs" 
incidental to any e4ritual aece, sis, establishes over and 
i; above such gaps a continuity of lived bxperienoes 
PinallY, there is one last charaoteristig of his 
reflexion which must be menýioned: 'it is its PoN; er to 
influence. As compared with that of Maine de Biran, Amiel 
and Du Bos (although excepting Gide) , it is not llol6Sedll; 
rather it operates, as does Pascalls, to move, influence and 
persuade the reader. It is notýonly a dialogue of self with 
self but a dialogue of the self with the other. It does 
;,, indeed constitute an 11appellf, "Effort ainsi de conversion, " 
says Baruzi of the Journal TletaphVoigue, - "comme si e-taient 
(1) Du Refus*"A l'Invocationp pp. 91-2. 
(2) Op. cit. g p. 11. Llarcel would reject entirely M. Prevost's theory that introspection is a "game". This theory is bound 
upPith the view that the memory is imperfect* (v. Jean, 
Prevootp Essai our IlIntrospection, Paris, Au Sane Pareil, 
19279 po'54. ) Bi although this may be v. --aid of conceptual 
memory, it is not so of the memory operating in active life, for it a function then is not to rocal. 1 things as they were but 
--tto give significance, to, afid take significance from the-preaent. 
i 
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devinees a 11horizon telles forces maGiques qutil nous fut 
possible de rbjoindre' oug toute differente, - ýeut-gtre meme 
adverset unelgracet 9'ddnt nous pourrions 
Stre 'rejoints(l). " 
ý/o 
0-00 
(1) Loc. cit. 
Of other masterslof the Journal Intime the one who has 
most in common with Marcel as a repr-e-se--H`EaýEive of the pros- 
pective dialectic defined above is of course Kierkegaard, 
whose I- Irepetitiox2l is not only an ethico-religious categoryq 
but also a mode of introspective enquiry; 'applie, d throughout 
his Journals. The JVurnals of Berkeley and Novalisq what- 
ever the differences in outlook and doctrineg have also in 
common with those of'Alarcel a prospective intention. in 
France itself it is perhaps in modern times Joubert in his 
Carnets who comes nearest to the latter, Before, thatjýwe Have to C. o back to Pascal, whose Pensees it would not bd ' 
incorrect to claim as'in some sor'U_a_-Lro_urnal Ditime, if we 
admit, Brunschvicg's description of th-e-Ap-olo-gy astaiý 
"itine'raire de 119me vers Dieu". 
The Journals of Baudelaire (Fusees, Mon Coeur mis a nu, 
etc. ), however, deserve special mention, for they eydAbit an 
interesting opposition between. the two dialectics, the retro- 
spective and the prospective. 
The first is: bound up with Baudelai3: ds enslavement to 
sinful and sensual' pleasure which brings with it discontinuityý 
and rupture. "Celui qui slattachd au plaisir, clest-ý-dire 
au pri5sent, me fait lleffet d1un homme roulant Sur une penteg 
et qui, voulant-se raccrocher aux arbustes, les arracherait 
et les eiaporterait dans sa chute. " (Mon Coeur, Oeuvres, Ed. 
de la P16-iade, Paris, Gallimardq 1935 Vol. 11.9 P. 654. ) 
The primary experience of Baudelaire 
Is the sense of time's 
; light and of its discontinuity. But it involves him at the 
Same time in a subjection to the past; each instant no sooner 
I. " 
is than it is past, engulfed in the ever-growing weight of sin 
which hanGs lilce, a chain round his neck and, under the 
corroding influence of the sentiment of the "irreparable"; - 
petrifies his moral life'and no less his spiritualomeditation. 
Yet Baudelaire comes to know the prospective sense and to envisage a 11 dynamicýue morale" % the possibility of a 
spiritual destiny, through the discovery of a prospective 
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Marcel's conversion in 1929 was the natural outcome of 
all his ýrevious efforts at spiritual self-knowledge. The 
very dialectic brought him into a region of transcendence I 
felt and experienced as allpresence'll whose Power to ,I 
illuminate had all the,, force and value of a Divine, Grace. 
God was the ultimate term of the process of introspection, 
undertaken in-the spirit 
'of 
truth and sincerity. In this 
his experience wýs. that 0, f the users of spiritual dialectic 
such as Maurice Blondel aýhd Paul Claudel and, to a large 
(Note (1) contd. from previous page. ) 
present which, infu8ed with purpose, can, by repentance, 
transform this past from a'dead weight into a positiveiforce 
working vrithin the present 'for the self Is salvation, so 
penaittinr, sfjiritual growthý , and 
destiny by making the ýresent, 
the focal point of a continuity o; past,. and future. !1 Que do, 
pressentiments et de signes envoyes deja par-Dieu qulil est 
grandejaent teUs dIagir, de considerer la minutq presente 
comme la plus importante des minutesq et de faire ma 
grp4tuelle volUt6 de mon. tourment ordinaire, clest-a-dire 
u Travail! ... 1.0out est reparable. Il est encore temps... Je n1ai pas encore connu le plaisir d-lun, plan realise. 11 
(Ibid., pp. 668,670t 671. ) Before him opens. up the hitherto 
closed vista of the future an&, ýof hope. "Puissance do Videe fixeg puissance de llesperance, 
, 
(Ibid., P. 671. ) 
It isq hoteverg Baudelaired, ýIs tragedy that his intention 
never comen to actual realisatidn. Both his meditation and 
his activity remain suspended býtween a corrodinG retro- 
spectioný Which is a factq and d lonGed-for prospectivity 
which remains an ideal. The tw'O'dialectice never meet. 
If Amielts Journal belongs to the cateCorj of the patheticq 
if Marcel's belongs to thaý of the traCicq in that prospective 
and retrospective meet in a conflict vAiose issue is never 
secure ana which is resolved at each and every minute by the 
infusion, of. renewed intentiong then Baudelaire's belongs to a 
-category set apart as an ultimate 
in its own right: it is 
the drama of eternal scission and disruptiong a cateGory which transcends both the pathetic and-the-tragic and manifesýs a 
sincerity, all its own. 
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extent, Jacques Rivike and Charles Du Bos. These last two 
are of especial interest as being in the f irst'place the, 
-close friends and intimates of Gabriel Marcell, their faith 
elaborated under the pressure of the same circumstances and 
influence, and because their religious thought offers 
striking differences with his. 
Both are the direct products of Bergs6nts'philosophy 
althouGh they arrivq at'different conclusiong. Both Apply 
the Bergsonian method of subjective introspection in the 
service of an ideal ot total sincerity aýad both find God at 
the end of their seaých. Godg says Rivi6ie, is "quelque 
chose'quton rencontre (l). 11 Yet lie remains fundament ly 
an immanentist-and hardly-transcends the region of subjective 
experience. 'lie Buis un objet dlexpe"riences 1.1,, expe'rience, 
'tonnement-do la. maiA qui palpe (2), 11 It is true that le ta 
-Ate he defines the "sincere'# man as he whollstarre a chaque 
etase de lui-laeme But strictly'speaking, he recog- 
'nisesl, in BerFsonian fashiong only two levels: one the field 
of rational relationsl'the other the field'of intuition, or 
pure immediacy beyond all relations, sort of fusion with the 
immanent, Divine force - in other words9 a state ot, experience 
impermeable to any dialectic whatsoeverý 
There isq moreover, in RiviO"re's faith a strong element, 
A la Trace de Dieu, -3rd ed. q. Paris# Gallimardq 19259-P, 54. Parýsq, Chronique des Lottres frangaises, 1927, Do la Voi, 
Po 9& 
131 Do la 8ince'rite envers soi-memo,, " Nouv. Rev. franý. 9 Jan. , 92p. 
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of fideism (the influence of Pragmatism on-him is important) 
and it is known that he lost his faith not long after his 
conversion only to regain it before his death. 
It is not surprising when we recall that the major pre-, 
occupation of his thought was to establish'his faith firmly 
on an act of will and to sap the pretentions of rationalism. 
Reasong he writes,, ", n1e6t-elle pas la faculte der. se 
representer autre chose que ce qui est donne (1)"? Ile seeks 
to show the primordial role of will and, 'of intuition iiot only 
in faith but indeed in establishing the very premises of 
rational inferences! "Il nly a que 16rsqutelle est'encadree 
,ý -I , -j - dlintuitionsg lattele'e*; 
ý'que'ses de' oristrations prenneýt de e em 
le la perpe ite (2). " A sort of f ideism and la constancel c 
radical intuitionism on the one handq and'on thd other a cult 
, of devenirg novelty, and heterogeneityq similar, to Gidels. (3)9 
such is Riviere's philosophy. 
With Charlbs Du Bos it is somewhat different. His 
conversion topý place almost parallel to Marcelts and we 
find a similar apprehension of the Divine Transcendent 
immanent in the core of self-hood. Wheng'he askal 
, 
do I have 
consciousness of myself? Alors at alors'seulement quo 
deus inest (4). 11 A similar sense of c6mmunion, at a certain 
level of experienceg of "participation ... a un monde spiritual 
. 
illimite, invisibleg dont-jamais ne'slinterrompt la 
1A la. Trace do Dieug p. 163. 
2 Ibid., p. 174. 
3 See Moralisme 6t Litterature. 
41 2xtiaits d1un Journalg p, 296. 
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I md. jestueuse revolution, dans lequel. i. tous taat que nous 
sommesq nous. sommes, prist emporte"B... Butj as we 
have seen, this central apprehension of the Divine takes 
place in a type of intuition whichq although'outwith time, 
a state of transcend6nce rather than immanence, is yetq like 
Riviere's state of fU; sions expra-rela#onal -a puret simple 
that reason$ like iti impermeable to immediacy and, for 
dialectic. 
As we have suggested in the previous chapter, q both of 
these conclusions are inherent,, in a, Bergsonian viewpoint 
for the pure experi4nee, being extra-relationall can be 
viewed either as a fusion with a temporal flux or, byl 
accentuating the non-differentiated, an; d extra-relational, a 
'fusion with, an extra-temporal -, both'imperviousito dialectic 
within a temporal"differentiation and approf ondissement. 
Du Bos's conclusion results; from a rigorous interpretation 
of Bergsonism. Accepting Bergson's dualism of intelligence 
and intuition, he'refuseb all-, relational element to immediacy. 
He could not have marked 
ýmore 
clearly the difference between 
himself-and Marcel as when he declares that, in contrast with 
himself qui sent sa vie" Marcel "sent sa vie et ses 
rapports-(2). " Indeed, -thle greatest originality of Marcel, 
lios in h""' recognition of a relational element in the 
experience of immedidcy, (temporal or spatialg, although not 
of course the merely, 'ration ý,, and conceptual)q allowing for 
1 Ibid*q P- 382'"'.,. 
2 Ibido P. 340: 
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proF, ressive levels of spatio-temporal experience and there- 
fore of self-revelation and self-realisationg and requiring 
- not a simple intuitionl'but a llreýflexion! ' within, and one 
withq i=ediacyg a,, dialeetio-of i=e4acyl 9 of 
llapprofondissementllý 1,1 
In this Marcel domes nearest to Blondel andq in certain 
respectaq Claudel. 
I 
i4e resembles them top in the firmness 
of his religious faith -, with this difference that his inner 
spiritual serenity does not exclude the tragic sense of the 
knowledge that God's face may be hidden, and grýace withdrawn. 
Marcelle subjection 
AO the', intermittences of grace and there- 
I 
fore ot. existence is a strong and'important theme in his 
philosophy. Yet, underlying the tragic sense and reaiismg 
lies a sense of God asýthe. inner presenceg veileA, sometimes 
obscured, but voicing a never-ending call. Du Bos toog. as 
distinct fromMviere, has ha4 this same strength and 
serenityp and it is in it thatýthe two writers have a very, 
strong common element , thd consciousness of the living 
presence of God beyond the intermittencea of faith. 110r, 
on mon cas, le moi du dous nlesý pas par essence 0 discontinut 
ses interinittences. sonV de mon. r66aort et non da sien; 
'do 
plus... il ouvre toujours'une porto'par-dela " Je voux dire 
(et cola a"quel degre' no l'tai-je pas, senti'dans toutes lea 
oeuvres que'j'admiro), que Itexpressi'on emanant du moi du dous, 
par dela lo-, contenu procis 4u'a tel moment elle viseq paralt 
, toujours., tracer une aerie de, cercles'concentriques qui 
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indiquent que la voie est 
iibreq que Von peut passer et que 
llon avancera 
0000 
Gabriel Marcel's thinking gravitates between two poles, 
each of which repres'ents ; an extreme of his experience, II-I 
Those two poles arelmusic on the one hand . and whatq in 
conversation with the writer, he preferred to call 'Ila grimace" 
on the other. 
Marcel is himsdif an accomp 
ished'eqmposer 
and executant' 
on the pianos he has even been known to affirm that mýsie is 
his true vocations 1111a seulement je duis cr4ateur" (2ý. 
From early youth he learned'to improvise on thepianog and 
from 1945 he began to set toý music,, po-ems of his preference. 
(The writer'has been. prIvileged-to hear some of these piecesq 
including melodies for poems of, Valdryq Supervielle and. Emily 
Bront6. , Although not aspiring to any competence in this 
field$ he can te . stify to their melodic beauty and harmonic' 
structure. They markq in their. proGress, a SraAual deepening 
of harmonic cOmpiexityf , and some of the last pieces, notably 
the settings for Emily Brontdqýare. quite remarkable for the 
exquisite purity with whichýeach modulation and shade of 
f eelinG in the originaIýIij incorpora ted in the intricate$ yet 
Ibid. 9 p. 297ý, 2 
hý4ýuoted 
by-bl. Roger,, Troisfontaines in Existentialisme 
r en -pp. ' 
melodious, harmonic texture, They conatitutel on the 
musical planeg a pure music whob6, means and effects can only,. 
in the writer's estimates be compared to those, in poetry$ of 
Mallarme or Valery. -'HavinG already, won the admiration of 
eminent interpretersq. ethey await only the opportunity, which. 
needs must be forthcoming, for th6m. to be made known to a 
wider musical publid. ) 
The r8le which Marcel's musicýl creation plays in his 
thought is of great interest* Music is for him the realm 
of pure lyricismg of pure subjectivity, the moment of con- 
templations qf immeAate 'commiinion with the essential, self - 
and the world-of essences. Thus, piusical expression sa 
type of. expression where. all reflexion, has ceased. a 
4 
musique ne signifie strictement rien, mais peut-, 6tre parce 
quIelle est signification... Llexpression aerait alors la 
permeabilite de llessence h elle-meme It is 
sigiificant that he records the influence upon*his mind of 
the Schopenhauerian theory of, music (2), 
In short, music and musical experience represent that 
point of contemplation which is beyond and transcends the 
spiritual dialectic; itAs the extremity of, Marcells, sub- 
Jective experience where time and temporal effort have given 
way to eternity in the moment of ecstatic participation. 
At the other extreme, is the "grimace", This is, the. 
state of pure objectivityl, of separation from the, essence, 
Etre et AvoirlTarigs Aubiert 1935, PP, 809 8; 6 2 Existe-FUl=sie Chr tien, p. 295- , 
ob 
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where the'mincl distorts the real and 
infects. the universe 
with its grimace. This mode of apprehension is represented 
in Marcel's work by his recently published Theatre Comique (1). 
Therein Marcel satirises himself and his spiritual 
experience: in the,, short plays which compose the volume# the 
characters are grotesques emptied of all spiritual signifi-. 
cance and- value 9 axid their relationships lhýve 
the f ixity'and 
mechanical rigidit imposed upon, personalities which have 
become types and ciphers. 
I 
As for the dramatic value of thos'e satirical or farcical' 
playst reserves woAd have to, be made*, No doubtg., farce, is a 
dramatic. kenre in its own rightg but ý'to be dramaticalýy 
successful it requires first to be lived by its quthot. The 
world of-farce, with all it entails of the Sroýesqae and the 
''inverted pathetic, is in every way a world of its owng 
endowed with its own', lifeg even if this life is an anti-life. 
And, to represent this world and. all its maleiieencei the 
author, must have lived with it and experienced it in all its 
diabolism. -, It-is this experience of such evil which seems 
to be lackinc, in Marcel's natureq with the result that his 
fqrces are curiously abstract an d artificial. . 'It would seem 
Andeed, that for the objective to be represented adequately in 
dramatic'form, it must first be subjectively experienced such 
as it was for Molierb: (whose great comedies are shot through 




I F, I 
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Voltaire or a Swift. (The great Romantics such as Schlegel 
and Baudelaire recognised this central factor in irony and 
satire. ), ?I 
Yet undoubtedly this Theatre ComLque represents someý-,, 
thinG real in Alarcel! s experience; - it is symbolieg as he 
admitsq of a certain "temptatiorYl. which$ although alwayI3 
overcomeq has not, ce, ased to attract and haant him (perhaps 
a remnant of that agnosticism which entered into the 
influences of his early home life). This is the temptation 
of irony: the temptation of the "spectacular" atpitudeq theý,, 
sin of distorting o4jectification, whereby the-'immediate 
communion obtaining between self and reality within the 
depths, of immanent experience is disrupted, and the real is 
made llaýsentll. Irony is the refusal of transcpndence. 
Now the, ironle, spectacular attitude too, at the other 
extreme from pure, musical subjectivity$ is outwith the 
sphere of dialectic. But not$ this tiraeg beyondq rather on 
this side of the dialectical movement. It mayl indeedq be 
considered as the essential starting-point of the dialectic 
of sincerity, as Kierkeraard has affirmed, but it is onlyt 
in his words$ an "absolute beginninEý19 anticipating dialectic 
but itself pre-dialectical. As M. Lacroix has well put,, it:. 
I'Si 11ironie est le 'commencement absolu de la vie 
personnellot$ elle risque. aussi do nous murer dan a notre 
lt)dividualitC. Aussiý,, comprend-on que' Kierkegaard ait craint 
on olle la ncGativite,, 4. ýfinies 'lleaseiýce do 11ironieg dit-il, 
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cleat do nier Vessence. Le point do vue do 11ironio an 
tant que telle est le nil admirari - et qui nladmire rien 
ile peut ce donner a rien. 'ý La vie personnelle qui meprise 
tout et se meprise elle-m8me ne peut que conduire au nelant. 
Il est necessaire de passer pmý llironiog mais il est 
necessaire aussi de la depa'sser. " Llironie doit etre un 
momentq mais un moment domine And therefore it is 
not properly dramatic. (It'is for this reason that farce 
is not in essence dramatic iný the true sense, but only 





ch excluding, in its own way, 
the movement of spiritual appr6fondissement, lies the ýeal 
domain of Marcelts reflexion. And within this domain, his 
metaphysical reflexion is pU'rsuýd on two parallQ1 linest 
first, in his Journal Intime and'-other phenomenological 
works; secondly in his plays. In a later chapter, Marcella, 
tra. Ced7 will be studied in detail. Suffice for the moment" 
to bay, that his plays represent an embodiment in dramatic 
form of his metaphysical dialectic. His tragedy is simply 
this dialectic made incarnate. 
flonce the f orm it takes. It purtrays in its characters 
arid their relationships the struggle of relves to attaing in 
the deptlis of concrete, temploral experience, the vision and 
possession of essential self-hoodg d struCgle which is-set 
between two polest the one the pole of absence'and objectivity', 
(1) Op. cit. t pp. 23-4o 
Ym 
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where darkness and separation reign, the other the pole of 
pure subjectivity, acting as the light which inspires and 
Gives purpose to the struggle. 
Within this field, bordered by irony on one side and 
lyricism on the other# separation and communion, judgment and 
contemplationp the dialectique dIURrofondissement has its 
legitimate applicati6n and function. And within this fihd# 
metaphysics and drama meet, not only in that they operate as 
parallel activities of reflexion, but in the literal sense 
that each lends the other 
i its aid and' its means. In every 
sense of . the term -. 
/and 
no statement could better define the 
"registev, of Marcel's 'thought - his metaphysical inquiry is 
dramatic, 'and his drama is metaphysical. 
It is to the exposition and elucidation of this drama 










CHAPTER , III 
IDEALISM 
I 
The evolution of Alarcelts thought is ful. l.!. of interest. 
Starting from an Idealist standpointg for the most part 
Hegelian or neo-Hegelian, he evolves through a phase of 
"positive" Idealism under the influence simultaneously of', 
Schelling'and the French Idealistsq, to end up in an uncom- 
promising philosophic Realism. 
Referring to hiy youthful "'Hegeliah ardour" soon to. be 
quenched, he relates howg when a student at the-Sorbonneg he 
scandalised Jacques Rivie"re by asserting that the Absolute 
might not be-the immediateg but the fruit, of dialectic (1). 
His Hegelianism, howeverg does notýlseem to have survived 
1, ong, as may'be seen grom his thesis for the Dipl6me Vetudes 
superieures in 1909. (We are-indebted to Charles DU Bos" 
for an account of this unpublished memoir entitled:, Les 
Idees metaphysiques de Coleridge dans leurs r'' orts avec app 
la philosophie de_ Schelling (2). )0 
Speaking in the name of a dynamic philosophy, of -a 
11philosophy which posits life as primaryq the whole as prior 
to its parts, finality as infinitely more true than 
mechanism, which is only a superf icial view of things", he 
criticises the attempt of the Absolute Idealists to explain 
the real in terms of an immarient dialectic. He rejects 
Constantes', article in the special number of the Nouv** Rev. frangellfommage., a Riviere, A, ýilj 1925. L P, 9 
127. 
such an attempt to make logic account for reality on the", 
score of its failure to explain two factors: ' concrete, 
individual'existence on the one hand, and freedom on the 
other. Schelling's philosophy of identityq like Absolute 
Idealism in general,, Isought to deny or eliminate the 
sensible, the concrýte, actuality., The lattert reilies 
Marcel ought not erhaps to exist 9 but it is,, 9 and must 
be accounted f or. As for the second factorg "for whoever 
has been made aware of freedom as a fact, as an actq as the 
only possible realityg, we believe that/a philosophy of 
immanence becomes Uýtdnablell. Both Schelling and Coleridge 
were ultimately obliged to recognise ýhe fact of, liberty as' 
essential to religious thought. And'so too mtist a c6herentý 
4 
llphilosoph; ý of life"* "Refusing both'to view ýhe world as 
an ensemble of abstract relations and to consider'it as 
subjoct to a blind becoming! ', it needs must affirm that "what 
is bebt and, 'Iiighest in us cannot be absolutely'unrelated to 
what is at the root of things and that. there must be'some 
profound analogy betweenth, e inner principle which animates 
them and the mainspring of our activity. " 
The source of Marcel's first meditations isq as the' 
subject of the memoir,, indiýates$ýthe philosophy, of Schelling, 
Scholling's evolution'from a system of rationalistic identity 
-and Pautheism, to, what-'Dr Bolman has called a "dynamic meta- 
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physics of irrational creativity (1)" reflects Marcel's own 
evolution from Hegelianism to a 11 dynamic philosophy" or' 
'' -philosophy of liberty. It is to Schelling (and not, as 
Du Bos suggests, to -BerE; son, for reasons that will become 
apparent later) that he is indebted for the means of over- 
coming the temptations of Hegelian rationalism. 
Schelling's philosophy of identity is a philosophy of 
immanence aiminGq 1ýka that of Hegel, at making logic account 
for existence. It shows howq through intellectual intuitiong 
the ideal and the real may be reduced to rational identity. 
It sees in the con4gent reality mere appearance, which may 
be wholly accounted for by pure thought intuiting the pure 
ideas and relations it embodies. "Philosophy'19 Schelling 
declaros, "is the science of ideas or the eternal prototypes 
of thinGe (2). 11 In the "positivd', Philosophy Schelling 
comes to see that the individualg or concrete actual 
existent, is distinct from the universalg the idea'and the 
conceptq and-that existence cannot be rationally inferred. 
Reason cannot account for existenceg for'it deals only with 
the "Possible", with the "essence". "Reasorf, 96 says, 
"gives everything, with respect to content, which appears in 
(1) SchellinG, The A5es of the Worldg. transl. by F. do Wolfe 
Bolman, Jr., New York, Columbia U Press, 19429 Intro- 
duction by Bolmang p. * 19. 
ubliche Werke, ed. K. F. A. Schellingg Stuttgart and 
uGsburG, OoTTa_9=56-619 Division I. Vol. V, p; 255, quoted Bolman, op. cit., p. 18. Br6hier describes th philosophy 
of identity as an eminently "abstract system aiming at determininG the possible relations between subject and object", 
op. cit. 
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experience; it comprehends what is actual buý , on that 
accountq not actuality (1). 11 The positive ihilosophy re- 
establishes the primacy of the existent as wholly contingent 
and free with regard to the mere "possible" or "essence!, I and 
thus makes the concept depend upon actuality. 'It comes 
therefore to find the ground of existence in a. free creation 
or act of absolute freedom on the part of'a Divinity 
transcendent with respect to his creation. 
On this basis, Schelling elaborates, 'a history of the 
divine drama which, takes us back to Jakob Boehme. He 
conceives a llsuper-ýodheadll (Ubergottheit)resembling the 
Unrrund or Urgrund of Boehme - pure will, absolute freedom, 
indeterminate and unconditioned. It'is this irrational 
principle in the Godhead, recognised as prius w#ý regard to 
his llesc(encellq that is-the principle of existence. It is 
the principle of the Divine existence itself; for the God- 
head exists in possessing it (2). Above all it is the 
principle of actual 'created existencog for pure will involves 
a possibility of willing what is* contrary to its essentiality. 
And it is precisely in deploying this pure will in-an act of 
(1) Op. cit., Division III Vol. 1119 P. 61, quoted Bolmang 
OP* cit-9 P. 52. 
(2) Cf. Charles Secre'tan: "Ainsi llexistenco inmuable, 
6ternelle de Dieu repose sur la base de sa volonte, Aussi 
lonGtemps que cette volontd reste en puissance, Dieu la 
pOSSede comme sa puissanceg et llexistence de Dieu distincte 
de cette puissance consiste a la poss4der; clest en elle., 
qulil se sent vivrog clest on elle qulil trouve la felicite, 
ce qui est proprement llacte eterneý do son etre. 11 (La 






or irrationality, so as to bring into boinSt in despite 
of the absolute, self-contained perfection of His'essencet 
-a- world of continGent and free 
individuals that the Godhead 
reveals itself as God, , ýCreation and existence are thun i 
wholly irrationaL9 havinr, their origin in an unmotivated 
act of pure-liberty. j 
The drama of the' universe then becomes the' revelation 
of God in nature andýhistory; a revelation which brings 
'into existence a contingent world and contingent beings 
endowed with freedom., The creation itself, is a 1ýf all" or 
a 10 1 e6p" The fini4 existing 
'beings 
are invested with'the 
freedom, which characterises-the Absolute from which they' take 
their originf "What is-exclusively peculiar to 6bsoluteness 
is that it invests its counterpart not-only with its own 
nature but, even independence; This being-in-self (in-sich- 
selbot-Sein), this, genuine and true realitý of what is first 
, envisagedt 
is, freedomo' and from that first independence of 
the counterpart flows what comes forth in the honoraenal 
world as freedom, which is the last trace andl as it wereq 
the seal of divinity envisaged in the fallen w6rla (l). 11 
In the universal or Absolute Will all things participate byý 
their f om. reed It is by the wronGful use of this freedomý-', ' 
that they separate, themselves from God; ' which is the 
, 
7,;, ', Ed V. nif icance of the Fall. At the same time# they are , 
impelled to return to-the Absolute,, The hi story, of the 
' univers- e one of, process'. arid one,, of,, ', gra "r 0'ýXnit idual`, eturn i" 
V1 13ion 'ted Bolma 39iý qu o Op. cit '701 VTO P'i' 'ý' D , OP,, cit, O 





each fom of being striving to pass, by what Bre"hier has 
termed a sort of 11 epigenesis" , from the lower to the higher. 
And throughout this dramaq the original "fall,, 9 the "process", 
and the "passagdl from. lower to higherg freedom and 
irrationality are manifest. 
This brief expose of Schelling's-final philosophy will 
be of use presentlyqýfor it would appear that it f orms the 
back(; round to all Marcel's thouaht before 1914. For the 
moment it may be observect. that besides Schelling himself, a 
source of Marcel's first Idealism may well be Charles 
Secretan, whose 'OphAosophy of'jib'ertyll is directly derived 
from Schelling. , It positsq in, a similar fashion, a Go'd 
endowed with absolute libertyg and explains finite existence 
int3rms of a principle of freedom (which Secretan, in common 
with Schelling and Ravaisson describes as "love') working in 
man and constituting what is real and divine in hiia; a, 
freedom, moreoverg whicht if exercised in conformity with 
the Absolute Willq enables. union with God (1). 
- 0*- 0- 0 
I 
Tais Idealism continues to characterise Marcel's thought 
for some time to come. It informs his first philosophy 
formed between 1909 and 1914. This first philosophy in 
expounded in the first part of the Journal AletapMsique 
ý1) On the influonce of Coleridge$ coupled with that of 
cliallinCt see Appendix to Chp. III below. 
(composed between January lBt and May 6thq 1914), in the 
important article Les conditions dialectiques de la philo- 
sophie de 11 intuition and the pref ace to his drama 
Le Seuil invisible (2), 
This f irst philosophy elaborates with greater thmý6ugh- 
ness the criticism of Absolute 'Idealism., Its primary 
indeedý is in it s*rejection of the*Hegelian significance 
, , 
ideal of absolute knowledge and of the pretensions of 'logic 
to account for reality. The argument cýntres on two points: 
firstg axW attempt to reconcile the Absolute and its temporal 
/ ' the destruction of the appearances it appearances leads to 
seeks to transcend (J M pp. 10-11): speondly reality is 
refractory to total determination by conceptual'thought. 
C This latter argument is developed fully in the aýove-mentione 
article which gives$' moreoverg the quintessence of Marcel's 
first philosophy. 
The object of the article is to determine the conditions Tl. "ý 
, under which a religious thought is possible, in other word6 
a philosophy of intuition defined as any doctrine which main- 
tains that Peing may be grasped by intuition and can only be 
' 
grasped by intuition (C D P. 638). The eAsential condition , 
IT of any such'philosophy of intuition is the preparation-of 
o, the intuition of Beirig by a, dialectic aiming at the 
stru cti on -of 
the idea of., absolute knowledge reveale as 
self- co ntradictory: 
Revue de Metaphysique-'et', de Morale 
. 1912. ,, 1, Grasset 
40 
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es ý "tablir que la philo- ý Nous serons ainsi amen" ae 
sophie de Ilintuition ne peut se constituer que 
sur une critique rationnelle de llidee de savoir 
absolu, et que celle-ci eat solidaire de celle- 
1h: si Von ne paut prouver que llidee de 
savoir absolu eat contradictoire, il faut 
renoncer & edifier une philosophie. de ltintuition, 
(Ibid. 9 P. 639. ) 
Ah absolute knowledge is iinpossibleg since it is impossible 
without contradictioli to affirm the complqtýe aýtonomy of 
knowledGeq implying as it does the idejitiýy of Being with 
the idea of Being. Thought transcends knowledge as Being 
transcends the idea of Being; between he two exists a t 
constant margin. , Though 
the idea of absolute knowledge 
may be a powerful impelling force in scientific and philo- 
sophical investigationg it is merely an ideaq that-is 
In, 
exigency of mind, and insufficient as. an expla*nation of 
reality. 
What then is this residue of thoughtq irreducible to 
knowledge or 
, objective 
thought? It is not Spencer's 
"unknowable, which belongs to the world of objectsq for no 
,, object is impermeable to knowledge. - Rather it is thought 
itself in so far as it is not knowledgel not idea# not 
objectivat6d by the process of reflexion in short# thought 
as positinGf,, not as posited. Thought so conceived 
ý'-corresponds seemingly-to Beingq'in Marcel 's viewq although 
"ý. we ar* not, justified in dedlaring it identical with Beinp#ý 
for to do.. so, would be to convert it into an object; nor earl 
, Beingý-itself, be thus objectivated, What Marcel calls a 
nerative di'ale ctic natural', - out come of the preceding 
4 '; U4 
": ýi 
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positive dialectieg namely a dialectic by which the core 'of 
Being is approached not by way of objective thoughtq but by 
*successive acts of participation. - It is this act of* 
participation which Marcel'defines as intuition: "An act 
of transcendence by which thought$ becoming aware of the 
deforming nature of ail objectivationo affirms itself 
irreducible to any1such conversiont and in,,; 'this sense if not 
identical with Being'(such an affirmation, would plunge it 
once more into the- world of ideas) at least as participating 
in Being. " (Ibid. qýp. 652. ) 
Intuition$ in sdortt is the act whereby thouE#t affirms 
itself as-transcending what is in itself but pure objectivity. 
It is an act not of knowledge$ but of faith, ýy which the 
mindq beyond all judgments of essence and existence ýgrasps 
the *spiritual reality within itself in an immediate 
participation: 
Elle est done en somme un acte de foig et son 
contenu ne pouvant slexpliciter que daus une 
dialectique pratique do la participation, par 
laquelle la pensdot depasuant le monde du 
savoir, se rapprochorait par des demarches 
successives do cr6ation du centre oti elle doit 
librement se renoncerg pour faire place a 
Celui qui est. (Ibid. ) 
The domain of intuition and faith is beyond the 
categories of truth and errorqý,, existence and non-existence. ' 
God, the ultimate "object" of the act of f'aith# is'not to'be 
known objectivelyg, hence a negaýjve theology. 'Hence'too, a 
neGative psychologyO for like Godi the self too "transcends 
all experience, all possible-exiýýenceq, all truth, 




Such problems as the nature of the divinity or of tile self 
vanish in the living experience. of f aithq as does that of 
tile relation between mind,, and body, for "there is no possible 
truth of myself" (J. M. P. 118). So that the out'come of this 
first philosophy is an, act', of faith beyond the sphere of 
knowledge, by which thbughV securesq in an immediate 
participationg the transcendent spiritual reality immanent 
within it: 
La foi est une affirmation qui ne doit pas et 
ne peut pas Otre ' jdibsocicýe 
de ce sur quoi elle 
porte. Dans la, mesure ou4 la foi est nide au 
profit de cq quIelle affirme (qui est alors 
traite comme un Objet) elle se convertit en- 
pensee theorique et se supprime. (J. M. P. 39, -) 
I- 0-- 0-6-0-4 
The significance of this fir ' st statementg 
taken toGether 
with, the memoir previously mentioned, lies first of all in 
its criticism of Absolute IdealiSý land of its assertion that 
the real may be wholly determined by reason in the idea or 
conceptf so that the Absolute may ultimately be accounted 
for, without residue, by. logic. Reality, it in shown, 
cannot be thus wholly determined by reason by vixtin of the 
fact that Being, transcends the idea of Being. Beyond the 
universal and tho conceptq which are the objects of ýrational 
construction, lies BeinG itselff the active subject which 
does the constructing and which it is for intuition alone to 
reveal immedlately to thought$ once all that ia mere obj'ect 
136. 
and construct in the mind has been transcended. 
None the less, however'much this first philosophy 
succeeds in refuting Absolute Idealiam, in restorinG the 
Transcendent, and in vindicating the claims of intuition as 
against discursive and-conceptual reasoning, it isýfar from 
being a Realism. 8peaking of this first period of his 
thought, Marcelq whiýe stredsing that his Whole philosophy 
springs from a reacp I ion against Transcendental Idealismq 
admits that it was within the framework of the categories 
of Idealism that his reaction developed4 
Cette reagion contre llidealisme slest cependant 
d4veloppee 6-11origine a 11interieur m6me d1un 0 iddalismog ou du moins dtune-ponsee qui restait a 
quol. quo de(,, rd tributaire de , cat6gories 
idealistea. 
ý Do 11i tout., ce qulil ya do difficiloo d1irritant, 
voire de rebutant-dans la demarche de la premiere 
partie du Journal metapUsiclue. A dist6nce, je 
me fais un peU 1r-e-ffet d'un Ho-mme qui slembarasse 
continuellement',, dans les vetements trop ajUstes 
dont il tente eri vain de so depouiller. (1). 
It remains, in factq within the 
iramework 
of the positive 
Idealism of Schelling and the French Idealists, as a closer 
analysis will serve to show., In *the f irst place, both the 
article and the first part of the Journal are the work of a 
dialectician, steeped in the'post-Kantian philosophers'(. 2). 
Marcel has accepted HeCells criticism of immediacy as 
contained in the Phonomenologý,. His intuition is the 
Exist. chret., P. 309, 
M, 
.. 
Baruzi remarks justly o the first part of the Journal 
a hysique that there is 11 som thing as it were curio 
'Yn this survival of a orm after the destruction of its colitelit". (Review ofýthe 
ýournal 




outcome of a lonE;. dialectic'andg on his own admission, 
depends for its validity on this preliminary reflexion. 
Marcel says that his first spontaneous reaction was hostility 
to empiricism, so much so that he could not take experience 
as his point of departure; rather, under the influence of 
Schelling, he envisaýed a process of dialectic which might 
lead to an 11 empirisme superieuVI I as its term But 
ouch a dialectiog 4ý goes on to-say, as he envisages it at 
the moment , could only be itself "ideal" 9 being not the 
dialectic of HeSell- whose movement is or claims to be 
throughout an expliý4tation of real existence, but a progress 
of thought whereby it transcends gradually its positiogs, 
Le prof, -res que nous de"crivons nlest done ýas' le 
proL. P. res synthetique hegelien qui depasse a la 
fois la these etýltantithese et lea eiýglobe dans 
la synthese, cleat le progres d1une reflexion qui 
transcende sea ýropres positions. Alors que le 
% e**fini a la fagon 
si 
helg6lienne pr6tend p3ýoG-res d- 
necessairement avoir une Cnification ontolo- 
Cique, mais que par la meme so trouve soulevee 
la question insoluble (et. qaton ne peut crviter, 
mais seulement escbLmoter) de la realite indepen- 
dante des moments inferieurs - la dialectique I 
telle que je la congois etant purement iddale, 
portant exclusivement sur des modes 41affirmation, 
et ne pr6tendant pa69 par suite, valoir ontolo- 
Giquementq ne se heurte pas a cette difficulte. 
(J. 1-1. pp. 12-136) 
He assimilated it to Bradley's pther than to Hegel's 
dialectic, as the former is defined in Ap2earance and Re ali! ýý 
whoreby appearances arellen que1que facon recueillies et 
I transiauces au sain d0une`realiteý'qui lea co'mports "a un niveau 
Exigt. chr e t. pp. 29 5 
rp 
iiiforieur d1elle-meme, mais qui on mgme tempo lea absorbe, 
lea recuso ot lea de'passe (1)" a progressive movement of 
-interiorisation by virtue of which thought, -transcending at., 
each staGe the objective conditions of intelliGibility it 
itself posits in its unfolding, is led to awareness of its 
subjective reality, thus allowing the passaGe from objective 
content to the intuition of fbLitho from "Appearance" to 
"Reality'. It follp'ws that the intuition he envisages at 
this stage is the contrary of'intuition in the Bergsonian 
sense or as Marcel will, understý4nd it laterg that is an 
immediate prise de co4tact of rý, ality serving as an immediate 
startin6--point for all future ref 
I 
lexion, 1(2). 
It is in somewhat similar fa, IS 
I hion ýhat SchellinG 
positive philosophy is preceded bý allnegativell philosophy 
called the science of reasong'which'demonstrates that 
existence-cannot be rationally inferred but must be sucpende4' 
upon an act of faith or immediýte concept of actuality 
althouGh this act of faith becomesq in a way unknown to 
Marcel, tile startin(ý-point of'a deductive science of 
exis. tence, namely the "positive,, philosophy In ýhis 
ý1ý Ibid. 9 P. 293. 2 We must however point out here that in his later Realism 
nd philosophy of immediacyg Marcel will Aot accept the BerGI-Sonian definition of intuition 'as a simple non-relational 
and absolute datum. On the'contraryg he will believe that immediacy is not exclusive of qualitative relations-andthat 
within the 12Lino do contact. there is a dialecti c9 not rational but by way R par--icipa--on, not posterior but one with the i1rIldediacy of experience. I Qf 'ýolmarit op. cit. t Introd. -p- 
63. 
39 
conxiection too, the influence of Bradley is appa: eent; 
Marcel, it is to be remembered, owes much to the study of 
the British and American neorHeGelians. (l). A parallel may 
be drawn with Bradley's dialecticý by which the Absolute is 
demonstrated unknowable, (although Marcel at this moment does 
not yet accept Bradley I s' apparent return to, the - immediacy" of 
sensation as, the starting-poiný of reflexion). 
In the actual developmentand movement of this pre- 
liminary dialectic there is. apparent a double influence. 
That of Fichte: the manner in Aich thouGht in its pure 





objectivity resembles closely Ficýtelsidialectical differ' 
entiation of Self and non-Self. 1n addition$ French 
Idealism undoubtedly weighs on the young. Alarcell1fresh from 
the Sorbonne. Jules Lachelierg in his philosophy of libertyt 
transcends by a similar dialectic the immediate data of 
consciousnessq as are sensationsq and discovers a final 
element$ irreducible to the status of-object, consciousness 
itselfq the perception of the activeg willing subject which 
conditions and accompanies all objective representationp (2). 
The similarity of this reasoning and that of Marcel is 
apparent: the same effort of dialectic to transcend objective 
Of. his article1a Metaphysiýue de Jositih Royce, Rev. do 
0 o'q$ 1918-19t published later in a volume (Paris, Aubierq 1945)j. 
(2) 0 the method employed by Paul Valery to attain a "purc 
cOllociousness" in La &Soiree avec M. Test'e. 
lkO. 
thought and the same general resu 
i 
lt , the recognition of an 




than thouGht itself in its pure activity (1). - 
But above all this doctrine of intuition, is built up in 
opposition to, or rather as an extension of the neo-Kantian 
I 
Idealism of Le"on Brunschwicg, under whose influence Marcel 
(1) Generally sp eaking 9 Marcel Is method -at, this moment is an 
application of the French Idealistid analyse riflexive as 
practised by Maine de Biran and his followers. For Ehis 
reason, his use of the term "intuitiox2l is a somewhat special 
one . It evidently corresponds to Maine'de Biran's "belief". It will be recalled that, in the latter's viewq self-awareness 
in the experience of effort constitutes, intuitive knowledgeq 
that is the subject ot only knows his existence but what he 
is. ' But this only 
ýecause 
the self is given to the subject 
as an object by virtue of a duality. In. short, it has 
intuitive knowledge of itself only as a series of pheno 
* 
menal 
and relative states. On the other hand and at the same timeq 
awareness of it-self as it is i"n-itself, as absolute self and 
pure subjectivity accompaniesq and is one with, ' the immediate 
presence of the subject to it-self in its act. This latter 
awareness, however, is brought to lightý, by a process of 
reflexion whereby the pure subject is revealed beneath its 
objective appearances in and through a progressive purifica- 
tion. It is not therefore an intuition. It is so even less by reason of the fact that it is not knowledge but faith 
or belief. The term intuition is applicable only to the 
sphere of Imowledgeg where there is duality of subj. ect and 
object and where, in the'case of self-knowledge, the subject becomes an object open to the vision-of the self. 
In shortq Marcel, like the Idealists, is employing a 
reflexive dialectic. His use of the term intuition should 
not OBE e this. (on the question of 11aino do Biranle 
reflexion and ita opposition to intuition cf. 11. Gouhierg 
Malmo do'Biran ot'13or[Sson in Les Etudes BerL:, ponionnes, Vol. 19 
Paris,, Albin 1,11chol, 1948, p. 17 oqq. ; it. Vancourt, 
La Thcorie de la connaissance chez Maine de Biran, 2nd ed. 9 
. Var! 
Ej Aul3ior, 19449 Part- Ifig Ohps. 1 an2l 11. -Por an instructive raprochement between Maine de Biran ujid, Lache'lier, 
as users of the reflexive methodg cf. P. Fessard, La Methodo de rOflexion chez Maine do Biran, Paris, Bloud et Gay, 1938-, 
P- 15ý sqqo7o 
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then was, Marcel ha's informed the writer in conversation that 
in the spring of 1914 he was contemplating a thesis on the 
nature of intelligibility. The object of this work was to 
be a study of the relation between. the', intelligence operante", 
and its ideological product. The whole would revolve around, 
Brunschwicgls theory, of verificationg 'to Vdlich the 
mind creates or forqes its own conditi OAS / 
/of verification, ioes 
the principles whereby it 'verifies". experience and accepts 
and rejects it as truth and knowledge. On the basis. of this 
theory$ Marcel would have attempted todemonstrate that'beyond 
the ideological con4nt, of the. mind, verified in terms of the 
sa domaln which is ý! - mind's self-made I 
conditions9there exi ý't 
"unverifiabld', inasmuch-as it is prior to the iealm ct' 
objectivityl', aB it is not content but mind itsel; C in its 
subjective activity; and that this "unverifiable" is. the 
"objecto o. f intuition. ' But this subjective realm of being 
I 
and spirit is not definable except in negative terms as wliat 
is not 11 verif iabld' 9nI ot'itobjectivell and not "knowledge". - 
That Marcel is expanding Branschwicgts theory of mindq 
but along lines suggested by Kant's Practical R easons ýS 
ob vious from a'study of the first part of the Journal Me a- t 
physi-que, where his analysis of 'f aith,, although somewhat more 
incoherent than- in the article, is also'more'explicit. A 
short statement of its contentsq supplementing our expose, of 
t -articlog is here desirable*, 
Marcel asserte; with BrunschwicF, that the, object is a, 
f ý, e 
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construction of thouCht in terms of forms (spaceg timeg etc. ) 
v4iich it creates- as the conditions of intelligibility. 
",.. llobjet est construit comme objet, atest-a-dire - et par 
definition meme - comme indep , 
endant du sujet percevant; cette 
construption nlest ni,, posterieure a llexpe**rience comme, le, 
I voudrait un empirisme' contradictoire, ni. anterieure 'a 91leg 
mais, elle lui est idenýiqueq elle lui eat coextensive (J. M. 
P. 15) (1) 
But in'this verý act of constructing the objectq the mind 
i 
is made aware of itself as thoughtq not, "constitueell but 
11constituantePI or ra4her Ilse constituant", in short as an act 
transcending the forms it*creates and which are the conditions 
of its objectivation and therefore of its "verification but'; 
to which it itself is not subjected. Thought # its pure, 
subjective reality is "unverifiable" and beyond all deter- 
mination. 
Le 11je pensell nlest pas un donne, il nlest pas une 
forme, il est un acte. Je crois que Descartes 
ta ici ete plus'loin que Kant. Llinverifiable es 
donc fonction de l1acte libre, il est la trace de ", 
celui-ci, il est l1expression toute negative de 
cc fait que l1acte libre devient pour Jui-idei; e un 
I mystere aussitft-qlil se transforme en pensee . objective (la pensee objective ayant pour caractere , 
de se nier au profit de son objet). Je iýe, crois 
pas quIon puisse aller plus loin dans la determina- .4 tion do 1t idde dlinverifiable. (Ibid. 9 p. 37. )ý 
Cf. "Ainci cc niest pas 
ilintelliGibilite" 
qui est fonction 
es foriaes, cc sont les formes qui sont fonction de 11intelli- 
Gib-i-lito'i et, jo le rephat il, est necessaire Tilil en soit 
ainsi; car rendre raison de lt; ntelligibilite, OeGtý ou bion no rien penserg oU'bien'preformor 11intelligible m6me, darts 10 principo formel' quiý ost destine al on rendre compte, " (Ibid. t P. 
tR 
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Puro thought 9 the inner reality of mindq reveals itself thus 
I 
as pure spontaneityl as liberty. 
L., Iacte par 1equel Je 
i 
pense . la liberte' est l1acte 
meme par lequel la. 1 berte se constitue. Le moi 
serait en que1que sorte le medium intelligible par 
lequel la liberte passe de lfidEre a 116tre. Mais 
il est clair, que cet acte 
,, 
de creation nlest autre 
que le cogito. La pensee se cree en se pensant; 
elle ne se trouve pas, elle se constitue. 
(Ibid. 9 P. 32. ) 
And this means that it cannot be posited'as existing. 
Il nly a de verite que de ce qui est dans llespace 
et dans le temps9mais il nly a de verit4 que Pour 
une ponsee qui se d4finit hors, Te- llespace etý=u 
temps. Une telle pensee ne peut sans contra- 
diction se poser comme existante: et ceci revient 
a dire quleýlle est libre. 
La liberte"', condition dq toute verificationg 
ne peut 9tre pensee elle-m&e que comme radicale- 
ment inveriflableg comme affranchie des conditions 
d1existence auxquelles doit satisfaire un objet 0' J. pourpouvoir etre verifie (d4termine comme verite 
(116id. 9PP-30-1o 
The CoEito posits, the thinking subject as libertyq a pure 
essence of thought, thus establishing the grounds of a 
universal science. 
t Le moig ai-je ditq est le medium de la liberteg 
ctest-'a-dire que dans le cogito le moi exprime 
l1acto par lequel la liberter so pose'eile-m6me. 
Soulement ce moi est universel, ou tout au moins 
il so supprime dans l'univorsalitd du sujet pensant. 
Bn tant que je pense, je suis univorsel, etq si la 
science se suspend au cogito ctest precisement en 
vertu de cotte universalite 
Inh4rente 
au moi pensant. 
(Ibid. 9 pp., 40-1. 
But the je penae itself 9', by the, inward progress of thoug#t, 
must Give way to a deeper intuition of the-subJective realit-v: 





this is the je crois, the intuition. of faithq wherein the. 
self is made aware of its spontaneity in its particular 
individuality. ýBoth in the Je pense and the Je crois we are 
beyond the plane 'of verification, but in the first case the' 
self posits itself aq, -transcending all objective categories 
in order simply to provide the universal ground and -condition. 
of objective, Icnowledge; in the second case the self is not 
concerned with establishing its freedom as a, universal ground 
for the developmentlof rational knowledge, but as the concrete 
essence constituting its, indivi: duality (Marcel is here' 
trying to surmount 
&'difficulty 
of the Cartesian res 
co itans). 1 1.1 
40 Le sujet de la foi nlest pas la pensee en general. 0 La pensee en general en tant quIelle se reflechit 
elle-meme (et slobjective par consequent) 
aI apparalitra elle-meme comme un pur "strait q Un 
pur. indetermineq comme une condition formelle et' 
rien de plus. Le sujet de la foi doit au 
contraite etre concret; ý %(Ibid., p., 41. ) 
Thus is obtained the passagedfrom the epistemological. to, the 
metaphysical subject. , Marcelq howeverg maintains that it is 
simply a transi , ýion$ for the intuition of faith is linked 
with the le ponse and merely represents a furtherr moment, in, 
the dialectic whereby thought "transcends its positiond'. 
% La question se ramene a celle-ci: comment le- lUi_M A 0? cogito peut-il se depasser em Il est 
clair en, effet quo 11individualite qui se realise 
dans la foi doit 6tre par dela ltuniversalitc(tout 
abstraite du jo, penseq elle doit la comprendro ot 
la depasser. -T-Ibid., p. '42. ) 
La foi est lfacte par loquel Posprit comble ie 
-vide ontre le moi pensant et lo moi empirique en 
affirmant, leur-liaison transcondante; ou plut^t' 0 
U4 
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la foi est 1 lacte par 1equel llesprit se fait, 
lles rit et rion plus le sujet pensantg llesprit 0 re ie vivante et active. Bt sans doute la 
dissociation de ces divers moments peut et doit 
sembler arbitraire. Seule l1analyse abstraite 
permet de les reconnal"treg deýles isoler et m6lae 
de les nommer. (Ibid. ý' p. 45. ) 
In so grasping its inner concrete individuality, the self 
grasps at one and ýhe same time the spiritual and divine 
principle of activity with which it participates. Faith 
is essentially Parýici2ation, j for this individuality 
iýlest quIen se suspendant a un acte de creationg 
a une liberte'qui est distincte d1elle; la 
ne'Ciation absolue du solipsisme est la condition 
, 
prealable? de toute vie spiri 
I 
tuelle. (Ibid. 9 p. 62. ) 
The act of faith is affirmation of liberty, but of a1 iberty 
which finds itself in 'participation aýd ultimately inýunlon 





Nlavons-nous pas ete dupe des mots en dissociant 
le cogito et l'affirmation portant sur Dieu? 
bien plus, nlappareit-il pas absurde de distinguer 
inaintenant deux libertes? Ne sommes-nous pas 
obliE; es dlidentifier au sein de la pensee so 
pansant elle-mome (et qui nIest ni ma pen. -, Co ni 
la pensee dlun Dieug mais soulement la PensCe) 
los deux moments quo seule une reflexion super- 
ficielle nous avait permi's de dissocier? 
(Ibid. 9 p. 38. ) 
Clest-a-dire que llesprit pose Dieu c6mme le osant. 
(lbid. f 
La foi appara'ltl dlune faqon encore grossierd, 
c9rune llacte par lequel une pensee so niant elle- 
ifteme comiae suiet fixe at existant se reconstruit 
olle-meme comma suj at (voulu at cre e) par la 
Participation 4 Dieu ýqui semble se def inir comme lo iiiddium mysterieux a cette-recreation). ', 
-2. ) (lbid. 9 pp. 41 
In tll(, - f3olf-aSfirviation of faith suspended on ýhe affirma- 7 
It ". 
tiOn of Gods freedom attains its true actuality: in short, 
146. 
the individual subject attains true actuality only. in union 
with Absolute Spirit. 
f La liberte qui 6e realise dans 11, acte de foi est 
une liberte' actuelle, une liberte pour soig ce 
nlest plus la liberte"virtuelle du cogito qui se 
supprime dans son objet. La seule liaison qutil 
soit possible de penser entre Dieu et le monde ne 
Sf etablit que dans la foi et par elle, clest-a- 
dire quIelle reside dana la mediation perpetuelle 
du croyant,. (lbid. 9 p. 46. ) 
Being beyond verification, Spirit and Godi which are the 
"object" of faith, 1. are beyond the judgment of existenceg no 
less than the pure thinking self. 
La foi ne peut se Justifier qu'la" condition dletre 
transcendahte au savoir; sinon, en assienant a 
Dieu 11existence, nous le r4alisons dans llespace 
et le temps. (Ibid. 9 P. 33,. ) 
It, will be seen clearly from this more detailed expose 
of the content of the-First Part of the Journal that Marcel 
is utillainG Brunachwicgls theory of verification as a 
startinG-point from which to develop a doctrine of faith 
along Kantian lines in. terms of ,. an "unvorif 
iable" but 
supplemented by a theory of participation on thwliýes of', 
the French Idealists. 
rl 
01- 0. - 
If we now turn to consider the nature of! the Being which 
is the 6bjoct, of Marcells, intuitionj it is no less obvious 
that his thought has its source in modern Idealism.. . T]3. e 
first philocophyg'indeed#-. aimply, olaborato6'the conel#i: ons 
4-'. -. -. ---. --.. . -. "-.. --.. --"---- 
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of his tliesis. Its aim is at bottom the 'same as that Of 
SchellinG: to show the inadequacy of a logical pantheism 
which reduces reality to a system of necessary and abstract 
relations', 'and to'reassert the primacy of, liberty. Itlis 
an intuition which'breaks the bonds of logical determinism 
and provides awareness of t" cardinal fact of liberty and 
irrational activity as the very substance of reality* The 
first philosophy of, I Marcel is from start, to finish a philo-* 
sophy of liberty: it equaýes Being and Freedom; it affirms 
-an 
intuition of a transcendent Active Thought immanent in 
selff, Its sOurces. 
4re first of all S6helling. Secondly, 
' 
French Spiritualism and Idealism from Maine de Birbn d 
Ravaisson onwards; Jules Lachelier an'd Jules Ldgneau n 
II1141 
particularg all of w1iom define Being as absoluteispontaneityg 
pure will and active mind. 
The identificatidn of Being with liberty is sufficient 
ýin 
itself to mark the abyss-between Marcel's 
iirst philosophy 
and his, later development., One outstanding feature which is 
to 
. characteriaq, 
his, f inal philosophy is the uncompromising - 
rejection of what he is to term the 11primat de lh liberte" 
J% common to pýactically all modern Idealisms. 
., The full implication of this Idealism will become evident 
if we consider the intrinsic nature of Being as defined above 
by Marcel. Certainly, Being, considered as Freedom and 
'-Spontaneity,, is not the bLbstract notion of Being formed by' 
th, 0 Scholastics.. Comparing his conception of Being with that 
L_! ov-t4. ft. ý_ 
INI 
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of BerGsonq Marcel states in a note: "It Cpes without saying 
thatq for meq Being (as grasped in intuithn) is the concrete. '# 
(C. D. P. 638t Note. ) None the less, the comparison is at 
this stage inaccurate. For it is obvious that he is not 
de: CininG Being as existent. I'La reralitE( spirituefle, " he 
writes, IIhIest doric quta*' condition de se nier co=e existence. " 
(J. Al. p., 122. ) The Being revealed in intuition is rather, I as, 
M. 'Wahl has pointed out,. the Transcendent Unity. of Plotinus, 
situated on a plane beyond all categories of existence or non- 
existence, essence or non-essence$ truth or falsehood. 
Indeed the author d'6clares as-much: 
La negation de Dieu comme existant entratnel" 
l1affirmation de Dieu cormae transcendant) avons- 
nous dit. Ceci vout dire'que nous devons ýenser 
Dieu comme transcendant a toute d4termination 
quelconque; aboutirons-nous done 1i l; IUn alexandrin? 
Je crois qulil faut reconnaitre ce qui est absolu- 
ment vrai chez Plotin; llidee que Dieu nlest, 
veritablement pour nous quIen tant que nous 
participons a lui. Seulement il iMPorte de 
transposer dans 11ordre de llesprit, dans 11ordre 
subjectif tout ce qui subsiste chez Plotin.. 
dt6wmatisme objectif. (J-M- PP. 35-6. ) 
Or again it is conceived in the Fichtean and Spiritualistic 
sense as the pure Transcendent Subject or Active Mind, 
grasped outwith the spatio-temporal conditions of actual and 
sensational. e. xperiencee The JO penseq declares Marcelq 
11transcendc all experie . ncet all possible existence and all 
truth". (J. M. P. 8. 
, The sources of, thisý-conception of Being are once again 
the French Idealists and Schelling. The principal feature 
IIý 




century is the gradual tran ition from thq contingent, 
existential subjectq which is the object of Maine de Biran's 
psychological analysist t6, 'the transcendent Absolute Subject. 
It has its starting-point in the analysis of the empirical 
consciousness initiated by Maine de Biran., in the conscious- 
ness of the self as iroluntary activity or cause distinct from, 
what is mere passive sensibility and affectivity. "J'agisq 
je veux, ou Je penqe en moi l1action-,, q done je me saiS-causpq 
done je suie ou j1existe reellement 'a titre de cause ou de 
force 1). 11 With' Fe')flix 
IRavaisson, 




passage from psycholbSy to metaphysics. 
The active will of the self becomes liiiked with the tr6s- 
cendent. principle of love working in man and natureq a 
universal aspiration towards hark6ny and beauty'ý- Absolute'' 
Being or God. So that Being becomes. identified with a single 
universal principle transcending the individual empirical I 
consciousness and towards union, with which it strives. 
It is Lachelier who transforms'Spiritualism into a pure 
Idealism. 'The transcending of the objective content of 
thought$ already describedg leaves-an element which-analysis 
cannot reduceg namely consciousness itself - the consciousness 
of mind or thought as pure activity and spontaneity. But 
this consciousness is not the "conscience sensible",, but a 
pure consciousness "conscience de 16 consciened, The 
Being. or Thought grasped therein is aý'Ispontaneite, abs6lue". 
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transcending the purely relative perception of self-activity 
which is the datum of the. reall empirical consciousness. 
"Puisquo la philosophie se propose d1expliquer toute la 
% 
- realite*9 il f aut bien qu I elle., en cheiche la derniere raison , 
'- 
dans quelque chose qui ne soit plus reel, et qui soit par 
conse P quent une pure ide"e tl). 11 "No craignon 
Is pas de 
suspendre en, quelque sorte la, pensee dans/le videl car ellq 
A 
ne pout reposer que-sur elle-memeq et tout le resýe ne pout 
reposer quo sur elle:, le d, brnier p6int, d1appui de toute., 
verit4'et de toute existeý=6,, clest la Opontandito absolue 
de llesprit (2). 11 
Lachelier thus turns his', back upon all psychological,, 
Realism, which he dismisses a. 4 & mere"InaturalisruP. ,II 
le 




active force which is the objec f the intuition of the realq 
existing seif and which forms hýs I'substaned' or '#essence" as 
aa, individual personalityg but iý', an Absolute Spontaneity' 
transcending selfhood and existence as such. The Absolute 
ý. is-not the individual existing selfv but a Pure'Thought which 
is the measure and ground of bothýthought and existence., I'La 
pensee et l1existence ne sont que deux noms de 11universelle 
, 
ýlý PsZchologie et metahysi ue , PP. 103-4. 90 2 ibld, 157-8. THe n-o! Elon of a "pure consciousness", 
conscience do, la conscience, ' is the same as Vale'ryls. - "Tout le cede 'a cette universalitd purel & cette ge"ndral. itg insur- 
montable que la conscience. se sent etre. 11 (Introduction, a la 
m4thode de Leonard do Vincig p. 26. ). Ili-e suis, otantf et me 
voyant; me-voyant me voiri et ainsi. de suite. " (Monsieur 






et eternelle ne'cessite-(l). " 
The same turninG back upon f inite existence is to be 
found in thd philosophy of Jules Lagneau. He denies the 
possibility(of grasping the'self. ' (Sensation is an ideal 
limit never given nor experienced as such. ) VAlat alone can 
I be graspedg and that by I pure consciousness,. is Absolute Spiritt 
"Cet effort vers llesprit-moi est vain: le moi echappe, 
llesprit seul, universel, est atteint par le sentiment du. 
J# - necessaire absolu a la f ois subi et subissant ,cI est-a-dire 
de l'unite" totale et absolue (2).. " ; "I 
These telidencies/of French Idealismýhave their counter- 
, ', part in Schelling. Reflecting the insp, iration of Boehmeq 
Sthellin-'s Being or Absolute Liberty, in,, which the contingent 
selves participate in respect of their degree of beingg is 
i 
described in strictly neo-Platohic terms as beyond essence 
and existence, entirely indeterminate and unconditioned. 
Itself tUe ground and principle of being and existenceo it 
yet cannot be said to be or existp as it is beyond predication. 
BeinG, or the Itsuper-Godhead", is'uncharacterisable; in one 
sense it Is and exists, in another it is not and does not 
exist. In short, it enjoys what the-neo-Platonic theologians 
term "super-existence" and super-essence", "It is eternal 
freedom, pure will, but not the will for something - for 
example the will to reveal one Is self - but pure, pbLssionless 
(1 Du Fondeirient de 11inductiont Parisq Alcanj 1924, ý ý 
". 
54s, 2ý Ncrýits, P-99 
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and desireless will', will in so far as it does not really 
will (1). 11 "Thus, in a strict sense, the Godhead cannot 
be called-consciousq for this would presuppose a distinction 
of itself from something of which it is conscious, since it 
certainly is altogether pure, consciousness and throughout 
nothing but just itself, and'ýeverything is absorbed in the 
nature of the, Godhead,. ' According to this,, sam*e doctrine# the 
I Godhead in itself caýinot be called willing, because it is 
will, pure freedom itself, although just on this account it 
also cannot be called non-ýilling. Finally that ancient 
-- proposition, vdiich so4nds stranýe only to the 
. ignorantg also 
1, follows from this docttineq thatýthe godhead in itself 
neither is nor is not , or , in, another 9 though inf erior 
phrasinGi that it is as well as isýnot (2). " Inýshortq the 
ultimate BeinG or Reality is beyondýall categories; although 
in one sense infinite Beingg infinite existence and infinite 
personality, it cannot be said to possess being, existence or 
personality'-in a 11positivdI sense., Hence, the Absolute is to 
be known only "negatively" 
Finally, Dr Bolman has described Schel ling I s'evolution ,, 
as a Iýtransition from a relatively static to a truly dynamic, 
poetic monism (4). " And a, Monism his philosophy remains 
(1) The Arcs of the world, p. 123. 
ej ibid. 9 p, 1? -). 3 Cf. John Scok Brigena:. "Nam qui dicit superessentialia 
es , nong quid est, dicit, sedg quid non est; dicit enim 
casentiam lion esseg red plusquam essentiam. 11 (Do Divisione, 
fiaturao, 462 D, quotod by 11. Bett, Joh6Lnnes'-Scotj-j-2- =r3. en&q., 7 (; am6r' t; a University Preac,,. t 19251, pe . 
24. ) 
(4) 01). cit. t Introd. f p. 67. 
4 
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(no less than the Monism of French Idealism). Ile visualises 
aii Absolute Spiritq beyond contingent existence, in which all, 
,f inite beings participate by their freedom and to union with 
which all ýaspire (1). 
The-first phase of Marcel's thoughtf as oiýr analysis may 
have helped to show, exhibits all these traits of post-Kantian 
Idealism. He seems to' conceive intuition, as bearing upon a 
universal "Geist' t; anscending individual, consciousnesses, 
I 
ultimately-uncharacterisablej beyond concrete existence, into 
which the individual, finite, existing s, elf is to be absorbed 
in the final phase oi ihtuition. Marcel in the first part - 
Df the -Yournal Metaphysique criticises, ýIspiritualistic onism? ' 
no doubt. - 
Ceci revient a dire quton se trompe en joroyant! ', 
que la.. predoýainance de llesprit ne peut etre 
affirmee que sur la base d1un spiritualisme 
universelq dtun monisme du psychiqueý Il ya. 
- la' une exigence realiste et illegitime* que Je I, repudie. (p. 94. ). 
I- 
But, in reality, he is only criticising Monism in so far as 
it denies the ývalue of external relations; which it does 
because it confuses such relations with pure relatione of' 
"juxtapositioxyl. No doubt, he arguest external relations 
have no intrinsic reality and are not ultimateg but they have 
their place at a certain moment of dialectic: 
4 
(1) "Cc qui est, de la. plus grande importance non pas seulementý historique mais intrinseque olest lleffort quIa. fait ici.. SchollinG pour fonder la liberte humaine ontologiquement, ou 
plus exactement encore pourIla. greffer sur la-vie divine elle-ý, 
11101110.11 (G. Marcel, review ofýSchellingj La Liberte humaine. 0 transl . G. Politzer, Nouv. Rev. ' franc., ' Ocu. P)46. ) 
4 
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Le monisme ag je crois, pleinement raison tant 
5 lil se borne !L affirmer que plus nous nous ulevons 
dans lletre, plus le pur juxtapose tend 
a ^etre elimine". Le progres dans lletre a cet 
egard est un progres dans-l'interiorite... 
Pour nier'la valeur ontoloGique de l1aussi (pour 
flui refuser toute realite intrinseque), est-il 
necessaire de chercher a l1eliminer? La question 
R ui se pose avant, tout est de savoir si cetto 
imination est reelle, si elle nlest pas 
illusoire., Il ya un plan de la pensee qui est 
celui de l1aussig quoi quIon fasse pour le nier; 
la question est de savoir si en niant que ce plan 
soit ultime; onaffirme par la m6me la these 
moniste de la reductibilite de toutes les %z 
connexions externes a des rapports d1interiorite. 
(Ibid. 9 p. 95. ) 
It is certain thatthere is here some incoherence and that the 
author's dialectic has overrun itself:,, to deny the "intrinsic 
realitYl and llultimacyl of external relations is tantwhount 
to affirminG Monism and no Monist ever meant anything else. 
And, in actual factt Marcel's philosophy at thisitime denies 
any reality except to theý, Transcendent Unity what he calls 
111'Esprit" as opposed to lithought thought". 
The intuition he describes, is therefore completely 
unlike that of Bergson andýtheýintuition he later defendeq 
namely the immediacy of feeling and sensation as experienced 
by the existL: ýa self and given in the concrete sýatio-temporal 
conditions of such experience. At the momentq the intuition 
he envisaGes is the very contrary of sensation (whibh with 
the Idealists, lie would no dou'6t relegate to the domain - of 
objectivity (1)). It is a form of "pure intuitior2l prepared 
(1) TO. Wahl, in his article on'ý'the Journalg. observes rightly 
that Marcel a-b this time identities-e7isteiice withýspace and that it is for this reason that he refuses existence. to Being. 
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by a transcending of all that is contingent (and therefore, 
strictly speaking, spatio-temporal) in experience. 
Moreover, it puts us in touch with, ýa Being which is not 
itself existent; an(Iab6olutý spontaneityg or God, not even 
characterisable as a 11 persod' $ as a 11 substance" or as an 
essence". Nothing- could be further removed- from the Being 
of his later philosophyg-revealed in f. eeling and sensation; 
a Being which is a plurality of-individual selves and 
"essences" existing in Timej Space and History. 
In conclusiong two'f eatures of this preliminary Idealism 
starid. 'out in opposit on toýhis later Realism. Firstq 
i 
what 
seems to be its Monistic implications. i His thought appears 
at this moment to be dominated by the mystical notion Of a 
return to unity, culminating in what is at bottoiA the 
4 
depreciation of individual finite existence., He is quite 
obviously under the influence of Schelling and Fichtet whose- 
Idealism reflects the neo-Platonism of Eckhart and Boehmeq 
and of Hegel hiýaself, 'in so far as the latter's dialectic 
derives from a similar source and originates In a like concept 
of Unity (1). Secondlyq there is the neGative 8haracter of 
his first philosophy and of the theology it involves; so 
unlike the positive Realism of his later and more original 
phase. The being he describes is characterisable only in 
neGative terins; an Indeterminate Absolute One, not everva- 
tri 
O-V ' 
this intcrpr(eýation of HeGel's dialectic cf. Brephier, 
III., ) oiro dc la 1ý1111oqojýhio allemande, p. 138. - For a full or discussi on of Retrol Is indebtedness to John Sc(it Erigeilag'Of. 
11. Bett, op. cit., pp. 194-6. 
Ii 
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person, to be approach6d by successive acts of participationg 
transcendence or faithq in short by a dialectic which implies 
-something not unlike*the via negativa of. the Christian Neo- 
ýatonistsq of a Dionysius or an Brigena. 
- 
Al. Jean Wahl has pointed out that Marcelg in his later 
philosophy, is on the prolongation of, a', line from Hegel to 
Bradley (l)-. 'Bradley's position is extremely equivocalv 
his criticism of aýdolute knowledge and his defence of 
sensation as a concrete participation in reality, the Tatter 
made known to the subject not in an objective relation'but 
in an immediate presentationg seems to incline him towards 
a true-Realism. Nevertheless, he seems unwilling to maintain 
wholeheartedly that the unknowable Absolute is thus grasped 
in what is for him an individual fragmentary experience (2). 
ý1 Op. cit. 
2 Bradley's Metaphysics, triadic in characterg marks an 
ef ort to transcend the naive immediacy of sensation and 
feeling and to arrive at a new immediacy on a higher level 
which will restore the vision of the Absolute `, Ihole -which the 
relationary activitZ of the intelligence has fraGmented. 
Comparing Bradley's immediacy and Spinoza's intuition, 
Alexander writes: 'four simplest life is that of bare feeling; 
then follows reflection in which we think of the relation of 
thinGs; then comes the feeling in Which we cease to break up 
the unity of realities into their separate aspects or features, 
which our analytical ref lection discloses and. in vAiich it works 
as in its appropriate* inedium, and we return to the immediacy 
of our oriL; inal feeling, but an immediacy which is no longer 
nalve and irreflectiveq but chastened. by reflection and 
superior -to It (S. Alexander, S2inoza and T'M2L London, ' 
Allen and Unw: Ln, 1921$ pp. 61-2. ) 
.. 
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And his theory of. judgmentg which stresses the impossibility 
of any valid judgment other than the all-containing Judgment 
'which relates the totality of the real to the totality of 
determiniýaG predicates, pOstulates an ultimate universal 
reality'or Hegelian G6ist as the term of a long dialectic. 
Thus Bradley hovers between Idealism and Realism. Gabriel 
Idarcel, with the aiý of Bergson and hiý d? fence of immiediacyt 
takes the step Bradley refuses- to take f "d there: by turns his 
back upon Idealism. He. identifies the immediate and t4e 
Absolute and proclaims the individual ex perience of sensation 
and feeling to be a 
4eve 
I 
lation of the Absolute itself., The 
! %. 
-Absolute, 
impermeable to thought$ which transforms theireal 
into an object and thereby deforms it, is-Crasped'in iýs, pure` 
essence in feeling. ' And thus MarceltS Ideali6lwith its" 
-negative philosophy of'Being'yields to'an uncompromising 
Realism and a positive th6ory. of'Being'as essence and-- 
existence. 
Already in this first phase there were several indica- 
ý. tions of his later development. In his Regard'en arrie"re, 
Marcel himself has noted'ý, that from*the beginning heýwas 
.., hostile to pantheism, which for him-implied a loEical 
pantheism: 
Sans que Je puisse expli uer exactement pourquoi,, je constate que le panthaisme ne m1a jamais attire 
sans doute avant tout parce qutil me semblait incapable de laisper subsister lq vie personnelle dans sa plenitudeý, concrate. - (PP. 307-8. ) 
Anything in the-naturd''of 'thought in general"-was abhorrent' 
" 
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to him and he relates that already in 1912 he had adopted, 
while still unacquainted w#h his works, the position of 
Kierkegaard as to the subjective individuality of faith: 
ilavais reqonnu une fois pour toutes que le suiet 
croyant ne peut en aucune facon (ýtre traite comme f une modalitd de la, pensee en general, que par 0 consequent il ne peut y avoir de Glauben Aberhaupti, 
en d'autres termes que la croyance est le fait 
d1un sujet concret, ýIindividuel, mais qui ne peut 
cependant se confondre avec le moi empirique pour 
cette simple raison que ce dernier se reduit bL un 
ensemble. de d4terminations susceptibles dIdtre 
objectivement reperees. Cette affirmation si. 
difficilement concr6tisable m1apparalt encore 
. -aujourdhui comme le reduit de tout ce que J'ai. 
pense depuis lors; en toute, 'conscienceg je crois 
pouvoir. di, re que jly suis'parvenu par moi-m8me, 
puisquIa dette epoqueje, n1avais pas lu une ligne 
do Kierkegaard, chez qui il, est trop clair qe 
j taurais pu la trouver. (P 310. 
AGainghis first phase shows evident uneasiness)over te 
question of Monismq so incompatible with his urUe to con- 
creteness. We have already quoted the passage in the 
Journal hle'tUhysique Whereq unsuccessfullyq he attempts to 
justify within the general framework of his Monism externýl 
relations. But theýincoherence itself of the passage bears 
witness to the fact that he is seeking to define a new type 
,, of relation - the relation of participation whiýh invoXve. s 
both-the plurality of personal e oncre, te ent ities and their 
unity in participation. From an early time the study of 
Bradleyq he tells us, had caused him to react vigorously 
againatthe idea of an $'absolute knowl'ýdgell and. tO place 
reality ýn. the $'act'. - 





reflexion sur l1acte considd're comme irre'ductible % .1 
a un contenu de. pensee que j lai erte d'abord amene 
mlinscrire en faux contre llidee dýune totalite 
intelligible qui serait a'la fois le'principe 
moteur et la fin de la dialectique. (PP. 316-17. ) 
So much so that he was for a time tempted by the monadist 
solution until he realised fully its total incompatibility 
with the requirements of his own views of participation and 
comnunion: 
l1acte m1a toujours retenu avant tout par son 
irr(kuctible originalite", ou m6me par la singu- 
larit4 de perspective qui le commande inevitable- 
ment. L& est, la-raison pour laquelle'le monadisme 'i' a pu me seduire quelqud temps; et sans doute mly 
serais-je e 
'pallid 
durablement, si. -la th'se de 11incommuAicabilite dep monades ne mIdtait*apparue 
comme un ddfi a llexperiencei et'. au sens commi3n. (P-317. ) 
It was these two exigenceso the necessity of a thlory of, 
concrete plural persons and the necessity, of ia theory 
explicative of their participation\and union which drove him 
to seek for a solution beyond both Monism and Pluralism 
propers 
. -De ce point de vue 
je crois pouvoir dire aujourd'hui 
que J'ai toujours tendu a accorder au pluralisme ý 
une valeur au moins n4gative - celle d1un refus, .1 I. d1une protestation necessaire'- sans d'ailleurs 
aller jusqu'd y voir une doctrine metaphysique 
tenable; ma tendance personlielle'etant bierý 
.' plut^t de deýiier 
% 11opposition de l'un. et du, 0t 1ý 1ý 
plusieurs la por ee ontologique que lui ont I assi6nee les metaphysiciens depuis ltecole d'Ele*'o 
jusqulaux neo-hegAiens. ' (p. 316. ) 
And the solutiong#alf-glimpsed in the first part of the 
Journal Meta5lýysicjue, he will find in-a new type of conorete 
personal relation over and beyond the abstract concepts ither 
, of 
internality or externality., S. 
", -.; -1 ,ýI, 1. ýAA 
160. 
Je vois distinctement aujourdthui que je tendais 
ainsi a substituer un type de rapport concret et 
d-ramatique aux relations encore tout abstraites 
d1inherence ou d1extdriorite entre lesquelles la 
philosophie traditionnelle prOtendait me 
contraindre a. opter. (P - 317v) 
Again, we have seen how Brunschwieg's notion of the 
', 'unverifiable" plays a large part in the first phase. At 
this time he could define this non-objectified and non- 
objective realm of being only in negative terms. Although 
I 
univillinG to lapne into a Spencerian agnosticismg he cannot 
wholly escape from it. As. he sees itq reality is beyond 
thought and the condiýions of knowledge., ' His theory of 
knowledge is at bottom a negative one. The insufficie4cy 
of this viewpoint will soon become apparent. As he stýites, 
it will soon contradict his later philosophy of existence 
w-'aich rests upon positive ex2erience. By attem 
I 
ing to Pt 
"discern the transcendental conditions of a faith grasped' 
in its purity" he was led to transcend wholly the domain of 
positive knowledge and of fact. Ilia viewpoint I'visait a 
poser un inve"rifiable qui transcende-le progres de la 
connaisseaice tel qulil se poursuit au sein des sciences 
particulieres". (P- 309. ) In this he deprived religious 
experience of*its basic experiential ground: ' 
Ici ce t bien en derni%ere , 
pendantq cles analyse 
l1experience qui decide; il reste 'a 4tablir, ý, " 
quo la teldpathie est un fait, qatil y a-des 
proMonitions r6ellesq etc. Il m1aurait au 
contraire de prime abord paru scandaleux de 
soumettre la foi religieuse pensee dans sa 
purot6 a ce contrSle einpirique. Elle se 
presentait 'a" moi comme allant par essence au dela de tout d4menti et de toute confirmation 




It is precisely on the basis of sensation and all its . 
attendalit forces that he will establish his own Existential' 
Realism. a 
Yet, ýaltliough that is - so, this distinction between the 
I'verifiabld' and the IluinLverifiable" will be the origin of 
his later. distinction'- between llprobiei2l and I'myster; yl 
Ce que ma 
demarche tendait en definitive "a, exclur`69' 
cletait laýýnotion d1une pensee qui definiraitlen 
que1que soýte objectivement la s, tructuredu reel" 
et se regarderait des lors comm'e' qualifide pour 
statuer sur lui. Je posais au 'contraire en 
principe que l1entreprise ne pouvait se poursuivre 
quI& 11int4rieur d1une realiteen face de laquelle 
le philosoiphp ne peut jamais se poser co=e on se 
cpTape devaht un tableau pour le contempler. * Par 
1& toutý ma recherche anticipait sur 1 position 
du mystere telle quIelle slest pý(ýcisee pour ýoi 
dans Positi6n et Approches concretesdu Mystete 
ontolog-l'q-ue. (pp, ý16-19, ) 
Only this latter will be interpreted in a. po. siti4e empirical. 
senseq as valid positive knowledge. 
The supreme factor in the transformation' we shall now 
witness was'the experiences during the 1914-18 *arq of which 
we have spoken and which forced upon him the problem of' 
-personal r'elationships, normal and supra-normals' It was 
., these, experiences which provided the'reservoir of eipirical 
information and positive discovery of which. he'was later to 
attempt a philosophical explanation (1). 
With this transformdtion'of his-'thouýht runs parallel 
a transformation in hid dýalectical method. Hithertot, in- 
the first phasel this dialýectic-'vias"conducted on'the 'ideal. 
"(1) Existi chrjt. *o PP'. 311-ýý131' 
.- 
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plane, It was the movement of thought "transcending its 
own positions"; a dialectic largely inspired by Bradley 
and reminiscent of the synthetic method of Octave Hamelin. 
It is this juxtaposition of a rational dialectic with a 
philosophy vdiolly directed to establishing the primacy of 
freedom which is so curious in the first phase. For the 
dialectic has little resemblance with an existential dialectic. 
It progresses in a continuous movement with all the facility 
of a thouGhtlltransmutingýl Appearance into Reality (1). But 
such a diplectic, Marcel was soon to see, leaves out of 
account error, suffýringq sin, which are facts not to be so 
simply reduced, indeed not subject to reduction at all,: 
La pensee d1un Bradley, quand il parle de trans- 
mutation, ne slexerce-t-elle pas exclusivement 
sur des contenus qui peuvent en effet, se pr6ter , 
a un rajustementg comme, les morceaux mal assembles 
dluji puzzle, qulil est toujours possible en 
principe de regrouper correctement? Mais nly 
a-t-il pas-justement dans une erreurg dans une 
faute quelqiýe chose qui sera toujours irreductible %I a un pur dlement de contenu? (pp. 298-9. ) 
What will be required is a dialectic of a quite different 
sort; one whicA operates on an existential plane, being theý, 
reflexion of the subject on his concrete situati6 as 
ýe 
lives it at the moment; a dialectic Which is. subject to 
discontinuity and interruption whenever sin aný error intrude 
upon its movement and block its access to Beingg and one 
above all whose proGress consists, not in the transmuting of' 
nin and death by a sort of passe-passdg but in, the espquaing 




and realisinG of their inner core and so snatching from their 
jaws BeinG itself. 
- 
Tho preliminary, phase of Idealism definitely transcended 
in tile second part of the Journal h. -letaphysique, Marcel's 
philosophy presentq itself from now on first and foremost 
as a Realism. In common with Whitehead and Minkowskiq Marcel 
condemns the separation effected by modern Idealism between 
the mind and the unii4erse to which it adheres: 
. Lqous avons cru, on nous a fait croire, qu, il; nI etait d1interiorite possible et pour tout dire 
de reconnaissance de llesprit par lui-meme qulau. 
scin de llidealisme. Cletait la une effroyable 
erreur et dont je m1accorde avec JacquPs Maritain, 
pour penser que les consequences ont ete traoiquee 
et illimitees... Le fait le plus Crave pCut-etre 
qui se soit accompli au cours des derniers si6clesq 
clest larupture d1une amitie' se*culaire entre 
llhommc et l'univcrsq d1une amiti4 que l'oeuvre 
mal6fique des philosophes a precisement consiste' 
a, nous rendre aujourd'hui impensable. Et il ya 
la un point sur 1equel l1accord me semble en train 
de slaccomplir entre les croyants authentiques et 
les poetes m6he-diftrangers a toute foi veritableg 
un D. H. Lawrence, par exemple, dont les derniers 
ecrits marquent la protestation la plus veh6mente 
que je sache contre la mutilation systdmatique dont 
1 111orruae moderne *a I est lui-7m6me rendu victime (1). 
In ori)osition to Idealism, defined'ac; a philosophy which 
"attempts to maintain in the margin A Being a consciousness 
which posits or denics it (2), Marcel- seeks to restore that 




API)roches, concretes du Alys-tere ontologique j. 11 I L(3 Loadc, (; as. 3(-), Paris, Dese lee de'Brouvier, 19339 p. 264. 
lit 
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I'vinculum substantialej that, mysterious bond which unites us 
to the world we live in, a world which is more than a place, 
more than a theatreo a vital envelope, and, so to speakq a 
spiritual placent (1). " 
For Marcel, philosophy is Metaphysicsq Ontologyq philo- 
sophy of Being. The philosopher is one who experiences a 
certain need, who cannot be satisfied with abstractq loGical 
'! 
11 
truth, but desires, the intimate possession of reality and 
must be assured of, its presence by a, sentiment of plenitude 
I 
and total satisfaction. This needt felt by the true philo- 
sophers, Marcel cal&t in terms reminiscent of Alexander and 
Hockingg I'llappetit de 116trell (2). Such metaphysicaL need 
isl as, Pascal has shown inseparable irom. "anxietyl or 
I 
41 
"Inquietude", (3). The true philosopher is a prey-to an 
"inner want", an, 'oppressilon of spirit or inner lltensibdl 
which finds satisf&ction only in and thýrough Metaphysics. 
Far from belonging to the realm, of pure speculationg a form 
of "transcendent curiosityqf,, philosophy appertains to the 
realm of life, it begins and ends with the satisfaction of 
tile inner appetite for'Being'and the consequent resolving of 
the, inner tension (4). Marcel's philosophy is thus grounded 
in a Realism: it aims aýt restoring the sentiment of immediacy, 
at recuperating, to use HuSserl's term, the "vision of. 
1 Pref. to LucýBenoist,. op. ýit., p. iii. 
2 J31.1 p. 279. 
3 Ibid. p. 280. 
41 IlLe mhaphysicien est compar6ble a un malade qui cherche 
une position.,, (Ibid. 9 p. 281. 'ý)ý 
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essences", to establish and elucidate those immediate, 
spontaneous exp'eriences Wherein the real is made present 
to mind (1) 
(1) I'Le honheur ne serait-.; i, l pasune certaine facon df. gtore 
present soi-meme? " (Ibi4.9 p. 260. ) 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III 
Al")ubsumed under the influence of SchellinS Is final philo- 
sophy is that of Coleridge's "spiritual IdealisdIj allied, 
however, with the general influence of French Spiritualism. 
Ool6ride; els philosophy is grounded in the opposition between If 
Nature and Will. Nature is a power subject to the Law of 
Continuity, which finds its necessary expression in the law 
of cause and effect, a law or, in the Kantian terminology 
Coleridge employs, a ord' of the Understanding (the 
"faculty judging according, to sense", as, opposed to Reasong 
"the Power of Universal and necessary Convictions, the Source 
and-Substance of Truths above Senseq and havinG. their evidence 
in themselves (1)). 11 Nature appears thus, by viýtue of the 
inherent structure of the Understanding, as a continuity and 
.I. -. 
Causal Mechanism, without beginning or end, and the negation 
of freedom. 
But over andabove Nature stands. the Will, whose activity 
. of s elf- origination and the furnishes tho inner conviction 
possibility of discontinuityq of creation: "Nature is a line 
in constant and continuous evolution. Iýs beginning is lost 
in the super-natural: and for our understanding, therefore, 
it must al). pear as a continuous line without beginning or end, 
But where there is no discontinuity there can be no origina- 
(1) Aphorisms on Spiritual Religion in Aids to Reflection, 
Bohn's Library, London) Bell, 1913, p. 143. 
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tion, and every appearance of oriGination in nature isýbut a 
shadow of our own casting. It is a reflection from our own 
Will or Spirit. Herein, indeed, the Will consists. This 
is the essential character by which Will is opposed to Nature, 
as 
ISpirit,, 
and raised above Nature, as self-determining Spirit 
- this namely, that it is a power of originating an act or 
state (1). " 
ColeridGels phil. osopliy is therefore Sýrictly atI 
3piritualim of the French variety. Forits starting-point 
is in the intuition of the'individual consciousnesst' the 
self-conscious activiýy of the person which brings awareness 
of the self as causa sui. 
Colerid. re's analysis of the fact of self-consciousness 
4,: 
is on a parallel with that of Maine de Biran, butlof a Maine 
de Biran nourished on the dialectiod of Fichte. Self- 
consciousness is the'condition of consciousness in general; 
"the precondition of all experieýncell$ it signifies "to know 
a thing in relation-to myselfq and in the act of knowing 
myself as acted upon by that something (2). 11 It is given 
only in the act whereby I dissociate myself*from riy self (or 
non-self) in order to construct iý, and thereby simultaneously 
apprehend myself as something constructed and a something 
which constructs$ that is, as Act or Will: "namelyg that there 
can be no I without a Thou,. and that a Thou'is only possible 
by an equation in Which I is taken as equal to Thou, and yet 
ýl Ibid., p. 176, n. l. ' 2j An E ssay on Faith in Ibid. q p. 343. 
. 
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not the awne. And, thist again, is only possible by putting 
them in opposition as correspondent opposites, or correlatives. 
In order to thisq a something rrust be affirmed in the one, 
which is rejected in the other, and this something is the 
will. ' I do not will to consider myself as equal to. myselfg 
for in the very act of, constructing myLelfIq I take it as the 
owne, and therefore as incapable of comparisong that isq of - 
miy application of t4e will (1). 11 Therefore "the becoming 
conscious of a conscience (i. e. self-consciousness) partakes 
of the nature of an act". -Moreover, it. involves an act of 
Faith towards my self/. - "It is an act in and by which we 
take upon ourselves an allegianceg and consequently the 
obliCation of fealtV,; 'and this fealty or fidelity imýlying 
the power of being unfaithfulq it is the first and fundamental 
sense of Faith (2). " 
It is in the will-or the actq as exhibited in self- 
conscious activity, that ColeriaGe places the ultimate 
reality: "It is at once the'dispinctive and constitutive 
basis of my philosophy that I pla'ý'ce the ground and'Senesis of 
my systeta, notj as others, in a ipLet impressedo mAch less in 
a geTieralisation from facto collectivelyq least of all in an 
abstraction embodied in an hypothesis... In contradiction to 
thisq I place my principle in an act in the lanE; uage of 




reality M. 11 
It in the self-activity of the moral being which aloneq 
-in his viewq bridges the gap between the finite and the 
Absolute. "From whichever of the two points the reason may 
start: fromýthe things that are-seen to the One Invisible, 
or from the Idea of the absolute, One to the thinGs that are 
seen, it will find a, chasm, which the moral being only, which 
Vie spirit and religion of man alone, can fill up or over- 
bridGe (2). 11 
Like Maine de Biran and Ravaissong Coleridge proceeds 
from. psychology to m4aphysics. ' Positing the priority of 
the will in the human consciousness, he posits a like pFiority 
in the Absolute consciousness. Ile relates the stuff of the 
self to the ultimate stuff of reality. Like Sclýelling and 
Ravaisson, he conceives the human will as participating in 
the Absolute Will. ' "A finite will constitutes a true 
Beginning; but witli regard to the series of motions and 
I 
claang, es by vidich the f ree act is manif ested and made, ef f ectual 
the finite Will gives a beginning only'. by co-incidence with' 
that Absolute Will j which is at the same time Inf inite 
Power 
Like them, too, he defines the willýasq in its essence, 
love. Underl'ininG his disaGreement with Kantts stateme. nt 
t1u. it "love is a matter of f deling, not of will" , he writesi 




-bordon$ LUlen and Unwing 19309 p. 105, ý2ý Ibid., p. 108. 
3 Aido to llofloction,. p, 1789 noto, 
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"But the contrary I do believe. What Kant af firms of man 
in the state of Adam, an ineffable act of Viiii choosing evil, 
and which is underneath or within coilsciousness, thou 
incarnate in the conscience, inasmuch as it must be conceived 
as taking place. in the Homo Noumenon not the Homo Phaenomenon 
- somethinC!, like this I conceive of Love, in that ML41est 
sense of the word which Petrarch understood (l). 11 Thus, 
like Schelling and-Ravaissong he sees the moral, life in a 
striving towards union with the Absolute Will through Love. 
"Is it in this or that limb, or not, ratherg in the whole 
body, the entire 
'Orlanismus, 
that the Law of Life reflects 
itself? Much less then, can the Law-of the Spirit work in 
frae; ments (2). 11 The final actuality of contingent beings 
is in their union with God or the Absolute. The origin of 
their beinGq as the origin of sin, is in the voluntary lapse 
from the pFistine TInityq "a ceasing to be eternal and a 
transition into the temporal'19 org in Muirhead's wordsq 
"willinS their actuality in themselves and not*in God (3). " 
Their salvation and redemption lie in the merging. of the finite 
will in the Absolute Will. Although'we must note, that, in 
contrast with Schelling at leastg Coleri dge s strictly., ethical 
startinG-point will not admit a loss of the individual in the 
whole (4). 
(1) (ýuoted Muirhead, op. cit., P. 158*' 
2 Ibid., p. 160. 
3 Ibid., p. 241v 
4 Of. Ibid., p. 159. ' 
CHAPTER IV 
REAtISM' 
The Realism of Gabriel Marcel starts from a closely 
worked out and preeminently Bergsonian distinction between 
Existence and Objectivity. 'PhilosophicaX Idealism, intent 
on defining the intel: ligible, characteristies of the objectq 
whereby the thinking self, iS enabled to,, grasp it in the 
conceptual processq le es necessarily in the background 
its existential aspects, 
The'arbitrary separation of thinkiýg subject and rebl 
object, the disruption of the vinculum. substantiale which 
links the self and the real results, in the objectýs being 
endowed with a, sort of "insularity", and in the construction 
of a system of stable relations between the object and the 
mind, Such objecti±ying processes of thought, Marcel agrees 
with Bergsonq are_. necessitated by'practical considerationsg 
for only throuGh them-can science function. - But what is % 01 , 14 
left out is the object in its inner existential nature and 
realit mad' y present to the mind in a mode of-knowledge 
which exists'ýAn its own right on an infra'or supra-intelle'cýUal 
plane: 
par contrb, sera de "libdrement laisse de"' 
cesera le mode suivant 
' 
lequel 11objet est 
present a celui qui le consideret ou, ce qui. A 
oIr au memet 
la mysterieuse J)uissance A% d'Affirmation de soi grace a laquell6 il-se 
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dresse devant un spectat"eur; ... Cette prelsence 
sensible de la chose$ qui, si elle ne se confond 
pýs avec son existenceg apparait du moins a une 
reflexion non prevenue comme sa manifestationg 0' N sa rev4lation la pe )1us imm'diate, voila ce, qu'une 
philosophie tournee ýL la fois vers les', idees et 
vers les objets tendra ne"cessairement a escamoter. 
(J. M. P. 310. ) (1). 
The consequences of the Idealist theory of knowledge 
are far-reaching. In the mind-object relation, such as it 
obtains in the mode of reflexion, we are in/ 
/ 
the'presence, 
Marcel points out,, 3. n keeping with Royce's view, not of a 
dual, but of a triadisrelation: I'llobjet a pour caracte"r- 
istique dletre cela de quoi Je mlentretiens avec un inter- 
locuteur r. eel ou ideal. " (Ibid**, p. 3; 6. )' The objectq 
on which I reflect, is in some way interposed between meland 
myself. This peculiar,, situation of the, object-idea leads 
to two consequences, 
I 
First, the tendenqy of the 
lobject to 
assume an unwarranted , insularity" to app, ear as a' mere 
11thinIjI, indifferent'to the mind which, discourses on it. 
In the*second place, it gives rise to the closed mental 
system within which the Idealist lives. For the thinking 
subject and the object are in a state of mutual interrogation: 
"... 11objet ntest pas, si llon peut dire,, inerte par rapport 
a ce cliscoursq a cet entretien; nous serons en droit de dire 
quo je le questionne et qulil me repond. 11 (Ibid., P. 316-) 
17hat occurs is that the Idealistq recognising only the 
11) The essay entitled EXis . tence et Objectivite**q from whfoh 
he following quotations are taken, forms an appendix to the Journal 'Acta-plýZsique. . It first qppeared in the Revuede, h! 6 liyslque et do Alloraleg 1925- 
, -9. ý j2, -- lý 1. 
j 
,- 3ý 
" ". -"" 
". "" 
173. 
colicitations of the enquirinG mindq is blind to the contri- 
bution of the object9 which has become for him an indifferent 
and inert element: 'Ices doctrines, mettant un accent toujours 
plus decisif sur ce caracte're insulaire de 11objet, seront 
appele"es 'a minimiser ltapport original que cet objet est 
susceptible de nous fournir. 11 '(Ibid. ) So thatq finallyg 
the subject forms with itself aýllclosedll system, an identity 
from which the object is excluded as such, losing its 
existentialg extramental status 6Lnd becoming a mere term in 
the process -of discursive thoughtý., Furýhprmore, it is in 
the nature of thinGs th&t this deqýanting in the real object 
of its existential reality should result in the subjectts 
falling victim to a sirailar fate. 
ýý'Within 
the closed system 
of Idealismg the real assumes. the aspect of a system of 
logical relations and identities, linking a sequence of terms9 
within wdich sequence, the mind. or subject itself is integi-ated 
as, a component term. Object and subject are alike. "dis- 
individualised" and deprived of their singularity. -Indeedg 
the effort of Idealism, as exhibited in the theses of' 
Brunschvicot Lalande and particularly Meyerson, is, directed 
towards a pro6Tessive elimination of the particular and the 
continbent, and the. C; radual reduction of multiple real fact' 
to the smallest number of identities. 
_There 
is always 
behind Idealism, 'whether of the Cartesian, the Condillacian, 
or the HeGelian type, the vision of a real world totally 




In shortq the arbitrary rupture of the Self and the reall 
of subject and object, which characteriseg Rationalism and 
Idealism, and their consequent insistence on the intelligible 
features of the object by which it, is made known'in thd'ided 
and the concept, leave,,, 'out of account the latter's existential 
nature, its reality and f elt presence. Marcel 16 Realism 
marks an effort to r6habilitate the Existenti. aiid non- 
conceptual mod: e of knowledge in *which it reveals, itself the 
subjective mode of thinkingg as"opposed'to the mode' of 




In his'pmalysis of Existence$ as opposed to PbJectivityq 
Marcelfirst enquireslas to the'possibility of doubting 
existence. Doubt is-always the rupture of a certain adherence 
and iý only'practicable within a, duality. But Existen'ce is 
_never 
a predicate. Only the structure of our language allows 
us to ask whether there is some thing which. posseases 
existence.. In realityq existence and the existilng ihing 
compose a unity, whose expression in'terms of'a subjectv 
predicate proposition is, arbitraryq and*upon which doubt can 
have no hold. Those výhýý like the Idealistsq'rejecý 
Existence, do so'by an arbitrary decree. . Andg. says Marpelt 
"if the denial of existencý, is a decree, we opt then for the 
'6ppoeite decree, and do'not hesitate to declare that existence 
NOR 
,,, : ýý ,n 
175.1 
isq in our view, indubitable.,, (J-M- P. 312. ) 
What now is the nature of this assurance? It is not an 
assurance of existence in general, considered as an 
I 
. abstraction. 
Nor is it an assurance of the existence of any 
particular thingq for that again would involve treating 
existence as a predicate. It is. illegitimate even to affirm 
"I existq unless the 'V is first of all understood as the 
express neCation of any particular content.,, (Ibid. 9 Po, 313. ) 
What is Given is simply "the confused and Slobal experience 
of the world as existinIjI. '(Ibid. ) 
It is this assurqLce of an existing,, universe with. which 
we ardýfurnished in the, "judgment of exi'stence". But the 
term "judGment" is here dangerous. It-is not, a proposi. tion; 
it is pure feeling (1), pure experience; "an assurance which I 
(1) The term "feelind' is used in the sense which has now 
become current in contemporary philosophy, notably in-Bradley 
mid Whitehead; "Bradley uses the term Feeling to express the 
primary activity at the basis of experience. It is experience 
itself in its origin and with the minimum of analysis. " 
('Uhitehoadq Adventures of Ideasq Cambridge Univ. Press, 19339 
P. 296. ) VIhitehead, in týepa'ssaGe quotedg brings out, the' 
resemblance between his-own use of the tend and Bradley's. 
Ile quotes Bradley: "In my general feeling at the moment there 
is more than the objects before me, and no perception of', 
objects will exhaust-the sense of a living emotion. 11* ss s 
on Truth and Reýgý, Oxford, Clarendon Press9 1914, p 9; ) 
And he adds: 11-Fn accordance with this doctrine of Brýdlqy s 
I analyse a feeling (or prehensioný into the *datum'. which is 
Bradley's 'object before me' into he 'subjective form' which 
is Bradleyts 'living emotion19 and into the lbubjectl which is 
Bradley's $met. " Op. cit., p. 297. ) Whitehead believes 
that"blie word 'feeling' has ýhe merit of preserving this 
double siGAificance of subjective form and of th6 apprehension 
of an object. It avoids the disiecta membra. provided by 
abstraction. " (Ibid, O p. 299. ) In Vinitenead's doctrine of 
prehension as expli ative, of process feeling belongs to the 
positive class of prehensions. -It is the "basic Generic 






coincides strictlyg. which is one with the reality on which 
it boars, a reality massive, global'like itself. " (Ibid. 
P. 314. ) To replace this immediacy by a logical propoBition 
is to detroy the unity of existence , convert it into a 
4 
predicate and reality into', an "object". For that reasong ýt 
kl: 
the distiiietion between, existence and-the "idea of existence' 
must be rejected; itýis a ", fiction qui prend naissance dans' 
l1acte arbitraire pajý l. equel', la pensee pre'ýend transformer 
en affirmation d1objqt ce qui, est une conhaissance imme"diate 
et une participation. " (Ibid., P- 315. ) 
Marcel now turns4o examine the three main f orias -of 
, immediacy in which Existence is revealed. These are w4ling 
ds the first' he 'relies t or , memory and sensation. As regar 
the most part on Reilouvier and ýIdrgson (the viewsýtoo of 
Ravaisson and Lachelier are brought to mind). He reacts 
gly against the" conception, on which determinism is stron, 
ultimately based, of the, will as &ýSort of instrument inter-' 
mediate between motives which determine it, and the act which 
carries them out. 'Such is Lockets well-known definition of 111"', 
liberty as "a power to act or not-to actq accordinr, as the 
mind directs (1). " But this-mechanistic interpretation 
(Note (1) contd. from previous page. ) 
rlubjectivity of the actual entity in questiong" the actual 
entity itself beinG "a process of ffeelin, 31 the many datag so 
as to absorb them into the unity of one individual Isatisfac- 
ti on#. " (Process and Realiý-, yq CambridGe Univ. Pressq 1929,. 
P. 55. ) PcelinG, it may added, is also analogous in 
certain respects to Alexander's "enjoyment". (Cf. SDace,, 
Time and Deity, London, Macmillang 19209 Vol. I., InTr`o., 
pps 12-13 
21 UY. on, Human UndorstandinES , Bko 119 71 
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of the process of willing in termsý,, of a mind workinG upon a 
will which, in its turn, - sets the aýc ,t in motion is the product 
of a dictortinG analysis which transforms into distinct 
"objects" what is a sinGle and immediate experience. In 
this experience, motivesq willing and action are one in a 
si"Gle actq which is the projection of the whole personality. 
I am, in every, sense of the term, my act of will (J. 1f. p. 190. ) 
So that, in willinG, it is no outward relation I hdve with my 
self; I partici2ate immediately in the reality'of my self. 
In similar fashion$ it is an error tor define memory as 
a relation between thý actual self and its past., I am By paýst 
N. M. PP, 187,9. ) My past is the condition of conscioUsiiessg 
and for that reason I am not conscious of, itq I feel itq11 am 
it$ I participate irl'it (1). 
It isl howeverg the theory of sensation (and perception) 
which provide's the most interesting and the most original 
analysis. Sensation is usually conceived as "something 
emitted" by an object and picked up by the perceiving subject. 
It is an irresistible tendency of commonsense to consider 
sensation as "a means of communication between twd posts";, 11 -1 P I 
"A (E-O- P. 317. ) In short, as a I'messatell transmitted b; y*an 
, 
object to the perceivin(-; mind and which the latter "translates". 
Novi this presupposes that in sensation the mind is furnished 
Of. S. Alexander's theory of memory, vjhere ho argues that 
our consciousness of past and future is direct, and is not the alleGed artificial process of first having an experience 
Of the present and then referrinG'it by some'mothod to tho 
Past or future.,, (Spaceq-Time and DeitX, Vol. Iq P- 133-)ý 
1786' 
with a "dat='; which is not the case; we are -led to believe 
co only by reason of that spatial image of the two posts which 
we dannot banish from our minds. Sensationg on the contraryp 
io an immediate participation in the reality perveived: "une 
participation immediate,, 'de ce que nous nommons habituellement 
le sujet a une ambiance de laquelle nulle frontiere ne le, 
separe. 11 - (Ibid. 9 P. 322. ) , "A-sensationg" he says elsewhereg, 
p. -185. ) "is an affection, noýla piece, of information., ' (J. M. 
. 
of sensation derives' a highly original From this theory 
, 
l calls "the th6ory, /'of my body'. It conception which Alarce 
, 
is a natural result oi the conception of, /sensation as a,, 
ý. coifijiiunication between. subject and object' to consider the! body 
as the means of this communicationg as the "instrument" 
which tho transmission between the two posts is accomplished. ' 
This instrunentalist theorý, Marcel considers wholly inadequate. 
bodyl fails'-ýo'render the facts of The expression "I empl6y myý , l, 
internal experience. , "I d&, not, employ my body, LRa'my body'l 
(J-hl- P. 323. ) "Quelqud chose nie en moi l1exteriorite de -, I- ,-"i, - , 
ton corps par rapport a moi-nAe (Ibid. ). 11oth Materialism 
and Sensationalism are efforts to account for the immediate 
GXperience of my body. The instrumentalist theory is due to 
a veritable d sincarnation by which I divorce myself from my 4 
body and treat it as an object. Immediate experienceg, on 
the' otlier hand, is that of a selr'ý incarnate" in iL body in 
which it participates; : ,; 1 1 7 
Ainsi, dans la mesure ou Je arlerai de mon corps comme 
' d1un instrument, je le trait ai, comme un objet, clest- 
Z, 
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a-dire comme non-mien; j'adopterai par rapport 
a., lui la position d1une tierce 12ersonne, et la I def iii-ition que JI en pourrai donner sera lie"o a. 
la deSinearnation ideale a laquelle j'aurai da 
proc6der auproalabieý et a l1acte par lequel 
ilaurai delegud a une sorte de double fictif le 
"pouvoir, d1utiliser cet instr=-eEE-. Pour'autant 
quo jagisq je mlidenti: Ve a ce double qui recourre 
ainsi la realite dont, en me detachaný de 
I 
lui,,, Je 
l1avais ddpouille: ot par la se recree 1 unite 
que l1analyse cýv4t brise"e et a laquelle elle 
avait substitue la dualite I de l1instrumentiste ,,, et de 1 'instrument. (Ibid. 9P- 324. 
At t4e very centre of Mareells. Realism is this fact of 
llincarnýtion! l which he describes as "the fundamental datum 
of Metaphysics" an-. iiiitlal unity givenj'in the immediate 
experience of sensatiAn, revealingithe b, ody as 
Ia felt presence. 
The whole possibility of judgments of e; cistence, that is of 
participation in the 
. 






fact of incarnation. For it is only in and through the body 
as existent or, as Marcel puts it , in its quality of 
ediateur absol-WI, that the self is put inýo possession of 
the real:. "Dans la mesure ou nous pouvons imaginer un 
enteiidement-pur, il nly a pas pour un tel entendement 
possibilite de c6'nsiderer les choses comme existantes ou 
. non-existantes. 11 (E. A., p. 
10. ) The fact of incar'nation 
renders meaningless the so-called "probled' of the external 
world. The self participates in the body'andq through it, 
acting as I'me'diateur absolvIl participates in the universe 
and othor selves: 
Il est-peri-ais de se demander si.. llunion de l1ame 
et du corps ebt d1une 6ssence reellement differente 
de 
. 
11union entre 11&ne et les autres choses 
existantes; en d'autres termesq est-ce quia toute a 
i 
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cSfirmation d1existence nlest pas comme sous- 
eDtendue une certaine experience de aoi comme 
lie a 11univers. (Ibid. ) 
The "problem! ' only arises when I'form an idea of my self- 
and proceed to treat it as incommunicable, with my body, 
for then, divorced fromithe bodyq I am divorced from the 
real, both being converted into objects: 
Pe'tablis ui)e notice de moi-m6me. ". Clest, cette 
notice animee que jappelle mon 
Ke, 
ma realite 
spirituelle,; elle t end des lors a se transform-er 
en un personnage; et clest sur les rapports de 
cq personnage mythique avec mon corps (lui-me4ne 
. detache de moi... ) que, ppeudo-philosqhe, 
j1entreprends bien en vain -'ýde reflechir. 
N. M. ' P. 328. ) 
This union of mind and-body must'never be resolved into 
an objective relation: "Dds'le moment oii,, Ie corps est 
- traite comme objet de science, du meme coup je4a'exile a, 
I 
llinfini. 11 (B. A. p. 12. ) 
It is moreover by virtue of a misrepresentation of the 
cardinal body-self unity that the doctrine of sensation as, 
communication or translation of a message emerges: 
I 
Clest du point de vue de ce que J'oserai appeler 
le coE. ýs-sujet, ce corps que je suis sans pouvoir 
lavidentifier logiquement a lui, que la sensation 
se revele, immddiate; clest du point de'vue du 
cor2s-objetq au contrairet que la sensation 
Elapparalt comme une communication. (R. I. P- 39-) 
For once a distinction is mado'between the physical affective 
I 
datum on the one hand and the activity'of a consciousness 
A 
which is placed over against the bodily organism aiýd receives 
or accepts the datum on the other, it becomes possible to 
view the process of sensation as a process of, translation, 
I-, - Im MAN I 
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a process of mediatign instead ýf what it is: immediacy 
itself : 
"fl'chissons profoid" nt aux implications Si nous re en eme 
d1un, donne quelconque - du fait dletre donne, "des 
Gagebenseyns", --nous voyons bien que l1exteriorite 
qui caracte'rise ce rapport, en admettant que clen 
soit un, suppose une interioriter e, ssentiellQ,,, 
clest-a-dire la conscience elle-meme. Wevenement 
physique en tant que telg lorsquIon le considere en 
tant que souVassement de la sensation, a pour P 
ýpssence de n! 6tre pas et de ne. ppUvoir etre donne I a cette conscience qui est censee le traduire en 
sensation, 
Il nly a en rgalit, 4 aucun sens 'a', traiter la . sensation comme une traduction; 'elle es't immediate, 
I 
elle est a la bane'de toute interpretation, et de 
, ýca ion, 
toute commun: 1 t' ' et ne peut, 'donc etre elle-m'e"me' 
uneý interpretation ou une commilni cation. (Ibid. 9p. 38. ) 
blarcelts dontrine of "indarnation! ' is a, version of what 
has become known in contempora rY philosophy as the theory of 
the "embodied self". Whiteheadq for instanceg afFirms an 
immediate experience of--the bodyq an "intimate sense of 
derivation from the body, whichý s the reason of our 
instinctive identification of ourý bodies vrith ourselves (1). It 
There is thus every reason to be lieveg" he statesq 'that-our 
sense of unity. vdth the bodyhas the Same original as-our sense 
. 
of unity with our immediate past of', personal experience. 
It is another caao of non-senauousý, porception, only. now 
-devoid of the strict personal, order (2). 11 The Cartesian 
dualism of llthinkinC; substances" and, "extended substances" 
derives from the error of llmistaking,, an abstraction-for a- 
1% 
Adventures of Ideas, p. 290ý. 2 lblil. -, pp. 
* 
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final concrete fact (1). 11 "The truth is that the brain is* 
continuous with the body; and'the body is continuous with the 
rest of the natural world. " Human experience is an act of-. 
self- origination including thie whole of naýureq limited to 
the perspe6tive of a focal region, located within the bodyq 
but not necessarily perLsting in any fixed'co-ordination 
with a definite-part ofi'the brain (2). 11 Whitehead sees the' 
ultimate root of an unwarranted dualism in the, "exclusive 
primacy of introspecti6r2'9* considered'as the sole method of' 
exai-AninG etperienceg and involving the liPitation of 
experience to sense-peiception. "It lifts the clear-cut. 
data of sensatioft into primacy, and cloak ts the vague 
compulsions and derivations-whicA form the main'stiiff of 
experience. In particular it rulesbut that intixýate sense 
of derivation from the body, Which is the reason'for our 
instinctive ide , ntificatf6n of our bodies with ourselves 
In similar' ±, ashiont S. Alexander develops a form of- 
"tile identity doctrine of mind and body, maintaining that 
there are not two processes, one neural, the, other mentalq 
but one. ', (4). 11 "The bodily person is thus the tyie and 
beGinxiinr, of all forms of the self. " "Mind and body are. ýa 
ex2crientially, 'one thing, not two altogether, separate thingsq 
(1), Ibid., p. 245- , That is the "Fallacy of misplaced 
Concreteness" described in Science and the Modern World, CwabridCe Univ. Press, 1927,. p. 64. 
, 
ý2) Adventures of Ideas, p. 290. - Cf. his doctrine of SocleUes", Process Reality, Part III Chp. 1119 IV-xIt 
-in part icular-p-1)-. 7Z0-. ý. (3) Adventures of Ideas, p. 290. 
(4) Space, 'Time and Deity, Vol.. 11, p, 9. Cf. Ibid. 9 PP- 4-5. 
- 
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because they oc. cupy the some extension and -places as a par 
.t 
of the body (1). " It is this immediate experience of mind 
vdth body which conditions his Space-Time theoryq according 
to which "Time as a whole and in its parts bears to Space as 
a whole and its corresponding parts a relation analogous to 
the relation of mind to its equivalent bodily or nervous 
basis; or to put the, matter shortly... Time, is the mind of 
Space and Space the ýody of. Time (2). 11 "The identity 
between the relation of Time'and Space and that of mind and 
body, on which the hypothesis is based, is that mind and its 
correspondinG body arl indissoluble and identical 
In conclusion, in'certain experiences of immediacyi the 
reality is directly present to mind. Such experiences are 
prior to reflection and'verification: 
ip Lliruiediat de la sensation est fonciereinent un 
paradis perdu. La dialectique, le drame de la 
sensation., clest qu'elle doit etre rd-flechie, 
interprete'e; par la l'erreur devient possibleý.. 
klais d'autre part la sen-s--aUiron non-r4f16chie est 
en dega du plan du faillible. (J. M. p. 131. ) 
They provide the initial dataq prior to the objectifying 
ft 
processes of rational thought, and upon which the reflection 
of the philosopher or metaphysician erects his demonstrationsqý 
althou(, h they themselves are not capable of demonstration. 
Taey are the irreducible "facts" which form the maýerial'for 
"Problems" but are themselves non-problematical: 
1 J: bJ - J.. - Vol. It pl). 106 2' 107. 2 lbid. Vol. 119 P. 38.4 
3 1). 391 See also Appendix to Chp. IV below. 
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Get ensemble de discussions nous amene a faire 
une distinction CEfnerale et tres importante entre 
les donnees susceptibles de fournir la mati8re 
d1un problZme, donn6es qui sont par la m&e 
objectives - et celles sur lesquelles il faut que ltesprit slappuie pour poser un probibme q 
conque; ii est impossible de traiter celles-ci z 
comine problematiques sans tomber dans les pires 
contradictions. La sensation (le fait de sentirg 
participer a un univers qui en m1affectant me de , croe) et alpi le lien intellectuellement indefectible 
qui ialunit a ce que j'a-ppelle mon corps constituent 
des donnees de ce deuxieme type: et il nlest pas 
difficile d'apercevoir que, selon toute 
vrai. seinblance, elles se confondent au seýn de IV 
l1existence telle que nous l1avons, au debut de 
cette etude, non point definie, mais reconnue. 
J. Ce quIon ýRpelle communement mais improprement 




To com-olete this'Realismg Marcellcombines with the theory 
of Existence a theory of BeinG. The former has demonstratedg' 
I 
in the various forms of immediacyg 'an immediate participatioiý 
in the real world of things, Vie are'ýcid of the'Idealism of 
the f irst part of the Journal 9 where this participation was . 
deocribed as, a participation in the Transcendent Unity of 
spirit. Ilona the less, in the theory of Existence, ': ýt is 
said to reveal a confused and global reality, permitting no 
a0surance as to the existence of, a. particular existentl'no. t 
even our own self. The theory of Boirq, -j which now runs 




explains the process of participation' in individual 
"substance0l or "asoences", 
The question had already been raised in the first part 
of tile Journal. Love and faith had been described as a 
direct communion with the reality of the person loved or of 
God; both types of participation being non-reflective and 
transcendinG any possible Judgment: "Il nfy'ý pas de 
JuGement valable portant Sur lletre. 11* (J. 1d. p. 92. ) - "Dieu 
ne peut et-ne doit pas etre juge: il nly-a pas de jugement,. ' 
possible Sur llessence. 11 '(Ibid. jýp. 65. ) In common with- 
Platog Pascal and Pro; 
&t, Marcel affirms' that in love,, and, 
faith we are put in direct communication with the inner! ý 
reality or transcendent essence of the'object, an essence 
which analysis fragments into abstract elements: 
. pour 11 amourg et pour 
l1amour seul, 11individu- Llite de l1aime ne se disperse. ýas, ne sleffrite 
pas en je, ne-sais cluelle poussiere d1elements 
abstraits. Mais d1autre part cette realite de 
l1aimEf rýe peut 8tre' maintenu'e que parce quIelle 
est posee par l1amoiir comme transcendante a toute 
explicatiOn, a toute reduction. (Ibid. 9 Pe 63. ) 
In the latt. er part of the Journal the theory of Being 
is developed more thoroughly. It starts fromia aistinction 
bet-acen Being and Objectivity. Objectivity is the r ealm of 
questions and, dnswers; 'answers which are mere'llrenseignements" 
or pieces of, information given to a questioner as indifferent 
-to the person questioned as the latter is to himself; each 
a 
beinG, in Marcel's terminology$ a "he, ' for the other. 
Science, for instance, is a system, of-such questions and 
answers, in the third person. Science forms a system of 
-' 
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propositions,, whose subjects are the cluestions it sets - 
'Idea questionnaires qui, peu a, peu, *se., remplissent-11 (J. M. 
P. 157) - and whose predicates are -precisely the answer. s 
obtained. 
All objective judgments, scientific or not, are. so - 
composed of question and- answer in, the third person. They 
are "judgments, in hdl., ý They are concernediWith-the 
obtaininr of, a piece*, of information, whose. truth or falsity 
is independent of the being and personality-of, the interlocutor 
Thus, the judgment"I, have"blue. eyes" is 
; 
ini objective judgment; 
it can be expressed-i2 the form of'question and answer, and 
formulated in-the third person, for the T, of the question 
"have I blue eyes? " is quite ýndifferenti is a mere llhellý; 
Eaid the ideal responder is no less a "he, ', The ýroposition 
itself is a piece of factual informa tion, and, 'as ouchg 
verifiable, 
In'contrast tLre J: udgments of,, beirigg V&ich cannot take 
the subject-predicate forraq nor be formulated in the third 
person, Such is the judgment "I am!. To express it. in 
terms 9f question and answer, ta answer the questJ: on "what 
am P is to destroy. the reality of the 11 rl , which is precisbly 
what-the judgment assures' us oft 1113lus il slagit de ce quo 
je suiS comme totalite"(et non de ce que j'ai) eponse - 
plus la r ** 
et la-question meme perdent, toute signification. (J. M- P,. 152. ) 
In other'viords,. it is not, expressible in terms, of subject and 





unity. It is whaý Marcel calls a, judUment in P9f or the 
subject"I" is the real individual ,, self, incapable of beinG 
converted in-to a" he" , or third person. In short , the 
"jud[-gnent in 111 is an immediate "presence" of the self to 
self: I'Dans le juGement en je, clest l'imme**diatete' de lldtat 
qui fait fonction de sujet. Il ya un*feelino pur et simple, 
clest-a-dire un absolu, ou quelque chose qui imite un absolu, 
qui nlest pas rapporte"l meýdiatise". " (Ibid. 9 p. 145. 
Of similar nature is the "judGment in thou'19 likewise 
opposed to the "Judgment in liv. It is the "presence" of 
wiother self to the self: direct participation in the 
11subStance" or "essence" of the friend or lover. In reality, 
says Marcel, the two Go-hand in hand; the presence of self 
to self and the presence of other selves to self are inter- 
.4 
dependent: "plus je me suis present a moi-melme, plus les. 
autres existent eux audsi pour moi. 11 (Ibid., p. 280. ) 
I 
L'otre que j'aime est aussi pou que possible un 
ýJ-ers pour moi; et en memo temps il me decouvre 
a moi-m&de, puisque llefficacite do sa presence 
est telle qtle Jo suis Se moins en moins lui pour 
moi; mes defenses interieures tombent eýE-en m6mo temps les cloison. C qui me separent d'autrui. 
(Ibid., p. 146. )(1). 
Marcel analyses closely this sentiment of the "presence" - 
Uf. Jaspers: "Einswakeit ist das Bereitschaftsbewusstsein 
lituGlicýicr 13xistenz, die'nur in Koimuunikation wirklich wird... Ich kann niciit selbst werden, ohne in Koimunikation zu treten und nicht- ih Kommunikation treten, ohne einsam zu suin. " 
Derlin, J. SI)rinf. erg ý1932, Vol. II, p. 61j)- 
Jaspers et l'Existenz-Philosophie in 114 anges Paris, ýjUock, 1934, p. 368. l'or a de,: U-ailecl 









Iii particular he notes the inner despair or ennui which 
cliaracteriseS ordinary living'and its objective relationships, 
where not only the self but other selves become indifferent 
objectst he contrasts it with the joy and sentiment of 
spirituýl enrichment which mark those moments when their 
presence is assured: 
Lon ement reflJchi su Ir le sentiment d1indigenc Ie 
intp, rieure qulil m1arrive dle"prouver si cruellement. 
Jo crois toujoura qýe ces moments sont ceux ou 
116tre slamincit, ou il cesse de resister a lui- 
Merlie* Bt cet amincissement de soi parelt lie au 
fait que tous les autres, sont trait4a comme autres; 
le toi disparalt; le m6i devient lui-meme lui'pour 
soi... Le boýiheur ne serait-il pas une certal-ne 
fapn dl, 6trd present a sbi-meme? Et plus je me 
suis present a moi-momel'-plus, les autres existent 
eux aussi pour moi. (J. RI. PP. '279-80. ) 
The suprieme "judgment in thquIl is the immediate 
A 
presence of 
God, who is the "Absolute Thou". Faith is of theýsame order 
of immediacy as love. To treat God as a "he'#, as an "object" 
or idea, is to depriVe him of his reality and his spiritual 
efficacy. The essence of faith is participation in the being 
of God. Hence IvIarcel, in common with Pascal and Kierkegaardq 
rejects rational theoloG-y; God cannot ultimately be proved 
or "verified,. Moreover, as the presence of self to self and 
that of other selves to self are interdependent, so too is 
God's presence intertwined with other presences. 
On tAese lines Marcel develops what AT. Wahl calls a 
Iý.. I "jayotical personalisrfl. Beyond and abovýp'the order of 
Objective, j-3, it-)(,. rronal, relationsliipst thero exists a spiritual 
order of comnunion and invocation; , rhysterious contacts, 
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between selves, sudden revelations. of "presenced'. Marcelts 
dramas are full of such spiritual communions. The theory. 6f, 
BeinG Is indeed-based, on an acceptance of metapsychical 
phenomena. The theory of-, 'my body, is of this nature. 
Marcel goes so, far as to maintain that the bodily element 
with v ihich the self is! in direct contact through feeling 
I 
remains after death. (l). The theory of presences in 
particular involves ataetapsychical doctrine. The self is 
a centre of spiritual, energyg a core of feeling. '.. Contact- 
between selves. takes place,, by means of a sort of "fulguratiod'. 
And these contacts can/tran'scend time and space;. *in the 
experiences of memory and foresight, a. self may 
, -participate 
in'the past or future of anoýher; byýtelepaýhy 
it may enter into contact with a distant mind. Hpnce selves 
are linked in mysterious bonds, 'reachix)g out even beyond the 
grave, actinC, by an o'coult process upon each otherl to 
produce conversions and provide sudden insights. (We shall 
study this mystic personalism in detail after exposing the 
ý1) Marcel describes the probleiý,, of immortality elsewhere as 
he "pivot of metaphysics". (E. A. p. 11. ) The theory 
described above revives the speculation of the 17th century 
h1ortalists. It has also-. a coun-b, erpart in the system of PalinGenesis of Charles Bonnet, who considers the ', ethereal" bodily elementj which is the 11immediate orgad' of the soul, to continue attached to the latt ý'after death. He deems ý' this necessarý for the survival 
of, 
personal identity; memory J' being the condition of the latterg and memory, in accordance 
ý 
, vdth his psycho-physiological vievi oint, working by means of ,: "the impressions left on t he ., nervous fibres" of the body by sense- experience. See Appendix toý, 'Chp. IY., 
190. 
novel theory of Time and Space which it involves. ). (l). 
- 
The return to Realism is now complete. By the theory 
17 
i 
of Existence we-are assured of participation'in an existent 
universe. By the theory of Being vie are assured participation 
in real "substances" or, "essenceb", self, other selves and 
God. Die two theories complete each other., Willing, 
jaemory, sensation, love, and faith are the several varieties 
of immediacy, the severaý forms of a commonparticipation in 
Reality: - 
... ceci revient a dire quIon ne, peut dissocier 
rdellement: Existence; 
Conscience de soi comme existant; 
Consci(ýnce de soi comme lie a un corps, comme 
incarne. (B. A. p. 9. ). 
(1) In tile above rcsl)e6t, - the theory of "my body" -and of 
"presences" has similarities with the no less metapsychical 
theses of I. I. -TeOn Daudet. Ile 
distinguishes an "elementary'19 
called 111 lairibiancul ,a sort of energy in which the self bathesq noitacr quantitative nor qualitativeg yet both. 
"Llambiance ne se confond pas avec la pensee, et cependant 
elle sert de vehicule a la pens 4e. Elle ne se confond pas 
avoc la son"cation et cependant elle propage... ordonne toute 
Sensation. " (Melanchol1a, Paris, Grassetq 1923, pý. 16-17. ) 
Its seat is the epithelj: w_n or cutaneous surface;. by it we 
are puL- in imiediate contact vrith the real, assuring an 
equilibrium between "nos rythmes inte'rieurs et les rythmes de 
la ilaturell. After death, the "ambiance" may manifest itself 
as -ai aura. Y loreover, all contacts between selves and 
bet-aeorl self and thinGs are tile'-product of a, "fusiov, of two 
"aubiaii-ces", as for example in love. ' Vniat Daudet calls the 
" alabiance" is not unlike vdiat. Marcel calls 'my body", whic4 
Sc'Clves as the irmaodiate organ of contact with other realities 
-a -sort of othereal corporal organ by which the spiritual force or energy which constitutes tile essence of a reality flows out and by a, species of fulb-uration fuses with, that of 
another. 
F 
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The Realism of Marcel affirms, in terms as uncompromising 
as those of Bergsong the absolute primacyýof feeling. Foi' 
both, intelligence is thought directed to the practical ends 
of scientific knowledge; its activity consists in the 
reduction of the manifold, concrete variety of the real to a 
homogeneous system of identities for the obtaining'of , power 
I 
over the real. It thus abstracts from real, things their 
general qualities and lets slip their condrete, individual. 
essence" Yet Marcel, is as far removed as Pascal from 
affirming an opposition between feeling and' thought itsel,? 6 
In an article on HockinS entitled W. E. Hocking et la 
dialectigue de 11instinct, 
-(l), 
we find a, most interesting, 
discussion of feeling in relation to thouýht. Feeling, he 
says , is simply thought in its pure. virtuality; it jis ,a mass 
of ideas at viork in us". "The idea is an integral part-of 
feelinG, and the latter isýdestined ultimately to be completed 
and consummated in knowledge of an object. " (p. 24. ) Far 
then from beinG opposed to the idea, feeling is none other 
than the idea itself, but the idea in action, , working in us. 
to free itselfg as a forgotten name is at viork-in the depths 
of, the mind strivinG tý recall it. " (Ibid. ) Th6 error we 
make is to conceive an idea as a "finite content" devoid of 
any plasticity - as a sort of block. On the contrdry, 
anything'in experience can become idea; - the latter is 
experience itself, selected, to enable it to-be remembered 
(1), Rev. Phil., 1919. I 1[ 
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aild communicated. The ul-ýimate'identity of feeling and 
taouGht is shown by the fact that insensibility is more often 
than not accompanied by lack of intelligence. What then is 
feeling? It is an activity of ideas, it is thought a llertat 
2ur, thoujit not yet poured into the mould of ideasq but 
mobilised for action. In short, it is 11thou, Fht assuminG 
the control of, the. real. " (Ibid. 9 p'. ý 25): 
Ainsi dirons--ýnous que les instincts humains, si 
du point do -\tue physique ils sont formdýs dola 
n0rlie substance que les systehos solaires, rqcta- 
physiqueiýient parlant sont faits do l'u-boffe dont 
I loo rOves, les idees et les r onnements sont 
f aits. (Ibid 
Thus Marcel is an "anti-intellectualist' only in the 
sense tliat he will not limit the activity, 'of thought to the 
purely conceptual processes whereby reality is e)Tressed as 
a systen. of abstract ideasq permitting US to treat things as 
"objects" or I'limited contents" for the better handling of 
them in our scientific deductions. But, like Pascalq he 
seeks to preserve mid to rehabilitate, as the necessary 
complement and indeed condition of the former, those 
iinnediate processes of thouGht Which provide knowledge of, 
the concrete, individual reality of thinGs. 
Kny attempt to discredit the testimony, of feeling on 
the grounds that it deceives us rebounds upon itself; for 
it is not mal-ntained that feeling is verifiable, can be 
describod ERS trUC or false, but only that it provides an 
imnc, dirtto ox,, )crienco of reality which, as such, 
_ 
founds all 




Value. A feeling can be affirmed, as true or false only if 
it is actualised as an idea$ in short ceases to be a feeling. 
But-then, the adherence to reality being broken, no judgment 
as to the value of the original experience is possible. So 
that there is no judgment of feelinGt no judgment of judgments 
of value; from the tribunal of feeling and immediacy there 
is no appeal possible to, reason. ' -Such experiencet sensationg 
memory and the like, is the stpLrting-point and the condition 
of demonstration and mediation, the premises/it so provides 
are themselves undemonstrablel- 
0-0-00- 
Marcells'Realism has its place in the neo-Realipt', 
movement in contemporary philosophy; with its two main 
streams, the, Anelo-American, inspired largely by G. E.. Moore 
and Bertrand Russell, and the Phenomenological, derived from 
the new psychology of Frantz Brentano, the theory of the 
"intentionality" of consciousness and tlýe "prepositional" 
theory of perception. Vie can, at the same time, mobe clearly 
thah in the Anglo-American Re, alistsq discern in his thought 
the influence of later 18th century Empiricism and its 
rehabilitation, aCainst conceptualism., of sensation, memory 
and belief a6 providinG imme4qte-'knowledge of reali 
Marcel takes us back beyond theý, transcendental diaiectic 
, 
of the post-Kantian Idealists to Humb and Reid and to such 
k 
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Gorman Intuitionists as Hamann and Jacobi (1). 
In conclusion,. this psychological Realism of M. Marcel 
is to be transcended in the new phase by a philosophy of 
Existence in the accepted sense of the term. Yet none the 
lessq it must always be, remembered that it provides the 
startinLý-point and basis of his Metaphysics. ZtAs it-, as, 
we'shall see, that will prevent him from lapsing into any 
mere "negative Ontology' and thus safeSuard'him against one 
of the pitfalls which beset the Existentialist by reason of 
I1 11 J; / 







Micf. Reid's assertion that sensation entails an immediate 
. 
be of in the reality of its object and thus provides a'' 
-criterioA of the reality of the external world. (Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, ed. Id. Hamilton,, EdinburGtiq 
Idaclachlan and Stewart, 18531-Essay II, Ohp. IV. ) For the. 
-relation between Reid's Commonsense philosophy and modern 
Realism cf. J. Feibleman, Reid and the Oriains of Modern 
. -Realism, 
Jqurn. of the Hisý. of laeas, Jan. , 19,44. 
.5 
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APPE, NDIX TO CHLETER IV 
In classical philosophy the theory of the embodied self 
is antiý, ipated most fully, in the Monism. of Spinoza. 
"Objectuin ideae humanam mentem constituentis est corpus, sive 
certus extensionis modus actu existenst et, iiihil aliud (1). 
"Hine sequitur hominem mente et corpore constare, et corpus' 
humanum, prout ipsum sentimus, existereý )'. 11 I'llens se 
ipsum non cognoscit, n si quatenus corporis affectionum ideas 
percipit ... quoniam primum., quod me. ntis essentiam 
constituit, est idea corporis actu existentis, primin etl 
praecipuum nostrae mentis condtus est, 
existentiam affirmare '(4). " 
corporisO nostri 
II 
Alind and body being modes of thought and extensiong 
attributes of a single substanceg the mind is the body and 
vice versa; so that "the 'soulq being an Idea of this bodyq 
is united with it-An such, a ývay that it-and'this body, thus 
constituted, tOGether form a whole 
By the term "IdeV Spi oza means an emotion or immediate 
feelinG of the state of our body, -'"an immediate fe . eling of 
Ethical Part'II. , Prop. 
ýIII. 
2 Ibid., Coroll. 
3 Ibid., II, Prop. XXIII. 
4 Ibid. t III, Prop. X, Demoýastr. 51 Short 12reatise on God, Mat and his Well-being, trans. by 
10if -bo dong Black, 1910 p 21-# Of. L. Brunschivicg, Le PrONes de la Conscience d6ps la philosophie occidentale, Rakris, Alcan, 1927, Vol. Iý ]? -ý, 171* 
-I 
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its tone" and. anl"awareness of the increase or decrease of 
our Leneral vital, energy (1). 11 "And this change in us9l". 
says Spinoza, "resorting from other bodies acting upon us, 
cannot take place without the soul, which always changes 
correspondingly, becoming aware of the change. And (the 
consciousness of) this chanGe is really What we call feeling , 
1 From which it, f ollows that 11 as the f irst thinG which 
the soul gets to knoW is the body, the result is that the 
soul loves it so, and becomes united with'it 
This primitive and immediate unity is the condition of 
other immediate knowl4dge. "The most important of these 
, (the influence of the body on the soul)j we maintainq'is that 
it causes the soul to blecome aware of it, and through it also 
of other bodies (4). " And, in particularg knowlodge of God. 
For if týie essence of the soul is that "natural, love which 
prompts everything t6 preserve its bodY, or the "Idea is the 
lobjectivol essence of such body which is in the thinking 
attribute, " an(I if, consequentlyg "according as the object 
chanr, 'es or perishes, so its Idea must change or perish 
then tile soul perfects its essence only in so far as it 
contemplates God as eternal object or eternal body. 111f 
. once vie to know Godo at least with a knowledGe as clear 
as that with which we also know our body, thený. me mustý, VeeoM'q 
(1 L. Roth, Spihoz fMon4oh'. 1? BqnA4ýý, pp. 105-6. 2 U--1- 'J. 'r. ý; cc- XIiI, p. 65* 




united with him even more closely than we are with our 'podyl 
and be, as it were, released from the body (1). 11 "As it 
were, " for the union with the body is the condition-which 
permits the final transcending, of the created body and vision 
of the eternal body. 
Brun. -: )chvdcG has uummettised Spinozats theory of the bodyq 
in opposition to Cartesian Dualism, in a brilliant passage 
where he writes: "Loin dletre une 6ubstance irreductible a 
la substance pensante, un poids mort q`ue 116he sletpuise a' 
rejeter... le corps devient le pivot de la dialectique, 
ss a mrant a 11homme 11Lperience effective-et profonde de la 
beatitude. Lleternite nlest pas le privilege de lla'4jne; 
lIaMe nlest Aernelle que dans la mesur6 ou" elle est llidee 
d1un, cor-ps eternel (2). " 
We can perhaps trace Spi4ozals'influence in the 
Cartesianism of such, 18th oentury'thinkers as the Abbe de 
LiC; nac, in whose philosophy we find a thesis. somewhat similaý. 
to the one Presented, He posits as the initial datum of 
thour,, ht an immedia: be apperception. of the self as an acti, veg 
thinkinG substance. But in contrast with DescarVesq he links 
therowith what- he calls the 11sens de la coexistence"; - or 
limnediato perception of. our body, the volume of matter to 
which Vic soul is bound and which belonGs to it's IIJ I ai. la 
perception habituelle do llqxistence meme nume"rique- d1un * 
Ibi! d. p. 123. 
2 ;. ýrinoza. ot ses. coritol-aporain6l Rev. ' do Alet. f 1906, P. 40. 
1ý 
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volume do matiere qui mlest propre. Cette percef)ý16n:... me 
J 
rend mon corps toujours present; elle'mo le fait distinguer 
de tout autre corps; elle le rend partie de mon, etre; elle 
complete ma personne;. elle fait que mon corps entre dans ce 
que JI appb1le moi (1). ". From this double perception, in 
conjunction with the immediate perception, -of God as the Cause 
of our being, he derives all our ideas (2). 
It is noticeableýthat the, Leibnizian'Iqealismg on the 
other haild, remains within the : ýramework, oý, Cartesian dualisml 
in that the body, although United with mind q'is strictly 
phenomenal (3)- 
Finally, we may notice, the, theory of, Palintenesis of the 
(1) Elements de metapUsique tire's de 116:: 5 ý? ienc ýper zi Parisq 
DesairET-et Saillant, 17,5. ý, pp. 101-? -. Of. L. Olle--Laprune, La Philosoi)hie de Malebranche, Ladrangeq 1870, Vol-ý 119 
pp. 
ý2) Cf. Pt. Bouillier llistoi: ýe du Cartesianisme, 3rd ed., 
arisq DelaCrave, 18ýa, Vol. II, Ohp., 5=1. Mis current of 
thouGht persists in the Spiritualism of Maine de Birang 
inasmuch as the consciousness of effort, productive of self- 
consciousness, involves, no less than of the soul, an immediate 
apprehension of tlýe body experienced as resistance or inertia. 
Cf. R. Vancourt La Thdorie de l1acte volontaire chez Maine de 
'Biran, Rev. Phii'.,. lq42-, 3. 
L. Lurrnet has brought out clearly the incompatibility 
of the Leibnizian Idealism and Scholastic Realism on this 
point, in an, article whe. r_e he refutes Leibniz's claýim to be a 
continuator of Scholasticism,, "Iddalisme, puisque pour lui, 
la mati6re premiare se rdduit, on derniere analyse, A la 
limite des perceptions de chaque monade, et 16 matiare seconde a une convergence, un amýs confus de perceptions tendantes A 
un etat de clarte plus developpe. Le corps humain lui-meme 
nlest plus qu'un systeme de reprCsentations,, et sa consistance' 
nlest qulidýdleq tout-comme celle du temps et de 1.1espace. 
J Essai sur les rapports'entre la philosophie suarezienne do ia 
maZ-iarc -e-'U la pens6e do heibniz, Rev. d'histoire de la =PoooPiiie 
, no .ý9 1955 9p- -136 1, - 
j 
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16th century Charles Bonnet. I lie distinguishes between the 
. "corps calleu: Wq mere'envelope$ and the 
true seat of the soul 
which is 11un compose de matiere analogue a celle du feu ou de 
ether. "'' It is the "organe-immediat de ses operations" and 
accounts*for the 'instant aneit6l 'of sens"ati'ons 
distinct from the-formerg it survives witýh' the-soul after 
death. 
'A 
Q). Essai analytique sur les facultds de 11itae, 2nd ed., 




The discussioh up to the present has been conducted 
mainly on the plane of psychology, in terms of an analysis 
of the processes of sensation. and feeling. At this point 
Marcel's meditations týLie a new-turn. As Phenomenology has 
suggestedg psychologyq analytical or descriptivol does not 
provide an adequate bas s for metaphysics. The way to 
metaphysics is opened up by a properly ontolokical approach. 
For psychology is not chiefly concerned with the problem of 
value, but rather with the explanation of functions. The 
problem of value, which enters as a chief element iixto Meta- 
physics, requires the isolating, within the multiple facts 
of experienceg of some central fact of import which conditions 
and legitimates the individualts judgments of value. It is 
towards this end that Marcel's-reflection is now directed. 
Before entering upon this discussion Marcel devotes 
I 
considerable space to what for him is a preliminary problem: -, 
that of the relation between Being and reflective thought'. 
Just as Descartes had to struggle to liberate himself from 
8cholastic forms of thought, so that his whole philosophy is'l 
coloured by this struggleg so*. Gabriel Marcel has found 
constant difficulty in freeing himself from the Idealistic 




was rid once and f or all of Idealism. The the ory of 
presences has revealed an infra-intellectual mode of 
knowledge chýaracterised by immediate participation in the 
realq as oppo'sed to the objectifying mode of thought which 
interposes between the thinking 'subject and the real object 
a screen of ideas. Idealisra, by claiming this latter to bel, 
the sole mode of knowledgeg is led altogether to discount 
and to eliminate the real eicistent object and to substitute, 
for the variety of the realq present in feeling and sensationg 
a world of pure ideas and logical identities. 
But at this point; (the passages here to be dealt with 
refer to the year 1929) , under the inf lu, ence of the Neo- 
Scholastic group (he refers to his reading of Father Garigou - 
Lagrange; and we must no doubt include the personal influence 
of Maritain)q Marcel feels the necessity, before embarking 
upon the problem of the. access to Ontology, of undertaking a 
further critique of Idealism on the plane of epistemology 
proper, by an analysis of thq process of objective or 
a 
reflective (i. e. mediate) thought itself in relation to Being, 
Forg ai3 ouggrested above, although thought and feeling, the 
idea and the presenceg are opposed, as are the mediate and 
the i=ediate, they are notý exclusive as regards Being and 
Existence. They offer two modes of knowledge, equally 
leGitimate no*doubtl each in its own sphere. Marcel 
therefore proceeds quite naturally to discuss the relation'-, 
between conceptual thought and, Being. - He seeks first to 
establish that the act of thinking by means of the concept 
202. 
itself implies reference to a real object and that, thought 
is intentional in charactero, secondly, -in the light of this 
conceptual Realism, to crit. icise the epistemology of Idealisme 
In his discussion he relies'forýhis arguments on ThoMiBtiC 
epistemology, and in his criticism of Idealism adopts an 
attitude towards Cartesian and Kantian'llsubjectivisnfl current 
in Neo-Scholastic"writingSt notý. bly those of Maritain. 
Marcel's first, question is: is the idea (essence) prior 
to the saisie of the object in its inner exist6ntial nature 
(existence)? Nol he answers: ',, this is a pure illusion on 
our part "due to our'/, opposing what is only conceived (and. what 
we think ourselves justified in'treating as non-existent) to 
. what is realised. 11 (E. A. - p. 34. )'ý In reality, thought 4 
(conceptual) and existence are twoýmodes of. existence: or 
rather thought is included in existence; there is no passage 
thinkable from the idea of the thing to . the thing itself i 
Le passage a llexistence est quelque chose de 
radicalement impensableg quelque chose qui Ala 
meme aucun seni. Ce que nous appelons ainsý 
est une certaine transformation intra- 
existentielle. (Ibid. ) 
Thought by which the mind conceives the object iiq with 
reference to Being, one with the existential participation 
in the objects and it is only by-an abstraction that the two 
can be divorced, In other words, they are to be distinguished, 
within the limits of Being. and Existences as two modes of 
knowing a transcendent objectl the one,, i=ediate and of the . 
nature of feeling, 
Ny 
the other mediate or conceptual and cf' the 
: 'i: H 
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nature'of reason. In both cases the mind is directed 
towards a real object other than itself and to the espousal 
thereof: 
Il faut done dire que la pensee est interieure Ad llexistenceg quIelle est une certaine modalite4 
de l1existence qui Jouit du privilege de pouvoit 
faire abstraction-d'elle-meMe en tant vlexisteneeg 
cela'pour des fins strictement d4termines. Ii 
ne serait pas faux de dire que, la pensee'implique 
en ce sens un certain mensonge, ou plus exactement 
un certain aveuglement fondamepLtal: aveuglement 
qui diýparaat dans-la mesure OU il ya connaissanceq 
clest-a-dirb retour h lletre., Mais ce retour ne, 
peut etre rendu intelligible qu'a condition que 
l1aveuglement initial- soit expressement reconnii. 
(E. A. P. 35. ) 
Hence he condemnsýCartesian and Fichtean'Idealism which 
/xakes'. the idea or concept the object 6f thought presented 
immanently to consciousness and so leads' to the eventual 
elimination of the world of-transcendent things3 
A cot egard', un certain cartesianisme, *et surtout 
un-certain fichteismeq m1apparaissent comme les 
plus graves erreurs dont'aucune metaphydque se 
aoit rendue coupable. On no dira jamais assez 
combien la formule es donkt in mir est pr4ferable 
au cogito qui nous e3cTýose au pur subjeetivisme, 
Le "Je pense" ntest pas-une source, clest un 
qbturateur. (Ibid. ), 
We may so with Idealism* as far -as to hffirm that knowledge 
Dears on IcLeas (essences) rather than 
, 
things, if We understand 
that the idea is directed towards the thing and can only be 
detached therefrom by an arbitrary abstraction which trans- 
forms the idea into an object devoid of all intentionality 
and acquiring itself an unwarranted status: 
, Une connaissance avouglea de lietre en general 





connaissance portant sur la chose et non sur 
llidee de la chose - llidee nletant pas en soi 
objet et ne pouvant Otre convertie en objet que 
par une demarche r4flex-ive ulterieure et suspecte 
implique que nous somme reli6s a lletre., 
(lbid. 9 P. 36-) 
Il faut qulil y ait a ia racine d6 11intelligence 
Une Prise sur le reel. (lbid. 9-P. 650 
From this general affirmation'Marcel passes to a morO 
precise discussion of the problem. '' This discussion takes., 
the traditional Scholastic form of an'analysis in its 
epistemological implications of the principle of identity 
which, together with the principle of non-dontradiction, 
provides the firmissimum principium of the Thomistie philo- 
sophy, and which is both grounded and'illustrated in the 
assertions Being is. It is impossible to denyý-this 
principle-except in verbis, and this impossibility renders 
untenable the position which denies Being and at the same 
time abstains from pronouncing as to whether Being is or not. 
, (Ibid., PP. 36-7. ) Being must be affirmed or denied; the 
e4uivocal abstention of certain philosophies is untenable. 
Now if Being is denied and refuge is sought in Nominalismj 
A4"- we are affirming not only that there is no reality correspond I 
to the word, Beingg but that there is not even an idea. (Ibid. 9 
P. 37. ) For the principle of identity, by virtue of which 
we affirm that Being is, becomes a pure re le du JeU, or 
commodity of thought: thought is deprived of what is the 
essential condition of ideationg namely the possibility of 






objective standard of verification. The, absence of such a 
condition, by the reduction of the principle of identity to 
a-pure commodity of thought in the Positivist sensel or in 
the Kantian sense to a purely formal condition of thoughtq 
renders it impossible to rise from the plane of purely- 
subjective states of mind to ideation proper. 
Marcel proceeds now to examine more closely the 
principle of identity, and its epistemological implications 
in the assertion: A is A. The principle,, of identity as, ' 
expressed therein is the'condition, of any, thinking at all. 
To deny it, to deny th4t A is A, *implies that at the moment 
iI think A, it is suddenly*withdrawn as the object of my 
thought and is dissipated, so that I cease to think: 
On ne pourrait, en re'alite, nier le ppincipe 
dtidentite quIen niant la possibilite poiir la - pensee de Porter sur quelque chose, en. pretendant 
queg dans la mesure o1i Je pense quelque choseq je , I ceBse de pehserg ma pensee devenant eBelave d'un'. ', ', 
certain contenu, qui 11inhibe ou meme l1annule. 
(E. A. Pý 39.5 
On the contrary, the affirmation A is A implies thatq 
in the(act of thinking A, the mind is directed towards an- 
object which remains identical with itself through6ut 
successive'acts of'thinking and on each of which it is 
presented as an identical object to the mind; an objectq 
in short, which is extra-mental and not simply a state of 
the mind. For it is the characteristic of states of mind, 
by reason of"the fluidity of subjective contentsq to be 
refractory to identity. '- It is possible, says Marcelg. to 
1-1, -W ! v; 4 
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conceive a Heracliteanian or super-Bergsonism which would 
see in thought a purely subjective process lacking any 
transcendent object or confronted with a constantly vanishing 
object. A4d he asks further whether such a thought "qui no 
serait pas-la pensee de quelque choseq serait encore une 
pensee, si elle ne se dissiperait pas en. une sorte de songe 
dtelle-meme. 11 (Ibid. 9 p. 40. ) He. for his part, is convinced 
Of it. And'for this reason he maintains that it is 
impossible to think one's thoughtg for the latter inevitably. 
by virtue of its deveniiq provides no real object for the. 
knowing mind, is a constant passage of ideas into their 
, contrariesq a neant whi6h eludes 
the thi r1king subject. I 
cannot think my thought 11sans convertir, ce moi pense en 
quelque chose qui West rien et qui est'done contradiction 
. pure". (Ibid. ) 
*Marcel thus rejects Cartesian Idealism which appears to 
him essentially a 11 subjectivism2l 9 in that all thought is 
affirmed to be thought of the thinking self and of its 
contentsq and adheres to the Thomistie theory of intention- 
ality: all thought is thought of a transcendent object, 
which the mind espouses: 
Glest ici quo je rejoins la thomisme, tel du 
moins quo je la comprends. La pensaa nIest > 
nullement relation avec soi-meme, alle est au 
contraire par essenceý, self-transcendýnce* 
En sorte quo la possibilite da la d6 ini; ion 
rgaliste de la verit4 est impliqud'e dans la 
nature meine de la pens6e. La penede est 
tournee vers l'Autre, dlle est appetence de -, ý l'Autre. (Ibide) 
'e, 
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In another passage Marcel replies to the subjectivist 
theor., ý in an argument whichg strangely enough, has a 
-distinctly Cartesian flavour., The assertion that knowledge 
is of states of'mind seems-to enirelop the ideal supposition 
of a knowledge of Being, a supposition deriving from an 
innate positive conviction or aspiration. The latter can 
hardly proceed from a world of purely subjective states; 
must we not then conclude that it is the "mark" of a superior 
order, the order of transcendent Beingg as Descartes 
concludes that the idea of the perfect is,, tlie "mark" of a 
trbLnseendent Perfect B6ing: 
Mais il ne mlest guere possible de comprendre 
co=ent llid4e d*une connaissance reellet clest- 
bL-dire d'une'rerference hL 118tre, pourrait-prendre 
naissance-a 11interieur d1un monde de., pu: ýs etats 
de conscience... Ne serai-je pas conduit Ia reconnaitre das lors que 6ette idee m&ae'est 
II 
comme la mq que ineffacabl&. en moi'd1un autre. 
ordre? (Ibid., P. '78. )' 
'sis of the principle of identit-y In conclusion, naiy 
and its epistemological implications shows, in Marcel's viewq 
that this principle is the condition of all knowledgeg' not in 
any mere formal Sense, but in the ontological sense that the 
mind, in applying it, as it must in all true acts of knowingg 
is directed towards an object other thýn itself or its statesq 
and is affirming as identical to itself the transcendent 
object. Likewise, the negation of the principle of, identity 
is seen to imply that the mind, in the act of knowing, may 
think Simultaneously an object and its contraryg from which 
the conclusion would follow that the object of the mind is 
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not extra-mental but its own subjective stateý; - which 
assumption is further shown to be epistemologically absurd9 
as it would imply that, in the act of, knowing, the object 
of thought might be withdrawn or dissipated at the very 
moment of thinking, the mind bereft of its content and the 
act of knowledge left unconsummated. Thereforeq Marcel. 
concludes, in every act of knowledgeg by virtue of'the 
principle of identity itself, is implied contact with Being, 
Finallyq the original affirmation of Ontology: Being is 
(Being) is not in any sense a redundancy. It is the 
affirmation of a transcendent reality, just as'the particular 
;, affirmation A is A is seen to be equivalent to the assertion 
that A is a transcendent object (1)., 
To understand fully Marcel's views on refleetýive thought 
it is'necessary to indicate their Thomistic origin. Although 
he simply refers to a certain identity of his views with 
those of the Neo-Thomistsq it is throughout obvious that'his 
main arguments agbLinst the epistemology of Idealism are at one 
with those of Maritain. The argument f or the existence of 
-Beingg. based on the principle of identity, is of cýurse 
Scholastic in tenor. ItAs the fundamental contention of 
Saint Thomas that the principle of identity is grounded in 
ý1) In*an article on LIEvaluation traSique (Journal do 
'- - sychologie, Jan. - Ya c'T, --192-6) 11arcel finds in the idea r t t nega ing i self a superior form of the tragic. It is 
interestinG t6 note that Hegel himself in his Phenomenology 
presents his dialectic as essentially a dramaýof the tragic 
' consciousness likewise. Cf. J. Wahl9 LtIdeo du malheur chez 
Hegel, Rev. Phil. 9 1926-7, and La Conscience mEheureuse-da-Es ' 14 la philosophie de He5ell Phxis Rieder, 1930. 
,. 
W, 91, za "o sotL-Lý 4ý,; Y-f 
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the notions of Being and not-Being and serves simply to 
articulate the various modes of Being (1). "It is 
sufficient, " says Maritaing "for eadh to consult himself and 
experience vrithin himself the absolute impossibility of 
thinking the principle of identity without positing extra- 
mental Being (at least possible) of which this first of all 
axioms expresses the behaviour (2). 91 
-The analysis of any judgment is sufficient, in the 
Thomibtic viewq to establish this. The act of judgment 18 
an act whereby a subject and predicateg differing as notions 
or mental objectsq are declared to be identical in the 
'transcendent object or 
thing, i. e. extra mentally. And the 
function of judgment is none other than to trans port the Min 
from the plane of the ideal object or essence to that of the 
existent thins. 
Secondlyq the epistemological assertions here, taken over 
by Marcel are Thomistic in origin and are opposed alike to 
the Cartesian and Phenomenological doctrines and to the 
Kantian. It is assumed that all knowledge is conformity 
ýWith a transcendent objectq the fruit of an act wh; reby the 
mind is made intentionaliter one with the object: fieri. 
l 
aliud in quantum aliud (3). The process of knowledge as ' I ii
described by Saint Thomas is a'process of reflection thereby. 
L-., Rougibr-iýLa(, -Scolastigue et le Thomismeg Paris, 
authier-Villars, 1925, pp. 144-, 5* 
ý2) DistinDuer pour-Unir ou les Degre6 du Savoir, Paris, 
escl(jo do Brouwer, 19529 p. Id5. 
ý3) Of. J. Maritaing''Antimoderne; Parisq Editions de la Revue 
es Jeunesj 1922, p. -97. - 
', ' 
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the transcendent objectq as given in sense perception, is 
rendered intelligible and thereby present to the mind. 
Knowledge starts from sense perception wherein the thing is 
Immediately grasped in its sensitive species,; by a process 
of abstractiont as defined by Aristotle, 'the mind extracts 
therefrom the forma rei or intelliýible species, thanks to 
which the thing is rendered intentionally present to thought; 
finally, by means of' the concept or idea mhich the mind 
furnishes spontaneouslyl the intellectual faculty is put in 
possession of the thirigg concept and intentionalg intelligible 
species becoming one 
L the final consu=ated act'of knowledge 
(1). "The whole Thomistic epistOmologY911 writes Gilsong 
"rests on the fact'that the intellect attains to being and 
takes possession of it, because it attains to theisensible 
species and takes possession of thatq after transfbrming it. 
The. objectivity of knowledge is consequently based upon the 
sensible species as the meeting-point between the intellect 
and the objectj hence the impressive formula in the Compend. 
theol. c. 83: 'Qum vero praedictas species (s'cil. '' 
I intelligibiles) in actu completo habueritg vocatur intellectus 
in actu. Sic enim actu intelligit res, cum species rei facta 
Q Maritain, Les Degrels du savoirl pp. 228-9. Cf. Saint 
homas: "Univleirsalia non sunt res subsistentes, sed habent 
esse solum in singularibus. 11 (Sum. cont. Gent., 1,65. ) 
Cf. Albertus Magnus: "UniversalT a re accepTu-mper abstrac- tionem est intentio formae et simplex conceptus mentis, qui de re per abstrahentem, intellectum habetur. (MSOI 19 Vit 
p. 89 B. ) Cf. Duns Scotus: "Necesse est ut actio 
intellectus prius attingat singularel qx quo per actioiiem 
quasi de quadam miateria faciat, universale. (_Qu.. do rer. 
_ Princ., 13,3. ) 
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fuerit forma intellectus possibilis. " It is impossible to 
express more forcibly the continuity'between object and 
subject (1). " 
Now in this theory of knowledge two points are note- 
worthy. First, the concept or idea is not itself the object 
of thought, which is rather the intentional species or 
universal, i. e. the thing itself in its intelligible aspects. 
The idea is simply a means or instrument whereby the trans- 
dendent thing is grasped as an objeet of thought (2). 
Secondlyl all knowledge is mediate. Starting from sense 
perception it consistý in, a process of mediation whereby the 
. mind, 
in and through the concept, is put in contact with the 
thing in its intelligible aspects. It is therefore a process 
of mediation aiming at the extraction'of the universal from I 
the particular 
The reader, ' it , is. hopedq will forgive this*lengthy 
digression when it is seen that it throws light on Marcel's 
own views on conceptual thought. He has nowhere explained i* 
precisely his attitude, but it, can be safely inferred from 
his adoption of the general Thomistic thesis that all ideas 
are ideas of Being that it is in a similar manner he would 
account for the intentional nature of the concept. Only on 
1) The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas Cambridge Univ. 
Ig ess, 19 1 p. 2-14,. ' n., 
40. =* also pp. 206-7. 
(2) Cf. Maritain, Rýflexions sur'llintelligence et sur sa vie 
proprej Paris, Bi 1. frang. de phi t 19249 P. 527. Plelione, Western Christian Thought'in the Middle Ages, 
Edinburgh and hondon, B ckwood 195.5, p. 
(3) Cf. AT. de Wulfj Philosoýhy_: and Civilisation in the Middle 
A910s, Oxford Univ. Press, 1922, p. 194. 
this basis can the reader account for his criticism of 
Cartesian Idealism which approximates to those of the Neo- 
Scholastics; and only so can the ideas expressed in the 
above passages be rendered compatible with his more : funda- 
mental doctrine of immediacy. 
To consider first his criticism of Cartesian Idealism. 
Cartesianism is described by himq as by Maritain, as a 
"subjectivism"; firstly in that it considers the idea or 
mental concept or essence as the sole object of thought, 
grasped in an immediate intuition by the thinking self of its 
ovm states. DescartJs and Husserl alike posit a pure object 
or universal essence dependeiit on the Cogito, that is grasped 
in an immediate intuition of pure consciousness without 
reference to a thing, present in sense perception. Marcelq 
like Iýaritain, rejects this epistemology on the. ground. that 
the concept is not itself the object of thought, but the 
means towards the saisie of the object, which latter exists 
independently of the thinking self; and on the ground that 
knowledge, starting from sense perception and the particularg 
rises only by a process of mediation to clear and'intuitive 
vision of the universal as a final consummation (1). From 
OL 
Of. Maritaing Les Degrgs du Savoir, p. 177. It may be 
noLd that Saint TFo--mas express. Ly de-clares that the idea is 
the medium and not the'object of thought, and criticises those 
who "have maintained that our cognitive powers have knowledge 
of nothing but their own mutations. " (S=na theol. Iq lxxxvs 2. ) 
For, the clear opposition between Husserl and S asticiSM see 
E. Parl Welch, The Philosophy"of Edmund Husserl, Ne* York, 
Columbia Univ. 1941, p. ee4 sqq. 
- . -_____e_____, 1.. _- '_-. -, - 
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which it follows that evidence accompanying the concept is 
for the Cartesian a "subjective evidencet quality of certain 
ideas", whereas it is for the Thomist a "property of being! ' 
(1). ' * It is in this sense-that Maritain, reproaches Husserl 
with the substitution of the 'verifiedl farthe "true" (2). 
- But not only does, Mareel, have to reject Cartesian. 
immediacyq he has to go to the root of the matter and 
criticise the inlial 1cosito of Idea1ism. 
The 6ogito for 
Descartes and Husserl is the essential condition of a theory 
of intuition of essences: that is the*immediate, intuition 
of a self as a thinki4substanceg the revelation of a pure 
;. self directly intuited other than the empirical self, an! ' 
intuition in which are grounded and which accompanies all 
intuitions of essences. It is this coGito which Via-reel 
rejects in terms similar to those employed by the Neo-ThomistS 
in the passage quoted above. It is impossible, he maintains, 
to think my thought, in the sense of my having a dire6t 
intuition of myself as a thinking substance. It is inýfaet E 
a common-place of Thomistic doctrine that the first principle 
of philosophy is not the cogito but the cogito ens (3). 
What is first given is the extra-meiltal object; the knowledge 
of self is not immediate, but given in actu aecundo in the 
1) Mariýain, Trois Reformateursq Paris, Plon, 19259 p. 106. 
2) DeEres du Savoir p. 1719 2. 
3) C1. I'Aaritain. Trois Reformateurs, p. 103 sqq,; Les Degres 
u Savoir, p. 199 pqq., where MariýEýn criticise ýthe doctrine 
of Husse7-. 
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reflex act of thought (1). As Marcel suggests in the 
passage quoted, thought is essentially "self transcendence! ' 
rather than an internal relation of thought to thought. 
Any attempt to intuit the thinking selfq independently of 
its relation vvith Being, presents thought with a vanishing 
and self-contradictory object which it is powerless to grasp. 
Knowledge of the thinking self, as far as conceptual thought 
seeks to attain itl, is a by-product of knowledge of Being. 
And this is due to the fact that t1iought is essentially 
mediate; ideas are not themselves objecis of thought, but 
signs of things; therefore thought in the presence of its 
contents is not'in immediate possession of its own essenceq 
but in the possession of knowledge of e#ra-mental Being. 
It is only inasmuch as it knows Being that the thinking self 
by implication knows that it exiStsl and this reflex intuition 
(1) Cf. Saint Thomas, - Spmma Theol. f ILXXXVII 9 1. On the vanity of certain Neo-Thomisti ttempts to integrate the 
Cartesian co jto in the Tbom-I'A-ic schemd, df. E. Gilson, 
Realisme thomi-ste et critique do la connaissance,, Parisq Vrinq 
1939, p. 68 sqq. - Vie may refer also to the more recent work 
by Father Joseph de Finance: CoGito cartesien et r4flexion 
thomisteg Paris, Beauchesne, 1945& 'Xhe autHor criticises 
the Idealistic implications of, the Cartesian cogito which 
establishes a divorce between thought and existence, and 
concludes that it cannot be assimilated by Thomism, whose 
starting-point is similar to that of Existentialism. Of. 
also, by the same author, Etre et Agir dans'la philosophie de Saint Thomas, Parisq Beauchesne, 1945; Father Geiger, 
La ParticiR-ati-on dans la philosophie de Saint Thomas d'Aguin, 
: Paris, Vrin, 1942; B. Gilson's chapter ' istence et R6alitd in tho 4th editioA of his Thomisme (Paris, Wing 1942). 
All these works attempt to interpret Saint Thomas in 
terms of the txistentialist philosophy, rather arbitrarily in the present writer's view., 
U? 
tVV fl 
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does not permit the self to conclude that its essence is to 
think, but rather that its essence is to think Being; it 
is not the presence of thought to thought but otýBeing to 
thought that is the staiting-point of knowledge. 
To 811mmariseq Marcel's views on thought (as reflective 
or conceptual) are inspired ýy Neo-Thomism. 'Thought for 
him is directed towards Being. Ideas are not'themselves 
the object of thoughtq but represent knowledge of things. 
Thought is mediate, dependent upon concepts expressive of 
r 
b 
the nature of things. There is therefore no intuition, as 
far as reflective th4ght is concerned, of self; the, content 
of thought being incapable of becomingan objeci of knowledge 
in itself. Idealistic epistemologyq 13; short, is at fault 
in assuming that ideas are sole objects of thougýt independ- 
ently of things, and in conceiving the relation of thought 
-to, thought as the initial condition of reasoning. 
At the root of Marcel's return to rational Realism is 
obviously his fundamental rejection of dualism and the 
separation of mind and body. In keeping with the Thomists 
he sees in the mind-body relationship a cardinal fact of 
unity whose nature he expresses forcibly in his theory of. 
incarnation. This theory marks the starting-point of his 
J, 
- 
own doetrine, of'immediate knowledge through feeling and 
sensation. But already, on the plane of rational and dis- 
cursive knowledge it precludes him from accepting an Idealism 
i 
i 
grounded on a negation of this cardinal fact. 
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Now this alliance with Neo-Thomism is merely provisional. ' 
The passages studied are undoubtedly of great-importance, 
certatnly of greater importance than M. -de Corte is willing 
to concede (1). but it is imperative to place them in their 
true perspective. The discussion has been on the plane of 
epistemology rather than of Ontology proper, (in this respect 
we can understand the comment of M. de Corteg who is a 
Thomist, when he declares that the passaýes-reveal, not only 
Marcel's incapacity "to realise the metaphysics of Being as 
Being, but even to think metaphysically (2)"). The passages 
treated are motivated Vy a final reaction; ýon the author's 
part against Idealism: he has desired to give a final co 
de r9ce by refuting-it on the plane of epistemology and.! 
reflective reason. This he has done by recourse to the 0 
Thomistic doctrine of intentionality. He has sought to 
show, as against certain forms of Idealismllthat ideas are 
ideas of things and that on the plane of ideation itself 
there is contact. with Being. 
But none the less, intelligence and the processes of 
ideation and discursive thought are=nceptual in their mode 
of operation. The intelligence grasps the real only in, and 
through concepts'Which intervene as the mediating instruments 
between the latter and consciousness. It therefore functions 
on the plane of Objectivity ýLý not of Existence: it offers 
q. ý1) Cf. Ijarcel de Corteg La Philosophie de Gabriel Marcel 41 aris, Tequij 1939. 
(2) Ibid. 9 p. 13* 
cA - 
"r* L"l! ' 
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i 
not immediate participation in the peall but Itknowledse of" 
the real. Even if conceptual knowledge does bear upon 
reality and the essences of things, these essences are 
intelligible, not existential essencesq the purely formal 
elements of the real, 'or Being in its intelligible featutes 
and not in its existential nature (they would correspond to 
Whitehead's "factors in fact", i. e. the universal forms or 
entities provided inextricably with the concrete of sense- 
experience and whichq by becoming-objects"of thought, allow 
' bout them the latter to make true-false propositions a 
Thomism has, thus/proved of great service in the limited 
, 
sphere of epistemologyp it has served to define the status of 
reflective thought and the status of the cogito which all 
reflective thought involves. It has guaranteed as a ainst 09 
Idealism the adequacy of reason'to its object and thus 
t legitimated the methods of scientific enquiry. The previous 
discussion has played-the-preliminamy role of clearing the,,,, 
ground of certain Idealistic misconceptionsl but it has not 
conditions under which it has knowledge of the object'and the 
knowing self, those conditions being shown to belong to the 
order of mediacy. But beyond objective thought and beyond Io 
the orden of mediacy Marcel. posits'a higher order of immediacy 
yet brought us to ontology proper* It has been aimed merely 
at defining the status of discursive thought* i. e. 'the 
and ])artici2ation. On this plane alone does tho mind have, 
ý1) Cf. D. M. E=et, Whitehead's Philosophy- of, Organism, 
0 ondont Maomillan, 19329 p. 59. 
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access to Ontology* Ontology is synonymous with Existence. 
. 
Over and beyond the problem of knajvledge about being is the 
problem. of Being itself, or ratherg-for here we'are in the 
domain of the meta-problematicalg. the "immediate datum" of 
the presence of self to,, self (involving the presence of other 
' selves to self), which is the initial fact conditioning 
ontological meditation*, On this plane reality is not 
presented to the mind through the mediacy of the conceptq 
but is one with the experiencing subject; duality is 
' A 
abolished in favour of an experience which involves an 
intimacy of subject aýd object inexpressible in conceptual 
., terms, and wherein the Being grasped is not an essence but an 
existent. What then is the precise nature of this cardinal 
and initial experience which provides access to Ontologyq 
, 
that is to the real existential? 
Here Marcel's philoso-Dhyturns its backon Thomism no, 
less than on Cartesianism. ý As against the former, it 
' transcends obj ective conceptual thought, it establishes as, 
its starting-point an immediate revelation of self to self 
or Ego Sum. As regards Cartesianism, it defines, this initial 
Ego Sum'in te=s not of pure thought but of feeling. It is 
all-important to develop these ei iplanations. 
Thomism is content to start X'rom the judgment BeinE is 
and to olaborate a process of thought by which Being is made 
known to the subject through the concept. Further, it 
relegates the cogito to a secondary position. Marcel has 
2ý9. 
taken over those theses in so far as they seem-to explain 
the process of discursive thought'and the founding of the 
epistemological subject. But ov er and beyond discursive 
thought-and over and beyond the epistemological subject is- 
thought in its pure immediacy and the ontological, subjecto 
On the plane of existence the experiencing subject is placed 
in a totally different situation, one not of objectivity but 
of subjectivity. It'is this cardinalisituation. and the 
judgment of existence which it involves that alone provide 
an adqquate, starting,. -point for a philosophy of existence, 
that is for a true Onýologyq which, refuses to-separate 
knowledge of Being and existential experienceg as does Thomisal 
and which seeks to approach th6ýreal by'a purely'subjective 
way, 
In the sphere of Ontology, Marcel thus reverts to a 
subjective approach Whichq in itg, "first aspects, has much in 
common with Cartesianism and its modern counterpart, Pheno- 
menology, in that he. posits as a condition of access to the 
real a primitive ontological judgaentl or judgment of existence 
- Ego Sum. In a similar manner Husserl posits his pure Ego, 
the "I to Which I am present" and: which participates in the 
realm of pure essences (1). The Ego Sum of Marcel fulfils a 
similar function; it is the pure. 1essentialI. self revealed 
to selfq in and through which the latter participates in, 
other selves. Such is the immediate prise de contact which 
(1) Cf. Ideas, p. 172. 
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serves as starting-point for Ontology. But here all 
resemblance ends, for Marcel refuses to identify the Ego Sam 
with the cofrito. 
In the Esquisse d1une Phenomdnologie de 1'Avoir, Marcel 
underlines the uselessness of the cogito as a starting-point 
for knowledge of the existential self: 
Contrairement a llidele qui se pre"sente dlabord a 
llesprit, je ne crois pas que le cogito puisse 
nous 6tre ici dlaucun secours. Le cogito... garde 
le seuil du valable et clest., tout; 15 'sujet du 
cogito, clest le sujet epistemologique. (B. A. p. 2-49. ) 
The subject of the 6ogito is the epistemological subject, the 
subject present in all judgments. Nor is this subject-the 
real ontological selfq as Descartes supposesq revealed by an 
intuition of pure thought. - The coSito, has its place on the 
plane of rational thoughtq as'establiShing the epistemological 
subject underlying all objective judgments; althoughl as 
already shown, it is not, as Descartes supposesq primary even 
on this plane, being given in'actu secundols conditional on 
the positing of transcendent Being. As far as discursive 
thought is concerned, it begins by positing transcendent 
Being, andq as it were by implicationg posits a thinking self 
as a subject of its future discourse and reasoningg what 
Marcel calls"le sujet epistemologique co=e organe d1une 
connaissance objective (1). " But this pure thought gubject 
is not the existential subjeett'the self which acts and feels, 
(1) Position et A2proches concretes du stere ontoloEigue, 
Ir Parisq Descicie de Brouwerg 19559 p. 264. 
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the self of "passion! ', to employ the term of Kierkegaard, 
the concrete* self of, temporal and historical-bxperience 
(we may recall Heidegger's reproach against Descartes and 
Kant for neglecting the"Sum" of the "res cogitans" (1)). 
Something more than a merely, formal condition of objective 
judgments is required. Althoughq for the purposes of 
reasoning it is not necessary to, proceed beyond the affirma- 
tion of real things and of a thinking subject which conceives 
them, i. e. the epistemological subject9 there is necessary, 
to found the self ontologicallyg i. e. as existing and not 
merely as the formal( I condition of thoughtq a judgment of 
existence. - II 
i Now Descartes claims in his version of the cogitoliwhich 
Marcel rejects, to have found such a judgment of, existence. 
The cogito ergo sum in Descartes' system opens up the way to 
Ontologyt as it affirms'me to be'inasmuch as I ýhink. But 
Marcel rejects entirely this standpoint which*introduces a 
disastrous divorce between the "intellectual and the vital" 
and which limits'the existent self to a purely thinking 
(1) "'Realit, ýtsbeivusstsein, ist selbst eine Weise'des In-der- 
Welt-seins... Sollte das Icogito sum' als Ausgang der 
existenzialen Analytik des-Daseins dieneng dann bedarf«es 
nicht nur der Umkehrung, sondern einerneuen ontologisch- 
pha"nomenalen Bewahrunr, seines Gehalts. Die erste Aussage ist dann: tsumit, undg zwar in dem Sinne: ich-bin-in-einer- 
Vielt. Als so Selendes 'bin ich' in der Seinsmöglichkeit zu 
verschiedenen Verhaltungen (cogitationes) als Weisen des Seins bei innervieltlichem Seiend: en. Descartes dagegen sagt: 
cogitationes sind vorhanden, darin ist ein ego mit vorhanden 
als weltlose res cogitans. 11 (Sein und Zeit, Erste Hälfteg 
Jahrbuch fÜr Philosophie und pÜUomenologis-cle Forschung, 




activity. For him the primitive Judgment of existence or 
ego sum must found the truly existential and pathetic subject: 
Et certes il nly a pas lieu de nier qulil soit 4 legitime d1opdrer des distinctions d1ordre au 
sein de 11unite' d1un vivant qui pense et slefforce 
de se pens6r; mais le problbme o-n7-oIoSiqqe ne se' 
Rose que par , 
de-LAL ces distin 
' 
ctions et pour'cet 
etre sais, i dans; son unite, dans son 41an. 
(E. A. pe 249. ) (1)* 
We may siinmarise Marcel's views on the cogito as follows. 
He rejects the cogito ergo sum as',, haviyýG no ontological 
(1) From this point of viewl the Ego sum of Marcel approaches 
more nearly the Co ito of Saint Augustine than that of 
Descartes, in so ar as the former is an, intuition of our own 
existence or life rather than that of our thought. I'Scisne 
saltem to vivere? " OSciog" inquit. I'Scis ergo habere te. 
vitam.. *? " "Et hoc, ". inquitj "scio. 11 - (Do Beata Vita, 119 
7. ) N; w -light has recently been thrown on the ve_x_e_T`piýoblem 
of the relation and opposition between the Augustinian and' 
the Cartesian cogito by Dr Nigel Abercrombie. Reacting 
against their Ts-similation by Gilson (Cf. Etudes sur le rdle 
de la pensOe medidvale dans la formation du systdme cartd enj 
. Varl sqv r3m, -L). 5U j APpenai: Campanella;, Introduction 4: 
. varis, vriA, pp. of-the various Augustinian 
is founded, and arrives at 
cogito erQo sum is in fact 
NUgustinian U-chetype" 
. Thought, Oxford, Clarendon 
scavues 
EL 11 tude de Saintýstinq- 2nd ed, q q, he makes a searching analysis 
exts upon which this assimilation 
the conclusion that "Descartes' 
independent of its supposed 
(Saint Au ustine and French Classical 
Press, 119,56, pp. >7-64. ) 
Historically speaking, it is probableg given the fact 
that the intuition of existence comprises the intuition of 
thoughtq that Saint Augustine is the source both 'of the 
rational and the existential coEjto. I'Llon peut discerner, 
tout le long de la spe"culation augustinienne, la presence 
constante et le developpement paralle'le'de deux augustinismes 
philosophiques, celui de llontologisme des verites 
rationnelles, qui vient precisement sidpanouir chez Descartes, 
et celui " 
de llexpe"rimentation des verite's religieuses, qui, a 
son apogee chez Pascal. Augustinismes diffe'rents, qui 
engendreat deux intuitionnismes differents, celui de la 
raison pure ot celui du coeur4 Tout cela, qqi so fondalt en 
une admirable unite dans Saint AuGustin lui-memeq slest 
dissoc16 pou a peu. " (E. Bauding Recherches de sciences 
religieuses, 1924, 'p . 345*) 
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validity. If claimed, as it is by Descartesq to be a meta- 
physical principle, it does not fulfil the function, as it 
posits simply the thinking selfg not the exiEtential self: 
for it makes the ego sum depend quite arbitrarily on'the 
cogitol. 
In actual fact, the coGito has its place 'only in the 
sphere of reflective thought to establish the thinking 
subject-as the formal condition of discourse. It says 
nothinG more than that I am the thinker., As Kibrkegaard 
has pointed out, the eg6 sum, is illegitimately"introduced 
III and indeed is tautological in this sphere: "If the 
writes Kierkegaard, "which is the subject of*the-cogito'means 
an individual human being, the'ý, proposition proves nothing: 
'I am thinking, erESo I am; but, if I am thinkingwhat wonder 
that I am': the assertion has already been madeq and the 
first'probosition says even mor6ýthaxx the second (l). 11 On 
this plane the cogito has its use, though limited-, ý It 
establishes that a thinker is required as the subject of his 
thoughts or as a "unity of'apperceptionlIq to employ the 
Kantian term, but'is illegitimately used to posi, 6 the eSo sums 
that is the existential subject. To. found the latter there 
is . required another jud, C,, rvnt on a plane other than that of 
(1) ConcludinfS Unscientific Posteriptt transl., by D. F. Swenson 
and W. Lowrie, Oxfora Univ. Press, Tg4l, p., 281. 
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reason I 
Marcell then, posits as the starting-point of OntOlOGY 
an, i. Ego sum, an immediate reveýation- of the transcendent self 
to consciousness, given not on the plane of pure thoughtq but 
in the intense personal experience ofactiong sufferýing. and^ 
existing. In all such moments of true existence the self 
transcends the limits 'of its finite nature and participates 
in its eternal and infinite "essencol. It is thus made 
I 
aware of transcendent Beii3g i=anent-within it, regaining 
contact with the source of its spiritual activity. The 
Eao sun is what*HeideFger has termed the "ontic truth'ý-. 
' "La verite, du ju-Sement a sps racines dans*une ve'rite plus I 
primitive, dan la re"velation antepre'dicative de l1existant, , 
(1) Notwithstanding this complete disagreement on the function 
and status of the co *to, the reversion to the subjective mode 
must always have some ing in common with Cartesianismq as the 
close relations between the latter and Phenomenology bear 
witness; and bl. de Corte is right in brineing together the 
cogito of Descartes and the Ego sum of Marcel (op. cit., T. 6U). Common to both is ýUH-ei-Teintification of the immediate 
apperception of the self with the very existence of that self, 
Knowledge and existence, the act of knowing and the act of 
existing are one. It is in this assertion that Hamelin sees 
the profound originality of Descartes' d6finition of thought. 
"Ce qulil ya de plus nouveau dans la ddfinition de Descartesq. 
... clest la part qulil accorde au sujet dans l1a6te de penser. ' Il a eu le sentiment tr4s vif, inconnu avant lui, que penser 
ou se poser pour soi est tellement bien un acte du sujet, quo 
etre pour soi clest en quelque facon Stre par soi, ce qulexprime, 
sum dans le coGito, err ,o sum. (Le Systeme de Descartes, ' 2nd. eU-., Paris, Alcan, 19,21, p. 182. Of. also R. Lef?, Ivre, 
Le cogito, activite' irreductible du sujet, Revue d1histoire de 
la philosophie, 1931, p. 282. ) It is this same assertion, 
transformed by the passage. from the plane of pure thought to 
that of passion and feeling, which informs the Existential 
philosophy. 
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et quo nous appellerons verite ontique (1). 11- 
The Ego bum is the supreme example of what Marcel in his 
Position:. et Approches calls the #'mystery" as opposed to the 
"Probled'. The "probled' exists, for a. mind confronting an 
object which it aims at "verifying'; it has r. eference solely 
to"llactivite verificatrice! ' of mind. As long as the mind 
remains on the purely objective plane and within the limits 
of a purely psychological or epistemological enquiryq it is 
debarred from 11 l1expe'rience ontologique" The latter supposes 
the destruction of the merely external mind-bbject relationship, 
and the passage fromithe plane of "obJective knowledge" to 
,a plane on which'the self perceives itself that of "being". 
as"implicated", as an activeg sufferingg and not only thinking 
being, in a reality which encloses him all about on all sidesq 
and of which he is the "seat' rather than the "subject". 
The ontological situation is one v&ich cannot be said to 
it 
% -% be "mine", but rather to consist wholly a etre moil': 
er ae ee La connaissance int" ieure % 118tre, envelopp" 
par lui: mystere ontologique 4e la connaissance. (E. A. P. 166. ) 
At this level of experienceg the psychologic6l'and epistemo- 
logical'yield to the ontological. We are beyond the realm 
of the "problematid, 9 in the sphere of the , met a-probl emati call' 
or the "mystery,, where being and knowledge'are one: "nous 
sommes ici dans, une zone 6u" il West plus possible de dissocier 
llide5e elle-m6me et la certitude-ou 11indice do certitude qui 
Quoted by M. de Corteg ýOpe cit., P. 58. 
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l'affecte. 11 Subject and object apprehended can no longer 
be separated, but are one in the I'mystere du connaltre" (1). 
The transcendent self is revealed'as a felt presence to the 
experiencing subject:. what Claudel calls the presence of 
ýIquelque chose en moi qui soit pýus-moi-meme qudi moil'. 
The e2o sum is an irreducible fact, an experience 
inexplicable in intelligibleýterms. As a, revelation of self 
to self in immediate partýcipation it does not allow itself 
i 
to be degraded into a "problen2l, 
Il convient dlautre part de remarquer que moi qui 
interroge sur lletre, je ne sais de prime abord 
ni si je s-dis-ni a fortiori ce quo je suis - ni " 
mem7e-tout a fait clairemeE ce que signifie 
cette question: Sue suis-je? qui pourtant 
mlobsede. Nous voyons done : Lei le ]ýrobleme de 
-1letre empieter sur ses propres donn6es, et 
slapprofondix A Ilintoriew mome Tul -7suJ t qui le 
pose. Du m8me coup il se nie (ou se transcende) 
en tant que probleme et, se transforme dn mystere. 
(E. A. p. 169. ) 
The Ego sun constitutes knowledge but not "objective" 
knowledge: it does not provide "knowledge about" but 
"knowledge of" my self. Put in*another wayl in*the initial 
mystery of self-revelation, q knowledge and existence are oneq 
identical and inseparable. I know myself inasmVch as I 
exist, in acting, suffering, bte., and vice versa. MY' 
"existence, ' is not abstracted from the experience of existing 
and treated as an abstract idea, but is known in and through 
the experience itself. 
The Ego s4um is thus the perfect illustration of what 
Of. the jemeiniEkeit of Heidegger. ýý 
i 
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Kierkegaard has called- ý' subjective thinkinE, 11 or "I inwardnesal t 
a process of self-revelation. induced by an inner-type of 
reflection which grasps withi n the depths of consciousness 
the transcendent "essence"' of the self, -immanent therein and 
with which the finite self is in commiinion. It, contrasts 
therefore with "objective thinking' to which such access is 
debarred by its methbdidC approachq treating the -self as some- 
thing to be understoodg something indifferent to our existence 
and external to it (1). "Subjective thinking! ' is the 
thinking of a self implicated in etistence: it approaches 
reality through immediate personal experience, 
it is 
. $'existential" thinking (2). For all real knowledge 
is ý 
gained in the personal experience of action and suffering (3)- 
It is important to enquire under what conditions the 
I 
Ego sum is given. It has been stated that the "existential 
(1) "For an objective reflection the truth becomes an objectp 
something objective, and thought must be pointed away from the 
subject. For a subjective reflectiong the truth becomes a 
matter of appropriationg of inwardness, of subjectivity, and 
thought must probe more and more deeply into the subject and 
his subjectivity... The way of objective reflection makes the 
subject accidental, and thereby transforms existence into 
something indifferent, something vanishing. Away from the 
subject the objective way of reflection leads to the objective, 
truth, and while the subject and his subjectivity become 
indifferent, the truth also becomes indifferentq and this 
indifference is precisely its objective validity; for all 
interest, like all decisiveness, is rooted in subjectivity. " 
Kierkegaard: Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 1719- 
73. ) 
Q For a description of various'aspects of existential 
hinking, e. g. Hegel, Marxq. Feuerbach, etc., cf. P. Tillichq 
Existential Philos2phZ, Journal of the History of Ideas, Jan., 19449 PP., -53-5 
it Il (31 Cf. P. Valery: West de veritable savoir que celui 
qu peut se changer en Stre et en substance d16treq clest-a- 
dlý e on acte. 11 (Cahier B, p. 39. ) 
-y 
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judgment" is not given on the pldne of the cogito.. The 
cogito of Descartes is the clear and distinct idea of'my, 
own thought, of my existence as a purely thinking being, 
and therefore independent of body. Existence is for this 
reason a datum wholly, permeable to thought and expressible 
in. terms of a clear and distinct idea. For Marcel, on the 
contrary, in the fact of consciousness we are in the presenee 
of a datum not tran. parent to thoughtq precisely because it 
is given to a self which is"incarnate" in a body: the 
primary situation is thaVof"lincarnationliq th e "situation of 
a being who appears 
Zo himself as united to a body". (E. A. 
P. 
The starting-point of Ontology is'n6tq therefore, a self 
-abstracted by means of an initial doubt from spage, but the 
concrete self implicated therein. The point of, departure of 
a "philosophie concrete! ' cannot be the cojUito of Idealism 
which denies this implication of self in reality: 
Ce que je n1ai pas cesse de vOuloir marquer le 
Plus fortement possibleg clest quIun6 philosopýiie 
qui part du coGitog. clest-a-dire du non-inse'rg, 
ou m6me de la non-insertion en tant qu! acte, risque de ne pouvoir jamais rejoindre 1164tre. I'Llincar- 
nation est la donnee a partir de laquelle un fait 
est possible; " 'ce West pas une forme, on ne peut 
meme pas dirq-purement et simplement que ce soit 
une relation., Clest une donnee non transparente 
a elle-meme. (RIIII., pp. 90-1. ) 
Rather is this point of departure-in the primitive datum of 
a self 11 situated" and enga ed" in the world (1 'e'tre-au-monde 
or Iletre-en-situation; as he terms it in the'essay so 
entitled in Du Refus "a lInvocation). 
. '. qa-t'.. -t r 
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The starting-point of Ontology is a most rigorous 
, 
Realistic affirmation: 
Je dirai de ce point de vue qulil no saurait y 
avoir selon moi de philosophie concrete sans 
une tension continuellement renouvelee et 
proprement creatrice entre le Jo et les 
profondeurs de lletre en quoi -e7 par quoi 
nous so=es, ou encore sans une ri; flexion 
aussi stricteg aussi rigoureuse que possible, 
slexercant sur l1experience la plus intensement 
ve cue .S (Ibid. 9 p. 89. ) 
For that very reasong the existence revealed in the Ego sum, 
far from being a datum permeable to thought, is precisely 
the hard core which is Impermeable to thought, 'Ice qui 
resiste"t a "donnee/opaqud'. For Marcel, the fact of 
consciousness revolves around an impenetrable obscurity; 
it is not a domain of clearness or distinctness (1): 
Romprq, par consequentg une fois pour, toutes avee 
les metaphores qui representent la conscience 
comme un cercle lumineýý ptour duquel il nly 
aurait pour elles que tenebres. Clest, au_ 
contraire, 11ombre qui est au centre. (E. A. p. 15-) 
Ici slamorcerait une reflexion sur'llopacite" et 
les'conditions qui la q4terminent. Vai eiýte 
amend'progressivement'a adopter la these sans 
doute paradoxale d1apres laquelle clest toujours 
le moi qui se fait 
, 
ombre a lui-meMe, llopacit4 
venant de ce que le moi slinterpose entre le Je 
et llautre. I'Llobscurite du monde ektdrieur 
est fonction de mon obscurit6 pour moi-m6me; 
aucune obscurite intrinseque du monde. " (R. I. p. 91. ) 
It is just because Being is buried. in the impenetrable 
cavern of consciousness that a passage will be secured from 
the self to Existence as a wholeg to the universe and other 
selves. Marcel's philosophy is protected from any danger 
(1) Cf. Malebranc-he as opposed to Descartes. 
- . --'-, 
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of solipsism. For the body is a I'me"diateur absolir, between 
myself and the transcendent Reality; the I'donnee opaque, ' of 
self-existence opens out on to the world of other existences. 
It is in and through "incarnation! ' that the s'elf is put by 
sensation and feeling--into possession of reality as a whole. 
On the contrary, 11dans la mesure ou nous pouvons imaginer un 
entendement pur, il nly a pas pour un tel entendement 
possibilite de cons 
, 
iderer les choses comme existantes ou 
non-existanted'. (E. A. p. 10. ) 
The Ego sum given in the fundamental situation of 
Itincarnati6x2l is the initial condition of all further 
judgments of, existence, of the revelation of all other,: 
"Presenced'. The passage is secured only by virtue of the 
"subjective way, but immediatel; Z and not$ as for Descartesq 
by a process of, inference. The Ego_sum marks the-point of 
contact between the psychological and the ontological; it 
alone provides access to Ontology proper. By virtue of it 
the self is in contact with the Transcendent'in an 
indissoluble bond; and by the eiperience, which it makes 
explicit, the universe, to employ Claudelts term, oleo-nalt 
a nous". 
- 0- 0- 0- 
"Subjectivdl or "Existential" experience, indeed, 




all-inclusive tran cendent realm of Being: 11 omnipresence 
de lle'trdl. The self is thus made "open to" other selves 
and other- realities, to the whole plurality of "essences" 
which inhabit the Transcendent. The initial Ego sum, the 
revelation of self'to self in existence is what renders 
possible the self's participation in a real universe: 
Le bonhe-ur ne serait-il pas une certaine facon 
d. 18tre present a moi-mane? Et plus je me 
suiý present, a moi-m6me, plus les autres 
existent eux aussi pour moi. (J. M. p. 280. ) 
Transcendence and Immanence are thus, 'closely inter- 
twined in Marcel's plý10sophy: the Transcendent 
, 
is immanent 
in the mind of the existing subject, 'and it is only by the 
"inward" thought of such a subject, by a "method of immanence! ' 
that it*is made manifest: 
omniprecence de lletre et , ce que 
J'appellerai.. 
ýeut-gtre imprtoprement 11immanence. de la pensee, 
a 116tre, cles a-diret et du me 'me coup, la 
transcendance de lletre"a' la pensee. (E. A. p. 49. ) 
That access to this Transcendent, is only by way of immanence 
cannot be too strongly stressed. The starting-point of 
ontological reflexion is the concrete experience of an 
existing subject, who becomes conscious of the source of 
being immanent within him (1), and the ontological reflexion 
is itself , or itself is one* with the dialectique d'appro-, 
fondissement vjhich unveils at ever deeper levels this being: 
Cf. Ileidegger: I'Lletre se comprend toujours en partaat 
e son existence., dlune pos'sibilite do lui-me'me dletre ou de 
nl6tre pas lui-meme. 11 (Qaoted by M. Boucher, K. W. F. Solger, 
Esth4tiquo et Philosophie do la Presence, Parisq Stock, 1954, 
Pe 24.5. ) the notion of Erlebnis -in Dilthey. 
- --- --- .-- 
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Je dirai qulil ya au centre de la rdalitd ou 
de la destinee humaine un inepuisable concret 
dans la connaissance duquel on ne progresse 
pas par 6tapes et en faisant la chaline, comme 
clest le cas pour une discipline particuliere, 
quelle quIelle soito., A cet inepuisable, chacun 
de nous ne peut acceder qulavec le plus intact, 
avee le plus vierge de lui-meMe. Les diffi- 
culte**s d'ailleurs sont-immenses. Llexperience 
nous montre en offet que ces parties. vierges 
qui peuvent seules prendre contact avee lletre 
sont d'abord recouvertes par une foule dlýLpports 
et de scories; ce nlest que par un long et 
pinible travail de deblayageJ ou ý)lus exactement 
de purification, par une ascese penible quo nous 
parvenons & les, degager; et clest d'ailleurs 
concurremment a ce travail que se forge 
11instrument dialectique qui fait corps avee 
lzý pensee philosophique elle-meme et dont 
pourtant ýelle-ci doit toujours garder le contrOle. 
(R. I. pp. 91-2. ) 
The discovery of the nature and scope of the experience 
which'finds expression in the Ego sum solves an important 
difficulty which has beset Marcel throughout thq whole course 
of his previous reflexions. Marcel himself has underlined 
itj speaking of the "difficulty he has always experienced in 
discerning the relation between Being and Existing.,, (B. A. 
P. 50. ) Hitherto he seemed to be thinking along two '' 
parallel lines, in terms of a theory of Being and a theory 
of Existenceg of Transcendence and Immanence. Furtherg his 
existentialist vievrpoint led him more often than not to 
depreciate the order of Being and Transcendence. He himself. 
speaks of his repugnance"to employ'the categories of Being: 
"Pai toujours eu, je mlen rends compte, une repugnance 
intime a penser selon la-categorie de lletre. 11 (E. A. P. 38. ) 
But this repuGnance cang he declares, be no longer'Justified 
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at the moment he is about to set out on his ontological 
meditation: 
La pensee se trahit elle-memeg elle me"Connalt 
ses propres exigences, en pretendant substituer 
11ordre de la valeur IL 11ordrede 118tre; et 
elle se condam33e du meme coup a, demeurer, " 
ltambiguit6 la plus suspe-cte en fac6 du donneg 
et la ou' il slagit de saisirg de definir ce 
donne meme-. (]ý. A. PP. 38-9. ) 
The difficulty is solved by the discovery of the nature and 
scope of the Ego s= or existential' experience, which ina ks 
the point of intersection between Being and Existenceg 
Transcendence and Immanencet their'union and-synthesis in 
the concrete actuallýy of immediate experience. It appears 
to me evident, " says Marcell"that existence is a certain 
form of being. " (E. A. P. 39-Y 
Perhaps, he'suggestS9 it is not the only forms perhaps 
I 
something can "bell and yet not'lexist" (and this margin 
between Being and*Existence is what constitutes the negation 
of any Absolute Idealism and preserves the irreducible 
character of the'Transeendent). Butq at any rate, the 
inverse propositi6n, that what "existOl may not "bell is 
inconceivable. The former domain of pure possibility, of 
"non-existent' Being, can however be rightly neglected as of 
no consequence to a metaphysics which posits as its sole task 
the elucidation of the actual and the concrete, and aims at 
grasping the Transcendent. as it is actualised in the drayna 
of human existence and reve aled in the contingent and the 
temporal. 
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From now on Marcel treats the terms Existence and Being 
as practically synonymous. The employment of one in 
preference to the other has little but philological signifi- 
cance; the category of Being is used when attention is 
focussed on the ontological import of experience, that of 
Existence when analysis is being made of the concrete 
situationwherein Being is revealed. 
Thi: 4 affirmation of concrete experience, in which-the 
Transcendent is revealed as immanent in thought, as the sole 
starting-point of Ontology, is at the very core of the 
Existential philosopýy. It'is of the utmost significance 
for the further development of ontological reflexion. For 
if Being is revealed only in and through Existence, if , as 
Heidegger says, I'llacte meme de la-revelation. ontique 
slaccomplit dans*l*e. n. es e au itat ce sth" ique de 11homme plac" 
coeur de l1existant et dans les comportements impulsifs et 
volitifs, fonde"es en cet e"tatq "'a lle"gard de l1existant (1)9 1 
then it is obvious that Being is grasped only'in Time and 
Drama. Time will be the only road to Being; and the 
problem of Time becomes central in metaphysics. ' 
- 
The closing of whatever gap remained between Being, and 
Existence is marked by a certain change of vocabulary. On 
(1) Vo'm Viesen des Grundesq P. 769 quoted by M. de Corte,. 
OP. cit., P. 60. 
- --- -. -. ----. -- 
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first adopting the standpoint of Realismp Marcel was wont to 
use the term intuition! ' perhaps to stress his new Realistic 
outlook, to denote the type of contact with Being procured in 
immediate experience. But strictly speaking, as Heidegger 
has remarkedg the ontie'truth" or Ego sum is hardly an 
intuition. The term intuition is still impregnated with 
objectivity. With the bringing together of Transcendence 
and Immanenceg Being-and Existenceg and with the recognition 
of a"Isubjective wayI1 to Ontology, the term "participatioV' 
comes*to be used constantly by Marcel. It serves to mark* 
the subjectivity of metaphysical experience, as also the 
dialectical character of this experience, inasmuch as Being 
is made manifest only in andthrough t'he'exploration and 
deepening of existential experience. 
One may viell ask however if there is not a contradiction 
between the ontological approach by way of a subjective 
dialect and the Realism of sensation and feeling. Is the 
substitution of 11participatioV1 for "intuition! ' not equivalent 
to an overturning of the whole'Realistic premiss? Does it 
not even mark a return to the Idealistic viewpoiýt? 
The'answer to these troublesome questions is, in the 
negative. The Realistic position remains at bottom intact. 
Marcel affirms that self , selves and things, as they exist in 
themselves, are given to the mind in all experience; sense- 
experience does not differ in kind from faith or even from 
sOlf-awareness. All consciousness is an i=ediate relation 
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of mind to-something presented to and transcendent to the 
mind. In this Marcel is a Realist like Bergson. But Why, 
then-, does he not accept the Bergsonian "intuitiod'? It is 
because it is in his view inadequate to describe the true 
nature of immediacy. Bergson's intuition is, as we have 
already said, a type of-vision-involving a fusion of subject 
and object. Bergson himself describes it as a "connaissance 
qui est contact et meme coincidence'(1),,, A simple or single 
act, it admits of no degrees; it is an immediate coincidence. ' 
Here lieg as Marcel sees it,. and if we interpret his 
thought correctly, thý limitations and dangers of modern 
Realism. We risk seeinG the mind, vaniph in the stream,; of 
nature and intuition or perception become a fact rather. ýthan 
I 
what it. is - an event or process. Are we then to renounce 
. 
Realism and adopt the viewpoint of subjective Idealism?.,, Are. 
we to say that there is no immediate experienc6 other than- 
the merely subjective, no presence of the real as it is in 
itself other than that of the self to itself? 
According to Maine do Biranq it will be recalledq 
perception and intuition (he uses the latter term in the 
pro-Bergsonian and classic senseq in conformity with 
ýits 
derivation) are a relation between the, mind and its object or 
its objective content; as suchq they do not reach beyond 
what is represented-and phenomenal. The mind's intuitive 
Imowledge of itself is equally objectivb in so far as it 




involves its becoming an object for its own inspection. 
all such case. s there is stipulated a dualism or separation 
of subject and object. At the same time, in every experience 
of self-awareness in effort, says Biran, the subject in its 
inner reality is also limmediatelY Present to itself. This 
immediate grasping of. real substance in inward experience 
(and there is no oth , er) is. what he cailalreflexion. It is 
the pure presence of the subject to itself independently of 
its objective content. It is not knowledge, intuition or 
perception: rather is it"IbeliefI (1), 
Both the Bergsoh an Realism and the subjective Idealism 
aspire to a pure experience of-fusion with substanceS, in 
their inner reality. The only difference is that thellatter, 
ran conceive such a fusion as possible only within the merest 
subjective experience. 
Now,, if it is this type of identification that is taken 
as the criterion, no doubt the Idealist position is the 
sounder. So it seemed to Marc61 himself in his earlierg his 
Idealistic phase0' Now, however, he envisages another type 
of immediate relation, a new doctrine of immediacy which gives 
a more. satisfactory account'of existential experience*and not 
only is compatible with, but'requires the Realistic postulate. 
ý1 On the distinction betweein Bergsonian intuition and Maine 
e)Biran's reflexion, cf. H. Gouhier, op. cit-t PP. 153-8*t 
A. Forest, LlExistence selon BeiýEaon in Bergson et le 
,, 
ol. Bergsonisme XVII, Uahier I of the Archives de phi; osophie, 
Pari 9 BeaucELesnes, 1947, pp. 'ý92-7; Jean Nabert, L'Experience int4rieure de la libertd, Paris*. e3ses Universit'aires, 192-, 479- 
ýi 7 and Chp. III §.. I. 
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What we have called his Subjective Realism posits a form of 
relation which, although maintaining all the qualities of a 
relationg yet'involves an immediate contact. - It supposes 
that, within the immediacy of sensation and feeling, of 
"prosentification! ', degrees are possible. It thus allows 
for a dialectic. It supposes too that the duality of 
subject, and object can be transcended in a now, relation of 
diversity within unityg so safeguarding the claims both of 
mind and of the existent reality. In shortg it introduces, 
into the Realistic postulate what we'might term spatiality. 
There is in experience ;, which is always experience of some- 
thing, a volume; and that volume is neither of the subject's 
nor of the object's making, but is as it were the medium in' 
which both bathe and by virtue of which each, and , the reýation , 
of each to the other, come to light, 9 and both are constituted 
mutually as significant existents. The dialectic of the 
"approches concreted' is simply the progress of this mutual 
awareness and coming-into being. 
Moreover, this new definition allows Marcel to define 
immediate experience as knowledgeg as being itself reflexion. 
Certainly not conceptual knowledge. But neither is it 
contemplative and intuitive in the Bergsonian sense, nor 
relationary and intuitive in Biran's sense; it is rather 
11supra-relational'19 by that meaning not extra-relational but 
relational in a fully subjective and qualitative sense. 
With his usual perspicacity, M. Wahl has lighted on this 
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original feature of Marcel's doctrineq without however 
developing it further. "Le romantisme d'un Novalisq'I he 
writes, I'le romantisme en*general concoit'le sentiment comme 
fusion, identification. Il est apparu avec Schelerg avec 
Lawrence, en France avec G6briel Marcell une conception 
differente ou les etres restent separes dans l1amourt oU ils 
sont presents, mais presents en face llun de llautre, plutOt 
que presents llun dans llautre. Ces ecrivains ont marque 
dans llamour llelement d'alterite" ot do transcendance (1). 
ý- 
In conclusion, the approach to Ontology is in and through 
certain i=ediate and intense personal experiences. At such 
f 
moments, of "existence,, decisiong despairg sufferingg etc. 9 
the self is, made aware of its essential being výhich transcends 
its finite nature and with which it is*in a relation of 
immanence or immediate participation. The mind encounters 
a I'donnee opaque", 'Ice qui resiste'19 a more-than-selfg orl to 
repeat the phrase of Claudelq "quelque chose en Inoi qui soit 
plus moi-meme qub moi'(2). 11 In such moments of existing the 
essential self is made manifest 9 and with it the whole realm 
ýlý Sur l'Absolu, Idealismus, Bd. 
- 
1.9 1934. 
2 (; f.. Jäs-pers: "Wenn ich zu mir als eigentlichem Selbst in 
as nur und nie ganz zu erhellende*Dunkel meines ursprÜng- liehen Wollens zurÜckkehre, so kann mir offenbar werden: wo j, ch ranz ich selbst bin, bin ich niCht mehr nur ich selbst7. ir 
-ohie du oso Vo -119 p. Lgg. Of C. ýUahl , La ProB c ioixt «t'ntence et la transcondance dansla phIloso-phie dii 
Jar,. Uersl, itevue da Met. j 19349 p. -419. 
240. 
of the Transcendent and of Being, the realm of other selves 
and things on to which the self opens out. 'These revelations 
-of Being ground the Ero sum, and with it 9 all'other 
existential judgments. 
This participation in the Transcendent is only possible 
to a type of "subjective, ' Or Ile: kistential" thinking. By 
virtue of it the mind penetrates below the subjiact-objeet 
distinction to the stratum of. Being which Jaspers calls the 
Urs-2runot transcending mind but'immanent, 13ý the depths of 
mind, and which is revealed only to the, "pathetid, thinker., 
A method of 11 inwardnýssll, 
'Or 
to employ the old Germanic term, 
Innerlichkeit. 
The Ego sum is not then to be construed as a relic of 
subjectivism. It is the product of an experienýe which 
penetrates below'the distinction between subject and object 
to a Being neither objectivity",, " nor. mere subjectivity, but 
transcendentto consciousnessq with which it must not be 
identified. 
Now, if the Ego sum alone provides a starting-point for 
Ontology, if Existence is the portal to Being, Oiýtology as a 
"science, is no longer concerned primarily or wholly with the 
explanation of Being, its nature and statusq but with the 
nature of the existential situations wherein Being is' made 
manifest. The way is clear for the elucidation of, the human 
drama in its'actual spatio-temporal features in so far as it 
may be taken as revealing the Transeendentl that is for a 
philosophy of Existence proper. 
CHAPTER VI 
EXISTENCE, 
I. 11-roblem and IVstery. 
After the psychological approach to the problem of Being* 
(theory of sensation and feeling), after the ontological 
approach, Marcel ris6s to the final and truly existential 
approach - to the elucidation of the fundamental situations 
org as he names them, the "concrete approaches" wherein the 
transcendent self and selves are revealed to self. In thi6 
section his thought lies very close to that of Kierkegaard 
and Jaspers, as we find in studying his analysis of such 
fundamental situations as despair, d, eath, etc. 
He comes to his problem, ýý in characteristic fashion, by 
way of a radical disýinction between the "problem! ' and the 
"mystery" (1): 
.. un probleme est quelque chose que je rencontrp, ; ýe je trouve tout entier devant moil mais que Je 
puis par la-mCme cerner et rEfduire - au lieu qulun 
my. tte%re est quelque chose en quoi je sufs moi-meme 
en6age, et qui West par Consdquent pensable que 
comme une sphere oil laý, distinction de llen moi et 
du devW-nt moi perd sa signification et sa valeur 
r- initiale. (B. A. p. 169, 
... le mystere est quelque chose Oýu je me trouve engage, dont 
essence est par consequent de nýgtre pas tout entier deyant 
moil! ' (Ibid., p. 145), wherein the subject remains "inte*riQur 
, I-1) Or. Position ot Ap2roches concrle'tes du Mystere ontologigue. 
reproduced in its esoantials in Etre ot Avoir, % 
---- 
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a une certaine affirmation quo - le suis plut8t que je ne la 
une affirmation dont je. suis le siege plutOt que 
le sujet. 11 (Ibid. p. 250. ) 
Un mystere, clest un probleme qui empilte sur 
ses propres donndes, qui les envahit et se 
depasse par la-meme comme probleme. (Ibid.. ). 
A problem admits of Polution by virtue of some technique or 
method: "Tout probleme authentique est justiciable d1une 
technique; et toute, technique consiste a resoudre, des 
problemes d1un type determine**. " (Ibid, 
'g p. 149. ) The 
mystery, on the other hand, is, incapable of such solution 
and cannot, under pWnalty of its being, degraded into a 
problem, be the object of a resolving, technique; it 
-appertains to the zone of the llmeta-problematicý111, and 
"meta-technical". Science treats problems, metaphysics 
deals with mysteries, in ý 
short, certain concrete situations 
wherein the subject, far from being an inquirer, is 
inextricably involved and cannotýaccomplish the necessaryý 
recul whereby he might - envisage the given, as an ýobject and 
treat it as ýa problem to beý'ý, 'solved. All so-called "problemd' 
of Being are in reality mysteries of this sort, 'such'as the 
mysteries of love, evill suffering and death. 
In this definition of the "problem! '. as what is subject 
to verification, and its opposition to the "mystery" as what 
is beyond verification, Marcelý, 'is directing, his attack 
against the doctrine of verificdion of Leon BrunschvicS. 
He has elaborated his criticism in a communication to the 
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Union j2our la Ve"rit6 made shortly af ter the publication of 
the Journal Metaphysique and reproduced in substance in Du 
Refus a l'Invocation. Brunschvicg's doctrine of verification 
is an offshoot of Kantism. He conceives reason as a power 
applied to sense-experience to order and comprehend iti 
Reason does not, however, operate by way of ýL priori 
principles; those principles it employs are, to use 
Poincare's term which Brunschvieg affects, "commodities"; 
it forges and develops its: ýprinciples in the process of-its 
verification of experience. ý The march of reason and 
science is essentiaAy a "progress of consciousness". On 
the other hand, reason is'not an activity of the individual 
consciousness but of a universal consciousness - or 
"conscience intellectuelld'. ý"'Llunivers de llide'alisme 
ce nwest pas celui qui se dissout dans la subjectivite"de 
la conscience individuelle, clest celui dont la-re'alitel lj 
slimpose a la conscience intellectuelle, foyer du jugement 
' 
ý 
de verite (l). 11 -In a wordq the'advance of knowledge is a 
process of verification wherein the intellectual conscious- 
nessýverifies the tontent of its experience in terms of 
universal principles immanent within that experience, 
incorporating within the body of expanding truth what is so 
verifiable and rejecting the unverifiable. 
What Marcel wishes to. point out is that this doctrine 
of verification is bound up vrith an Idealism, namely the 
'4 
(1) IOEXpe"rience humaine et la causalite phybi2ue, Paris, !, IS Alean, 19229 P. 611. 
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view that thought, universal and generalq is as it were 
placed against the real and that therefore this real becomes 
the object of knowledge only in so far as it is reducible to 
thought by virtue of verifying principles immanent in the 
structure of the latterg even if they are called out by 
experience. 
We may accept the fact that one type of knowledge - 
namely obje6tive knowledge - is so obtainable q but at the 
cost of losing the concrete essence of the reality known 
and of the knowing Subject. But what Idealism affirms is 
that there is, no knýwledge possible other than what may be 
verifiedl what lends itself to treatment and solution as a 
"Problem! '. It is here that Marcel proclaims another 
positive,, form of knowledge Which exists beyond verification 
and which is essentially"real" (usinr, the term in the way 
Macmurray uses it of "being r; al in our feelings! '). It is 
the type of knowledge*procured in the immediate experience 
of a subject no longer set over against the real but itself 
immersed in a process including and therefore transcending 
subject and object. The artistiog religious and moral 
consciousness bears witness to a type, of experience highly 
individual and eminently concrete. In such experiences the 
plane of verification is transcended, for the knowing subject 
cannot detach himself from the global reality with which he 
is "given! ' in order to verify his experience in, terms of 
,, 
general and universal principles of judgment: - 
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Certaines des plus hautes experiences humaines 
impliquent soit llappr6hensiong soit tout au 
moins la position de quelque chose qui va au 
dela, de toute verrification possible: pour 
fixer les id4esq j1evoquerai simplement l'amour 
ou lladorationg , 
dont 11objet est par definition 
impossible a detailler, et ne se laisse pas 
atteindre par ces demarches de proche en 
proche en lesquelles se distribue au contraire 
tout processus de verification. (R. I. p. 11. ) 
,, qui 
suffit a montrer qutil est des Mais voila*, 
domaines ou un ordre, cleat-&-dire une intelli- 
.4 gibilite, se laisse reconnaltre ý la faveur de 
. conditions en quelque sorte inspecifiables 
parce quIelles sont inhdrentes aa sujet lui-mame 
en tant qulil est une exp4rience vivante, qui 
par essence ne peut se rirflechir, elle-meme 
inteGralement. (Ibid., p. 12. ) 
It is such experience and the'type of knowledge it procures 
that Marcel seeks to designate by the term I'mystery"s and 
the doctrine of the "mystery" in Marcel is insýeparable frouL 
a wholehearted Realism. 
It is worth while underlining that the opposition 
between "probleal and "mystery" (as Marcel himself has 
assured the writer) is, built, up against Brunschvieg and his 
doctrine of verification. Already this reaction was preseAt 
, in the Idealistic phaset but at that time Marcel was 
envisaging a realm beyond thought and existence, beyond 
knowledge itself. only thus could he transcend, in his 
view, the realm of verification. What he offered was still 
rather a negative theory of knowledte, a corollary of his 
negative theology. Now he indicates a positive mode of' 
knowledge, which transcends verification but is no less 





with the writer, until about 1930 that he felt able to 
define the content of the "mystery" in other than negative 
termsq as a "transeendance*actuelle". He would, he further 
declared, relate this mode of knowledge to the phenomenon of 
memory and forEetfulnessq where the forgotten name is some- 
thing more-than non-existentg something more than a mere 
possibility, being present and 11 knowV1 and indeed already 
operative in the actuality of the present reflexion; and 
yet not known in the ordinary sense of the term. "On ne 
sait pas ce quIon cherche. Si on le savait on ne le 
chercherait pas. 11 In a senseq one knows the name without 
knowing it. I'Vous l1avez sans l1avoir. 11 It is in similar 
manner that the future is known in the'anticipation of present 
experience. The content of the "mystery" Marcelý would 
define as"la presence voilee! 19 thus stressing its positive, 
although meta-problematical character. 
Such mysteries cannot be solved but only "elucidated, 19 
and this elucidation is the true domain of metaphysical 
reflexion, -which Marcel defines, as a "reflexion levelled at 
-a myster. -rl. (B. A. p. 146. ) It is not meant by that that 
4 
the phiiosopher's task is to, draw a line between the knowable 
and the unknowable; a mystery is not synonymous with any 
Spencerian residuum or unknown. Face to face with a mystery 
the philosopher is in presence of a positive, realm of knowledge. 




from certain existential situations which'present 




themselves to his reflexion in the form of mysteries; 'and 
it is these mysteriesq which are already themselves ýoth 
knowledge and experiencep reflexion. and existence, that 
provide the"concrete'approached' to Ontology. Metaphysics 
is thus what-blareel calls a "reflexion on a reflexionlIg a 
"reflexion to the second degreVI. (E. A. p. 171. ) The 
reflexion of the metaphysician is directed towards the 
I 
what Marcel, speaking* of Jaspersq calls an "orographie de la 
elucidation of these ", concrete approaches"; it constitutes 
vie interieurel. By it and by, the exploration of Such 
"concrete approaches" it aims at recapturing the primitive 
participation in Being given in immediate experience or, 
0 
betterg at rendering explicit the dialectical. content of 
such experience (1). The method is one of description aimed 
(1) A certain similarity between this conception of meta- 
physics and that of the final Bradley is striking, as Marcel 
himself., recognises. "'Je tiens a observer en passant que 
cette reflexion du second degre ou a, la deuxi4me puissance, 
cette r4flexion slexercant sur une reflexion initiale, est a 
mes yeux la philosophie elle-meme dans son effort spdcifique 
pour restaurer le concret par-, dela les d4terminations dis- 
jointes ou d(ýsarticulees de la pensee abstraite; et sur ce 
Pointq malsre les differences pe je ne songe pas a nier, ilai conscience de demeurer tres procheq non point de llh4Gdlianisme lui-me'met mais de certaines doctrines qui llontý 
Prolonge en l1assouplissant - en particulier de celle d6 Bradley. '$ (R. I. P. 34. ) In conuersation with the writer lie 
has more than once stressed the influence of Bradley on his thought. * He mentioned that about 1912, or so he proposed to 
. 
Write a memoir on Bradley's Apýearance and Reality (noting the influence of Lotze). He has in his possession a short un- 
published text dated 1912, all that survives of this project, devoted to a reflexion on the notions of appearance and 
reality. Reference to this text will ýe made later in 
connection with another matter. 
j-6 As regards the present question, it must again be 
stressed that what Matcel shares with, Bradley is a certain 
4. 
\' T'! -'- 
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at vision of Being; at exposing the Absolute b. 6hind the 
accidental and. conýingent of experience, at discovering 
what Heidegger calls the Being of Being or what Solger terms 
the "vision of what is revealed (1)". 
'This recuperation of the primitive participation in 
Being*-is possible to the metaphysician in and through a 
preliminary operation ýhich Marcel calls "recueillement". 
Le recueillementg dont la possibilite effective' 
peut gtre'regardýfe comme 11indice ontologique 
le plus rev4lateur dont nous disposions, 
constitue le milieu reel au sein duquel. cette 
recuperation est susceptible de slaccomplir. 
(B. A. P. 171. ) 
By virtue of this mental prepabtion or ascesis, whose purpose 
is to free the mind temporarily from all external impressions 
and restore its capacity for grasping and reading the 
essential, the reflexion of the metaphysician is 
; 
confronted 
with certain spiritual situations wherein the transcendent 
self and the realm of Being it opens on to are revealed; 
the real self is revealed transcending the "empirical self": 
beyond 'my life" I discover what "I aMP: 
Au sein'du recueillement je prends position... 
en face de ma vie, jo mlen retire en quelque 
maniereg mais non point co=e le sujet pur de 
la connaissance; dans Cette retraite J'emporte 
avee moi ce que je suis et ce que peut-6tre ma 
vie nlest pas. Ici apparalt llintervall e entre 
mon etre et ma vie. Je ne suis pas ma vie... 
Le recuoillement est sans doute ce qulil ya do ýl 
(Note (1) contd. 'from previous page. ) 
conception of metaphysical thinking as 
and explicita: tion of immediacy. wher 
in their view of the Absolute, for the 
other the individual concrete. (1) M. Boucher, K. W. F. SolEer, p. 245. 
aime d at the recovery 
e they differ finally is 
one the wholeg for the 
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moins spectaculaire dans 1I&Ime; il ne consiste 
pas A regarder,, quelque choseq ýl est une, 
reprise, une refection int6rieure. (P. A. pp. 273-4. ) 
The ontological mqthod is by way of elucidation of such 
situationsq which reveal a Being transcending consciousness 
and capable of being accepted or denied': 
Slil en est, ainsig les approches concretes du 
mystere ontologique devront 6tre cherchees non 
point dans le registre de la pensee logique 
dont 11objectivation soule've une question 
prealable, mais, plutOt dans lidlucidation de 
certaines donnees proprement'spirituelles, 
telles que la, fid4lite, llesp6rance, l1amour, 
oýL 11honme nous apparalt aux, prises avec la, 
tentation du reniement. (E. A. p. 173. )- 
The method employed by Marcel is strictly phenomeno- 
logical. What he calls "recueillement'! corresponds to the 
Cartesian doubt, but more, clearly to the Epoche ofIHusser1q 
I 
-the suspension of the thesis" that bracketing! ' or dis- 
connecting, ' of the world and of the psychological IITI*with 
a view to obtaining -a vision of the pure sphere of-trans- 
cendantal subjectivity, with its essences which are the 
content of pure consciousness. But whereas, 'like Descartes'sl 
I 
Husserl's philosophy moves in the sphere of the'elear. and 
transpareAtq Marcel's moves in the realm of the 116paque? l and 
the "mystery". In-both, howeverg the fundamental experience 
is recaptured by a similar preliminary ascesis aiming at the 
r 
transcending of the practical, self so as to lay bare a realm 
of transcendence immanent in deep experience (1). 
(1) On Husserl's phenomenologicalIepochell or "bracketing' of 
the natural and objective'thesisl cf. Ideas, p. - 107 sqq. 
It will be noticed, that we have spoken, of "correspondence",. The parallel at this point serves to underline the general 
- As -. -----: --- 
--' 
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(Note (1) contd. from previous page. ) 
phenomenological approach of Marcel; namely the view that 
the starting-point of metaphysics rQquires a certain 
"bracketine: 1 of the Objective world: by which is meant not 
a denial of its reality or its transcendence, but a refusal 
of its merely objective appearance so as to allow its 
essentiality to become immediately known in immanent 
experience. Husserl's phenomenological reduction affirms 
too that ". it is not that the real sensory world is 'recast' 
or denied, but that an absurd interpretation of the same.... 
is set aside". (Ibid., p. 169. ) And it aims also at 
revealing the essential nature of reality to the pure Ego of 
subjective experience. 
Nevertheless, , Husserl's theoryq in spite of its claimsq 
develops on Idealistic and epistemological and not, as does 
Marcells, on Realistic and existential lines. For Husserl, 
in bracketing the real world,, withdraws himself from existence. 
"I use the tphenomenplogicall epoche, which completely bars me 
from usinp- anv ludment that concerns spatio-temporal existeFc-e 
tHe o"B'j&ctiire spatio-temporal world in order to reveal -its 
subjective and existentialg spatio-temporal essence. (Cf. 
Chps. VII and VIII. ) And if Husserl does so, it is because 
he seeks to show that the world, or Being, is in itself 
"nothing at all" and exists only "for" consciousness, that all 
its meanings (i. e. what it is essentially) comefrom the field 
of pure consciousness with its "essences", spacelessl time- 
less and, like the pure Ego itself, transcendent to existent 
reality. His reduction has for purpose-to demonstrate that. 
"the whole being of the world consists in a certain 'meaning' 
which presupposes absolute consciousness as the field from 
which the meaning is derived; and ... that this field, this 
existential realm of absolute ori5insg is oDen to rese=c 
on an intuitioia basis and, contains, an infinite wealth 
- - ' e of 'the highest scientific worth. " insight- rooTe d lmowled 
In shortq he will show that the world is (Ibid., p. 169 
and comes o0 ist as it is "for a consciousnesdl or is 
constituted by consciousness-in its intentional acts. "The 
whole spatio-temporal world, *to which man and the human Ego 
claim E5 belong as subordTHate singular realities, is according 
mere intentional Being, a Being, th-er-elore. to its own mean ng 
which has the merely seconcLaryg relative sense of a Being for 
a consciousness. " (Ibid., p. 153-) 
liarcells doctrineq on the other hand, aims at probing 
40L 
beneath the objective appearance of the world of selfq selves 
and things, so as to participate in them, in their essential 
and existential nature, a nature which is wholly existential 
or spatio-temporal (although not in the objective mode of 
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It is important to note that what Marcel mean by 
"recueillement-11 is, if'we interpret his thought correctly, 
an ascesis; it is not a dialectic. It differs thus from 
tLiat traascending of the objective content of consciousness 
so as to permit intuition of-the pure subject which he 
described in his earlier Idealistic phase. The latter was 
itself the dialectic and had for aim to transcend all 
I dialectic. But here, and from now on, the immediate 
experience is the only beginning and end; it is, and nothing 
else is, the dialectieg and there is notlýing beyond it. The 
"recueillement" simply prepa: Fes the way for this dialectic to 
I 
become explicit, for it to be "read". 
For the same reasong the "second reflexiod' he speaks 
about is not to be construed as another dialectic superimposed; 
it is simply the rendering explicit of the dialectic involved 
in immediate experience together with its content. Immediacy 
is the sole metaphysical "fact'll the starting-point and the 
end. 
(Note (1) contd. from page 249. ) 
Being Which, when found, is found to be itself izistinct with 
meaning and does not derive this meaning solely from the self immanent in consciousness - an intersubjectivity composed not, 
as is Husserl's, of an "absolute consciousness" set against "real" Being, which it constitutes as an existent by the infusion of its own meanings$ but composed of a mutual 
participation and mutually informative activity of self and 
selves or of self and things endowed with all. the, qualities 
of real, that is subjective, existence. 
For a further development in relation to Jean-Paul Sartre, 
who follows out the consequences of Husserl's theory and so develops on lihes wholly opposed to Marcells, cf. Chp. XII. 
---- -1. -,... - ---r i 
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Marcel, moreoverg is able to limit himself to this f act" 
because he considers immediacy to constitute itself a reflexiong 
to be not a mere or simple datum. but a movementq a participa- 
tion with spatial and temporal volumeq and one where the 
process of unveiling moves within the content of what-'is 
revealed - in every 6ense'ý, a I'mystery" Metaphysics is this 
expliciting or descriptive'ýIlreflexion upon a reflexiod, and 
its transcendent co,. ntentg prepared by a preliminary ascesis. 
- O'_. O, -, 0- 0- 1"I. I, I. 
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U. BeinQ and HavinG. 
A preliminary question here rises naturally to the mind* 
Why should it in fact be necessary to study the problem of 
Being thus through certain concrete approaches, by the 
elucidation of specific situations? Because Existence and 
Being are not a necessary accompaniment. of consciousness and 
ordinary human activity. Ordinary living. -takes place on a 
plane other than that of Being; the vision of true Being, 
the realisation of Selfhood are the result of a certaiii state 
of grace, occurring only at certain privileged moments when 
the plane of ordinari living is transcended. That there is 
such a thing as a "probled' of Being is due to a radical 
difference in nature between I'living! ' and "existing! ': 
-sera done qu I une Le "probleme de 116tre, ne 
traduction en un langage inad6quat dl-Cui mystere 1: . qui ne peut 6tre donn qat a un etre capable de 
recueillement, 'a un etre dont la caracteristique 
centrale consiste peut-6tre a ne pas coincider 
purement et simplement avec sa 'vie. (E. A. p. 171. ) 
In Marcel's terminology this fundamental distinction becomes. 
one between two orders: that of llhavingýl and that of "being". 
He deals with it in a short lecture entitled Esq uisse d1une 
phenomenologiede l1avoir included in Etre et Avoir. This A 
study, which he claims has nothing in common with Gunther 
Stern's Ueber das Haben, is not psychological in character, 
but phenomenological, in that "elle porte vraiment. sur des 
contenus de pensee qulil slagit proprement de faire 4merger, ýf!.! 
de faire affleurer 'a !a lumiere de la reflexion., 1 (Ibid., C. 
P. 229. 
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How far is it possibleg he asksg to identify a senti- 
ment first experienced? Only in so ýar as I treat it as 
comething I "havd, and thereby intellectualiSe it, define 
its content. * I am then, treating it as an object independent 
of my own being, On theý, other hand, the feeling, when 
preserved in its pure affectivity, is so i=ediate to the 
self that I, cannot say I"have" itj but rather that I "anYl it: 
Mais n1existe-il pas; par opposition a ces'senti- 
ments que'j'aig une sorte de trame affective qui est 
a tel point 
- 
consubstantielle a ce quo jeLsuis quý Je 
ne peux pas me 11opposer r6ellement (et par conse- 
quent la penser)T", (Ibid., p. 
; 
224. ) 
It is therefore . possible to'distinguish between two radically 
different orders, "havine: 1 and llbeinV. All "having!, 
involves separation of the subject and the object: ' "un 
, certain quidrapportel 
"a un certain qui traite'comme centre' 
d1inherence ou dlapprehension. "'ý(Ibid. q p. 230. ) From the 
point of view of-the "having"; subjectl his separation of 
himself from his affect reacts 7 on his self;. not only does 
he transform the former into an object, but he transforms his 
own self into a similar object9 depriving it of its individual 
reality; it becomes a mere "another" or "he": 
... nous ne pouvons-nous exprimer en termes d1avoir 
que dans un ordre comportant des references a 
autrui en tant qulautrui... Car le J'ai ne peut se 
poser lui-m6me que dans sa tension -avec un autre 
senti co=e autre. -(Ibid., -p. ý34. ) 
To proceed, all having implies possession; what I have 
is Xhat I deem to possess and consequently to have power over, 




that is of real importance from the existential standpoint. 
"Havino' is centred in the desires and f ears of the individual; 
the peculiar relationship of possession obtaining between the 
self and its object results in a perpetual tension or 
"angoisse", provoked by the desire to continue in it*s 
possession and by the fear of losing it: 
iI 
D'autre part en tant que, ce quid est une chosel 10 
soumise par consequent aux vicissitudes ]Rropres 
aux choses, il peut 8tre perdu, il peut etre 
detruit. Il devient doneg ou risque de devenir, - 
le centre d1une norte de tourbillon de craintes, 
dIanxiet6, et par la se traduit precis6ment la 
tension qui-est essentielle a1lordre de, l1avoir. 
(Ibid., p. 235-) 
The order of "having! ' is the domain of human*Suffering and 
despair. 
It follows too that abstract knowledge appertains, to 
the order of $'having': 'Ila I connaissance comme mode de'llavoir" 
(Ibid., I p. 210y, inasmuch as such knowledge converts realities' 
A' 
I (t, 
into concepts. Its extreme form is fanaticism and ideologyq. 
which is "une sorte d1injustifiable alienation du sujet... en 
face de la chose quelle qulelle soit". (Ibid., p. 242. ) But 
all thought in its generalising activity has the, same effect 
of transforming the intimate relationship of a self partici- 
pating in reality in immediate experience into a purely 
I 
external relation between anýanonymous subject and a no less 
anonymous object: 
i. 
En realite, la pensee en general, clest le on; et 
le on clest 11homme de la techniqueg de mem-eque )l cle-s7E le sujet de ltepistemologie, 'lorsque celle-ci 
considere la connaissance co=e une technique, et 
clest, je croi6', le cas chez Kant. Au contraire 
- --' ----. ------- -- 
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le sujet de la reflexion me/taphysique sloppose 
essentiellement au on; essentiellement ce nlest 
pas n1importe qui, (T-e man in the street Toute 
epidt'-emologie qui- pretend se fonder sur 
ia 
pensee 
en general va verS la glorification de la technique 
et de 11homme'de la rue (ddMocratisation de la 
connaissance qui au fond la ruine). (Ibid., p. 182. ) 
The, order of llhavingýl is the. order of spac6; for the 
identification of sentiments appertaining to selý or other 
selves involves -their delimitation as "distinct objects, and 
consequently their situation in successive points of space: 
Avoir et spatialite. Llavoir se r4fere sa prendreq 
mais il semble qulil nty ait de prise que de ce qui 
est dans llespaces ou de"'ce qui est assimJ16 a du 
spatial. (Tbýd. 209. ) 
Moreover, "havinE: 1 implies also temporalityq the situating of 
selves and, feelings in points of time. We shall be dealing 
more fully with this problem, later, as it requires special 
treatment; suffice to recognise for the moment týat Space 
and Time are what Marcel calls "modes de liabsence"; inasmuch 
as the individual treats his self or other'selves as' things 
he "has" and destroys them as "presencedl. wherein he 
participates immediately and wh 
I 
ich are, to to speak, one with 
his own being and existence, heý'delivers them over to the 
despairing, su. ccession of time, mid space, alienating them to 
a great. er or less degree from hiiself. 
i-; - e3)4 
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III. The Concrete Approaches., 
Now the order of "havind', can, on certain privileged 
occasion-sq be transcended and*access gained to the domain 
of Being. . 
There are in every human life certain situations 
which procure to the'individuall'ýý, if only for a brief momentj 
participation in the transcendent'reality of his own self or 
other selvesq and which release him from those exigencies of 
normal living which oblige6him to,, treat reality as something 
he "had' and thus alienate it. It is the task of meta- 
physics, to elucidate such situations by a method other than 
I the objective method Auitable for the treatment of a "problem2l 9 
by the "subjectivel, method already desc: pibed, a method of 
explgration or Iapprofondissement": 
Au fond, la methode est, toujours la meme: clest 
llapprofondissement dlune certaine situbtion 
metaphysique fondanentale dont il ne suffit ýas 
de dire quIelle est mienne, car elle consiste 
essentiellement bL 6tre moi. (B. A. p. 24. ) 
Of theseýsituationsq which represent for the philosopher 
the concrete approaches to Being, the basic one is that of 
"incarnation! ', the primitive relat, ionship of the individual 
with his own-body. The body is, in a senseq 1111bLvoir-type"; 
it is that which I sebm to "have"; for 'all actical purposes pr 
of life I am obli'ed to treat it'as a "thing!, or as an 
instrument, something over which I have complete control, and 
of which I cdn dispose at will. In fact, it is 11ilavoir 
, absolull as it is 
in and through it I have control over all 
other thin[Ss. The result of so tre6. tina my body as a thing 
is not 'only the liquidation of its existential realityl but fill 
i 
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the complete absorption of the self by the body and its 
desires: 
Il semble bien 6tre de llessence de mon corps ou 
de mes instruments en tant%que je les traite 
comme poss4d(ýs, cle tendre'd me supprimer, moi 
qui les possede. (ýbid., p. 240. ) , 
The self (moi) loses both-its individuality and its spon- 
taneity and becomes a soi, which is none other than a 
I'sclerose", a sort of "hardening! ' resulting, f'rom enslavement, 
to desire: 
Celui qui reste au plan, de l1avoir (ou du desir) 
se centre soit sur lui-meme so'it sur l1autre en 
tant qulautýq... il faudrait prendre en quelque' 
sortea bras le corps la notion du soi, du soi- 
meme, et reconnaitre que toujours, contrairement 
a ce qutont cru beaucoup dlidealistes et en 
particulier les philosophes de la consc 
,, 
ience, le 
soi est un epaississement, est une sqlerose, et 
'5-eut-etre, qui sait? une sorte d1expression 
app ar e=eit spiritual is e**e, d1expression a la 
seconde Puissance, non du', corps au sens objectif, 
mais de mon corps en tant que mien, en tant que 
mon corps pSt que1que chose que j'ai. (Ibid., p. 243. ) 
This dual relationship with my body may however, in 
certain circumstances, give place to a relationship of 
immediacy in which the fact of "incarnatiod, is realised - 
I am my body. ' No doubt such an experience can b6only 
momentary, by reason of the fact that, practical considerations 
require my treating the, body as an instrument, if only to 
control other thinGs; but inasmuch. as I -am my body, I free 
myself from the slavery of desire: "peut-6tre un Stre est-il 
en realite dautant moins osclave de son corps qulil a moins 
la pretention de disposer de lui. 11 (Ibid., p. 121, n. 1. ) 
(In the same note Marcel suggests that in such-an attitude 
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might be found the explanationcE miraculous cures and other 
supranormal influences of mind ovýr body. ) 
The consideration of the situation of "my body" leads 
automatically to the elucidation of further, situationse 
The body is in a special position, as in and through it we 
have access to other things and selves. And according as 
the individual uses this"mediateur absoli2l., to acquire 
control over them or. to participate in them, he rests within 
or transcends the realm of"having! 'l he either obtains or 
la denies himself access to Transcendent Being* 
corpore e comme zone frontiere entre lletre et l1avoir. t' 'it 
(Ibid., p. 119. ) Thus while the pursuit of practical 
I 
knowledge requires the demission of sensatibn, which provides 
immediate participation in realities, in favour of a subject- 
object relationship whereby the "subject' acquires control 
over an object' decanted of its, -realityiý there are privileged 
occasions where'tho full immediacy of sensation and feeling is 
preserved: all moments of pure affectivity where the 
individual enters into and is one with the perceived object. 
(Cases of involuntary memory come under this headý, as do the 
intense, aesthetic experiences described by Theodor Lipps in 
terms of lleinfAhlunol and Vernon Lee in. terms of "empathy'. ) 
Such, moments of- participation are achieved on a pre-, 
rational plane: they are a reature of the primitive or pre- 






(l) Cf. Los Fonctions mentales dans les societes primitives 
Parisi Alcan, 1910, and La Mentalitd 2rimitive, Paris, Alcan, 1922. 
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But there are higher levels of spiritual activity wherein 
the plane of "havin1j, is transcended and immediacy restored. 
Thus in any type of creative activityg the material worked 
upon, the instrument employedg cease at a certain moment to 
be objects and mere instruments and become one with the 
creator in the common task of creation: 
" il ya creation pure, llavoir en tant Partout OU 
que tel est transcende ou encore volatilisd au 
sein., de cette creation meme; la ddalite du 
possedant et du possede slabolit dans une realite 
vivante. (Ibid., p. 1241. ). 
This is so, in particularg-of the artist and his instrument, 
or of the scientist in his laboratory; in all such cases, 
the current of creative activity trqn forms the-objects and 
instruments into felt presences, the material ceases to be 
instrumental and becomes one with the artist in t4e creative 
act. 'This Pointj in Marcells opinion, will even serve to 
distinguish the true' thinker. from the "ide"olosuell. The 
lattertreats his ideas as objectsq as*mere things; they 




-thinker, on the other hand, is one with his ideas, which he 
ceaselessly moulds, tran forms and revises; his ihought is 
an active, creative process imbued with finality: 
Le penseur au contraire est perpetuellement en 
garde contre cette alien5tiong cette p6trifica- 
tion possible de sa penseo; demeure dans un 
etat perpetuel de creativite, toute sa pensee kI 
est toujours et d. tout moment remiso en question. 
14 (Ibide 9 p. 242. ) 
This distinction, formulated in terms which remind us of 
®R Valeryis Leonard de Vinci and Monsieur Testeg involves a 
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further distinction between activity and passivity; for it 
is inasmuch as the individual is passive towards his material 
that he treats it as mere object or instrument; while, on 
the contraryl any active attitude he adopts thereto promotes 
him from the plane of "having! ' to that of "being! '. "Having, " 
rill fI A 
writes Marcels' is "perhaps a certain manner of being what one' 
is not.,, (Ibid., po 214. ) The true thinker is he who ceases 
to "have, '-ideas and 11is" his*ideas. Not that Marcel would 
relapse here into any mere Idealism or Subjectivism; he is 
simply stressing-a certain &ttitude on ýhe thinker's. part 
which is conducive toýa sense of existenceg and a 6ertain 
state of mind which cannot be continuous, as so much of, our 
thinking must of necessity bear on "limited contents's and 
move in the sphere of 11having! ', but, which, when Spanted*in 
the comparatively rare*moments of creative thought, constitutes 
a precious revelatidA and rI ealisation of the true self. 
- 0. - 0- 
Turning now-to the consideration of situatioýs revelatory 
of the transýendent self and selvesq the truly existential 
situations, in that they bearý, witness to what he calls the 
poid8 ontologique de llexiste3ice humainelteE. A. p. 149)t 
Marcel folloWs out the implicati, ons of evil, disease, death, 
hope and despair in terms which iecall Jaspers and Heidegger. 
Here again the individual is" in normal lifel a prey to 
- 
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the claims of"having'. As regards evill the, temptation is 
to regard it as a problem to be solved; to consider it not 
as part and parcel-of my self but as outside my self and 
subject to treatment or remedy: "Seulement le mal purement 
constate ou meme contemple*cesse dl8tre le mal souffert, tout 
simplement je crois qutil cesse dletre le mal. 11 (Ibid. 9 P-251-) 
Similarly with disease*and suffering. But if-the individual 
grasps them in their inner-mystery and accepts them as his, 
just as his body is his, he is put in immediate communication 
with his essential self: he realises his true being in 
Existence, beyond the/plane of living:, 
En realite 
'je 
ne le saisis comme mal clue dans 
la mesure ou il mlatteintl clest-a-dire oZL jty 
suis impliqui au sens ou on est implique dans 
une affaire; clest cette implication qui est 
ici fondamentale; je n1en puis faire abstraction 
qua par une operation l6gitime'd certains egardsq 
mais fictive - at dont Je no dois pas 6tre dupe. - (Ibid., p. 251-) 
And, at the same time as the individual recaptures the 
essence of his self, evil, diseaseq and suffering cease to 
be for their part abstractions and regain their positive 
character as e3iistential realities. Marcel praipes Schelling 
for having thus recognised the positive nature of evil: "Le 
t 
. mal est 
ici traite" non point du tout a la facon-leibnizienne , 
comma un moins-etre, mais comma une realite positive (1). " 
In all such experiences we have access to the Trans-, 
cendent. Even more so in the mystery of death. In the 
(1 Note on Schelling's La Liberte humaine, transl. . by G. 
Politzer (Paris, Rieder971-D76), Nouv. Rev. franc., 1926, 
Pe 509. F 
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individual's capacity to grasp (etreindre) his own deathl to 
feel it as'his with all the weight of hope and despair 
attached to it, lies the secret of his selfhood. It is the 
merit of Kierkegaard and Jaspers, affirms Marcel, to have 
stressed the ontological implications of deathq, as it is the 
defect of Neo-Thomism to overlook them. (B. A. p. 149. ) By 
so espousing his own death the individual realises his 
essential self and as it were closes the gap between it and 
his life. In martyrdom especially we have exemplified such 
espousal of death and realisation of selfhood; by his free 
choice of death the martyr affirms his being transcendent 
,. to his , Jife,, t his eternal essence trandeendent to his 
contingentl empirical self; thus tBstifying to, the "identite" 
cachele de la voie qui mene 'a la saintete et du chemin qui 
conduit le me"taphysicien a l'affirmation de lletre". (Ibid., 
p. 123. ) Suicideq on the contrary, is a manifestation not 
of being and existence but of "having! '. The individual who 
takes his own life is claiming'to treat not only his body but 
his being as an object; he is decanting both his body and 
his self of their reality; he is acting not in the first but 
in the third person as a 11hell. or an "anyone", as an individual 
indifferent and unspecified., 
The fact of death is the condition of both despair and 
hope; ' 
La mort co=e tremplin d'une., esperance absolue. 
Un monde 0**U la mort f erait def aut serait un monde 
ou llesperance nlexisterait qula lletat larve.. 
(Ibid., p. 135. ) 
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The analysis of despair is most fruitful ontologically. 
Despair is rooted in the individual ts preoccupation with 
self 9 his slavery to desire and the'spirit of possessiveness, 
all of which, are manifestations of having. 'Inasmuch as t6 
individual treats his self and others as possessions he is 
obligedq for the better handling of themq to situate them in 
successive points of time. Hence the root, of human- 
pessimism is-metaphyqicalg and, as Kierkegaard and Heidegger 
have'indicatedg is to'be found in man's servitude to time 
and succossivity. Despair is"llangoisse meme de la 
temporalite, l1angoisWe de se sentir livre"au temps". (E. A. 
106. ) It 6haracterises all human life, . is the mark set 
upon man at his creatioiý; it is the universal characteristic 
by reason of the fact that temporality is the condition of 
, living in its practical aspect': 11.. '. l1inquietud, e eomme 
disgrace fondamentales, comme donnee ... xiniverselle. 11 (Ibid. 9 
P. 107. ) This despair iii its universal aspect is-not 
directed towards any definite object, but is merely the vague 
and unreasoning anxiety of the temporal being; rather than 
despair Marcel prefers with Thomas Hardy the term"lunhopell 
(which he translates by "inerpoirl)'; only when it-is directed 
towards any given object-or thing, does it become despair in 
the normal sense. 
Should this despairl.,,, be. treated as an object cap, able of 
"treatment', the individual consents to a perpetual anonymity, 
, ý, and the positive fruitfulness of his despair is frittered away 
" . -. - S--- 
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in the frantic pursuit of the pleasure and distraction which 
Pascal has so keenly analysed in his Pense"es under the name 
of "divertissement". But for the self which accepts its 
despair and lives it, so-as to-extract therefrom the ma imiim 
weight of pathos, there is assured a participation in the 
source of its spiritual being beyond the activities of the 
purely finite ego. For despbJx which is made the object of 
deep personal experience and suffering affords the revelation 
of the eternal and transcendent within us (1). In fact the 
inquietude which beets us in existence. -and which*is the Ma k 
of sin and guilt upon us (the Verfallenheit of Jaspers), when 
properly understood, is seen to be thezign of the transcendent LE 
in man, the finitude it implies pointing to an etbrnal essence 
. within us 
(2). 
Yet in Marcel's thought despair has not in itself the 
bLetual positive character it has in Jasper's or Heidegger's. 
It remains a symptom of our "indigence ontOloSique". Rather 
is itg when deeply dxperienced, the gateway to a deeper 
revelation of the Transcendent given in hope. To the "0 
individual who espouses-his despair there is opeiied up a new 1. -
vista of hope; despair is the condition of hope, for hope 
(1) Cf. Jaspers: "Mein Leid istnicht mehr zufgllig das 
Verhd"ngnis meiner Verlassenheit sondern Daseinserscheinung 
der Existenz. 11 (Philosoýhie IIt p. 232, quoted by H. L. 
klieville, Le Probl6me de la transcendonde et de la mort dans 1ý la phi 100OTM10 czltistentl el le de KarI Jaspers, Revue de Th6ologie, 1940, p. 1117 ) 
(2) Al. lljlauriýe Boucher defines despair in this sense as 
I'llintentionnalite do l1ame tout entiere". (Jaspers et 
llExistenz-2hilosophiell-P. 366. ) 
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consists in "giving credit to realityq affirming that there 
is in it sufficient to triumph over this peril", (E. A. p. 108, ) 
Just as despair belongs to the realm of 11havine: 1 and is 
centred in the objectifying activities of self, * and is thus 
the outcome arid the accompaniment of a negation of reality, 
so hope appertains to the order of "being" and of the I'meta- 
problematical" and is essentially the affirmation of reality: 
"Elle porte toujours sur la, restauration d1un certain obdre 
vivant dans son inte"grit4l' (Ibid. )q as for example the hope 
of a bodily cure. For this'reasong. as contrasted with 
pessimism which is, 
4S-we have. 'seen, . rooted in the temporality 
characteristic of ordinary livingg hope is the supreme 
ontological affirmation of a transcendent order of Eternity. 
t 
In this sense, "all hope is hope of salvatiodl.,, (Ibid. 9 p. 109. ) 
Hope is not*of the mture of reason, for reason, limited 
to its conceptual processes, is denied access to the real as 
such, a fortiori to the invisible order of the spirit. 
Io Reasong through its categoriest constructs mental objects. 
vdiich provide the data of "problems, ' and are subject to 
verification!,. Reasong on which the modern woýld sets a 
premium, is an instrument or IIaxWI aimed at power over thingst 
and rational activities constitute a "technique". Hope, oh 
the contrary, is situated'on the plane of the 'mystery" and 
the "unverifiable", for only on that plane can'it find, 
fulfilment: 
11 est par consequent de son essence memeg la ou dans le domaine du Visible elle a et** tromp, e de, 
4 
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de se refugier sur un plan' o"*u* elle ne peut pas 
etre deiue. (Ibid. ) 
Nor is it an arm or instrument of power, but rather synonymous 
with faith and love, a mode of participation. It is one with 
faith, love and feeling as an immediate mode of knowledge, 
transcending reason and the rational categories of space and 
time. Maxceý. calls it a "prophetic power" elle ne porte 
pas sur ce qui devrait etre (the Sollen of'Rickert), ou meme 
sur ce qui devra e'tre; simplement elle dit: cela sera. " 
(Ibid. 9 p. 115. ) It is a pure elan d1amour, a refusal to 
11supputer les possibilites .. (Ibid. ) As such, it is 
ultimately to be related to, the*wi-119 and might, in Marcell. s 
opinion, be defined as"une volonte" dont le point d1application 
serait place a llinfinill., (Ibid. 9 p. 116. ) In such passages 
we hear the acceiýts of Pascalq Kierkegaard and Ravaisson, as 
well as those of Marcel's contemporariesq Pe"guy and Claudel. 
0- 0 




self and of other selves in involved. First, love or charity; 
1 
love implies immediate participation in the reality of the 
loved oneg who thus becomes a "presence" or "thoW, A 
"presence,, is 'Ice dont je ne dispose a aucun-degre't"ce que je J 
n1ai pas"s (B. A. p. 211. ) In so f ar as I treat a person as 
a 'he,,, as an object of possession, I establish a dual relation 
which-renders impossible any commu'aication of self with other 
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selves: 
L'amourg en tant que distinct du de'sirg quIoppose 
au Sesirg que subordination de soi ýa une realite" 
superieure - cette realite qui est au fond de moi 'plus moi-meme que moi-meme - en tant que rupture 
de la tension qui lie le meme a l1autreq est 'a 
mes yeux ce gulon pourrait appeler la donnee 
ontologique essentielle. (Ibid., p. 244. ) 
Opposed to love is desire; whereas love supposes the absolute 
gift of self or, as Marcel terms its a state of Ildisponibi- 
lite", desire is the outcome of the spirit of possession. 9 
which seeks at one and the same time to possess a person and 
to withhold the self. Desire is a state of llindisponibilitell, 
I 
and the spiritual life itself may be defined as I'llensemble 
des activites par lesquelles nous tendons a reduire en nous 
(Ibid. 9 p. 
*101. ) ` Desire is la part de l1indisponibiliteM4 
therefore the product of "self-consciousness", whereby the 
individual is rooted in the preoccupation with self, that 
anonymous self , that "hell or 11 soil' which all men carry with 
them. Under its influences we substitute for the person, 
present in love in all Iiis' concrete llothernessliq an idea of 
the others an abstraction as indifferent as the anonymous self: 
Ltautre en tant qulautre n1existe pour moi quten 1: 4 taut que je suis ouvert a lui (qulil est un toi), 
tt lui que pour autant quo mais je ne suis ouvert 
je cesse de formerýavec moi-meme une sorte de 
cercle a llinterieur duquel je logerais en quelque 
sorte llautre, ou plut03t son idee car par rapport % a ce cercle llautre devient llidee do l1autre - et it ! llidee de llautre ce nlest plus llautre en tant d 
qulautre, clest 11autre en tant que rapporte a -moi, 
que demonte, que desarticule ou-en cours de 
desarticulation. (Ibid., p. 155. ) 
It may also be noted that the revelation of othersq furnished 
. 
by lovo and charity, is, in Marcel's view as in Jasper's, 
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inseparable from, and indeed a condition of, knowledge of 
the individual self; a further proof that "nous ne so=es 
pas a nous-memes, '. (Ibid., p. 165. ) 
Like other realities immediately experienced, self and 
selves are "uncharacterisable". Such characterisation is 
-a product of the mind's conceptual activity, whereby it 
gains control over objectsq for 'Ila caracterisation implique 
une certaine position de moi-meme on face de l1autre, et, 
dirai-jej d1une sorte dIabsence radicale ou de coupure entre 
, 
les deuVI. (Ibid., p. 245. ) To seek to-define selves is to 
convert them into abstractions* 
With these considerationsl we are brought back to the' 
now familiar circle of ideas on love as'developed in the 
Journal MeftapýZsiquej' but with this difference that love is 
now presented both as a mode of knowledge and as a concrete 
situation or experience among other similar experiences, by 
reference to which the human drama is clarified and 
elucidated. 
-0- 0- 0- 0-I 
Weýcome now to the two i4odes of existence which occupy 
the central place in Mareells', meditations: faith and 
fidelity. Faith as a mystery may be defined as the "evidence 
of things unseen!,. (B. A. p. 27ý) It is in its highest and 
purest form participation in the Being of God, who is the 
P-70. 
"Absolute Presened' or "Absolute ThoWl. As a presence God 
admits of no predication, and Mar6el is convinced that any 
attempt-to define Him in terms of His attributes would 
convert the reality of faith into an abstraction or 11cela 
m e"t ap hy si qu d., 
Pavoue que, pour, moi du moins, les attributs 
de Dieu sont exactement, ce que certains 
postkantiens ont appel6-Grenzbe[Ziff. Si n 11Btro est d1autant plus incaractdrisable 
clest-a-dire d1autant plus imposserdable, 
lautant plus transcendant et do toutes les 
manieres qulil est plus Etre, les attributs ý 
c ulex-, primerg quo trcýduire dans un ne feron 5c 
isement tout inadequat le fait lanCage pr 
que PEtre absolu est integralement refractaire 
ýL des deterfainations qui no porteront jamais 
que sur un Moins-6treq sur un objet devant 
lequel nous nous plagono, en nous reduisant ',, nj 
sorte a sa mesureq et en le en quelque % r4dilisant a la notre. (E. A. pp. 247-8. ) 
It is important to note here that the negatiVe theology 
of Marcel's first, period has yielded tog or rather is now 
subordinated to a pobitive, conception of belief. The two 
now go hand in hand. He remains refractory to any I'doctrine 
of attributes"; the divine attributes can be e stablished 
. 
only by a negative dialectic: 
Il me semble que l'Infinite*, la. Toute-PLssance 
de Dieu no peuvent Otre 6tablies elles aussil 
que par la. voie reflexe: il nous est possible 
de comprendre que nous no pouvons nier ces I 
attributs sans retomber dans la. sphere du 
proble'm'atique. Cola reviendrait a dire que 
la theologie la laquelle la philosophie nous ! tL 
conduit est essentiellement ne"eative. (Ibid. 9 P-176. ) 
Simil, arly, the proof of the existence of God serves only to 
-confirm an initial 
intuition. (Ibid., pp. 175-6. ) Theology 
is -strictly subordinated to faith; and as faith appertains 
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to the order of the meta-pr6blematicals it is refractory to 
any specification, for only the object and never the presence 
can be specified, clarified and defined. So that the 
paradox of Chestov "I do not know myself what I believe, ' 
remains a true statement of the nature of faith.. Admitting 
of no analysis of its content,, it must remain itself 
unspecified, its content not a definition but a transcendent 
reality which invests, the self to the exclusion of all else. 
Il faut bien maintenir cette foi globale, 
massive, comme anterieure a toute elucidation 
possible: elle implique une adhesion a une 
rdalite dont le propre est de ne poii)t se 
d4tailler ou/se d4biter. Cette adhesion 
serait impossible, si Fette re'alite nletait 
le I pas presente, peut-etre faut-il dire: si elle 
ne mtinvestissait pas tout entiBr. (Ibid., PP-178-9. ) 
But if theology is negative in this limited and modern 
sense, and if faith itself does not admit of objective 
determination, it must be underlined that Marcel is now far 
from transforming God into an Indeterminate Unity. He is 
no lonGer attracted by the Neoplatonic negative theology of 
a Dionysius the Areopagite or an Erigena. His is now a 
positive doctrine of faith; the negative theology, is 
subordinated to a positive one. The Neoplatonic theology 
is wholly negative in character: it involves a dialectic 
of successive dropping of predicates and a gradual approach 
to a final identification with the Indeterminate Unity. 
Marcel posits, on the contrary, in faith and intuition a 
positive and immediatellprise de contact' with the Divine, 
and with a Divine Being"moreover who, as the "Absolute ThoV' , 
- 
__ __ ________ 
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is more than*an Indeterminate Unity, a Supreme Self or 
Person rather than a mere., totality of Being; a contact 
finally which involves participation and noti identification 
or loss of all self-identityv for Marcel's immediacy 
postulates a mode of communication which, unlike the 
Neoplatonic ecstasyqýpreserves a distinction between self 
and "presened' and thus guards intact the pluralism which 
distinguishes-his philosophy from any Absolute Idealism. 
Now faith, like hope and love, is totally bound up 
with the will, and consequently its full implications only 
become clear when reiated to fidelity: 
I 
Je prends aussi une conscience de plus en plus 
claire du r8le de la volontd dans la foi. Il 
stagit do se maintenir dans un certain etat 
le- 
qui , sur laý plan humain, correspond a la FA6e. En ce sens', clest essentiellement une fidelite, 
la plus haute qui soit. Ceci je 11, ai reconnu 
immýdiatementq des le 25 Fevrier, avee une 
nettete foudroyante. (Ibid., p. 27. ) 
It may be said that the indiýidualls' capacity for 
fidelity testifies beyond all else to the margin existing 
between his empirical self and his true being; the 
possibility of fidelity or of its contraryt betroyal, implies 
the reality of a transcendent self which is in some sort an 
llenjeWls which can be accepted or denied: "Il est pout-etre 
de mon-essence de pouvoir nle'tre pas ce que, je suis. " (Ibid. 
P. 154. ) (1). The capacity for fidelity postulates*ný less, 
(1) In this contextt we may recall ColeridGe's definition of 
sclf-corugciousness itself as "fealty" or "fidelity' and there- 
fore involving an act of faith. "It1s an act in and by 
which we ta-ke upon ourselves an allegiance, and consequently the obligation of fealty; and this fealty or fidelity, 
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as the condition of self-revelation and self-realisationg 
adherence to some transcendent reality or principle. The 
individual at those moments he exists exists only in so'far 
as he swears fidelity to some transcendent reality, be it 
his own selfq other selvesq a group, a nation, a church or 
God. Being in this sense may be defined as the 113Jeu de la 
fidehit4l and betrayal as the I'mal en soill., (Ibid; q PP. 55956. ) 
Fidelity Marcel describes'as the recognitioh of an 
"ontological permanence", of some reality which is no mere Jii' 
formal and eternal essence, but implicated in time and 
history. Like faith, fidelity is then "pure transcendencellýt 
it describes a state wherein the individaal is an active', 
participant in the reality which invests him, and, to the 
existence of which he "bears witness! ". It is thu, s that 
the Church may be defined as alltemoignage perpAue", comme 
fideliteg" (E. A. P. 3: 38); and that, in generalq what 
characterises man as compared with the animals is his 
capacity for "bearing witness". (Ibid. 9 p. 140. ) 
Marcel extends his conception"ýýof fidelity to cover every 
relation of the true self to Being; it serves to define 
orthodoxy which also is a 11temoignage perpetue", as opposed, 
to more conformism which is nothing but a "pretentiod' (1), 
Similarly, it serves to describe spirituality itself; ` for 
(Note (1) contd. from previous page. ) 
implying the power of being unfaithful, it is the first and fundamental sense of faith. " (Essay on Faith in Aids to 
Reflection, P. 343. ) 
Of. Orthodoxie et Conformismel La Vie Intellectuell6,1938, 
-- - 
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spirituality is the love of truth, which is the continued 
attestation of a truth that is no mere construction of mind 
-but 
I bears on reality. Fort": as Marcel streesed in his 
ontological reflections and as he again repeats: 
'"Il faut 
qulil y ait 'a la racine de 11intelligence une prise'sur le 
reel.,, (ibid., P. 65. ) It 'is indeed the loss of this 
fidelity to a transcendent truth, the failure to bear witness 
to a truth of Being that char, acterises-modern thought and 
-dooms it to inanition (1). 
It is, however, the consideration of the more vital 
forms'of fidelity th6Lt provides Marcel'with the most fruitful 
reflections. ' Fidelity t6,, the Group, the Churchl'the common 
civilisation - to the ensemble of spiritual realities and 
principles which transcendthe finite life of the individual. 
Given the fact that all such realities are historical and 
made manifest in tifae, the condition of any fidelity to them 
is meiaory; memory as a faculty of immediacy and participation 
constitutes an"indice ontoloýiqudl. (Ibid., p. 140. ) The 
importance of memory in this context is brought out by Marcel 
in his preface to the Correspondence of V. Ivanov and M. 'O. ' 
Gerschenson (2)., In this correspondence we see two 
contrasting viewpoints: the oneý,, 
ý, of the revolutionary and the 
other of the traditionalist. Gerschenson is a Rousseauist 
and nihilist condemning history and the tradition it creates 
W90f. Carence de la spiritualite"t' Nouv, Rev, franc. , March 9r 
(2) Correspondance dlun coin-a llautre, Paris, Correaq 1931, 
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as corruption, the whole of civilisation as "a plain vovered 
with ruins, 19 and advocating a return to the primitive statd. 
-Ivanov, on*the contrary, is alive to the persisting vitality 
of the "spiritual patrimony" andýlits transcendent value. 
He believes that any purification must come not through the 
overturning of tradition and religion but through a purifying 
of our vision and of the spiritual order. - "Redevenir 
primitif est une trahison, un oubli, une fuite, une reaction 
lache et qui marque la lassitude. of Ivanov Is point of view 
is that of the "realist' as opposed to the "nominalist-119 the 
former endowed witha sense of the reality of the spiritual 
in all its manifold and historical-iariety, the latter seeing 
in it nothing but a degradation of some pure state, by 
reference to which is is mere appearance. The ýispute., as 
Charles Du Bos puts it, is between two views'which he caUs 
'Ile salut du thesaurus" and 'Ila hantise de la tabula rasa! '. 
As Marcel well understandsq at the core of the-debate is the 
problem of memory. In 1vanov's view the rejection of 
tradition "of which the Church is the prime receptacle" is a 
manifestation of forgetfulness and based on a misapprehension 
of the essence og memory. For memory is, in its purity, a 
dynamic princip1q, the source of contact and communion with 
the spiritual drama as enacted on the stage of time; by it 
the individual is enabled to transcend the "instruments. of 
disunion! ', space and time, and restore the continuity of the 
Absolute. 
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We have reproduced the points stressed by Marcel in his 
preface, as they illustrate his own conception both of 
.. fidelity as "pure transcendened' and of memory as an "indice 
ontologique! '; It is by arguments identical with those of 
Ivanov that'he would justify metaphysically the reality of 
our spiritual patrimony and the ontological value of 
tradition and particularly of the Church (1). 
Like love and hopeg fidelity is linked with the willo 
but nothing would be more wrong, than to relapse into a form 
of Stoicism. Fidelity is transeendenceg participation in a 
1) Fidelity, in Marcel's philosophyl plays the same role as ý 
oes "historical appropriation! ' or the "energy of veneratiod' 
in Jasper.! s. This "historical appropriation! ', the latter 
declares, with Marcel, is the essential condition of culture's 
He contrasts it with "historism! 19 the former. -to employ 
Ribot's terminology, operating through affective memory, the I' 
latter through mere intellectual memory. "For remembrance 
as a mere knowledge of the past is nothing more than a 
collection of an infinite number of antiquarian details; 
remembrance as mere contemplation instinct with understanding 
realises the picturbs and the figures of the past only as a 
non-committal confrontation. It is not until remembrance 
takes the form of appropriation or assimilation that there 
comes into being the reality of the self-hood of a contem- 
porary human being in the form of veneration; subsequently 
as a standard for his own feeling and activity; and finally 
as participation in his own eternal being. The problem of 
the mode of remembrance is the problem of such culture as 
still remains possible. " (Man in the Modern Age, trazlsl. by 
Eden and Cedar Paul, Londonghoutl dge, 19. ý. ýq P. 1,57. ) For 
Jaspers, as for Marcelg-fidelityt or I'veneratiorg', working 
through memory, is a chief instrument of self-realisation. 
ToCether with what he calls the "concentration in occupational 'E 
worklý and 11 exclusive Irove, ,I I 'all instances of "historical immersiod', it is the "foundation of self-hood". It is the Ic 
agent of continuity whereby the vision of the -transcendent is i 
maintained and, as traditiong rendered operative in the, , I 
present. "It is loyal to whatever has been effective in its 
self-becoming as tradition... Remembrance preserves for it as 
an absolute-claim that which no longer has any real existence. " 
(Ibid., p. 217. ) , 
V4 
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reality other than the self; and any ýttempt to see in it a 
purely subjective exercise of will-power lands us at'once in 
a Volontarism, of the Nietzschean type. Fidelity in its 
essence implies an engagement'of self with respec-ý to others 
or to some reality or principle; it postulates some promise 
given$ some responsibility assumed. Can fidelity then bq 
reduced to a mere "tension du vouloiVI? Were that so, the 
realityl the. other'selfg or even God,, in favour of whom the 
individual makes this contract, would be nothing but a 
"pretext"; fidelity would become mere pride and obstinacy., 
, 
Z 
Even more grave, it W Uld be pure deceit'. for the contracting 
ýparty would recognise no other law thanýhimself, than his 
'Inj 
fluctuating moods and states of mind of which his will forms 
a part. (E. A. P. 75. ) We must therefore conclude that 
fidelity involves a contract', made with something which 
transcends the self; it is an "Absolute Datum! $, a unique 
experience of sometlýing having been confided and for which 
one has assumed responsibility: 
"Gette fidelite", soi3s peine de demeurer sterile, i. 
bien plus, de se roduire ýL une pure obstination, 
'doit avoir son point de depart dans ce que " jlapýellerai, une donnee absolue (je sens cela au 
11 
supreme degre par rapport aux etres qqe J'aime). i 
A 11origine il faut qu"il y ait llexp6rience ,, d1une remi, -, 6;; quelque chose nous a e,. 'te confie, e 
en so que nous ne sommes pas seulement 
r bl i i ' d esponsa es v s-a-v s , e nous-memes, mais vis-a'-vis d1un Principe actif et superieur. 
(E. A. p. 16. ) 
Fidelity thus implying participation in a transcendent 
must ultimately be grounded in faith, of which all other ;, 'd 
modes of fidelity are, in a sense, the image: 
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Ce que jlentrevois, etqst qula la limite il - ý j: existerait un engagemeAt absolu qui serait " ' ' e"'me, ou moi-m de contracte par la totalite 
tout au moins par une)c! ealite de moi-meme qui 
ne pourrait e5tre reniee sans un reniement total 
- et qu; sladnesserait d1autre part a la, tOtalite de lletre et se3? ait pris en presence 
de cette totalite meme. Clest la fbi. 
(E. A. P- 63-) 
Examining the nature of faith anew in this light we 
can grasp its specifically transcendent character. Faith 0 
a subjective sentiment; it defines less in God is more than 
the relation of the soul to God than that of God to the soul; 
in the act of faith it is God who grasps and holds the SOUI 
even more than the soul participates in God. Therefore it 
follows that faith is conjoined with grace, just as the 
' liberty of the individual is merged in the Divine Will'and 
can be defined only in terms of it. Faiýh-is an"acte de 
transeendance avee contre-partie ontologique qui est la prise, ,ý 
de Dieu sur moi. Et clest par rapport a cette prise que ma 
liberte meme slordonne et se ddiinit. 11 (E. A. p., 76. ) 
But in turn fidelity must be conceived in terms of faith; 
TT 
it too is pure transeendenceg, relation or rather communion 
with a transcendent reality which lays hold of and binds the 
self. Fidelity is therefore inconceivable apart from the 
gift of grace. To conceive it otherwise, to deny the 
investing force of the real would be to place at its heart 
the deceit which an outmoded subjectivism involves: 
La mysterieuse rel, ation entre la grAce ot la 
4 
d6 f oi existe partoutf oU il yafi lite; et la 64 toute rolation, de co, genre fait deiaut, il 
nly a place que Pour une ombre do la fidelite, 
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une contrainte peut-etre coupable et menmongere N a laquelle llame se soumet. (Ibid., P. 76. ) 
ýLly a pas Wengagement purement gratuit, 
clest-a-dire qui nlimplique une certaine priso 
dQ 118tre sur nous. Tout engagement est une 
reponse. Un engagement gratuit serait non 
seulement t&eraire, mais a porter, au compte 
do llorgueil. (Ibid., pp. 63-4. ) 
In conclusion, like othe7 subh experiencesg-fidelity 
is a mystery. If the self's, assumption of responsibility 
towards the real, involves at a certain moment a judgmentg 
the latter serves only to sanction the prior apprehension 
which is its source. (Iýid. q p. 66. ) 
0-0-0-0- 
Such are. the various concrete approaches" tp Being. 
The elucidation of their ontological implications forms 
I 
what Marcell speaking bf Jaspersq has called an "orographie 
inte'rieure! '. Their further clarification now'demands an 
analysis of the spatio-temporal structure of existence in 
.I- 




In. his, excellent article on Karl Jaspers (1) Gabriel 
Marcel underlines one of the fundamental theses of the 
Existential philosophy. The Transcendent immanent in man 
cannot, he declares, 'be grasped outside of Time; the 
disclosure of Eternal Being', is accomplished'only by virtue 
of a certain 11 
. 
transceýdingl of Timeq and not by any 
gratuitous vision of the Platonic and pseudo-mystic type 
II involving a release from allý', temporal c. onditions. Theý 
eternal transcendent Essence of t3io self is made manifest, 
as Jaspers puts it; I'de telle facon, que dans le temps, je 
sois au-dessus du temps sans etre'en dehors do lui (2). 11 
Analysis of the human situation indicates in fact, beyond 
all doubt, the "temporal structure of human existence". He 
quotes Jaspers's-formula: "Aus m8glicher Existenz ergreife 
Ich das'GeschiChtliche moines Dasoins", which he interprets-' 
as follows: "En tant que je M6 m eus sur le plan de 
l1existence possible, je rec9nnais le caractere profondement 
historique de ma situation. Ill(R. I. 'P. 293-) Marcel, 
criticises Spinoza, whose philosophy he seems to interpret 
Sl) Situation fondamentale'et Situations limites chez Kak 
as'Rers, Recherches Philosophiques-11,1932-3; later 
included in Du Refus a l'Invocation. 
(2) Quoted by Marcel , op.. cit. 9 p-, *- -20r, I ,. 
-' -- '-. -------.. 
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in the manner of Alexander and Gunn (1), for what he calla 
his "radical misunde: ýstandinEýl of this factl adding that in 
this matter the Bergsonian position appears unassailable. 
If, howeverg as we are already assured, temporality is 
what iost characterises the empirical self and the plane of 
ordinary living, we must assumeq as the necessary condition 
of both the revelation and realisation of Beingg the 
possibility of transcending Time while remaining within the 
framework of actual spatio-temporal experience. Marcel 
seeks indeed to demonstrate that such tran cending of Time 
as is accomplished in moments of Existence and participation 
can be accomplished only in and through'what is most real in 
Time. Like Baron Von Hagel, with whose position he appears 
to be in general agreementg Marcel would consider'mysticism 
and the mystical experience as normal to religious life; he 
seems impervious to the experience of ecstasy which so often 
ends up in a form of Pantheism (2). Ecstasy, in fact, pre- 
supposes a complete liberation from the spatio-temporal 
conditions of normal experience, not so much the transcending 
I Cf. Alexander, Spinoza and Time; Gunnq The Pr oblem of 
- 
limej London, Allen and Unwin, 1925,, Chp, JIT-. 
Von HAgel: "Even the most exclusively mystical-seeming 
soul ever depends, for the fullness and healthiness of even the 
most purely mystical-of its acts and states, as really upon its 
past and present contacts with the Contingent, Temporal and 
Spacialq and with social facts'and elements, as upon its 
movement of concentration, and the sense and experience, 
evoked on occasion of those contacts or of their memories, of 
the Infinite within and around those finitudes and itself. " 




of Time but the destruction of Time. Rousseau in the modern 
era is a case in point: his experienceý as described in the 
R6veriesdu promeneur solitaire are of such a nature and end 
up in such a type of Pantheism; the personal, transcendent 
God of the Profession de foi du vicaire savoyard becomes 
identified, as Nourrisson has saidg with the Immanent God of 
Nature; or 9 as Maritain has put it 9 the self * of Jean-Jacques 
ends by eXI)anding into the Deity itself'(1). The deprecia- 
tion of'spatio-temporal-conditions is a-main characteristic- 
of all Neoplatonic thought (of which Rousseau to a certain 
extent is, through Fenelonq a, representative). 
Ilowever that May beg Marcel will admit no "privileged 
stato, whereby reality may be grasped under peculiar non- 
temporal conditions. Referring'to the supra-nor, mal 
experience of Proust, wherein memory is as it were super 
imposed upon sensation and the mind thereby thrown out. of 
the rut of temporal experienceg lie declares: "Il nly a pas 
d14tat privile'gie qui nous permet te de transcender le temps: 
Verreur de Proust est de ne llavpir pas compris. Un etat 
comme celui qutil decrit n1a qi1e la, valeur d1un. 6. mor2agel. " 
(E. A. P. 16. )- 
'jl) This tendency to Pantheism, Von Higel points out, is 
argely due to-the Intellectualist theory of Universals, 
according to which the Universal'is alone real. Cf. op. 
cit., P. 318. 
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I. Objective and Real Time. 
In Etre et Avoir Marcel broaches the problem of Time 
in the following manner. Taking as an example-of anýr given 
event in time the act of reading some passagel he distinguishes 
between two modes of apprehension open to the conscious 
subject. The latter may be taken as apprehending successivel; Z ' 
a content which is given as a simultaneous whole (what-Marcel 
calls a. totum simul)q and with regard to which it remains 
passive. Such a mode of apprehension is nothing more than 
a dechiffrage of a multiplicity of discrete elements. As 
such it does not describe the actual process of reading; it 
describes a certain attitude towards the ilobject'19 but 
certainly not the attitude of a self actively engaged in the 
41 
event. In any true act of reading the subject is far from 0 
passiveg but is on the contrary the active collaborator from 
moment to moment it the creation of the whole: "en d'autres 
termes, le sujet est engage"en tant quIagent (et, il nlest 
receptivite"qula condition dletre du meme coup agent)-dans 
le contenu qulil e/tait cense-de"chiffrer purement et simplement. 
(B. A. p. 18. )' In the first Case, the reality aýprehended is 
given as a whole. *and at once to be deciphered in successiong 
in a series of acts which are 
completely indifferent both to 
the conscious subject and the reality aýprehended. In the 
second case, the latter is one with the subject in a series 
of acts of mutual creation from instant to instantq permitting 




self in their ultimate essence. The process may be 
. 
described as one of "improvisationil, or bett. er still of 
"Participatio3Y' : 
Plus-cette participation sera effective, plus 
je serai engagd activement dans 11improvisation 
(moins je me comporterai par rapport "a elle 
comme pure rdceptivit4), et plus, en un certain 
sens, il me sera difficile de la traiter comme 
totum simul. Mais cette difficulte, cette J* quas3. impossibilite sera liee beaucouV moins a 
la structure m8me de cet ensemble qu'd la 
facon dont ity suis activement et personnellement f engage. (Ibid. 9 pp. 19., 20. ) 
It is obvious that we have here the familiar distinction, 
common to Bergson ancl contemporary psychology as a whole, 
between succession and duration. But before discussing 
the conception of time involved, several preliminary points 
may be stressed. The two temporal orders described are 
functions of the two modes of apprehension appertaining ýo 
the realm of "Having' and "Beinlgl of "Objectivity" and 
"Existence". It is -inasmuch as -I treat the real as an 
object which I Ohave, ' and possess* decanted of its reality 
and reduced to the status of an abstractiong that it is 
simply "gived, to me as a totum simul, to be apprehended 
passively by me in succession. . And this objective attitude 
to the real is involved in the conceptual activities of 
thought; it being a condition of such knowledge that 
reality be constructed as an object in terms. of concepts and 
relations, and it ýeing a further condition of ideation'that 
there be analysis and synthesis of the intelligible 




is a condition of. discursive thoughý, can only be accomplished 
in temporal succession: clear and distinct knowledge requires 
the analysis of the whole into its elements and, by comparison 
of these elements, their regrouping in a deducýive synthesis 
permitting the mind to form "par des gradations successives! ', 
as Descartes says, a clear and distinct-idea of the whole. - 
Temporýl succession, 
"is therefore the condition of, conceptual 
I thought, and as the latter' is itself a prerequisite of 
practical living, temporal succession is the condition of 
practical life. The latter aims at power, power over things, 
power over selves; '/and for its means it requires the defining 
of things, their detailing in terms of their intelligible 
i 
features. For the real it substitutes "objects", abstract 
notions, summaries or "inventories! ' of definable-character- 
istics, 'which are none-other than the deductive syntheses 
which a mathematician constructs in temporal succession. 
And thus the world, as viewed by the intellect and by the 
empirical self, forms a "given wholelq indifferent to the 
self, Who exists as a mere spectator-deciphering it in 
succession, and grouping a multiplicity of flobj6cts" and 
formal features situated in successive points of time, and 
thus made clear to the thinking mind. A universe of selves 
and thinGs delivered over to temporal succession, a universe 
meaningless and absurd: ., plus nous 
traitons le monde comme 
un spectacle, plus il doit necessairement nous devenir me*ta- 
physiquement inintelligýble; cela parce que la relation meme 
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qui sI eitablit alors entre nous et lui est intrins"equement. 
absurde. 11 (Ibid., p. 22. ) An indifferent universe, 
dispersed in succession, given as a spectacle to a self 
delivered over to succession; a spectacle productive of 
ennuil monotony, offlunhopell and ultimately of despair: 
11 ... l1angoisse me4me de la temporalite", 
l1angoisse de se 
sentir livre au temps,, 11 (Ibid. ýi p. 106. )' 'In this alienation 
of realities and selvesl-in their dispersal'in time Marcel 
seps 'Ile fondement d1une theorie du mal,, qui en maintienne 
a la f ois la re-falite"' et la contiýgencell (Ibid. p. 22. 
For is evil not simpiyllabsencellý I alienation of self, of 
selves and of God, indifference'to them? - real as originating 
in the unalterable structure of human'life, contingent as 
capable of being transcended by virtue of a transcending of 
temporal succession itself. 
This transcending of time takes place in those moments 
of Existence'already studied, in all those participations of 
sensation and feeling., There the self is in immediate 
contact with the transcendent essential self and beyond it 
with the essences of other selves and things; r, ealities 
which, far from being given to-be deciphered in succession, 
are grasped i3ý ever deepening penetrations in their ultimate 
esi8ence, and in a sequence of interpenetrating instants, each 
one of which has an atomic value and yet is in a relation of 
interpenetratio, u *ithathose preceding and following. The 
subjoct9 no lonGer confronted with a purely "cinematographic! ' 
10 
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representation and de'roulement' of the real, apprehends the 
latter as a felt presence in a se-quence of concrete instantp 
by virtue of bot. a the real and the self are made 
manifest in their true being. and as it were "created": 
Et de ce point de vue, en reprenant la meltaphore 
selon moi inepuisable de 111ya. -provisation absolueq 
on arrive a cette idde que transcender le tempsq 
ce nlest pas du tout sIdlever, conme on peut le 
faire a chqque moment,, a llideý'e vide en somme 
dIu4 totum simul - vide parce quIelle me demeure 
exterieure, eE ar ce fait meMe se trouve en 
quelque falon dývitalisee - mais participer d1une fac, pn de pD us en plus effective a 11intention 
creatrice -ui anime 1 'ensemble: en d1autres' 
termes a des plans oýa la succession 
'I- 
A% 
apparait comme de noins en moins do ee, ou une 
t representation si je puis dire cineýa ographique 
. uateq et 
des evenements est de plus en plus inadeq 
cesse meme a la longue dle4tre possible. 
(Ibid. 9 pp. 21-2. ) 
LIarcel suggests that to one who thus participates in the b 
universe through sensation and feeling the problem of its 
origin disappears. Such a problem only arises for 
reflective thought, when the universe is "conceived" and 
therefore detailed in succession: 
Je ne peux ýas, meme en pensee, me mettre 
reellement a part de l'univers, ce ntest, que 
par une fiction inintolligible que je peux 
Fe situer en je no, sais quel point exterieur 
a., lui dloýu je reproduirais, ýL-une Ochelle., 
reduite, les phases successives de sa genese. 
Je ne peux d'ailleurs pas davantaGe (et ce 
parallelisme est rev6lateur) me placer en 
dehors de moi et mlinterroger sur ma propre %b 
conese... Le prqbleme de la genese du moi et 
celui de la genecede l'univers ne sont qulun 
soul et m6me probleme, ou plus exactement un 
pul et m6me insolubile, cette ýnsolubilit 
etant liee a ma position meme, a mon existence,, 
au fait metaphysique radical de cette existence. 
(Ibid. 9 pp. 23-4. ) 
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Incidentally, in a pa.,.,, saE; e such as this vie see how Marcel's 
anti-intellectualismg like that of Pascal, amounts to a 
purely Kantian recoGnition of the antinomies of pure reason 
Which are the inevitable result of a speculative approach to 
Oirt-ology. And again like Pascal, Marcel the problems oL 
falls back on feeling. 
One last point remains to be stressed. M, arcel insists 
upon the active attitude of the self in all such participations i 
of exi9tential experience. Far from being confronted with a 
mere 11 given! ' , the self is presented with a real whose reality 
it in-part creates: I'll nlest pas inconcevable quo cette 
participation contribue en quelque sorte a 11improvisation 
elle-meme, " (E. A. p. 19. ) The act of participation is itself 
-an "event"-(a term which Marcel himself uses) or, to employ 
Whitehead's terminologyq allprehension! '. It seems therefore 
a distortion of Marcel's theory of participatioa to conceive 
the latter as a mere perception of a reality indifferent to 
the participating self and its "prehensions". Certainly 
Marcel's philosophy is grounded-in a Realism and would reject 
any such Humean phenomenalism ! ýU,. c!! Cas still lingers to 
however small an extent in the Epistemology of Whitehead 
himself. But his Realism is less naive than that of Von 
Hagel, for example, for whom reality is I'siraply there". He 
accords considerable activity to the mind in so far as the 
mind is actively "directed towards! ' the unveiling of Essential 
Being. In this he goes no further than the Phenomenologists, 
--- 
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aiýd is certainly, not a partisan of what Whitehead had called 
the "theory-of bifurcation of naturdll or even of the theory 
of psychic additions (1). 
On the theory of bifurcation 'of nature of. Vraitehead, ýýon'cept 
of Nature, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1920t Chp. 11; ' on 
tile tTeory of psychic additions, in particular, Ibid., p. 29 
scjq. 
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11. Real Time and the "Instant'. 
In discussing Marcel's theory of time, we propose to 
, relat& 
it to contemporary 'theory in general and notably the 
doctrine of Iffinitehead: it is by so situating it that its , 
full implications are brought out. 
Marcel's doctrine involves first of all the now generally 
accepted distinction between time as conceived and time as 
perceived, the objective 11clock-timUl of the mathematician 
and the real "lived" time, or duree. The f ormer is a unif orm, 
homogeneous continuum (1)9 infinitely divisibleg whbt Bergson 
has defined as a "discrete multiplicity (2). 11 - -It is 
essentially abstractq in that it arises from, the*abstractinG- 
of events from their happening, from a detemporalisation by 
(1) A uniformity that does not preclude the possibility of 
several time-systems, as the Theory of Relativity assures us. 
ý2) Bergson's view of duration is linked Ivith a highly 
it ebateable assimilation of conceptual time with space. La 
siýccession distincte, telle quIelle apparalt a la conscience 
reflechie, nlest que la dissociation et la ýuxtqposition, 
dans llespace homogene, dlimages etendues que nous substituons 
& la pen6tration nutuelle de nos etats do conscience., ' (Note 
sur 'La Genese de itiaee de teas' par Guvau, Rev. Phil., 
1891. U. Essai sur le nndcs immOcliates, p. 96. ) This 
relegation of simultaneity to space, considered as pure 
construction and measurementt involves him, we shall see, in 
the manifest impossibility of accounting for personal-activity 
and final causation and in a no less hopeless metaphysical 
contradiction as to the status of time itself, 
It is interesting to note that Kierkegaard among the 
predecessors of Bergson, had underlined the spatialisation of 
time inherent in the visualising activity of thought (cf. 
The_Concept of Dread, Oxford Univ. Press, 19449 P. 77 - But, unlike Bergson, he Eoes not, for that reason, reduce 
4me 
to 
pure heterogeneity and pure succession, discovering in the 
"instant" of lived time an element of permanence and-eternity. 
1 
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which the physicist substitutes for the -temporal relationship 
of past and future the purely logical relationship of "before" 
and t1after" (1). Objective time is thus mere successivity; 
it appears-as a line on'which events may be situated as 
appertaining to an irrevocable past, present and future (2). 
And it is on this plane that the empirical self , as defined 
'by Marcel, functions in its process of objectifying reality. 
B: ý treating the real as an objectq the self is detailing it 
and deciphering it in succession; and, as Bergson has said, 
he is consequently dissociating it from his-experience and 
transforming what is a present (a "presence, 'in'Marcel Is 
vocabulary) into a pastj each element of the real event 
becoming irrevocably attached. to a point in the series. One 
I 
living present is degraded into a "tout donne" or what Pe"guy 
calls a "tout fait". It is again*, as Bergson shows, this 
reduction of reality toappearance, by the substitution of a 
logical for a properly temporal relation Which gives the' 
process that mark of inevitability which characterises the 
world of objectivity. (It is perhaps this very substitution 
of the logical for the temporal in Descartes' philosophy, 
however far from his intention ahd from his starting-point 
in intuition and in a doctrine of discontuity with its 
Kl) Cf. M. A. Cleugh, Time and its Importance in Modern Thought,,,; 
Londonj Methuen, 1937, P. U. .ýI 
2 "The definite apprehension of 'a time-seriesl having'a 1tinguishable 
beginning and end, connected by a train of 
intermediate events, each having its ovm position in the 
series determined by its relation to other events which come 
before and after it. " (Stout, Manual of PsycholoEZ, 2nd ed. , London, Clive, 1901, -p. 400. ) 
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Insistence upon instantaneous experience (1)9 which gives 
rise to Spinoza's initial identification of physical causality 
with logical connection (2) and*his consequent geometrical 
determinism with its implicit "misunderstanding, of time 
stressed alike by Yarcel and Alexander. )-- 
In contrast with objective 11 clock. --timell contemporary 
philosophy distinguishes the time of immediate experience or 
durationj_the temps vecu of Bergson. This exhibits itself, 
to'employ the expression familiar in psychology since William 
James, as a "specious present". The "specious present" is 
the unit of immediate temporal exp6rienceg and the seqt; ence 
of such units constitutes the flow of time as a whole. The 
flow of real time is no mere succession or juxtaposition of 
discrete instants, but an interpenetration of moments; not 
a homogeneous series, but a heterogeneous continuity, each 
instant emerging from the preceding and exhibiting character- 
istics both of permanence and of-. novelty. Moreover, as 
distinct from conceptual timeq real time is not uniform but 
relative to the consciousness of the percipient as well as 
to the purposive activities of the individual. "There is 
time, " says Unitehead, "because there are happenings, and 
apart* from happenings there is nothinc, (3); 11 a point of view 
which informs Marcells doctrine of time no less than that of 
(1) Cf. J Wahl, Du R81e de 11instant dans la philosophie de 
Descartes; Paris, Alcan, ZM-. - 
ý2) Uf. it. Adamsoiiq Develoýment of Modern Philoso 
Edinburgh and London, Blackwood, J. 9()5, Vol. J:, 
Descartes and Intellectualism. 
Concept of Naturej P., 66. 
I 
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the writer. Again, it is not linear in the mathematical 
sense, where time is seen as a line of points having a 
before-and-after relationsbip, but dynamic, the present being 
no longer a point situated in a uniform series, but itself a 
moving line or, to quote Giinn, '"a line whose content is 
always changing (1). 11 
Bergson's view of duration tends to stress the "flowl. 1 
character-of time: his is a philosophy of evolution,. and it 
is natural it should lead him to an unjustified hypostatisa- 
tion of time. Marcel stresses above all the "atomic! ' 
structure of real 'time. In this he is in full'accord with 
Whitehead's "epochal" theory which defines the "specious 
present' as an Ilepoche" or "arrest". (2). Marcel's duration 
is less*the Bergsonian, flow'Ithan the event-sequence of 
Whitehead. ' For both, in accordance with the new world-view 
of contemporary physics as expressed in the quantum theory, 
the'intial datum of temporal experience is a discontinuity. 
For that reason, the temporal problem, in Marcel as in 
Whitehead, stated by the one in terms of natural and 
speculative philosophy, and by the other in terms of 
existential philosophy, turns on the passage from discontinuity 
to continuity (3), or, more exactlyq on the i=anence of 
The Problem of Time, P. 383. ý12-ý 
Science and the-T-7o7ern Worldl pp. 157,158$ 159. The 
epochal theory is the corolTary 6f his definition of the 
actual entity as a "throb of emotion! '. 
.I (3) Cf. J. Wahl, La philosophie, speculative de Whitehead, 
Rev. Phil., 19.31, pp. ý. 57-8; cf. also Note sur 1 th-space et 
Remarque sur le Temps, Rev. , 




continuity and permanence vrithin discontinuity and the means 
whereby they pass from possibility to actuality by repeated 
transcendent acts of freedom and "decisiox2f. 
, marcel's actual conception of 
the nature and function. 
of the specious present or "instant" of--real time follows 
closely that of James and other modern philosophers, more 
especially Whitehead, and which may be sumrnarisedý, as follows. 
Endowed vith the 
. 
11 saddlebaeL, 41 character which , James has 
attributed to it, the present shows 'itself as a duration 
having a certain breadth and involving a reference to a past 
and future, to a "beford' and IIafteVI (temporal, not logical) 
sensed at the same time as present (1). Miss Cleugh states 
that "the specious present contains both immediate perception 
and immediate memory' wedded together (2). "Distinction 
bet-aeen past, present and future. " says Stout, "can only be 
apprehended in*a rudimentary way at the'perceptual level. 
But there is, even at this level, what we may call a 'not yett 
consciousness and a 'no more' consciousness 
The presentq indeed, is'not in any sense an, instant 
without extension. "There is no sharp distinction, " to quot-e 
17hitehead, "either bet-; ieen memory and the present immediacy or 
between the-present immediacy and anticipation... -The past and 
the future meet and mingle in the ill-defined present. The 
ýl Of. Gunn, op. cit., P. 338 sqq. 
2 Op. cit., P. 19. 
(3 Op. cit., pp. 405-6. 
-- . -. -'---- - "-- . -. . 
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passage of nature which is only another name for the creative' 
force of existence has no narrow ledge of definite instantan- 
eous present vvithinwhich to operate. Its operative presence 
... must be sought for throughout the whole, in the remotest 
past as well as in the narrowest breadth7of any present 
duration. Perhaps also in the unreali: jed future. Perhaps 
also in the future which might be as. well as the actual 
future which vrUl be (l). 11 The'pfesent instant of real time, 
the time of existence, ' is, thus the focal point wherein meet, 
through the elements of immediate memory and anticipation 
which the present contains, past, present and future; for 
"past and future are together in organised union in the 
present (2). 11 
The implications of this conception of the instant are 
all-important for metaphysics. The present must no longer 
be conceived, as it is by Bergson, as. pure succession, change 
and'heterogeneity,.. but as involving an element of permanence 
and simultaneity. "Une he`t8`rogdne`Jt. etrop absolue, si elle 
etait possible, " Guywa points out, "exclurait aussi llidee de 
temps, qui a parmi ses principaux; caracteres la continuiteg 
clest, a-dire 11unite' dans la varie"te' In-the present 
the . re is not only novelty: something endures projected from 
a past into a fuýure by means of a present. And if that is 
(ý) Concept of Nature, P. P. 69s 73. Cf. Alexander, Space, Time an p. 122. 
(). Wildon Carr, The Moment 
- of 






so, it will be seen to involve a double assertion as to the 
status and nature of time; first, that time bears within 
itself a referance to alltimelessil essence; secondly, that 
-he "means" by vehich such "timeless" essences time is itself t 
are realised. 
It is in the light of this conception of time and its 
function that Marcel's doctrine is seen in its proper 
perspectiVe. 
The first part of the assertion follows from the 
consideration of temporal experience in its relation to 
personal activity'. - Such activity can only be understood_in 
terms of ends and purposes forwhich time is the means of 
realisation, but which themselves transcend time. We nay 
maintain the Reality of Time, " writes, Gunn, "but doubt its 
ultimacy. It is not the last word about reality. However 
much we stress the Devenire, the Becoming, it mýst*be 
remembered that our life has value and significance only 
because, and so far as, it realises in fact values which 
transcend Time and Becomings and are true at any time and 
for all time (1). " No philosophy w1iich fails to posit a 
self transcending, time and related to time as both formal 
and final cause can account for the unity and continuity of 
the personality. And this has been explicitly recognised 
(1) Op. Cit., P. 363. Cf. J. L. Stocks: "The perception of 
temporal succession itself proves that the perceiver is in 
some respect other. than teraporally successive, which is to 
say that the perceiver has in some respect non-temporal or 




by Marcell particularly irf his rejection of tho Bergsonian 
bynostatisation of time. 
In an important article on the Aesthetic of Adriano 
Tilgher (1) 1 he refutes the "reali6me 
au temp: wl which is at 
the source of the dramatic theories of Tilgher, and of 
Pirandello. Both distinguish between 11 f orm2l and 11 lif d' 
as between artificb. 1 and real andq like"Bergsong see in* 
Becoming the fundamental reality. -In Marcel's view, such a 
temporal realism means the destruction of the'unity of the 
self and consequently the end of dramatic characterisation. 
Again, in an interesting passage from his communication to 
the Congress of Philosophy in 1937 (2) he states his viewpoint 
more clearly. It is p. ossiblel*he says, to regard my life as 
an "object', from the standpoint of a detached spectator; in 
such an attitudel my life will appear to me as a "lottery". 
Il mlest loisible aýchaquo moment de me'detacher 
assez de ma vie pour la regarder comme une 
succession de tirages au sort..., Je constate que 
tels et tels nume'ros me sont deja echus, ce qui 
me permet de dire quo ilai. eu telles chances, 
telles malchances. (R. I., p. 183. ) 
In short, living in objective succession, my past and my 
future are divorced from my present, and any notion of 
permaýence, even less any notion of transcendence, is beyond 
my ken. But in truly purposive and willed action., that is 
in existence, my temporal situation is quite other, for there, 
(1ý TraEiSLu6 ot Personnalite, Nouv. Rev. franS., July, 1924. 
2 Le iýranscendant comme RRNaprobl 6'mati clue, indluded in 1ý R7-us--ETT-Invoc3ýu-ion. 
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renouncing the spectacular attitudet I am engaged in living 
my life. The latter no longer appears as a sequence of. 
cards dealt to me by chance, some already dealt9 others to 
fall to my lot, and all passively received. On thecontrary, 
am engaged in the game and, as I playq--l substitute for the 
spectacular, passive attitude cfthe recipient the active 
attitude of one who makes -his move in terms of the', past playl 
on the one hand, and of the anticipated aim on the other. 
Si. je considere de plus pr"es les lots qui me 
sont echus successivements il est clair que Je 
ne puis les traiter comme do simples elements 
juxtaposables et formant une collection. Ces 
chances, - ces malchances reagissent les unes sur 
les autres, se colorent, slinterpenetrent. Jo 
ne puis meme pas assigner a ces lots d4jbý tire's 
des valeurs fixes; ces valeurs varieront, je, 
le sais, en fonction des lots qui me restent a 
recevoir. (Ibid., pp. 183-4. ) 
L 
I 
In a word, past and future are conjoined in the present in 
all existential action, the present being the focal point 
for the realisation of the self's aimz and ideals, located 
in the anticipated future and grounded in the past. 
Novi, this impinging of past and future on the present, 
Marcel goes on to suggest, is only comprehensible ifj trans- 
cending the temporal modes in which it is realised, there 
exists a supra-temporal self 9 acting as final arid f ormal cause 
and constituting the ground of this permanence exhibited in 
time. It is conditional. on the positing that "I an before 
receiving; but can I be without being something or someono? lt 
In short, such activity implies a reference to a self in 
. some way antecedent to the temporal process and, in a sense 
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to be elucidated later, 'Itimelessý'. In particular, the 
facts of, permanence and endurance'exhibited therein can only 
thus be accounted for (1). 
&ý) Cf. Maite1nead: "This endurance of objects involves the 
isplay of a pattern as nas realised. This display is the 
display o. Pa pattern as inherent in an event, but also as 
exhibiting a temporal slice of nature as lending aspects to 
eternal objects (or, equally, of eternal objects as lending 
aspects to events). " (Science and the 11od. World, p. 157. ) 
"Thus however you analyse the event atcording to e, flux of 
its parts through time, there is the same thing-for-its-own- 
sake standing before you. " (Ibid. t p. 131. ) 
It may be pointed out that the significance of the 
Cartesian Co, 't lies also here. What it asserts, in ff '; o 
proposition form, is the identity of act and thought in 
!ý 'rL'- - 
self-consciousness. In self-consciousness I accomplish an 
act of thinking which brings with it awareness of my self as 
a thinking being. "Le sum nlest quo la face refelle du 
Cogito: le coFýito, la fYc-e consciente du sum., ' (R. Lefevre, 
re- CoFrito activitEf irreductible du sujet, Rev. -dIH3. st. de la 
Phil. 1 1931, P. 326. ) it is both an a ct and a thought. As the former, it is an act of transcendence whereby by my doubt 
I transcend the objective. content of my thought. As the 
latter, it is consciousness of a self as transcending what it 
thinks. Self-fonscious thinking is then the activity of a 
transcendent self which by its doubt can accept or refuse the 
"object" of thought: it is a villingg purposive activity. 
Essence and existence are one; the self is only in so far 
as it acts and is aware of acting freely ME a being transcend- 
ent with respect to its thought-content. 
And there precisely the temporal'implications of self- 
consciousness are manifest. The latter is impossible apart 
from the awareness of a self as "subject" transcending 
temporal succession on the one-hand, and of a self as ', object" 
on the other, constituted in time. Without the first 
condition no self-consciousness would be possible; for the 
self would be aware only of the immediate point in succession 
in whica its subjective and objective being would be absorbed 
and fused. Only a self which itself transcends succession 
ca 
,n 
become conscious of succession and so distinguish itself 
as subject from the flux of its objective appearances. And 
only so can it organise, by the infusion of its subjective 
transcendence and changelessness into the heterogeneity of these appearances, a permanence within time which is the 
characteristic of self-realisation. By such purposive and transcendent activit-j the self constitutes itself as causa sui 
and substance (cf. Traite" des Passions_, Part ll Art. -17). 
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Marcel's philosophy, like that of Whitehead, makes room 
for , eternal objects" which, again like the former's, are 
individuals'and not Seneralities (1). Although he refuses 
to define the unity of the self as a 11 Ix. P or a I'substance" 
in so far as the latter is taken to be an'abstract generality 
(in this he follows Bergson in denouncing the concept as 
artificial), he claims that the self does const itute a 
substance definable as a concrete individuality or what he 
terms a 11toill. Ilhat he says of the self may be applied to 
any other reality. ' -While hesitating to employ those terms, 
he conceives such realities in. the sense of the Platonic 
essences or, more correctly, the'Aristotelian Forms. 
Marcel is throughout intent on affirming a transcendent 
order of eternal Being beyond time and process. In the 
preface to Homo Viator he quotes a passage from Proust's 
La Prisonniere which in a sense serves as the theme of his 
book. "Ce qulon peut dire, clest que tout se passe dans 
notre vie co=ne si nous y entrions avec le faix d1obligations 
contractees dans une vie anterieure*" He underlines its 
(Note (1) contd. from previous page. 
It is, we may remarkq precisely by his refusal to 
recognise the Cogito as his starting-point that Spinoza can 
deny transcendence and evolve his doctrine of the Single 
Substance (cf. L. Brunschvics, La Revolution Cdrte'sienne et 
la notion spinoziste de la subs"Canceg Rev. de xiidt., 1904, 
Ppý 769-81 
(I "The irst principle is that each eternal object is an 
individuall Waichq in its own peculiar fashion, is what it is. 
This'particular individuality is the individual essence of the 
object, and cannot be described otherwise than as being itself. " 
, (Science and the Mlod. World, pp. 197-8. ) 
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Platonic affinities and adds,.. "Ce qui est au contraire 
affirme" ic-A avec force, et ce qui doit e^*tre sans nul doute 
retenu, clest la transcendance, au sens precis et seculaire 
de-ce mot, des normes auxquelles llho=e de bien co=e I 
llartiste se reconnalt tenu de conformer sa vie.,, (H-V- P. 
While commenting on the discrepancy between the two'currents 
of Proust's thouGht, his"empirisme 'a aimantation nihilistell 
on the one hand, yhich exhibits lif e'as a radical , temporal 
discontinuity rendering impossible personal construction and 
personal relationshipst-on the other the above-mentioned 
Platonic strain, he declares his gratitude'that -at certain 
supreme moments at least Proust should have been led to 
"reconnai. tre l'existence d'astres fixes au ciel de l'ame. " 
(Ibid. I pp. 7-8. ) 
Alarcel affirms, theal that the temporal process with its 
double element of novelty and permanence can be accounted for 
only by reference to such"timeless, " essences, that, in the 
words of Whitehead, "the things which are temporal arise by 
their participation in the things which axe eternal (l). 11 
Process has to be understood in terms of an ingression of 
such timeless essences into time, v'here they become actualised, 
again to employ the vocabulary of Whitehead which comes so 
readily to hand in this field, as "actual entities" or "actual 
dccasions". They are the llontau of Plato, whose ingression 
into the formless chora-infuses into it order and characterises 
(1) Process and Realityq P. 54. 
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it as process (1). 
Yet, if without such "timoless" essences both ; iovelty 
and becoming would be meaningless (2), it is none the less 
true that they are, in themselves, mere potentialities. 
Whitehead's definition of their metaphysical status might 
well be that of Marcel when he writes: "the metaphysical 
status of an eternal object is that of a*possibility for an 
actuality (3).,, As suchl considered as the Platonic 
essences abstracted from time, as mere potentialities for 
life, they are not of prima y siSnificance for a philosophy 
of existence - although their metaphysical stat, us as 
transcendent essences ingredient in and giving meaning to 
process is not in doubt. The essences he deals with are 
not, says Miarcel , to be assimilated to' 'Ices entite"s.. . que 
la metaphysique classique i=obilisait au ciel pur de la 
speculation, se mettant Par la en dehors des conditions qui 
peuvent seules nous permettre de conr-orendre l1existence 
humaine et la place quty occupe llechec sous toutes ses 
formes". (H. V. P. 163. ) Such essences or possibilities are 
indeed* instances of what "Whitehead has termed "vacuous 
actuality, (LI). 
(1) For the resemblances between Whitehead's philosophy of 
Organism and Plato's Timaeusq cf. A. EigTaylor, A Copmentary 
on the Timaeus, OxforE-, Univ. Press, 279'passim, and : 0. E=O, op. cit., Chp. VIII. 
2 Proc. and Real., PP. 54,62. ý3ý 
Science anH Mod. World, p. 198. For the development 
of this particular theory of eternal objects see the whole 
Chp. X, and cf. D. E=et, op. cit-i PP- 113-5- 
(4) Proc. and Real., p. 39. 
* 
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On the contrary, Marcel is concerned with essences as 
they are actualised in time, with "incarnation, ' - I'llacte 
infini-ment mystOrieux par lequel une essence prond, corpvl. 
(H. V. p. 97. ) His essences are rather the Forms of 
Aristotle or, to put it more clearly, it'is the essence 
realisins itself in time as 'If ormill which is his preoccupation. 
The same indeed may be said of Whitehead, notwithstanding his 
Platonic 
-aff 
inities. In both "the general Aristotelian 
principle is-maintained thatq apart from things that are 
actual, there is nothing - nothinG either in fact or in 
efficacy (2). " Fo3Z w1riatever metaphysical status may be 
. attributed by* 
, Aristotle to the form a parte rei, as it exists 
in the Divine Mind (the f orma ante rem for Saint Thomas and 
the Scholastics), it remains true that the reality is alone 
constituted for him by its implication in process as a 
concrete actuality (in re) (3). 
(1 For this reason, * the judgment of existence, derivative or 
mehate in Rationalism, is primary in Marcel Is Existentialism. 
It I Au depart de cette investigation, il nous faudra placer un 
indubitable, non pas logique ou rationnel, mais existentiel; 
si l1existence nlest pas a llo--isine, elle ne sera nulle p=t; 
il nly a, pas, je pense, de passage a l1existence qui ne soit . escamota, ge ou tricherie. " (R. I. p. 25. ) To refuse or deny 
existence to thinps is only possible by virtue of a loGical U trick which attributes ontoloGical significance to a hypo- thetical distinction between essence and existence. 2ý Proc. and Real., P. 54. 
3 Professor Lmmet quotes the ist with respect to White- head, where Plato criticises tlýc separation of BeinG from Process and the conception of the forms as detached essencos. None the loss, the Platonic viewpoint involves a depreciation 
of time and a doctrine of contemplation of the timeleiss, which 
are contrary to the standpoint of both a Marcel and a Whitehead, 
. for whoia the "timeless" is not only realioed but revealed solely in time. She indeed admits as much in her first 
paragraph. (op. cit. 9 pp. 134-6. ) 
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It is this standpoint whic'n determines, as we shall see 
more fully shortly, the sense of the concept of eternity in 
Alarcel Is -philosophy. Eternity, insofar as itis a 
"positive not-iiovl, has to be referred less to the properly 
timeless than to'a certain modality of, actual existence, 
that is to a certain mode of duration. It is'not the 
contrary of time, rather is it time experienced with such 
-intensity that in the present instant not only the immediate 
present but the realised past and the still unrealised future 
are made 'operative. Eternity is not the "timelessneso, of 
pure pps I sibility but the 11 time-fulness" of a -being whos e 
possibility has become a-dtuality, the eternity enjoyed by 
the form realisedg the entelechy or actus purus-of'Aristotle 
With these remarks we rejoin the second part. of the 
assertion to which the analysis of the present instant 
constrains us: namely that the instant of duration is the 
very means by vfaich the transeendent'eternal essences are 
realised. 
Those "timeless! ' essences bear to the temporal process 
the relation of both'final and formal cause. They act 
Immanently by way of efficient or formal causation in respect 
of their past realisations operative in the present and, by 
way of final causation, as what Whitehead calls the 
I'subjective, ain!, of present action. The present of purposive 
(1) Aristotle, Metaphys., Bk- IX9 Chp. '11j, § 
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action and existential experience is the mode in which, in 
so far as those transcendent aims grounded in memory and 
anticipation are projected in the present act or present 
experience, the eternal becomes actual. For the instant 
of duration is itself a 11 small - eternity' It contains, 
besides change, elements* of permanence, and simultaneity; 
it is a grouping together-of past, present and future in a 
simultaneous present. We. may agree with Wildon Carr that 
it is sensed'(1). yet it involves both an element of 
immediate memory and an element of immediate anticipation, 
elements which, theoretically, 'might be expanded ad infinitum 
to embody within the moment of attention the whole of the 
self's past, present and future (2). 
It is Marcel's contention thatp as immediate memory and 
anticipation are supplemented by memory and anticipation 
proper, such an eternisationP (the term is Marcel Is) becomes 
possible (3). In so far as the present instant and týe 
1) Op. cit., P. '9. ý2
"There is nothi4g contradictory in supposing that our whole life vrith its continuous past, its full present, and 
-its prospoctive range and activity might be through and through conscious, an wiiareness not concentrated into a 
moment, but such consciousness would not serve the mode of 
activity for which our whole organisation seems contrived. " Vlildon Carr, op. cit., p. 28. ). 
3) Vie may compare Saint Augustine's concoption of a "distending' of the mind by an expansion of consciousness to 
a point where past, present and future are made present to it 
and thus enabling a passage from time to eternity. "Inde 
mihi visum est nihil esse aliud tempus quam distentionem: 
sed cujus rei, nescio, et mirum, si non ipsius animi. 11 (Conf.., XIt 15:, - 26) 33. ) "Dicturus sum canticum, quod novi; antequam, incipiam, in totum expectatio mea tenditur; cum 
autem coopero, quantum ex illa in praeteritum decerpsero, tenditur et memoria meal atque distenditur vita huius actionis 
-. 
-- ___________ 'r * 
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sequence of instants that link up the duration of lived timo 
embody within themselves, as operative'eauses, past and 
anticipated future conjoined with the present, in that 
measure the "timelesdl essences of selves and things are 
revealed and realized: Time itself becomes, in Plato's 
phrase, "the moving image of eterniVI. A simultaneity, 
endowed with all the actuality of living emotion and enduring 
decision, is achieved (1). 
Time, then, will be the mean by vjhich the transcendent 
eternal is realised and revealed., The instant, by v&atever 
(Note (3) contd. from previous paSe. ) 
meae in memoriam propter quod. dixi et in expectationem propter 
quod dicturus sum; praesens tamen adest attentio meal per 
quam traicitur qupd erat futurum, ut fiat praeteritum. 11 
Conf. ý XI., A-,,, 28,38. Cf. B. Gilson, Introduction a 16tude de Saint Augustint 2nd ed. I Paris I Vrin, 1974. ý, pp. 2ýý-4. ) But a distinction should be made at the outset. 
Saint Augustine's concept of "distentioi2l, %vith which Wildon 
Carr's thesis has affinities$ seems to involve a process of 
. 
expansion of consciousness, one moreover which, in Augustine's 
view, encountering the natural limits of the human mind, 
renders impossible a final passage from time to eternity. 
In any case, the eternity envisaged is little more than a 
whole of time. Marcel's conception of eternity, like the 
one at least implicit in Whitehead, is different. Eternity 
may be a certain "consciousness of time", but it is not an 
expansion of the present to embrace past and future, but 
rrther -E-certain intensity or plenitude of present experience become the narrow-16=ca point f-6-r-: E FeemerGonce, in varyinG 
degrees of actuality, of what is potential in the self in the form of its past and unrealised future. 1-lareel's 
"instant" is not so much that of Augustine as of Aristotle. 
And on this point he differs fundamentally, as vie shall see, from the'Absolute Idealists such as Royce. 
(1) "This property (retention, endurance or reiteration) 
amounts to the recovery, on behalf of value amid the transitoriness of reality, of the self-identity which is also bnjoyed by the primary eternal objects. ', (Whitehead, Science 
and the Mod. World, pp. 130-1. ) 
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simultaneity and continuity it embodiesl is the focal point 
of its realisatidn. It is the 11substance" of time, the 
centre which participates in timelessness. * "Succession and 
continuity, " vrrites Bosanquet, are the 11two inseparable 
factors of a reality which is fundamentally temporal" and 
"the distinctive being of the self is inversely as its 
- depenaence on... successiveness. " Duration is therefore 
,, one with 
-the relative 
timelessness'of a finite self (l). 11 
The instant has to be thought of as the means whereby 
possibility becomes actuality, on the one hand causing to 
endure what has ceased to exist, and on the other bringing 
into existence what has not yet existed. . 
For even more than 
the projection of the past into the future it is the vehicle 
of the projection of the future into the past. It is the 
medium of what Rilke has called the "spirit of metamorphosis! ', 
conceived not as pure change but as the principle of 
Ileternisationil. 
We have now dealt with the preliminaries essential to 
the discussion. The problem, central in any Existentialism, 
but the one which for Marcel surpasses all others, is that 
concerning the modes of transcendence, namely the'manner and 
conditions of achievingg however fragmentarily or precariously, 
the infusion of eternity into time in the life of the self. 
(1) The Princiýle of IndividualitZ and Value, London, 
1Jabm7i=, 1912, pp. ý599 540. Of. JFspexds definition 
of the "Instant": "Der eigentliche AuGenblick als, der hohe 
AuEenblick ist Gipfel und Artikulation in dem existenti-e=en 
L, rozess. rl- (Philosophie, Vol. 11, P. 127. ) 
"S 
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Marcel's 3nost original contribution to the problem of time 
lies in his description of human life in terms of a drama 
and of man himself as 11homo viator". 
I 
 I. e 
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III. Memory andAnticipation. 
The tvio aeents of the process of I' eternisationt' in the 
present are memory and anticipation. -The doctrine of 
immediate memory has a prominent position in Marcel's 
thought. For him as for Bergson, the past is not dead: 
-I/. Plus le passe est pense in concreto, moins il ya de sens 
a le declarer i=uable. 11 (E. A. 9 p. 186. ) The past. is not 
a dead weight except in* so far as it has be6n converted into 
an "objecV, and 
-situated 
in some irrevocable point of the 
uniform time-series by the activities of intellectual 
memory. In real memory, on the contrary, as immediacy and 
feeling, the past relives in present experience and is 
operative in present action, albeit wearing on itself the 
mark of the past and preserving its autonomous status qua. 
past (1). 
On repondra qulil West pogsible do voir quo 
ýe qui est actuel, le passe co=e tel ne pouvant 
etre objet de vision, et la meMoire nfetant 
qu'une reconstruction. De plus en plus je sens 
que cotte the"orie est fausse; , 
je suis. convaincu, 
quo le passe en tant que passe nq pout pas plus 6tre reellement dissocie du passe en tant que 
present a la conscience - que 11objet vu de 11objet dit reel. Je vois 11objet lui'--meme, 
je me souviens du passe lui-mC^Me. Ceci nlest 
, 
intelligible pqur le passe quo parce que jo 
suis mon passe. (J. M. p. 189. ) 
Contrairement ý un lieu commun qui pe*se sur ce 
quo j'appellerai la philosophie coVante, il 
nlest pas vrai de dire que le passe soit 
immuable, parce quo nousne pouvons pas 
(1) Cf. the doctrine of memory. as llir=ediacyll in Hume and Alexander. Al. Wahl and M. de, Corte have noted the strain 






le. "'itimement distinGuer entre les evenaments, f fixes dans leur materialit4, et un 
c e-ý-'uain eclairement qui lui, au contraire, 
-ý-amric essentiellemont selon le ; Coyer dlcýu il 
cu, curie - ca Loyer qui est le present veou A (R. I. P. P. 74-5. ) 
Tiie view "U. r., at the past and future, iýhile experienced 
i=ediately in the present, "are enjoyed as past and future" 
which is given such prominence by Alexander (1) , is highly 
important in this context. The process thereby the past, 
according - to Marcef, "illuminateol the present does not rob 
the past of its autonomous status; and the same may be said 
of the future in anticipation. The recognition of what he 
calls a certain "temporal pluralism! ' can alone guarantee the 
integrity of the-tran cendent, eternal order displaying itself 
in a present EEos du passe' et charge de ltavenir. Failure 
to recognise it leads to a hypostatisation of time and the 
present instant or instantaneisme" , that is directly to a 
doctrine of immanencee 
In this connection klarcel Is conception of i=ediate 
memory has to be distinguished from the affective memory of 
Proust, whose nature and function are quite different. 
Proust finds in sensational experience a radical discontinuity 
and heterogeneity refractory to all identity and permanance. 
But he was led to the discove3ýy that the present sensation is 
capable in certain conditions of setting in motion what Ribot 
Calls the 11 memoire affective" or 11 memoire du coeuV, , whereby 
a past emoti6n, thanks to the recurrence of a similar I 
Space, Time and DeiýZj Vol. 1, pp. 113,125,133. 
311. 
situation, relives anew in all its intensity and, experienced 
simultaneously v, -ith the present emotion, establishes an 
affective, subjective identity. 'ciie self is throim out of 
the rut of time and contingent experienceg and grasps both 
itself and the object of experience as timeless (1). 
Now what is all important to-note is that the affective 
memory involves the union in the instant of an isolated 
present feeling with an equally isolated past feeling - the 
conjoining of two atomic elements of experience separated by 
a considerable interval of time. "Et je sens tressaillir 
en moi quelque chose qui se delplace; voudrai: t-slelever, 
quelque chose quIon aurait de'sancre, a une grande profondeur; 
je ne sais ce que' clest, mais cela raonte lentement; jieprouve 
I la resistance et j1entends la rumeur des distances traversees 
Moreover$ what it establishes is merely an identity, 
a generality$ a type: it disengages "une qualite commune 
deux sensations" by the perception of, Ilune de ces identite"s 
(1) It is interesting to note that the, concept of af f ective 
memory presupposes that emotions are su_ ._ 
_neris and not mere accompaniments of sense-images. (Cf. Ribot, ProbTe"mes de 
psy. chologie affective, p. 695. ) The type of iaciru! 'uy 
establisned by way of affective memory is ifholly subjective 
and emotive, the very content of memory being affectivity. Cf. Proust: 'Ila memoire de 11intelligence, et des youx ne nous 
rendant du pass4 que des fac-simil6s inexacts qui no lui 
ressemblent pas plus que les tableaux des mauvais pcLitres au 
printemps, etc. ', (quoted by L. Pierze-(ýuint, T. arcel Proust, Paris, Kra, 1925, p., 147)9 Cf. also on this poi Gh. - Br6ndol,, Marcel Proust. 'Heterorrýeneite du r4el et GeneralitO Rev. Phil 
July-AU97-1-17319-P. 199 (This article was later 'incorporated in his volume, sychographie de Marcel Proust, Paris, Vrin, 1932. )' 
ý? -) A la Recheridhe du Temps-Perdu, Du Cote' do chez Sy; ann, 
. 
aXi*El Gall'31-ma-r, =, 9291 Vol. I, p. 08. 
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ev entýe le present et le passll, filling Proust's consciousness 
, fou habituollement les sensations particulieres laissaient 
tant de viae, par une essence generale (1). 11 
Those e-xperiences of Proust are instances of what Janet 
has termed "presentification" (2). But this "presentifica- 
tion" is simply the presentation of an element, of the past to 
an element of present consciousness with which it is conjoined 
to form an 'essence_ generale" 'Each and every such experience 
is an isolated impression, differing from the particular 
sensation only in its function of gelieralising. It does not 
allow of any'energising of the past in the prese . nt; ' there is 
in Proust no solution of the problem of personal continuity, 
no drama, no realisation, no destiny. His doctrine remains 
within the limits of empiricism; and Benjamin Cre"mieux is 
right to speak of it as constituting al'suD-impressionnismell 
(3). 
I- Proust's doctrine is therefore, at least in part, another 
(1) Le Teý. ps Retrouve, Parisq Gallimard, 1932, Vol. 11, 
pp. "ý') t* 142 76. 
ý2) Cf. A. Dandieu, Marcel Proust. Sa revelation ]2s, 7chologique,, ' 
aris, Didot and Londo hrey Miliord, 950, p. 91. 
f 
(3) XXe Siecle, lere serie, Farisq Gallimard, 1924, p. 83. To d7oJustice to Proust, however, it must be said that, if his 
doctrine does not provide a satisfactory basis for an ethical 
philosophy, it is because it does not set out to do so. it 
is, first of all, a psychology of the Cartesian type 9 describ- ing a, ne,,, v CoEito , that is a pure experience where the pure subject, suostracted from dontingent, empirical te4, poral 
conditions, is enabled to intuit the-puro sensation. It iS2 
secondly, on a higher plane, a religiBus philosophy, describing.! 
moments of Erace, wherein the temporal discontinuity and the 
disrupting "intermittences du coeur" are transcended and 
overcome in-a visionary experience of the eternal. 
----- 
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1 form of what Marcel has called "instantanelisme". In fact, 
his memory theory is an instance of i7hat Whitehead terms 
"presentational immediacy", whose elevation into the sole 
mode of knowledge is at the root of the psychological atomism 
of the Sensationalists such as'Hume and Condillac. 
Marcel's conception of memory is quite different. 
Memory, for'him, is the function permitting the full range 
of the past,, wit4ouý intervals to become operative in the 
present, although its elements are, like the "petites 
perceptiond' of Leibnizls monad, active in varying degrees 
of actuality or potentiýlity. It is thus, to, employ White- 
head's term, "a mode of causal'efficac-y's the instrument of 
endu3ýance repetition, growth and realisation. 
It is precisely the function of memory to provide the 
basis*for such realisation and continuity; it is by memory 
that the past is, by way of efficient causation,, operative 
in'the present so as to allow repetition, pattern and 
enduranýe. Memory is, for Marcel, a principle of 11consecu- 
tion! ', to employ Leibnizls admirable term (1). Whitehead 
attributes the same r0le to memory: in the event Which 
realises itself in the specious present there is, he declares, 
"a memory of the antecedent life-history of its own dominant 
pattern, as having formed an"element of value in its own 
(1) "La memoire fournit une espece de consecution aux gmes, 
.11, qui imite la raison, mais qui en doit 6tre dis gueeell 
(Monadbl. 26. ) 
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antecedent enviro=ent (1). 11 Similarlyl Marcel defines the 
content of memory as a "melody" (2); it is by memory that 
tnere is infused into the lif e* of tho individual melodic 
pattern. 
This r3le of memory by which, as Whitehead says, the 
It deciýionsll of the past represent stubborn f acV, -and qualify 
the present, is the principle of what the latter*calls 
"objective 
-immortality" and what 
Marcel calls the "permanence 
ontologiqudl., it is likewise the prime agent of Mar cel s 
"fidelity" , by uhichg" in the personal order, this "permanence 
ontologiquell is secured. And thus memory is the instrument 
of transcendence, of the process of realisation of thle eternal, 
by enabling the past to become operative in the present and so 
providing an element of simultaneity within and above 
successivity. Without it, the eternal life and the 
(1) Science and the Plod. World, p. 131. It is by memory that 
"vie - as ený&--ring objects personal order - objectify the 
occasions of our past with peculiar completeness in our 
immediate -oresent. 11 (Proc. and Real., p. 225 
ý2 Quat"aor-, en fa diýze , : Paris, Plon, ý 1920, P: 
)177. 
3 Of. -Lel6iEz's theory of "perceptions insensibles", 
i ewise adduced to account for pernanence and the conscious- 
s of self-identity. "Ces percqtions insensibles 
marquent encore et constituent le meme individu, qui est 
ca33act4rise' par les traces ciulelles conservent des ýtats 01 precedents de cet individu, en faisant la connexion avec son 
etat present; et elles se peuvent connaltre par un esprit 
superieur, qqand meme cet individu ne les sentirait pas, 
clest-a-dire lorsque le souvenir exprýs nly serait plus., ' 
(Nouveaux-Essais sur l1entendement humain, Avant-propos, 
P. 169 Oeuvres pKilosophiquest Paris -uadrange 1 1866, Vol. 1. ) 
0".. " ." '", ". ".. '" 
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consciousness of eternity would be imposoible for man (1). 
Finally, 21arcel stresses that this function. of memory 
f 
is dep, endent on the fact of "incarnationPq that is our 
immediate participation in our body and, througli it, in 
reality as a whole - in the universal compresence. Here 
again the analogy with Whitehead is obvious. IIIt'is*9; I the 
latter writes, "by reason' of the body, with its*Miracle of 
order, that-the* treasures of the past environment are poured 
into the living oc. cas3-on (2). 11 
0- 0- 0- 
Linked with memory, as the instrument of ontological 
permanence, is anticipation, which is, vvith respect to the 
future, what memory is to the past. 
The possibility of anticipation and-previsiýon, as Gunn 
has p6inted out (3), involves the view that the future is 
.1 
. 
11 something! ' and not, as Broad would have it, a mere 
11 nonentity". Marcel has broached the problem in co=ection 
with the seer's vision of the future, But this question is 
(1) Von Hagel'equally reco-nises that it is the continuance 
of the past in the present which gives the germ of man's 
eternal experience. From it, he declares, 11we may rise ... to experiences of simultaneity transcendent yet human, in which 
perception of change. is wholly in abeyance. ', - (Quoted by 
Hilda D. Oakley, Time and the Eternal Life, Church Quarterly 
Review, 1913. ) 
(2) Proc. and Real., p. 480. It is in and through it that 
we naveexperience Ff causal eff; cacy and the origin of the 
idea of cause. Cf. Ibid. 9 pp. 113,1662 171. (3) Cf. Gunn's discussion, op. cit., p. 404 sqq. 
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only a special case of the more general p3ýoblem of anticipation. 
It is the latter with which we have to deal at the moment 
irrespective o-C t'--- claims for prophetic vision proper and, 
even more, of claims respecting foreknowledge of the future 
of another (the latter depends less on the temporal theory 11 
than on the theory of "presences!, and "co-mmil ni cations'? 
In the Journal IvIe"taphysique- Mlarcel %, xites as follows: 
Sur la Prediction a propos du livre d'Osty. 
'Llobjection fondamentale contre la pre"diction 
clest 'on ne pout voir que ce qui est; or 
l1avenir nlest pas'. Mais il ya la , un jr paraloýisme. On 41a sUrement pas le droit de 
dire que ce qui nleýt pas encore nlest en 
aucune facon. (J. M. P. 189. ) 
Therbefollows the passage already quoted - I'Je suis mon passe". 
At once the query is made: 11111ais suis-je aussi men avenir? ft 
A negative reply would mean the impossibility of anticipation 
and, at bottom, the impossibility of prospective action. But 
if in some sense I am my future, although not ne. cessarily in 
the sense that I am my past, the future too, although not 
necessarily in the same ways must somehow be llgivei, 21. "cot 
univers que le devin apprehende, ne faut-il pas qulil soit 
donnel? " (J. M. P. 190. ) The question, then, is to determine 
in what way the future'is given in the present of e-. %c perience. 
At this point Marcel makes the f ollovring comment: 
,4 (I,; n ecrivant ceci) ile"crivais en sorL-ae que toute N, vision -Se refere en derniere analyse 
'a un ordre, 
a un monde au sein duquel Iletre et la pensee 
coincident (co=e dans une imaGination'cr6atrice); 
je me servais m6me du mot supra-conscience pour 41 designer cet ordre qui transcende le dualisme du. 
sujet et de llobjet. (J. M. p. 190. ) 
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There is here involved undoubtedly the notion of a fully 
realised eternity as a sort of notion-limite: the notion of 
a totum simul as enjoyed by a fully realised essence where 
past, present and future are Imown and co-habit in a closed 
present. Such a "supra-consciousness" is of course an ideal 
state beyond the limitations of human consciousness. It is 
towards it that the latter aspires in e: Ustence and that it 
may hope tjo realise, in an immortal life when its existence 
is one with its essence; the self which is in the fullest 
sense of the terra, in tlýe fullness of -its being, would then 
be wholly transparent to itself and have simultaneous 
knowledge in an eternal present of its past, present and 
future. Such a supra-consciousness is that of God in actual 
fact - Pure Act wherein possibility and actuality, essence 
and existence are one. For the human being, 'no matter to 
what completeness of realisation he may come in moments of 
full existence, there vrill always be a residue of potentiality. 
If he is at such moments pure act, substance and causa-sui, 
it is in a dependent manner withregard to the Divine 
Actuality (in this sense, the notion of substan6e, to employ 
t-he old phraseology, is not "univocal" as applied to God and 
the creature). For if his full pastýand unrealised future, 
we shall see, are operative in the present of his action, yet 
it is. in varying degrees of actualisation or, which is the 
same thinS, varying degrees of potentiality, - this is true 
of his realised past, self-evident of his unrealised future. 
" ' 
" ." 
In God alone '- perhaps in the after-lif 0 of the. self - there 
are no degrees; each and every element of the essential self, 
all pastt present and future states have passed into 
actuality. 
None the less, it is with reference'to such a fully 
realised eternity that the problemlof anticipation and, 
consequently, that of self-realisation in time can be 
clarified, For the specious present of duration constitutes 
the gateway to such an eternity, itself being a!, ' small 
eternity', As long as we take. as system of reference the 
spatial world of physics and its uniformi homogeneous time- 
systel and assume as axiomatic"4u'il ya 'a chaque moment 
, une seule coupe temporelle possible du monde, une heure de 
l'universt et que le Present unique se detaille en une 
infinite de presents individuels" (J. M. p. 193), anticipation 
is an impossibility. - In such aýspatial representation the 
subject is divorced from its object (which may be the self 
itself), and the latter is situated irrevocably in a point 
of time said to be past, present or future, the present being, 
-taken to be an indivisible point alone the object of actual 
experience. 
If on the contrary we consider the temporal situation 
of a "participating subject", the latter is seen to be in 
immediate communication with its "object" on a plane of 
duration; its various elements are grasped not in a 




possible to affirm that the subject is aware of the "whole" 
(Marcel reverts here to the metaphor of I'llimprovisation 
sentiell 
-Pour autant que je me pense comme ýujet ai la fois actif et passif, comme affecte du dehors 
de fa2ons multiples, il est evident que la 
situation S vue par le devin'ne peut pas ne,, 
pas mlpýaraltre comme exterieure, non donnee, 
-non previsible. 111ais des le moment ou" je 
m? Eýlbve ýa Ilide"e d1une liaison inmanente (non 
pqnsable d1ailleurs en langage relationne-I ") 
-ontre moi-et 
les autres (ou 11unive-r-s-)-c-ette 
situ; ýtion cesse dl&tre exterieure, elle est 
le devel9ppement d1une situation actuelle E 
qui me depasse et 4ont par essence je ne puis 
prendre conscience. (J. 11. p. 190. ) 
For the present of 'lived time has all the simultaneity of 
the process v. ritldn Which it is immanent. 
As a dramatist Marcel likes to speak of "situationVI 
and, preferably, of "scenes" to denote the units of 1 ilý 
existential experience. A"IscenVI is, we might say, that 
portion of our destiny vfnich reveals itself in the specious 
present, better still it is the unit of our eternal destiny, 
the specious present being the temporal unit of its 
a ce plan, il nty a pas de sens a parler 
dle'lemýnts exterieurs les uns atzc autres. 
Une sceneest un tout indivisible, oU* Ilon 
ne peut decouper des termes, isoler des 
rapports que par abstraction. (J. 11. p. 191. ) 
realisation. Now, the scene itself is a unity where past, 
present and future merge: 
Moreover, it, transcends the categories of objective space 
and time: 
La scene poýsede une unite re lelle, ce sont des 
personnes reelles qui y prennent part, et il 
-r- 
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me semble bien cue clest paý cette unite, .LI par cette r6alite que la scone transcende 
les conditions contingentes de son apparition 
dans llespace et dans le temps. (Ibid., p. 168. ) 
It is not-rivetedt as it were, to some point in an 
irrevocable succession: "une scene nlest pas rive"e par 
avance a un certain point-de llespace, a un certain point 
du temps. " (Ibid., p. 167. ) The individual destiny foms 
a 11 dram! V, composed of such scenes" urorked out in the 
temporal-process: "a dynamism of situations transcending 
individual destinies and yet for them only a matter. " (Ibid. I 
. P. 
137. ) So that in any present occasion, in any I'scend' 
whi-th is in process of enactment, the realised scenes of 
the past and no less -the unrealised scenes of the future 
are immanent, procuring that "consciousness of the eternal,, 
vinift is both the consciousness of time itself. and the 
consciousness of destiny as a process with retrospective 
and prospective range. 
There is thus in durational experience a "rapport entre 
llimme/diat$ llanticipe, et aussi le rememoreP (H. V. P. 58) or 
what Marcel calls a "triangulation". From which it follows 
that the future is not LtnothinEýI ; 'it is already 11 giveiV or 
opera"Cive in the present: 
C. 'est uniquement parce quIon se place illegiti; e- 
ýient sur le "terrain des f aits" qu Ion est amene . a poser en principe que l1avenir nlest pas donne 
- et ne peut, done 6tre quo congu. 11 sorait bien plus conforme a'* la rdalite' 11 de dire quIen 
anticipant, je touche$ ýIencaisse par. avance j1o. Are un certain pr6levement sur un donne & 




In short, the future is given in the sense of being that to 
which my -present action tends; it is already immanent in 
the present in the form of purpose; and present action is 
inconceivable apart from this "making an advance! ' on the 
future. 
In the r6le given to anticipati, on Marcel once again is 
echoing contemporary theory. Whitehead, for example, 
maintains that "the future certainly is something for the 
present... Out away the future, and the present collapses, 
emptied of its proPer*con-6ent. Ilamediate existence requires 
the insertion . of the future in the crannies of the present 
(1). " But the future is immanent in a-sense different from 
the one which the past is said to be immanent in the 
present. The past has existed; the future is yet to exist; 
the future is therefore operative in the present as the yet 
undetermined effect (the future possible) of a cause Which 
is the present: the past as the already determined cause of 
which the present is the effect (2). ' In other'words, the 
future is effective in the present as that which is to be 
the ouPcome of both the present and the past and has to conform 
to the necessities of the pattern shaped and shaping 
(1 Adventures of Ideas, p. 246. 
(2ý "Tne occasion arises as an effect facing its past and ends 
as a cause facing its future. " (Ibid., p. 249. ) 
ý3) "The future is immanent in the present by reason of the 
act -that the present bears in its own essence the relation- 
ships which it will have to the future. It thereby includes 
in its essence the necessities to vihich, the future must 




Anticipation is thereford first of all the guarantee of 
continuation; it is the consciousness of duration -I shall 
remain myself. marcel shows that any type of fidelityq 
involving a mea sure of self-identity, is imý ossible unless 
the future is something for the present. The "attitude 
phenOMeniste ou instantane/istel", which denies the future as 
causally determined by the present, renders unthinkable the 
continuity-necessary for self-realisation. The moral value 
of a promise or engagement is obliterated otherwise. To 
give a promise implies that it will not be "remise en ' 
question! ', and is in fact already to form the'future. fill 
est clair que cette volontel active do non remise en question 
intervient conme facteur essentiel dans la determination de 
ce qui sera. " (11.1. p. 2-11. ) 
Yet the'future has a different metaphysical status from 
I that of the past. Vhereas the past is the realýl of 
efficient causesq the future is the realm of ends and 
purposes. It belongs in a sense to a different order of 
reality and enjoys a superior metapbysical status. However 
much grounded in past and present, it presents aims trans- 
cending actuality. It is the realm of final causes 
It ýt j;, 
determining the present. From this angle, then, anticipation , 
is the principle of novelty and prospective realisation. 
is the consciousness of finality and what we might call, 




1 shall be. other than I am (1). Anticipation is thus one 
with what I-Thitehoad calls "appetition! '. 
It is as endurance and pro-ject that anticipation co- 
operates with memory in the present to become*the agent of 
that "permanence ontoloSiquel. without which transcendence 
would, bo impossible. In the meantime let us stress certain 
conclusions which Marcel draws frora his doctrine of the future. 
Me instant of real time, in so far as those powers are 
operative in it, enable the subject to transcend correspond- 
ingly successivity and attain a measure of simultaneity. We 
must assume that reality may be experienced at varying and 
indee4 infinite levelsq according to Marcel. There is an 
exact. correspondence'betvieen the degree of reality to which 
penetration is made and the level of temporal experience. 
It is in this way, thinks Marcel, that premonition may be 
legitimated. ' The future "exists" in some sort at a deeper 
level of reality than either past or present by the very fact 
of its tran cendence with respect to these. To the subject 
1tring on the objective plane it Is simply nothing, what is 
not. But to one who*'Ie: cý-sists! ' in processq the future is 
both immanent and i=inent as the outcome of the pattern 
venich is being resolutely worked out in the present, on the 
one hand, and as the purpose to Which this activity is 
directed, on the other, 
(1) "The whole doctrine of the future is to be understood in 
terras of the account of the process of .s elf- completion of each individual actual occasion. ', (Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 
p. 247. ) 
iT 
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The consciousness of finality becomes a peculiar 
I 
sensitivity to the future. Anticipation takes on the 
appearance of faith, a 11 SivinS credit to reality". it 
becomes then a "feelino, for the future, not as what is 
actually to be, 'but as a direction or as''a pattern whose 
content remains to be filled in - in short, as the reality 
in the making (1) . 
This sense of Phe future admits of varying degreesq all 
dependent on the level at which the present is experienced 
and realised: 
.L 
Pourtant ne faut-il pas reconnaltre-cii; e ce qui 
nlest pas encore pour moi peut 6tre d6jý pour 
un autre clui a une sorte dlavance' (meitaphysique) 
sur moi? (J. 11. p. 194. ) 
Anticipation, as Marcel will say of hope itself, may become 
a form of prophetic vision procuring a"Imetaphysical advance" 
based on a deeper experience than normal of process. Vie 
shall see how Marcel links these views-with his . doctrine of 
communication in a metapzychical philosophy. They are, 
however, independent of the latter and in themselves involve 
no occultism. They go little further than the views of 
Alexander, for example, discussinG the, possibility of fore- 
seeing the future. Neither claims that the actual future 
is likely to be foreseen in so far as such a future is not 
0 
already pre-formed in the present immediacy, although even 
here it may be a question of sensitivity. "The future, " 
(1) Cf. Lady Macbeth: "Thy letters have transported me beyond this ignorant present and I feel now the future in the instant. " 
(M. acbetho Act Is Se. V. ) - 
32-5. 
I 
writes Alexander$ "will be what it will. But since it will 
be the causal outcome of what is presentr a: ctuallY, there, may 
be minds so sensitive to the influences at work in the world 
that they may divine certain future events. VIhat seems to 
me open to the gravest question is that any character of the 
future which transcends our hitherto experienced order of 
-fact should be foreseen. Yet the clairvoyant might be like 
a person of _genius -_more sensitive 
to things thanthe 
ordinary run of persons... But there is no intrinzie 
impossibility or even-improbability in the alleged powers (1). " 
Generally speaking, the openness, of mind with respect to 
metapsychical phenomena exhibited in such thinkers as Marcell 
Alexander and Whitehead is part and parcel of the basic 
philosophy of process and compresence which has enlarged the 
whole scope of metaphysical speculation by reintegrating mind 
or, more properly, what the ancient philosophies ýised to call 
"spirit" into the universe. 
S. Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, Vol. II, P. 379. 
. 's ... 
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IV. Time and Eternity. 
We may ; iow more easily comprehend the function and status 
of the instant in Marcel's philosophy. His general theory 
of time in relation to eternity follows on the lines of the 
classic doctrine, largely derived from Aristotle and revived 
in contemporary philosophy, according'to which the "instant" 
provides the means for the realisation of time lesst*trans- 
cendent essences. ýIt is in terms of the process whereby 
transcendent essencest serving as final causes with respect 
0 
to the time-process, are realised that the present of lived 
time is to be conceived. As such, the instant is the moment 
of self-realisation, of passage from possibility to actuality. 
"The present, " says Whiteheads"is the immediacy of teleolo- 
gical process- whereby reality becomes actual (1). 11 is 
inseparable. from the self's 11appetition! ' or urge towards the 
future embodied in its present experience by reason of the 
timeless purposes to which it aspires (2). The present is 
thus aimed at the future, being the means of transforming 
incognito in vfnich the eternal, as incommensurable for time, 
would nevertheless maintain its relations with time. Thus 
we sometimes speak of the future as identical with eternity: 
ý1ý Proc. and Real., P. 304. 
2 This peHtio'ý! ' is what. appears in 1,111, litchead's philo- 
-ophy as, conceptual feeling or the 'feeling of eternal objectal. 
Cf. Ibid. * p. 43 sqq. and D. Emmet, -op. cit., pp. 147-8. 
into actual f act the eternal ends which we anticipate. it This 
is due, " as Kierkegaard writes, "to the fact that the eternal 
Mans first of all the future, or that the future is the 
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the future life - eternal lifoý(l). " It is the same thousht 
which Vale'ry expresses when he writes: "IL'Avenirl est la 
parcelle plus sensible de 11instant (2). " 
The insistence on the forward moveme. 4t of time must notl 
4 
however, lead to the conclusion that the-instant is a mere 
passage from present to i=ediate. future., - The result would 
be a hypostatisation of time itself and the replacing of 
purpose by the gratuitous and heterogeneous urgings of the 
present immediacy. On the contrary, the definition of the 
instant as the locus of a passage from possibility to 
actuality marks a return to the Aristotelian and Scholastic 
notion of time, that is as a continuous process of Growthq 
exhibiting permanence in change. The eternal, in\factq is. 
I mmanent in the i=ediate present not only in the form of 
the anticipated future, endowed with objective realityv but 
also as the already realised past, endowed vrith. full formal 
reality. Self-realisation is accomplished only on the 
condition that final causation is supplemented by efficient 
causation (3) in such manner thatq both past and future 
causally determining tho presentq the latter exhibits 
pe=ananco ivithin novelty, unity within multiplicitY9 identity .A 
(1) The Conce2t of Dread, p. 80. Cf. Saint Augustine: "Praeseris tamen aa-e-s, -ýa ýentio mea, per quez traicitur quod 
erat futuruxil ut fiat practeritum. 11 (Conf. XI, 282 38. )- 
Cf. also Leibniz, Nouv. Essais, Bk. - t7l-q-O-7np-. XXI, -39, Oeuvres Phil., Vol7. -I-, p. Ilo. - 
2) - Eiel-aaEe, -Paris, Gallimard, 1941, '-. o. 37. 
35 rLFe--re two of course merge in causative action. Cf . V1. ames, Some Problems of Philoso2 London, Lon6mans Green, 
19111 P. 
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within difference. "The concept of activitys" vrcites 
Wildon Carr, "impliewchange. Change is not more succession, 
the alternation of existence and non-existence, it is becoming, ', 
the becominG actual of what was potential. Change implies 
I continuity. The new creation which constitutes it is the 
new form or order which the old undergoes (1). " 
It is this conception of the instant as grouping in its 
ranp, e"both past andfuture which, legitimates the metaphysical 
theseSof contemporary philosophy, the organic philosophy of 
Whitehead and no less the Existentialism of Marcel. Ceasing 
to appear as-an indivisible instant, the present is seen to 
contain both simultaneity and successivity and can thus be 
presented as the means whereby eternal essences are realised. 
The renevial 'of metaphysics is indeed bound up with a revival 
of Aristotelian conceptions of time (2). 
Of this renewal Whitehead is the most conspicuous example 
in the English-speaking world. He describes the present as 
constituting a "passage from re-enaction to anticipation" 
wherein the entityts llactivitY in self-fo=ation passes into 
its activity of other.; -formation (3). " This is the field of 
OP- cit-i P. 25. 2) "If we arc a part of the world, then the t of physics must become but a partial element in real time, anU a more inclusive 
phi3mophy thus rewon might aGain consider the evidence in favour of attributing movement to the future rather than to the present, While the idea of the past as dead and vanished 
might be consigned to oblivion with other curious relics of 
an over-mechanical aGe. 11 (E. A. Burtt, The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Modern Physical Science, London, Xegan Paul, 1952, p. 86. ) 
(3) Adventures. of Ideas, p. 248* 
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what he calls "objective immortality', resultant from the 
property Which-the entity enjoys as embodying eternal objects 
of "reli-O ation2 endurance or reiteration (1). 11 By this 
repetition and continuity of heritaýe the entity becomes the 
incarnation of a value and, albeit in time, assumes the pre- 
rogatIves of self-identity and simultaneity attributable to 
tho-eternal essence. 
Marcel's docitTine of time follows not dissimilar lines. 
He too recognises the operative power of future and past in 
the living present-creative of enduring values. He thus 
distinguishes throughout the course of time a "permanence 
ontologiqud, very like 111hitehead's , objective immortality" 
Idee d'une permanence ontologique - permanence de ce qui dure et qui implique 11histoire, par 
opposit 
, 
ion a la permanence d'une. essence ou 
d1un arrangement formel. (B. A. p. 138. ) 
A permanence which is I'llexpression phe"nomenale ... d1une 
liaison substantielle qui ne peut, elle, se consommer que 
dans lleternite. 11 (H. V. p. 169. ) A permanenceg too, which 
is the'incarnation of value in that it Provides ""a m'roir 
dans lequel il nous est donne' de lire toujours imparfaitement7 
toujours a travers une buee dAormante', le visage authontique 
de notre destinee. " (Ibid., P. 213. ) For value itself is 
#1 .1 that mirror and "ne peut etre pense'O coiimo realite... quo si 
elle est referee'a la conscience d1une dostinee immortelle. " 
(1) Science and the Mod. World, p. 130. Cf. Santayana: 
"I am not myself unless I re-enact noa the essence of myself, 
which I may re-enact at all times and places. " (The Realm 
of Essences, London, Constable, 1923, p. 19. ). 
... 4, $ . *.... - 
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(Ibid. 9 p. 211. ) 
By this recognition of the factors of permanence and 
repbtition as constitutive of value Marcel adopts the výew- 
point not of a Bergson but of a Claudel. This viewpoint, 
so strongly expressed by Whitehead, involves a criticism of 
the r. adioal empiricism whose principal exponents ivere the 
18th century philosophers; Whitehead has described their 
error as the failurý,, to integrate in their theory of 
knowledge the"Imode of causai efficacy'. Hume recognises 
only a mode of "presentational immediacy' which limits the 
subject to, immediate sense-experience and, as this mode 
reveals no causality, he is obliged to treat and explain 
causality as a thought-construction whose ultimate ground 
is custom or habit. His error and, Miitehead adds, that of 
Kant is to derive-the concrete from the abstract (1). For 
what is -Lprimitive'is not the mode of presentational immediacy 
but of causal efficacy. The present is no mere point in a 
succession but charged with past and future. Presentational 
immediacy sees the present alone as positive, past and future 
are defined negatively. In the mode of causal 'efficacy, that 
is Of Purposive action, the reverse is the case: the present 
can only, be conceived negatively with respect to the past and 
(1) Proc. and Real., p. 244. 
331. 
future (1). ' 
Alareells. theory of time stresses the mode of causal 
efficacy, for this mode points the way to transcendence. 
Indeed, the follovinG passage echoes 17hitehead's criticism 
of Hume and, although in different terms, -posits the latter's 
mode of causal efficacy: 
+-k-,, a chaque instant, mes impressions, au sens 
tr6s general que Hume donne a ce mot, se 
de. achent, sur un certain "background" dans 
1equel la rEýflexion seule est en mesure ae 
discerner, peut-etre assez imparfaitement . d1ailleurs, ce qui appartient au pass6 ou a 
lfavenir, ou ce qui nlest qutun horizon d,, e 
possibilites flottantes. Contrairement a ce 
qulon, est bien souvent tentd d1admettre, il 
nlest pas exact ;e soutenir que ce "background" 
sloppose au donne comme du simplement conou; 
il est en quelque,. facon donne" lui aussi (. 
ýLais 
sous d1autres especes), par exemple dans la 
mesure ou' j'anticipe l1avenir, lorsque je me 
rejouis ou mlattriste ou mtinquiete d1une 
certaine perspective. (H. V. P. 57. ) 
Then follows the passage already quoted on the immanence of 
the future in the present. And, as this theory'of time is 
the corollary of the doctrine of the embodied self and of 
compresences, Marcel suggests that the term "human conditioi2l 
should replace in philosophical speculation that of human 
"natture". "Qui-donque reprendrdit aujourd'hui llentreprise 
de Hume'devr&it, il me semble, intituler son ouvrage . De la 
Condition Humaine. 11 (R. I. pp. 122-3. ) The operative power 
(1) "In considering the causal model the past and the future 
were defined positivelyq and the contemporaries of M were 
defined negatively as lying neither in Nits past nor in M's 
future. In dealing with presentationaT immediacy the - 
opposite way must be taken. For presentational immediacy 
gives positive information only about. the immediate present 
. 
as defined by itself. " (Ibid., p. 174. ) 
1 
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of past and future, indeed, implies the recognition of 
eternal objects beyond the field of temporal process and 
finding therein the means to endure and be r-e-enacted. But 
iýo less does it involve and even depend on What Whitehead 
calls the "witness of the body' and Marcel "incarnation! ' 
organic connection with the universe of-things, a realm*of 
"Presences7l whose locality is not finally determinable but 
which are part ana,. parcel of our subjectivity as feelings 
which model our-activity and are essential to self-realisation 
(1) . 
To return to the main topic, it is according to the 
degree in which past and future are made operative in the 
present, that is according to the intensity with which the 
present is lived that continuity and permanence are secured. 
I'Llesprit9l, to quote Valeryl 'lest une puissance de pr ter a 
une circonstance actuelle les-ressources du passe et les' 
energ es du devenir (2). " Durat-Jon-then becomes the means 
of what Marcel calls 'I eternisation!; ' in the measure we 
secure re-enaction we'realise, he says, a "jinite supra- 
consciente et supra-historique'll image or reflection of the 
"Perennite vivantVI which is eternity itself. (II. V. p. 11. ) 
"The bonds of causal efficacy arise from without us. ýhle)y 
(* Usclose the character of the world from which we issue, 
an inescapable condition round which we shape ourselves. " (ý., 'Ihitehead, Symbolism., its meanin5 and effect, Cambridge Uni: Tersity Press, L9? -d, pl). . 68-9; ) i. M. WF=Jaas noted the analogy between Whitehead's doct ne and Arlarcells. (Cf. La -ohiloso2hie sp4culative de Vlhitehead,. Rev. P41.9 1931, 
P. 3697) 
(2) Melange, 'p. 27. 
r--" 
333. 
In the "instairt, ' man suspends in some measure the flight of 
time, like Rilke's angel, transforming the visible into the 
invisible: "Erde, ist es ni. cht dies, was du willst: um ichtbar 
ý* In uns erstehn? " 
The "instant" is the meeting-place of permanence and flux, of 
the one and the many, of identity and difference (1). It 
-assures us 
that "in the inescapable flux, there is something 
that abidqs (2). 11 And this property of the instant that it 
"holds within:. itzelf the complete sum of existence, backwards 
and forwards, that Whole amplitude of time, which is eternity 
is the sole means of transcending time in existence (4). 
Seen thus, the "instant' is the point of intersection of 
time and eternity. , It has in Marcel's philosophy the same 
status as in Kierkegaard's Where it isl. defined as the 
"synthesis of the eternal and the temporal", the category of 
"spirit" as opposed to "nature" and as such llnotý properly an 
atom of*time but an atom of eternity. It is the finite 
reflection of eternity in time-, its first effort as it were 
to bring time to a stop In the instant deeply lived, 
we can say, in the words of Spinoza, 11sentimus nos aeternos 
Of. Leibniz, 1, jonadologyj 13. 
Proc. and Real. 478. 
Aims of Education, London, Williams and 
gate, 1929: p. 
(4) "The perfect realization is not merely the-exemplification 
of what in abstraction is timeless. It does more** it implants timelessness on what in its essence is passing. The 
peifeýt moment is fadeless in the lapse of time. Time hds 
then lost its character of 'perpetual perishing'; it becomes 
the 'moving image of eternity'. '# (Proc. and Real., ' p. 479. ) 
(5) Concept of Dread, P. 79. 
- 
C 




'For, however similar the temporal theories of Marcel and 
Vhitehead, their context differs as between what is azi 
organic philosophy and. what is a religious philosophy. With 
Saint Aunýustine and Pascal, Marcel sees in the "instant' the 
portal to a religious Ontology. -, In the 11 absence! ' or * 
alienation of realityt--its relegation to some point in what 
is a mere past, lies for him the very root of evil, the 
I 
deliverance of, the self to the anguish of successivity and 
its consequent dereliction. Salvation is to be found in the 
"retour au- maintenant", the "never-f ailing- . NoWl of Boethius, 
that same redeeming instant of which Lr T. S. Eliot has spoken 
in a recent poem: 
f 
But to apprehend 
The point of intersection of the timeless 
With time, is an occupation for the saint 
No occupation either, but something given .L And taken, in a lif etime Is death in love, 
, Ardour and selflessness and self-surrender 
The consciousness of time as a means of perpetuation 
enables the existent subject to experience hi8 life as 
destiny or, to employ M-arcel's favourite termg as "drama! '. 
The. 11scenell as already said, may be described as the eternal 
as it is mirrored in the "instant'19 a'fragment of destiny, 
for by reason of the property of the instant to compose a 
simultaneity, it constitutes "un tout indivisible'. Like 
the instants in which they are reflected, the scenes may at 
first sight appear discontinuous, but this discontinuity is 
(1) The Jýry Salvages. 
. -. --r- 0 
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overcome as the sequence of instants is unified by the 
repetitions of purposive action. The life of. the individual 
is a sort of "matter calling for the active interventionY of 
the subject; -it being for him to weave the various scenes 
into a pattern by integrating the scenes-he has acted and 
,4 
those he purposes to act into a meaningful unity of which the 
present is the focal point. Then only the metaphor of a 
"lottery' ceases-to be applicable to, his life; the latter 
becomes a destiny, an effort to "prolonger au delaý du domaine, 
ou peut slexercer llobservation, -une courbe. " (H. V. p. 8. ) 
Here for Marcel is 
-the realm of 
11 hopV, , vihi ch- has become more 
and more for him the prime category of transcendence and 
which is the rdeognition that "toute vie humaine se developpe 
a la facon d1un drame". (Ibid.; p. 9. ) And in releasing 
this perspective, the'sense of death as onel. s ovm, as 
eiSentlich, has an all-important part to play by reason of its 
temporal reference; for it constitutes an absolute, end, set 
in the future but i*mpinG-inr on the past and the present, 
ProvidinS purpose and pattern, forcing a revaluation of the 
present in the light of eventual salvation or perdit-ione 
Au milieu ae'tant ae nuees Oui slaccumulent et I 
qui descendpnt en quelciue s6rte de llinconzu 
de l1avenir vers les profondeurs d1un passe 
qui de moins en moins se laisse reconnaltre 
comme donne, une assurance demeure'invarizable: 
je mourrai. -,, Ja mort seule, aans ce qui mlattend, 
est non-problematique. Clen est assez -oour 
culelle slf=pose "a moi co=e un astre do- 
scintil. 'Le:: ent des D-4vezse" - -cossibles. (-21.1.154. ) 
Kierkegaard has shov. m in similar fashion how the 11 instant, 
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and sequence of"instants" procure consciousness of destiny. 
He also shows how, if objective time is taken as referencel 
there is, in the true sense, no past, future or present at 
all (1). Only in the instant of real time, where they are 
co-present, do these divisions, become significant and acquire 
an individual and specific reality. "Tile instant is that 
ambiguous moment in which time and eternity touch one another, 
thereby positing the temporal', vfaere time is constantly 
intersecting-eternity and eternity. constantly permeating time. 
Only now does that division we talked about acquire signifi- 
cance: the present, -the past, and the future (2). 11 For, as 
Kierkegaard has rightly underlined, it is the condition of any 
ileternisation! ' and any creation of destiny that past and 
future should- preserve an autonomous status of their own as 
distinct from the imediate present. : This most important 
Point we shall take up later with respect to Marcel, for it 
constitutes the most original element in his temporal doctrine. 
Suffýce to say for the moment that, in common with Kierkegaard, 
he considers the "instant", understood as the focal'point of 
a past and future, ifaich, although immanent in the present, 
yet retain their distinct metaphysical status, to be the 
temporal mode wherein man attains consciousness of destiny 
with all it entails by way of possibility of repentance, moral 
responsibility and salvation. Apart from sUch an "instant' 
transcendence, hopeg repentance - the fundamental categories 
(1) Concept of Dread, P. 77. 




of a religious philosophy - would be meaningless abstractions. 
Marcel's whole philosophy echoes the judgment of Kierkegaard 
when he writes: "The concept around which everything turns 
in Christianity, the concept which makes all things newo is 
the fullnets of time, is the instant as eternity, and yet this 
eternity is at once the fut-ur e and the past. If one does 
not give heed. to this, one cannot save any concept from 
I 
heretical_and treas, onable admixtures which destroy the 
concept. . One does not get the past as a thing for itself 
but in simple continuity, With the future - and with that the 
concepts of conversion, atonement, redemption- are resolved 
in the significance of world-history, and resolved in the 
individual historical development. One does not get the 
future as a thing f or itself - and v7it4 that the resurrection 
and the judgnent come to naught (1). " 
- 
To turn to another problem raised by Llarcel Is doctrine 
of time, one which vrill assume greater importance as we 
proce-ed, we may note that his "instant" is a version of the 
totum simul or "Eternal Novel as described by Saint Thomas and 
Boethius before-him (2). We must, however, distinguish 
* 
carefully. Without entering into a detailed discussion of 
(1 Ibid., p. 81. 
(2ý Of. Boethius, De Consolatione Philosophiael 7, §. 6; 




the doctrine of Saint Thomas and Duns Scot as to the totum B 
simul and the nature of the eternity enjoyed by God, the 
Angels and m3n'respectively - involving a subtle distinction 
between the nunc stanst 
I fluctuans - we may, for 
eternity which Marcel Is 
-praesens non fluctuans. 
rather to -the nunc stan 
the aevum and the praesens non 
illustrative purposes, liken the 
philosophy attributes to man to a 
The totum siýmul proper relates 
q enjoyed'by the Divine actuality. 
It is superior to the eternity attainable by the contingent 
creature not in its "plerdtude, so much as in its character of 
totality" That is in God, in whom possibility and act 
essence and eidstence are one, every moment of His past and 
future enjoys the same single degree of actualisation in His 
eternal present; so that he has no past or future as such 
and is devoid of change, in so far as change signifies 
deperition. The cxeaturel on the contrary, in lwhom essence 
and existence, are separate cannot be in the same sense Pure 
Act. He can achieve a measure of simultaneity resultant 
from past and future being operative Jyl his 
, 
present; in this 
sens-el he too realises his essence as act and experiences a 
measure Of the "plenitude" the Godhead enjoys. . But his past 
and unrealised future, present always with some degree of 
actuality' (this is true even of the future, which is no 
"mere possible",. for then it would be simply nothinG), are so 
in varying degrees. There remains, then, in the present of__ 
purposive action a margin of what logic obliges us to term 
9.. ... .... . 
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possibility but what is in. fact an infinitely varying degree 
of actuality. in the moment of self-realisation vjhich the 
self experiences'the whole range of his, past and unrealised 
future is represented and pro-jected in the present, but the 
resultant act is but the narrow f ocal-point of all that is 
eternally potential. In short, -. 
the eternity which man can 
enjoy is a present which holds within it a distinctive past 
and future. 
It is p ecisely --h4s residue of "possibility, (or, =o-e 
correctly, the impossibility of transforming each'and every 
potentiality of the self into a single and simple degree of 
actuality) which is for the creature the guarantee of the 
transcendent; but for this "something over" Which he 
constantly e: ýTeriences$ the opposition between immanenob and 
transcendence would have no meaning. 11oreover, it is the 
condition of the whole movement of transcendence that 
characterises, the life of man viewed as a lldramý! V, Before 
him he has incessantly as his goal the state of full self- 
realisation and the possession, if not of a nunc stansl at 
least of something approaching it. At the utmost, all he 
can now enjoy is a plenitude where time-leaves something to 
abide, Yet falls short of the eternity which is an eternal 
present becauseýpast- and future have become wholly actual, 
and of the Actus purus which has no degrees. The life of 
the individual appears thus as a nisus, a striving within 
time experienced as both the barrier and the means to eternal 
life. 
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The classical philosophy has always maintained thatq 
in enjoyinG this measure of eternity, and so realising its 
being and essence, the self experiences itself ab. substance 
and causa sui. It possesses the essential attributes of 
substance and cause, namely the state of-being dependent' 
solely on itself, selecting by its free decision those 
potentialities in its past that, in Whitehead's'phrase, are 
"relevant" to its future and actualising them-in the present 
of its decision. It enjoys what the latter again calls a 
state of "satisfaction! ', having absorbed its data (1). 
Marcel has always, been reluctant to use'thdse-terms 
and he has often put on record his rejection of the notion 
of causa sui in particular. But this latt-er rejection seems 
to, be based on a misunderstanding due to the fact that he 
identifies the notion of causa sui with that of autonomy, 
which can have no place in a philosophy that, starting from 
an initial compresence of selvesq affirms self-realisation to 
depend on a mutual activity and creation, on a complex 
MYstique of , caliV, and "responses". But the notion of 
causa sui (or of substance) does not, as Whitehead's organic 
Philosophy showsl preclude mutuality and interdependence. 
All that it implies is, to use Marcel's ovm phraseology, that 
what is "received, ' is incorporated freely into the being of 
the self; Indeed, Marcel's own description of the permanence 
obtained as 1ý1-te: Tression phenome'nale... dlune liaison 
(1) Cf. Proc. and Real., p. 214. 
0 
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substantielle" (H. V. p. 169), as a "plenitude qui est 116tre 
memell indicates that he himself attributes to the self in its 
momentary realisations the characteristics of substance and 
causa sui as generally understood (1). 
Of course, this realisation of thes'elf as substance 
and causa sui would not be of the same character as that 
enjoyed by the Divinity or by the i=iortal self. It is, 
Elarcel says, but the exTression phenome"nale et trompeuse 
d1une liaison"substantielle qui ne peut, elle, se consommer 
que dans lleternitel. That is what Descartes meant when he 
declared the terms substance and cause cannot'-be employed' 
univocally of God and man. God is absolute substance and 
cause in that He is fully-realised Act. Man is act only in 
a subsidiary sense, the simultaneity he may enjoy embodying 
a margin of possibility. It is significant that Descartes 
should stress the deficiencies of memory in this, connection; 
these certainly constitute the main obstacle to a full 
actualisation of the past in the present (2). The difference 
between the substance or beinG of God and those of man is 
further underlined when it is pointed out that, in Marcel Is 
(1) With Descartes and Spinoza Marcel would identify substance 
and causa suiq as opposed to the Scholasticst notably Saint Thomas, who make a radical distinction between them (ens in se 
and ens a se)q substance being for them a mere substr or 
suppos-3,77lo-nof existence. The Co ito erEo sum--JL'. -Cs-e-r-, '. is the 
expression of their identity, f0 brunschvicg, La Revolution 
cartesienne et la notion spinoziste de la substancet Rev. de 1vidt. ', 1904's P. 78%)- 
ý2) On this topic f. Boyce Gibson,, The Philosophy of Descartes, 
ondon, Methuen, 1932t pp. 241-4. 
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view, the moments of existence or self-realisation are them- e 
selves discontinuous, and that whatever continuity may be 
achieved is ultimately dependent oh grace. So that the 
individual life can never be anything but an approximation 
even to the subsidiary being which he enjoys at privileged 
moments. None the less, in these brief 11scintillements 
dlexistencV' he achieves a type of substantial andýcausal 
"plenitude". 
p- 
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V. Time and Freedom. e 
As with Kierkegaard, the time problem assumes greatest 
urgency in 1,112, rcel Is philosophy in its relation to the problem 
of-freedom and necessity. His important reflections on this 
theme throw 1,; ae most vivid light on his-temporal doctrine as 
a whole and, indeed, serve both to bring out the fundamentals 
of that doctrine and to illustrate what has gone before. it 
must be borne in mind that Marcel is not a systematic philo- 
-sopher and thetheory here presented in this chapter is an 
interpretation made, in the light of AL-, ýcells numerous pheno- 
menological studies. Even more is this the case in the 
present instance where the temporal implications of free 
action are brought to the surface and clarified in and through 
the analysis of the concrete situations of despair and hope. 
In a lecture entitled Esquisse d1une -Dhe"nomenolog e et 
d1une' m4taphysi ue de llesp4rance, included in Homo Viator, 
Marcell seeking to define the existential of despair, relates 
it to a certain Itepreuvell described as a "mode de captivite". 
(H. V. P. 40. ) He then goes on to underline the intimate 
co=ection between despair and time: 
Il faut souligner le r8le que joue ici la 
durele: je mlapparais co=e captif si je me trouve non seulement jeý41 mais co=e engage 
sous une contrainte exterieure dans un mode dlexistence qui mlest impose"et comporte des 
restrictions de tous ordres pour mon agir 
pzopre. (Ibid., p. 41. ) 
For what characterises the llepreuvell is I'llimpossibilite... 
dlacceýider a une certaine ple"nitudell; (Ibid. ') Despair is then 
- the outcome of a certain mode of temporal experience; it has 
I 
.. _.... ______________ - -. .- 
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its source in Ill de se sentir livre au temp! V. 
This mode of temporal experience is itself one with the 
consciousness of necessity, being a "capitulation devant un 
.1 certainfat, 3E, a pose par le jugement". (Ibid., p. 49. ) It is 
rooted in the process of objec'uivation*hereby self and things 
are alienated and disposed in the discrete time-series of 
conceptual thinking. 
In other words, the experience of despair is inseparable 
from the 15henomenon which we might describe as the loss of 
the past and the future. On the one hand, the past is no 
longer felt as operative in the present, becoming an insigni- 
ficant dead-weight. This is most evident in the despair 
experienced an the death of someone loved, in what Marcel 
terms the 11 dialectique de la mort" where 11 elle. risque de nous 
coIncer d: ans une angoisse sans issue, de nous rendre 
prisonniers d1une experience e'c'artelante, opposant 
irreductiblement un donne, et un rememore qui, bien loin de 
]ýOUVOir so fondre, sont voues a se demen ir inlassablement 
Pun l'autre". (Ibid., p. 42. ) But on the other hand, the 
pastqýonce "immobiliseall anarenaerea incapable of fusion 
vrith. the present, preserves an untold power to destroy and 
contaminate the future, and to render purposes and ideals 
equally ineffect. ive in present experience: 
Mais ce qulil faut voir, clest que. plu 
's 
nous 
irwaobilisons le passe, plus llaverar a son 
.1 tour se pre'sente A nous comme du revolu avant la lettre, du revolu par anticipation;., cette 
contamination de llavenir par le passe est au 
coeur de tout fatalisme. (R. I. -o. '74. ) 
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We are then confronted by a situation where alone the Ii 
present of suffering, the ! tepreuvdl, fills and absorbs the 
consciousness. The nina is, as it were, 11hypnotise/ sur 
une certaine image precise". (H. V. p. 61. ), For despair is 
f 
essentially "fascination! ', *the contracting of a "habitus" - 
a Ilordmpli or-an "enchantment, ', concentrating the, mina on-the 
imagre of, destruction that the present destruction calls up. 
As a result of-this fascination, the individual cannot 
escape from the immediate present, that is from a present 
objectifiedl immobilised and tran formea into a point I 
divorced from past, and future, from process. * He is then led 
to "eternise" this isolated present itself, to believe and 
, feel that what he is and eý*eriences within the arbitrary 
out in time will recur vrith an irrevocable necessity 
throughQut time: 
Le ae"sespe"re' ne contemple pas seulement, il nla 
pas seuiement devant lui cette repetition morne, 'ýette eternisaHi-ondlune situation dans-laquelle 
il est pris comme une barque est prise aans; les 
glaces; par un paradoxe malaise"ment concevable, 
il anticipe cette repetition, il la voit dans 
llinstant memeg et il possede en meme temps 
llacre certitude que cette anticipatio3l ne le 
dispensera pas de continuer 'a vivre'114preuve 0 au jour le jour, inde"finiment, ausqu a cetute 
extinction quvil anticipe aussi a vrai dire, 
mais non comme un rem'e'de. (H. V. PP. 56-7. ') 
The consciousness of necessity is thus bound up with the 
consciousness of time as "closed", as a "prison! ', where future 
and past cease to be effective; "comme si llavenir, draing 
de s'a substance et de son myste"re, ne devait-plus etre que 




noted in passinG that this is precisely the temPoral- e2perience 
at the root of Baudelaire's LLennuill. Marcel has further 
noted, with characteristic penetration, that this form of 
"instantanei. -JI is paradoxically a consciousness both of time 
as closed and of time as pure succession: 
Autant dire ciulon est ici dans un monde ou le 
temps ne passe plus, ou, ce qui revient au 
memeg dans un monde oU* le temps ne 
' 
fait plus 
que passer, mais. sans rien apporter, sans 
ýharrier les materiaux suscý ptibles de servir 
a lledification d1une verite nouvelle ou dtun 
etre neuf. (Ibid., P. 70. ) 
And here again, this is Precisely the paradox residing in 
Baudelaire's temporal experience. 
In any case, att-he centre of despair and determinism 
3-s an experience of time which precludes all sense of 
realisation and destiny and substitutes for it what Kierke- 
gaard calls the Stoic"resignation to fate7l, the sense of- 
mournful r6currence. 
Now) existence becomes possible only on the condition 
that this fatalism is rejected, making room for hope. And 
this transcending of necessity is accomplished by the recovery 
of the true, full ttinstanti, wherein past and anticipated 
future are operative. it permits ifhat Marcel calls a 
"reconciliatiov, with the past, transforming it from a dead- 
weight into a force determining the present. No less the 
future, as the goal of action and as grounded in both present 
and past, is immanent therein.. The "instant, is thus the 
focal point of a junction between"Ilti=e5diat; l1anticipel et 




Life as lived in axýcation or existential experience is a 
process where tho present gathers up in itself the past and. 
bears within the future - like the motion of a sailing-ship 
conditioned by the double force of water and air, to use 
1,111arcel's happy metaphor. 
It is this sense of process Vaich liberates, the self 
from the fascination of narrow immediacy and from the image 
of that-. false eternity or Nietzschean , eternal returv, on the 
one hand, and of that false anticipation, which is the sense 
of mere recurrence, on the other. If despair results from 
nn "undoind' (se delfaire) or disruption of the self's reality, 
hope sprin, -, s from an inward "consolidation! ', from, the I'volon e t 
de rester celui que je suis". (Ibid., po 51) It is con 
sciousness of process: 11celui qui espere... s app ar alt a 
lui-meme comm'e implique dans un certain proces. 11 (lbid., p. 47) 
If despair marks a Itsouillure! l and "fletrissurd, of experience, 
hope embodies an "appel a ltexistence d1une certaine 
creativitel dans le mondeý'. (Ibid., p. 69) It is one with 
the entraiv, or ardeur a vivrd' vticli is the very "substance 
de la vie,,. (Ibid., PP. 57s 53). 
Hopel therefore, in Marcel's view, has a precise 
. 
temporal reference and must be assimilated to patience which, 
in the individual, is linked with 11sa reaction a la duree, 
plus precise"ment a la temporalite", clest-rd\-dire au foit qulil 
ya place pour le changement dans le reel". (Ibid. 9 P-52) 
It consists in "taking one's timelf; for example, the exercise 
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of patiencEL with reGard to another person implies 'tun subtil 
respect de la dure'e ou de la cadence vitale propre-a. llautrd' 
in order to move and transform him. (Ibid., P. 54. ) Hope, 
like other modes of existential experience, althou, ýto a 
greater deCree, supposes "an original relation of conscious- 
ness to time", being both-a consciousness of process and 
"confidencell'in this process, so as in some-manner to 
espouse`, 
_ 
it and ýavour it from withirl'. (Ibid. I P. 53. ) 
This consciousness of process arises when past and 
future cease to be isolated from the present and are 
expetienced as immanent therein, while at the same time 
retaining an autonomy of their own, so as to constitute an 
. enduring growthq 
a unity within multiplicity, a multiplicity 
overlapping unity - 11un certain pluralisme temporel, une 
certaine pluralisation temporelle de soi. 11 (Ibid., P. 54. ) 
Hope and existence in General may be described 'as 
a "pouvoir 
de. fluidificatio, xYlj a power of infusing past and future, 
Otherzise dead and immova-bleq into tho present: . 
!. 
On pourrailt dire encore que si le temps est 
par essence separation et comMe porp6tuelle 
disjonction de soi par rapport '. ý soi-m6me, 
perance vise a -contraire a la reunion, 1'es au bLIla recollection, a la reconciliation. (Ibid., P-72. ) 
In so far as the. individual breaks the circle of 
determinism which his ensl&vement to the present image 
entails, he emerges-into the realm of hope and freedom. He 
recovers his initial spiritual nisus. Time, ceasing to be 
"closed", is experienced as the means of realising an essence 
immanent in, yet transcending time: "tout se passe alors 
....  
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comme si le temps, au lieu de se refermer sur la conscienceg 
laissait passer quelque chose a travers lui. 11 (Ibid. 9 P. 71. ) 
Finality and purpose brome active factors in, experience; the 
future, with all the timeless ends it embodies, active in the 
present and foretold in the past, regaiiis its superior meta- 
physi6al status as the final cause governing action. 
Existence is this veritable "prophetic consciousnesVI, the 
urge towards and the anticipation of a fully realised eternity 
which the future carries mysteriously bidden within itself: 
"elle affirme comme si elle voyait,. " (Ibid., P. 71. ) It is 
very precisely a "meMoire du, futuV,, (Ibides'Po'72. ) 
This process-accomplished by means of the "instanVI is 
what Kierkegaard terms I'Repbtition!! and Marcel "Fidelity" (at 
bottom synonymous with hope). It'is the movement towards 
self-zýealisation'by virtue of the enduring content of the 
present. Although Marcel's thought, as he has, often declared, 
is inde pendent of Kierkegaard's, it is impossible not, to note 
the similarities of the two doctrines under discussion. 
Kierkegaard defines his Repetition, in opposition to the 
Platonic recollectiong as a 11forviard-100king recollection! ' 
(Marcel's lime/mat? e du futuVI)IW "Re2etition is a decisive, 
expression,. f or what 'recollection I was for Ithe Greeks. Just 
as they taught that all knowledge is a recollection, so vrill! 
modem philosophy t. eaea that the Vaole of life is a repetition. 
The only modern ]? hilosopher who had an inkling of this was 
Leibniz. Repetition and recollection are the same movements 
only in opposite dýrections; for what is recollected has 
ýi 
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been, is repeated backwards, whereas repetition properly so- 
called is recollected forivards. Therelore repetition2 if* 
it is possible, makes a man happy, *whereas recollection makes 
him unhappy (1). " He speaks elsewhere of the category of 
repetition "by venich one enters eternitj forwards (2). 11 
We shall discuss in the following section the-importance 
of this distinction; suffice to say that existencet for 
Marcel as-f or Kiezýkegaaraj is essentially a forward movement. 
The Platonic "instant' of recollection involves a stopping of 
time, that is, the destruction of the futre and of movement 
so as. to attain, by a total transcenaing of time, contempla- 
tive Vision of the timeless essence, For a philosophy of 
I 
existence, the actual is everything; its aim is to show how 
eternity is infused into time and movement; and this 
precisely by means of "rePetitiOlP or "fidelit-Y'. 
In these operations the important-factor-As obviously 
the prospective urge which transforms into actuality the 
future instinct with timeless ends. This is the "forward- 
movement, of all existential experience. it is perhaps to 
stress this that Jjarcell who in Etre et Avoir speaks through- 
out of "fide'lite", , comes to prefer the term "fidelite' 
-creatrice" in Du, Refus a l'Invocation, and in his last work, 
Homo Viator, identifies the'latter with hope itself. It isq 
however, important to observe that fidelity is by no means a 
pure urGd to the future; it requires equally preservation of 
(1) Repetition, Oxford Univ. Press, 1942, pp. 3-4. 
(2) concept of Dread, p. 80, note. I 
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and continuity vdth the past. The elimination of the past 
leads to theequally erroneous Heraclitean'linstantaneismel. 
Kierkegaard himself has noted that "recollection!, has its, 
place within "repetition! ', which includes both it and 
anticipation. "The dialectic of repetition is easy, " he 
writes, "for what is repeated has Ibeen, 
otherwise it could 
not be repeated, but precisely the fact that it has been 
gives to_repetition the character of novelty... Vhen one 
does not possess the categories of recollection or of 
repetition thu whole of life is resolved into a void of 
empty noise (1). 11 Marcel says the same thing in those 
passaGes previously quoted where he spe. -Ls of the necessary 
"triangulation!, of temporal exp_erience or whore he talks of 
hope as involving both an element of "returv, and of "novelty": 
He pourrait-on pas dire que celle-ci- impliclue 
toujours la liaison supra-losique d1un retou 
(nostos) et d1une nouveaute pure (! ý'. ainon tf)? 
On pourrait Us lors se demander si conservaý- 
tion ou restauration d1une part, et r6volution 
ou, renouvellement d'a-utrepartt ne sort pas les 
deux moments, les deux aspects ab strait ement 
dissoci4s d'une memo unite, qui ost posee dans 
Ilesperance par del& tout raisonnoment, toute 
mis. e en forme conceptuelle. Aspiration quIon 
tzaduirait approximativement par ces siniples 
mots contradictoires: comm, o au-paravanij, mais 
autrement et mieux qulau'paravErt-. (r.. -V-. 'o. 90. ) 
By fidelity the individual infuses eternity into time, 
placing "the seal of eternity on the act of creation 
perpetually renewed". (R. I. p. 132. ) , 
Fidelity ist for 
- Idarcel, as repetition is for Kierkegaard, the category of 





true "purity of Soul": 
the mark of 
Av/ it 
" 
lta. -puretý dlame, clest la er e de llexistence 
clul, en laits Ose et realise Ilimpurete dans le 
monde pour sai,, J-3ý dans la consc-lence 6continue 
de sa culpabilite la realisation de la puret 
7 
e 
co=e t akhe inf inie dans la tension de la vie 
temporelle. (R-1- P. 320. ) 
4 
In fidelity man recovers the consciousness of destiny, of his 
life as "accomplishment' (Erfýlllung) to use Jaspers's term, (1)., 
Fidelity-and hope are the instruments of this self-realisation 
throughout timei they are the virtues by and in which "is 
consummated the unity of our destiny both temporal and supra- 
temporal". (H. V. p. 123. ) Buý process as a whole has to be 
considered as a movement of transcendence directed towards 
an ultimate self-realisation, an ultimate eternity or 
plenitude of which those consimmations are but a reflection. 
This is what KierkeCaard means when he states that "the true 
repetition is eternity (2). 11 Fidelity and hope, theng as 
teleological activitiesq transcend at every moment the 
actuality and the immediate representatýion; they are 
ultimately, and with them all forms of existential experience, 
modes of belief and faith, just as treason and despair are 
modes of incredulity, for there is a point Vaere "incredulity 
coincides vtith a certain radical infidelity'. (R. I. p. 222. ) 
Existence, to sum up, is transcendence: "Le croyant est 
celui qui ne se heurtera a aucun obstacle insurmontable sur 
(1 Philosophie, Vol. 11, p. 228. 
(2ý itepetition, Editor. 's Introduction, p. xxvii. 
I 
It is, he Says, co=enting/Jaspers, 
i ', -. 
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cette voie de transcendance. ll (H. V. r. 62. ) 
- 
To say that existence is transcendence is to say that 
it is'freedom. 
De l'e'tre comme licu de la fidelite... Ici . IN 
apparaz--b une solidarite entre la philosop#ie 
de lte3tre et la philosophie de la liberte, 
que le metaphysicien ne saurai-b a mon sens 
affirmer trop visoureusement. (R. l. p. 222. ) 
To posit actuality is to posit freedom, as opposed to 
necessity, transcendence ass opposed to immanence, existence 
as opposed to logic, movement as opposed to mediation and 
deduction. ' Marcel would agree fully with Kierkegaard's 
repudiation of all attempts to make logic account for reality 
or to identify the real and the rational. To make this 
identification is to identify the actual and'the necessary. 
Thus the application of deduction to reality, as attempted by 
Descartes and Spinoza, envisaSes the reduction of the real 
v1ith its Contingent content to a logically necessary sequence 
of propositions (1). Logic is, however, the negation of 
movementl a deductive sequence of propositions in no sense 
constitutes a passage; whatever movement the mind knpears to 
(1 indeed, the ultimate ideal of Rationalism inspiring the 
noýion of a mathesis universalis$ common to Leibniz and the 
analytical pTýit-EQners of : EFe-18th century, is the reduction 
of reality to a single proposition: an ideal most forcibI 
expressed by D'Alembert (Discours preliminaire de 1'Encyclo- 
p4die, ed. Picavet, Paris, Gol: Ln, 1929, p. 39)nnd-to be found 
to-cLay in VaI&y who ovies much to 18th century analysis, 
notably to Condillac. 
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make is bound up with the limitations of thought which 
prevent it from i--rasping the entire sequence at once and is 
more apparent than real. The intuition operating at each 
stage is the fluctuating point of a single intuition. Nor 
does it embody novelty, the passage from'non-existence to 
existence. What we have is a series of identities which 
are at bottom expressions of a single changeless identity (1). 
The same strictures are valid for the Hegelian mediation, 
I 
which*was an attempt to introduce "movement" intolosic. it 
is against Hegel that Kierkegaard and, following him, Marcel 
and all other E. xistentialistsq are reacting. " Hegel likevrise 
identifies the actual and the'logically necessary. The 
actual he defines not as the existent, which is the unity of 
(1) Cf. D'Alembert, Disc. pre'lim., pp. 37-8. The conception 
stated involves the : Curther view that truth is a matter of 
definition and e-: Tression, the view expressed in Condillac's 
well-knoi, m dictum: "Une science bien traite"o nlest qu'une 
langue bien faiteir (Lanrae des calculs, Paris, Charles Houel, 
An VIo P. 7) and lateiy revived in--: E-he Logical Positivism. 
It is interesting to note that it was precisely in terms 
Of this theory of reasoning that both Diderot and Rousseau 
came to deny the competence of analysis in fields outside 
mathematics. (Cf. Diderot, Pensees sur ltinterpretation de la nature, Oeuvres completes, ed. Ass6zat, Vol. 2: 1,2ariis, 
GarnieF-, 1875, PP. 9-10. ) Rousseau's criticism of analysis 
and rational inference in general is based on the view that 
all reasoning is a continuous process whereby an initial 
proposition is transformed by gradual stages and that this 
very transformation is tantamount to a-deformation ie vres 
morales, Lettre TI, CorresOondance ýýenerale, ed. ourg Vol. 
111, Paris, Uolan, i525-, pp. 35-2--3) it-Yis interesting to 
see how Rousseau takes Condillac's hefi-nition of analysis, based on the doctrine of transfofmed sensation, and uses it 
as a sort of boomerang to throw doubts on the whole process 
of rational inference. 
-, - ý- - ý, I. ýýi. -. 
! I, 
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thought and being given in immediacy, but which, being 
unref lected, is still 11 appearance" , but this same unity made 
explicit in terms of logical identity and therefore devoid 
of all transition. "Being is, in general, unreflected 
immediacy and transition into another. - Existence is immediate 
unity of being and reflection; hence appearance: it comes 
from the ground, and falls to the ground. In actuality, 
this unity is explicitly put, and the two sides of the 
relation identified. Hence the actual is exempted from 
transition, and its externality is its energising (l). 11 
What Hegel calls mediation is the operation of"reflection 
whereby the contradictions revealed in the light of thought 
are reconciled, the transition which these contradictions 
involve overcome and the real or actual - namely the whole 
of which the divided members are part, or being as reflect" 
and reduced to logical identity - is viewed as 
In such a doctrine movement is relegated to the status 
of appearance and phenomenon; being and actuality are 
identified with the rational and logically necessary, free 
from all contingence. 11oreover, Hegelian mediation, howevel, 
much it may claim to be a amovement in logic", is not in any 
sense a kinesis ,a bringing into existence. - No less than 
intuition, it is simply a certain ordering of the data, in 
this case - since we are dealing with a logic of contraries 
(1) Logic, transl. by Iff. Wallace, 2nd edition, Oxford, 1892, 
pp. 271--Z, § 142. 
(2) Cf. "d, Wallace, Prolegomena to the Stuk of Hep; elts 
Philosophy, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1894, pp. 45ý-5- 
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and not of identity - the contradictions discerned beneath 
immediacy, so as to reveal them as illusory. Vhatever 
transition is imposed upon the reflecting mind is not process, 
which is a brin, ý-ing into existence, but a continuous movement 
, of reconciliation and approximation, and one which 
is to 
culminate in a state that is void of movement and is really 
a form of contemplative vision. 
In contrast with the doctrine of immanence, the 
existential philosophy refuses to identify the actual and 
the logically necessary. The actual is that vLich exists 
and has become, therefore that into which there enter freedom 
and contingence (what Kierkegaard calls possibility). Logic, 
transcending movementq cannot grasp reality; the latter is 
grasped in process, in its passage to actuaiity, that is 
simultaneously with the transcendent acts of freedom that 
bring it into existence in the "instant" of repetition or 
fidelity. Existence is therefore the realm of what Kierke- 
gaard calls "paradoxes"t transitions that are not conclusions 
but acts effected by"the leap". 
Repetition, as Kierkegaard describes it, is transcendence, 
"a religious movement by virtue of the absurd (1). " It is 
opposed to logical mediation'which 'cannot be employed at all 
in the sphere of freedom, where the-next thing constantly 
emerges, not by virtue of immanence but of transcendence (2). 11 
In short, it is a category of transition analogous to the 
(1) Repetition,, Editor's Introduction, p. x: rvii. 
Ibid. 9 p. xxix. 
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Aristotelian kinesis, namely a passage from possibility to 
actuality effected by a transcendent act of freedom which 
brings into being the reality not yet actual of the future (1). 
"In the sphere of freedom ... there is possibility, and 
actuality emerges-as a transcendency (2). 11 
Marcel defines his fidelity in exactly the same way, 
describing the 11voeu cr4ateurl which animates the creator of 
any enduring object: 
Le-voeu ne prend corps quIa' partir d1une certaine 
saisie-de l1artiste par une re'alite qui est donnee 
bien moins ý son regard quQ, une sorte de toucher 
interieur; mais Cette realite aý)prehendee comme 
telle se presente en meme temps a moi - et il ya 
. 
la a la f ois un paradoxe et un mystere - co=e inaependante par rapport a mon vouloir propre et 
comme neanmoins tributaire de 11acte par lequel 
je. la fais passer dans l1existence. Le voeu 
createur nlest autre chose que le fiat en vertu. 
duquel je me decide a mettre toute-F-mes energýes 
au service de ce possible, qui de"JL?; impose a 
e noi, nais a moi seul, co=. e une re i e, afin de 
le transformer en une realit4 pour tous, clest-a- 
dire en une oeuvre constitude. (H. V. p. 162. ) 
In short, existence is the realm of becoming, as opposed 
to th6 continuous logical approximation, vhich is'a sort of 
I'mouvement sur place" of the mind enabling it to picture 
terms under the category of identity.. But if existence is 
opposed to logical necessity and logical, continuityg as 
transcendence to immanence, it would be equally vrong to deny 
to existence any element of necessity or continuity, to fail 
to recognise the type of necessity and continuity involved in 
(1) Cf. Aristotle2 Rhysics, III, i''" 
(2) Repetition, loc. cit., p. ý='j.: Cf. Leibniz's definition 
of liberty, -176im 24 ss. , Book 11, Chp. Mýjj § 21. 
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moral freedom and compatible t'lierewith. The concept of 
freedom, in Marcel's view, is certainly not that of free-willt 
of liberty of indifference. This would mean transforming 
each act of liberty into a uniquej unmotivated decree. Such 
an absolute heterogeneity is incompatible with teleological 
process., -I 
In several iiiterest-ing papsages Marcel has analysed the' 
fact o On the one 'f liberty and its temporal implications. 
hand, he rejects the outworra aete=inism that conceives the 
act of freedom as involving a sort of mechanical action of 
clearly defined motives upon the will, consequent on delibera- 
tion. Such a definition of freedom is a distortion of the 
free act by a posteriori analysis: 
Non seulement llaction volontaire ne suppose 
pas une estimation object. -ve pre"alable au terme 
de laquelle je discernerais par avance ce qui 
est en mon propre pouvoir et ce qui ne llest pas, 
mais il faut dire au contraire que la formule 
- ault-, 
hentique du vouloir, clest je veux, done je 
peux. (Ibid. I p. 67. ) 
Indeed, liberty, according to Marcel, belongs to the order 
of the I'mystery" or 'meta-problematical". Only an arbitrary 
analysis can dissociate the self from its Nvill and institute 
between will and motives a subject-object dualism in place of 
the concrete subjective unity; for everything in the 
experience of free action points to the fact that ?, our liberty 
is ourselves" and is 1111ýame 6me. 11 (R. I. Pe 78. ) 
For that reason, as Bergson has recognised, purposive action 
transcends the realm of specifiable and objectively definable 
0 
" "t .. 
ends. 
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Any type of I'vocatlor-21 bears witness to this; that 
of fatherhood, to take one of-Mlarcel's examples, Ilse situe 
en deca do la zone ou les motifs slexplicitent et*se formulent. 
Llexperience montre distinctement que plus elle est imperieusep 
moins il est facile dlen rendre compte en invoquant telle fin 
couraLment reconnue comme bonne (11argent, ld%pouvoir, la 
securite, la renqmme"e, etc. ). " (H. V. p. 146. )_ 
In short, what characterises the *act of freedom is the 
identification of motives and act; it is the projection of 
the whole personality: 
Plus ... une action engage totalement Ia personnalitel 
agissante, plus elle participe de la vocation, et 
plus elle est unique par essence, de telle sorte 
qulil ne saurait 6tre question pour l1agent de la 
reco=encer, ni pour d'autres de 11imiter au dehors. 
_(Ibid., 
p. 145. ) 
Such a. definition of freedom is of course of Ber-so., -uan Cý 
inspiration, as Marcel aaknowledges in the same passage. 0 
Libertyq declares Bergson, is 'Ile rapport du moi concret a 
11acte qulil accomplit'; "nous so=es libres quand nos actes 
dmanent ae notre pers=&I-ite"entiere, quand ils l1expriment, 
I 
quand ils ont avec elle cette indeýfinisss: ble ressemblance 
qulon trouve parfois entre itoeuvre et Ilartiste 
Now, in stressing, in opposition to any atomic conception 
of mental process, the transcendence of free action vdth 
respect to objectively specifiable ends considered as the 
flobjectsil of action, I'larcel is far from introducing by the 
back door the concept of liberum arbitrium. i Indeed, on this 
I (1). Essai sur les donnees imme'diates, p. p. 167, . 132. 
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point his position is much clearer than that of Bergson. 
To make the preceding stipulation is tantamount to affirming 
all the more strongly that the act is fully motivated or$ as 
Marcel-prefers to say, "surmotive":, 
Cela v9ut dire que l1acte accompli par vocation 
apparalt", ,I celui qui le juge du dehors comme 
essentiellement gratuit, allors que le sujet 
lui-mCxp Iteprouve au contraire comme pleine- 
mqnt necessaire ou comme surmotivi, comme trop,, 
necessaire en ve"rite' pour pouvoir etre explique 
ou justifie. (Ibid., p. 145. ) 
The very fact that it cannot be justified or explained in 
terms 6f specific motives arises from the fact that it is 
fully motivated within the concrete situation, '"the question 
of justification having no meaning except for a posteriori 
reflection. All that is denied is that freedom involves 
a dualism of motives and act. Anything in the nature of a 
doctrine of gratuitous action is rejected. Marcel is saved 
from any such way of thinking by his "transcendentisrP if we 
may so call it. We have already seen at the beginning of 
the chapter how, in his view, purposive action bears within 
itself a reference to a transcendent self instinct vdth 
purposes transcending time and operating throughout time as 
final causes -a relation of self to self which is "religious 
in essence., ' (H. V. p. 65. )- Freedom, in short, is self- 
realisation. 
The temporal implications of freedom follow from this. 
If liberty is not mere indifference, the possibility of' 
choosing indifferently this rather than that, independently 
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of any determining motive, but rather the fully motivated 
and fully necessary act that realises the transcendent 
purposes of the ess antial self, then freedom is inseparable 
from the mode of fidelity or self-realisation in time, The 
condition of authentic freedom is that the act render 
operative in the present both past and future. These 
transcendent purposes have to be realised throug; hout the 
course of time, and do so by their power to determine the 
present by way of efficient causation in respect of past 
pealisations and by final causation in respect of what is 
yet to be realised. 
A free act, says Marcel, is the act which frees us from 
the past or the future as a mere dead 
no . h-entity powerless to influence the 
pas ee /loign"' de penser qu'un acte est 
cýu il est libe'rateurg" (R. I. p. 74. ) 
weight, that is as a 
present: "Je ne serais 
libre ... dans'la, mesure 
- Vaich frees us by 
transforming them into motive forces. Freedom is thus 
perpetiation or Ivocatio, -21, continuity and renewal. 
Subjection to necessity is, as we have seen, the result 
Precisely of a temporal discontinuity. Yarcell has seen 
clearly the intimate relation between fatalism and temporal 
. discontinuity on the one hand, freedom and temporal continuity 
on the other. 
Marcel's concept of freedom is thus the neý. -ation of 




as the power to act or not in- conf ormity with motives (1). 
Such freedom involves a moral necessity (as opposed to a 
mechanical or logical one), where the determination of 
volitions is compatible irith their contingence. For freedom 
loses nothing by the assertion that the will is determined by 
purposes i=anent in process; the act of will is the means 
of realising the continuity implicit in the instant: it is 
precisely in bringing it to actuality that the vvill is free. 
Moreove. t, in his rejection of liberty of indifference 
Tv'. 'arcel is in agreement with that other great defender of 
freedom, Kierkegaard. The latter has shovm-that freedom 
is not the opposite-of necessity but the opposite of that 
type of mechanical necessity or fatalism which is guilt (2). 
And this guilt islexperienced precisely vfaen the acts of*the 
individual are a meaninglesst disconnected jumble. It is 
remedied by the infusion of the sense of repentance and 
atonement, in short by the acquired sense of responsibility 
when the self I by the recovery of the "instant" with its full 
retrospective and prospective range, is enabled to bring 
(1) "Tant qjulun homme a la puissance de penser ou de ne pas 
penser, de mouvoir ou de ne pas mouvoir cOnfOrmement hL la 
pr&d'rence ou au choix de son propre esprit, jusque-la il est 
libre. " (11TOUV- Essais, Bk. 119 Chp. XXfj § 8. ) 
(2)%The Concept of Dread. p. 97. Cf. Leibniz: "Il me semble 
quia proprement parýýer, quoique les volitionssoient contin- 
Gentes, la n6cessitd ne doit pas 6tre opposee a la volition, 
.1 mais' a la contingence ,9.. et que la necessite" doit pas Stre confondue avec la ddteriaination, car il nly., a pas noins de 
connexion ou de determination dans les pensees, clue dans les 
mouvements (etre determine eý,, -ant tout autre chose ciuletre 
JI pousse ou force av%c contrainte). (Op. cit., Ibid., 5 13. ) 
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continuity and moral'purpose into his life; only in this 
measure does he become free. Then, as Kierkegaard puts it, 
"so soon as the actuality of freedom and of the spirit is 
posited, dread is annulled (aufsehoben)... but fate is too, 
for thereby providence also is-positea (i).,, Providence and 
destiny replace fate. But in a system*of indifference it is 
precisely the notion of moral responsibility, of moral or 
religious-growth, w4ich would be, impossible. "Un acte de 
pure liberte, " writes Jules Lachelier, Ilserait, *en effet, un 
acte inde/pendant de lWoute maniere innee- ou acquise de penser 
et de sentir: il serait done etranger a tout-ce qui constitue 
notre caractere personnel, ' et nous n1aurions aucune raison de 
nous llattribuer et de nous en croire responsables (2). 11 
Jules Payot in like manner declares that free-will or 
indifference is incompatible with morality. I'La moraleg" 
he says, 'Inta besoin que de la liberte, ce qui, est tr 
different; Et cette liberte ntest possible que dans et 
par le ddýuterminisme 
In temporal terms this signifies that freedom is 
inseparable from a solidarity of past, present and future. - 
the fact that 'Iles actes successifs qui composent 11histoire 
dtune meme vie- sont-lie"s entre eux, influent les unS sur les 
autres. et forment une seor'ie ou tout se tient (4). 11 The 
1 Concept of Dr. oad, pp. 86,87. 
2 PsycholoUie ot M. 6taphysil Ip 119. 3 LIEducation do la Volonte, Paris, Alcan, 1894, p. 33. 
ý4 H. iý, i on ' De la norale, 2nd ed,, Paris, 
aa UlAre, 1883, P. 140. 
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concept ol. free-vrill, on the contraryg is bound up vrith the 
assertion that each act is a self-contained temporal unit. 
Its logical conclusion is the doctrine of the "gratuitous 
act", the most radical expression of temporal discontinuity. 
In an illuminating passage entitled "Le-vide et le pleii2l 
Valýry has brought out vividly the connection between the 
llgratuitousý' and temporal discont-inuity on the one hand, and 
between tac, positive freedom in necessity. and temporal 
continuity on the other. "Je mets la ce livre; je reg=de 
mes objets familiers, je ine-caresse la menton; je feuillette 
ce cahier. - Et tout ceci se passe sans empechements, co=e 
librement, - co=e si cleftaient aes e've"nements separe*s, 
inaepenaants, separes par du vide, et co=e sans action les 
uns sur les autres... Mlais je puis tout a coup voir tout 
autrement - et youloir voit que tout ceci se tient co=e les 
engronages dlun mecanismeg les compartiments d1un. parquet - 
et que chaque modification est rigoureusement une substitution 
- comme dans un liquide ou une molecule ne se deplace qu'une 
autre ne la remplace. - Rien nIest plus Gratuit. Rien nIest 
plus isole*'* Les objets ne sOnt inde'pandonts quIen apparence. 
Lours distances, leurs non-contacts sont apparences. Et ma 
sensation de liberte... (1). " All Heraclitean doctrines 
whith end by attributing-value solely to the present at the 
expense of past and future are inimical to freedom, for they 
reduce acts to mere caprice. 
i 
Mlelange, pp. 23-9. 
The free act, on the contrary, 
I 
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is essentially an" engagement" with respect to a transcendent 
.; 
hout the course of time: realisiniS itself throug 
13- est evident cue renoncer 'a suivre une, 
voý3at-ion pour quel6que motif cue ce soiý... ce 
nlost on aucune facon se libe er ou slemanciper: 
c, est meme exactement ltinverse. (H. V. p. 146. ) 
01, as'? dire que le voeu, bienloin de se 
c du re ** une si eee .e3. a mple vell"it , pr"sente 
au cont; aire llaspect dlun engagement et 
dlune decision. Pvlais cet engagement ou 
0 
cette decision ne slaccomplit pas purement 
ý 
et sim-Lo; ement dans lI enceinte de moi-ia8me, 
un transcendant y est implique', si 
indistincte que soit encore la conscience 
que jlen prenas. (Ibid., p. 162. ) 
There is a different version of the same doctrine of. the 
,, gratuitous" involved in the Kantian notion of 11 autonorkrI 
of which 1.1arcel is the pronounced antagonist. -The reason 
f or this antagonism is not hard to' find. Kant's conception 
of freedom as autonomy implies a sort of eternal present 
situated outside time. In so far as man is a physical being, 
his i1rill is subject to the forms of his sensibility, to space 
and time, in terms of which he organises the data of his 
sense-experience. As such, that is as UDhenomenon! t, he is 
subject to an dLmpirical causality vfhereby his acts are 
dete=ined by his past: $the determining principles of everY 
action of the same reside-in what belonSs to past times and 
- is no longer in his power.,, On the other hand, he isq 
accoraing to Xant, conscious of himself as an intelligible 
being, as "thin6-in-itself" or noumenon. As such, he is. no 
longer subject to conditions of time and, may then know himself 
as 11 only determinable by laws v4-iich he gives himself thpough 
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reason (1) 11 as the source and grouna, itself non-: temporal, 
of temporal-perception - that is as autonomous or free. 
Freedom seems then to siCnify for Kant independence with 
regard to time, and therefore to be exclusive of process: 
its very definition is "transcendental freedom!,. A con- 
, ception entirely alien to A.. arcel's philosophy, *which can 
conceive no liberty apart from moral necessity and 
responsibility, that is apart from the transforming action 
of-time itself. "Ma liberte ne peut ... slaffirmer jusqulau 
bout quten 4pousant ma destine/e personnelle, bien loin de 
pretendre la survoler. " (R. I. p. 46. ) (2). 
It is indeed, for'Marcel, a condition of free action 
that past and future should be made operative in the present. 
Freedom is in no sense the "autonomy", whose corollary is 
some form of temporal llinstantaneisn2l, but fidelity, continu- 
ance and renevial. The ultimate freedom Possible to man is 
the state vvher6 he acts as causa sui, that is in a temporal 
-f 
plexjL-ude wherein the enduring and moving present is so charged 
as to form an eternity within, time. Valery once again has 
described this self-causation as the ultimate aim of the free 
mind, he too lin, king it vith repetition. I'Vivre doit donc, 
a mon sens, s, oraonner contre revivre. Clest dire qulune 
. 
(l) Critique of Practical Reason, transl. by J. K. Abbott, 
. uondon, Longmans Green, 1905-, p. 191. /. I- (2 Cf. I'J. Blondel: "Clestla morale... qui etudie et procure 
cle insertion d1une realit6 supdrieure dans la succession 
des choses perissables, une liberte dans la chalne du devenir, 
une immortelle responsabili"te dans la destin"e de 11ag-ent e humain. " (De l'Action, Vol. II, P. 313. ) 
f. 
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carriere de vie doit avoir pour desir essentiel une 
connaissance de soi-meme si accomplie, que rien ne puisse 
plus, 'quand elle touchb son plus haut point, en modifier 
la structure, les formes et les modes... Cette extreme 
connaissance ressentie serait aussi la derniere pensee 
possible, et co=e la derniere Soutte de la liqueur qui 
emplit tout af ait un vase. La mesure e"tant comble , la, 
duree de ma vie me semblerait exactement e`p'uisee 
a 
Op. cit., pp. 123,124. 
. ".  . t. . 
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VI. Instantaneism. 
Tlic condition of the realisation of the eternal in time 
is the in the lived precent of a past and, a future 
v.,, hich, cOM7=esE'r-t, Yet retain their autonomy as 
distinctive terip Any consciousness of times oral features. 
which f ails to make allowance for a temporal triangulation! ' 
for a "certain p'luralisme temporel, une certaine pluralisation 
temporell. e de soi", (H. V. P. 54), must likewise fail to account 
for the two factors of transcendence and immanence that 
intersect within existence and end by e2. bvbýtjh: S-.: the one at 
N 
the expense of the other. 
Leaving aside objective timeq with its succession of 
discrete, mathematical points, there are t%vo forms of what 
Marcel. has designated 11 instantanelisme7.1 9 the one leading to 
.a pure I=aneFntism, the other to a pure Transcendentalism. 
The first is to be found in the Heracliteanism of Bergson. 
It is in its rehabilitation of the present that Marcel sees 
the true value of Bergsonism and it 
Bergsonian conception that he sees. ý 
"passage from creative evolution to 
None the less, Bergson's definition 
it stands, unsound. 
is by development of the 
the possibility of a 
a religious philosophy". 
of the 11 instant' is, as 
In an-important artiold On the Aesthetics of AcLriano 
I Tilgher (1)$ Taarcel refutes the Ilrealisme du temps" vAUch is 
at the source of. the dramatic theories of both Tilgher and 
(1) Tragioue et Per-sonnalitel Nouv. Rev. franc., July, 1924. 
-___1v, v, r, rflc' . - 
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, 
Pirandell. o. The Latter makes a distinction between "foriV 
and "life", as between the artificial and the real, and, like 
Bergsoxi, see iii becominS the fundamental reality. Bergson, 
arrives indeed, starting from the self and its unity, 
at a ,: onism; he comes to identify time with the very stuff 
of reality and ends up in its 1hypostattisa-tion and substantiali.. - 
sation. "It is, " he de6lares, "the foundation, of our being 
. and, as we feel, the very substance of the world in which we 
live (1). " His is, not a philosophy of Being, but a philo- 
sophy of life and becoming. Beyond change there is nothing; 
the word eternity has little meaning; at the -most, for 
Bergson as for Alexander, it is synonymous with the incessant 
urge of. evolution. "He who installs himself in becoming 
sees in duration the very life of things, the fundamental 
reality. The Forms, which the mind isolates and stores up 
in conceptss are then only snapshots of the changing reality. 
They are moments gathered along the co urse of time; and 
because we have cut ýhe thread that binds them to time, they 
no longer endure... They enter into eternity, if you vrill; 
but what is eternal in them is_ j ust -7ihat is unreal (2). 11 
From the point of view of our discussion it is worth W'11-iile 
(1) Creative Evolution, transl. by A. 1111itchell, London, Tdacm=in, 1'9'=, p. 41. 
(2) Ibid., PP. 334-5. My italics. Cf. Guyau: "Lleternite 
semble une notion contraaictoire avec celles de la vie et de 
la conscience, tellez quo nous les connaissons. Vie et 
constience supposent variete, et la variýt4 engendre la duree. 
LI&'v-ernite', pour nous, clest ou le neant ou le chaos. " 
ýQuoted by V. Jankele'vitch, Deux Philosophes de la Vie. 
erE. son, Guyau, Rev. Phil., ý924. ) 
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to analyse'more closely the implications of Bergson's 
temporal doctrine. At first sight, 'the theory of duration 
seems to fullfil all the conditions required for self- 
-eal-; sation, but a closer examination shows that this is not 
SO* It is true that Bergson emphasis6s the continuity of 
real time as the progress of the past gnatting into the future. 
"Car notre duree nlest pas un instant qui remplace un instant: 
il nly aurait alors jamais clue'du presentl pas de pýrolongement 
du passe*' dans, llactuell pas dlevolutiong pas de duree concrete. 
La dure"e est le progr%es continu'du passe' cui ronge l'aven-ir 
Ak .- 
et qui gonfle en avanc. ant. Du moment que le passe slaccrolz 
Tothing sans cesse, indefiniment aussi il se conserve (1). " h 
would seem to be less like an "instantaneism! '. Yet if we 
consider his thesis in the light of bis intuitionary theory, 
it is precisely thet, it would involve. 
The fundamental feature of Bergsonism is the radical 
dualism it establishes' between intuition or pure perception 
on t7ae one hand and intelligence on -Vae other. 'T'he former 
is for him not only the contrary ofE what is conceptual but 
also of what is relational: whatever is relational is to be 
referred to the secondary, derivative activity of intelligence 
which replaces the fusion-and interpenetration of i=ediate 
NOVII strictly experience and perception by static concepts. 
speaking if all relation is foreign to the data of pure aI 
perception, it means that consciousness not only of space but 
(1) Evolution creatrice, pp. 4-5. 
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of time too, in so far as it involves discrimination between 
past, present and future, is excluded therefrom. By that 
we mean the-consciousness of time present in perception and, 
sensa: ýioxri itself , it beinS granted that the derivative 
conceptual time is not involved in the discussion. 
The problem that arises is whether i=ediate experience 
is, wholly non-relational or iýtether in fact it does not 
involve what William James calls "dynamic relations", as 
opposed to the static relations evolved by the conceptual 
intelligence. The ideas of James are here of much signifi- 
cance. He, indeed, while opposing perception and conception, 
allows for the 11dynamic relations vwith uhich the perceptual 
flux is filled (1). 11 Concepts, he declares, are the result 
of a secondary intellectual activity substituting the static 
for the perceptual flow. But he afso declares most cate- 
gorically that those concepts are elaborations of the 
primitive percepts, and this applies to conceptual relations. 
Relations in short, are already embodied in the flux of 
sensation: 'Les relations de toute sorte: temps, espace, 
I cause, etc., font partie integrante du flux des sensations 
tout autant que les sensations elles-memes (2). " The data 
_of 
immediate experience involve, then, some discrimination 
and distinction, and these perceptual, dynanic relations are 
the basis of the static relations later evolved. It is in 
(1ý Some Problems of Philoso-Cj , PO 81. ý2 quoted in Zrane-u and Sdailies, Histoire de la Philosonhie, 
aris, Delagrave, 1938, Supplement-, --p-. --, --)37. 
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this way taat James is enabled finally to justify the role 
of intelligence and dem-onstrate the interpenetration of 
perc; -pt and concept in our eý, T. erience and knowledge as a 
whole. Boutroux haswell brouGht. out the opposition between 
Bergson and Ja=es on this point. 'IFn--outre, si la connaiss- 
ance intellectuelle est, pour Bergson, derivee et non 
primitive, clest ciulelle contient des ellements clui 
appar&issent comme etrangers aux donneles ormediates et 
purement intuitives de la conscience: celles-ci, en effet, 
se reduisent "a la duree en so-;, degagee nor, seulement de 
liespace, mais clu temps lui-meme. Pour Jam'es, clest 
/ de complexitei et de richesse de proprement le degre 
l'experience qui en resure le desre d'authenticite. 
L'experience absolument i=ediate et. intuitive serait 
l'experience totale (1). 11 
But leavinS aside this further development, the centrall 
fact is that in immediate experience James finds relation (at 
a non-concentual level) while Bergson denies it. One mi6ht 
indeed enquire whether Bereson, accounts for experience at all. 
For, if it transcends all relatior, and discr-L. -ir-ation, it 
would be, as James declares, a total experience, a complete 
fusion. Bradley saw this when he declared that "qualities 
are nothing without relations (1)911 relationless qualities 
being. mere abstractions, and sought to show haa relations 
(1) Willian, James, p. go. 
(2 Appearance and Reality, 2nd ed.., London, Sonnenschein, 
IV 31 pe a6o 
- -. .. -. . ------- 1. 
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"break out' a-ad "fall betweeV, qualities of appearance (1). 
But Bradley, like Bergson, attributes this element of relation 
to intelligence while, unlike him, he opts, for intelligence, 
declaring that feeling has no part in philosophy; confronted C 
by the partial izraodiacy of feeling, which has concrete 
, reality but no ideal truth, and an ideal truth vfaich loses 
-. the wholeness of reality, he is led in his dile=a to envisage 
"beyond the vanishing point of the whole conceptual 
perspective, 'an labsolutel. reality, in-which the coherency 
of feeling and the completeness of the intellectual ideal 
shall unite in some indescribable way (2). 11 -- 
None the less, Bradley's view that qualities vvithout 
relations are inea-. ýJngless is sound. Were qualities not so 
bound up with relations of difference and simultaneity, 
consciousness and process would be impossible. It may even 
be claimed that Bergson's pure perception does not refer to 
consciousness at-all but to a sort of "pre-consciousness" 
(just as Le Roy talks of a "pre-lorriquell when defining his 0 
Bergsonia'a logic of fe. eling). 
It remains then to affirm that this element of relation 
is to-be found in immediate experience itself, as James in 
fact does (3). 
(1) Cf. R. W. Church, Bradl6ýrls Dialectic, London, Allen and 
Unwin, 1942, p. 26 sqq., and Bradley$ op. cit., p. 23 sqq. 
(2 James, op. cit., p. 94.1 
(3ý Cf. Ibid., p. 219, n. 1, where he shows the consequences 





It is, however, in its application to time that the 
assertion assuries its full siGnificance. It suffices to 
distinguish idiolly the temporal doctrine of Bergson from 
those of James, Whitehead and Marcel. For the latter, 
i=ediate experience involves a7uareness of relation: relations 
of difference on the one hand, a distinction between past, 
present and future; relations of identity on the other, a 
simultaneity 
- 
of past, 'present 
and future - allowing by their 
combination the-present of experience to become the inter- 
secting point of pe=anence and change. 
Now, in spite of-appearances, Bergson's duration does 
not permit this, for. it is non-relational and must transcend 
all temporal structure. Consider, for', example, his doctrine 
of memory. He asserts that in memory the idhole past is 1 
preserved and presses upon the present: . "En re'alite' Ia passe" 
se conserve de lui-ineme, automaticiuement. * Tout entier, sans 
doute, -il nous suit a* tout instant., ' No doubt only part of 
it emerges in consciousness, but it-is all there at the back 
of the pres'ent: "Notre passe se manifeste done interralement 
a nous par sa poussee et sous forme de tendance, quoiqulune 
faible part seulement en, devienne representation.,, The 
present is, thenl'the amalgamation of this past with novelty: 
I'll con. centre dans son indivibibilitel tout le pereu avec, en 
plus, ce que le pre"sent y ajoute (1). 11 
But, given the Bergsonian theory- the subject Cannot be 
Evolution crelatrice, 5t 61-7. 
L 
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conscious of the past as such. His temporal experience 




means of ideiricifying the past (1). What he must be aware of 
must be a rlobal ex-perience Where no discrimination is 
possible and one which is, to all intents and purposes, 
--wholly a present. Bergson describes it as being an "etat 
- simple!? , and it is clear from the context that he mean by 
that that it is oneg-absolute state. * 1,11oreover, he infers 
therefrom that eaph present is wholly novel, if only by the 
fact that it is 'simple" and "indivisible" , and not only 
novel but absolutely unpredictable: - 'Ice qui n: la jamais ete 
percU, et ce qui est, en meme temps simple, est'ne"cessairement 
impreVisible (2). 11 
In short, the present is a distinct moment of novelty, 
incommensurable with any past or with any future moment. 
It exists in consciousness as a purellelaW, an indeterminate 
prospectivity. Duration appears as pure heterogeneity, each 
instant being as it were self-sufficient. This is borne out 
by many passages where Bergson treats the past, qua past, as 
a mere idea. "Le passe nlest qulune ideel le present est 
ideo-moteur The Present is the momerit of prospective 
(1) Cf. S. Alexander's criticis= of Bergsonts doctrine of the 
past on this score. (Space, Time ana Deitys Vol. I, P. 140 
sqq. ) It is Undoubtedly tAis same point that Marcel is 
making when he rejects as unacceptable what he calls Bergson's 
notion I'du pass4 entierement -present". (Journal Metai)hysiaue 
III, (Fraýý-me us) ", Confluences,. No. 16, Jaý7, -Tq--43,9.12. ) ý2ý Evolution creatrice, P. 7. 
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urge, an urge which is tIrwarted by the influx of the past (1). 
- The result is a form of it instantaneismit I the exaltation 
"of 
t4e present instant and the attribution to it of an e 
. ýf autonomous status, as when PeGuy, referring to Bergson, f 
writes: "Un honme vit que le present nletait point l1extreme, 
rebora du'passe", du cote"de la re'Cence, I mais l1extreme bora 
du futur du cote de la presence... 11 montra ... qutil fallait 
saisir le present danp le present meme... qulil ya dans. le 
t 
present un certain etre propre (2). " It has its culmination, 
in Gide, who places value in sensation alone, in the 
maintenance 'of a state of constant " Gratul tY' ivhe: ýeby the 
I (1) "On inontrerait sans peine que les diffe'rents degreS de la 
tristesse correspondent, eux aussig a des changements quali- 
tatifs. Elle commence par nletre ciulune orientation vers le 
passe, un appauvrissement de nos sensations et de nos idees, 
comme si chacune d1elles tenait maintenant tout entiere dans 
le peu quIelle donne, comme si l1avenir etait en quelque 
sorte ferne. 11 (Essai sur les donne*os i=ddiates,, p. 8. ) 
Cf. R. lJoUrgue's article where he quFEes pathological evidence 
in support of Bergson's theories, cases'of advanced schizo- 
phrenia characterised by the total loss of the prospective 
sense. (Une Decouverte scientifique. La duree Bergsoniennes 
Rev. Phil., J. 935. ) 
For Guyau likewise the past tends to be described in 
ficaceous present action. terms of what is no longer efL 'LO-i 
"Le passe... clest de l1actif devenu passilf, clest un residu 
au lieu d"tre une anticipation et une conquete. A nesure 
que nous d2pensons notre vie, il se produit au fond de nous- 
memes, co=-. e dans ces bassins d1ou llon fait 4va-Porer llean 
de la mer, une sorte de depot par couches re, liýras... Cette I' Gu cristallisation interieure est le passe. La Genese, de 
llidee de temps, D. 39. ) Jankelevitel'i. assoclatues Guyau's ilocýErime witH kouJillee's philosophy of idee'z-forces and 
relates them to the taeory of effort : La 11.1ai-ne de Biran (Guyau declares that time exists in germ in consciousness "sous la 
forme de la for ce , de 11 eff ort. 11 Ibid. 1 -1). 35. ) He applies the teria "dynayiisme atomistique" to both. (Op. cit. ) 
(2) -Note conjointe sur 14. Descartes, Oeuv: ces,, Vol. IX, p. 281. 
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instant and its act become ends J-n themselves (1). 
it is not possible in the Bergsonian system to account 
for what is permanent In time; for if all relation is 
f excluded and consciousness is that of a present without 
discrimination, no zuch permanence is possible. The latter 
requires that ýime exhibit both novelty and simultaneity and 
that our experience of time include experience o. J. a past as 
such and of-a futurelas such and of elements common to them 
and to the present... Vor Bergson, all simultaneity, being 
relation, is to be : ýeferred to spatial, that is conceptual, 
representation (2). 
The resultant exaltation of the prospective urge, of an 
instant which is a mere passage, and the devaluation of the 
past and of the future itself as such render impossible any 
realisation of being. Pushed to its extieme, it would 
culminate in that state described by Pascal in a famous 
passage: "Nous ne nous tenons jamais au temps present... Le 
present nlest jamais notre fin: -le passe' et le pre'sent sont 
nos moyens; le seul avenir est notre fin. Ainsi nous ne 
vivons jamais, mais nous esperohs de vivre; et, nous disposant 
(1) The f orce -of Gide Is 11 instantaneism! ' is well brought out in 
passages such as the following. "Et je pris ainsi Ilhabitude 
de seDarer chaque instant de ma. vie, pour une totalitd de joie, 
iSe L'ourritures terrestres, Oeuvres compl'tes, Vol. II, 
.1 p. 91. ) . "Ll-liabitude Ee : 5a pensde te gaie; tu vis dans le passe, dans le, futur et tu ne percois rien spontane'ment. Nous ne 
som: nes rien, Pjyrtil, quo da'n-s llinstan: tane de la vie; tout le .I passe sly meurt avant que rien dla*' venir y soit n6. Instantsl 
Tu coiaprendra4,1ýVrtil, de quelle. force est leur pre'sencel" 
(! bid. I p. 1211 .) (2)'"Espace et Temps ne se penýtrent clue dans les systemes en 
mouvement ou le physicien reel ntest pas, ou' n1habitent que des 
Phy, sýciens par lui imagines. " (Duree et Simultaneit4, Pdj: CS, 
p. '254. ) 
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toujours a' Atre heureiL-., il est ineNituabie que nous-ne le 
., 
soyons j amais (1). " 
I- '11.1orcover, theýconcept of freedom is distorted in such an 
se 
instantaneism by its identification with pure novelty. 
of 
Although no one has done more than Bergson himself to restore 
the concept of liberty, his actual conception of the latter 
cannot wholly escape criticism by the very fact of its being 
somewhat equivocal., He certainly defines freedom as the 
power to, "act in. conformity with one's self" and the free act 
as one which expresses the whole self. The latter is thus 
intermediate between the moral freedom of the-determinists and 
free-will, for it cannot be wholly undetermined by the past, 
vinile at. the same time it is the projection of the past-present 
which is the self. But, as we have seen, the past is 
dissolved ultimately in tho present, which becomes a moment 
of pure nove*lty. It is significant that Bergson adds: "La 
liberte, telle que je llentends, est situee entre ces deux 
termes, mais non pas a egale distance de Ilun et de llautreq 
slil fallait a toute force la confondre avec Ilun des deux, 
clest pour le Ilibre arbitrel que jlopterais (2). " 
Is cauaalltY not present in -Inmediate experience 
precisely in the form of relation (not of course as a category 
of the understanding)? It is, we may say, bound up vrith tho 
wwareness both of difference and of identity in time and vrith 
(1 Penseles ed. Brunschvicgg II, p. 172. 
(2 Art. Libertel in A. lljýandels Vocabulaire philoso2liiqup, 
4t ed.; iaris, -Alca. nt 1932t p. 416. 
'. -. 
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the process of uniting in action this double element in 
consciousness. It is much more than mere consciousness of 
change or of a changiný-, ground; it is more than more pros- 
pectivity, it is purl) 0s ivelle., -, s. , 
The mere presence of the 
past in an undifferentiated present or the mere awareness 
of change'(for these rivet the mind to a self-sufficient 
instant) are insufficient to provide motivation, idthout 
which freedom is arbitrary. Motive for action requires 
3e - 
)f 
awareness of the-past and of the future as distinctive powers 
within the immediacy of experience, the self being thereby- 
enabled to take cognisance of their content, real or Possible, 
and draw from them, the ends to be realised in the present. 
Freedom cannot be c. onceivedepart from a process of colitinuous 
realisation tbroughout a differentiated temporal range. it 
is precisely this element of permanence and simultaneity which 
Bergson depreciates, In his aversion to it, says Von Hu'gel, 
he has stopped half way; "he has removed the mechanical 
obstacles to Liberty, but he has not discovered the spirituaý 
conditions and requisites for the same Liberty. Indeed, by 
his strenuous exý. -Iusion of all permanence and of every aim. 
and ideal, as of so many abstractions essentially hostile to 
Freedom, he has, most unintentionally, brought us back, in 
this anti-Finali. -m., to that Naturalism which he had so 





Mechanism (1). 11 
The Heraclitean current associated with Bergsonism thus 
ends up in an Immanentism. What is denied is precisely the 
realm of trazscendent eternal 'selves that provide the unity 
to be made explicit in temporal continuity. IXierkegaard 
has spoken no truer word than when he says: "eternity is 
most easily disposed of by living merely in instants (2). 11 
Time becomes an end, whereas it is merely a rieans. And as 
a. means, it is more than a passage, it is the vehicle of 
continuity and permanence. This it can only be if within 
the instant past and future retain a: properly guaranteed 
reality of their own. 
- 
(1ý Eternal Life, Edinburgh, Clark, 1912, p. 301. Bergson's 
rejection of alism, in so far as it involves repetition,. is 
cleArly stated in the following passage, together with the 
concomitant doctrine of temporal heterogeneity. ', "Bref, 
llapplica: tion riGoureuse du principe de finalite, comme celle 
du princi. -r, )e de causalite me"canique, conduit a la conclusion 
que 'tout est donne". Les deux principes disent la meme 
chose dans leurs deux langues, parce qulils repondent au meme 
besoin. Clest pourquoi ils slaccordent encore a faire table 
rase du temps. La duree r4elle est celle qui mord sur les 
choses*et qui y laisse Ilempreinte de sa dent. Si tout est 
11 .A 01 dans le temps, tout change interieurement et la memo roalite 
concrete ne se r6pete jamclais. La repetition nlest donc 
possible que dans l1abstrait. Ce qui se rep. lete, cles1i tel ou 
tel aspect que nos sens et surtout notre intelligence ont detache de la re'alite precilsement parce clue notre action, suz laquelle tout lleffort de notre intelligence est tendu, no se 
peut mouvoir que parma. des repetitions... Des que nous sortons des cadres o'u' le me"canisme et le f-Inalisme radical enferment 
notre pens4e, la 'rdýalite nous appardit comme un jaillissement ininterrompu de nouveautes dont chacune n1a pas plutOt surgi 
.1z pour faire le present quIelle a deja, recule dans le pass4.1f Evolution cr4atrice, p. 49 ý2ý 






There is, however, another form of "instantaneism2ll such 
as to be foundin the Eleatic, Platonic and Schopenhauerian 
philosophies. These describe a type of' "instant' or "eternal- 
3e- 
present" vLich marks a release from temporal contingencies 
)f 
namely the instant of contemplation or "recollection! '. ' It 
is assumed that the course of time may be brought to, a halt 
by a transcending of the consciousness of the future in favour 
of an instant that grasps within its range the vlaole of time. 
In the previous-version we were confronted, broadly speakinG, 
vrith an elimination of. the past as such, here by an eliminat-4 on 
I 
of the future as such. - 
Curiously enough, this type of instant is to be found, 
no less than the foregoing one, in Bergson's philosofhy. 
Bergson's doctrine of memory-is at least as important as his 
doctrine of the elan vital. Pushed to the extreme, as Miss 
Hilda Oakley has pointed out, the principle it involves of 
the survival-of the past in the present I (coupled, vre may add, 
with the denial of any, relational element in the pure intuition 
of duration) would denote the total impossibility of change (1). 
"Ouig je crois. " writes Bergson, "que notre vie passee est ld, 
conservee jusque dans ses moindrcsdetails, et clu6 nolas 
nloublions rien, et Ve tout ce que nous avons percu, pcns, ý, 
voulu depuis le premier eveil de notre conscience, porsiste 
indefiniment (2). " If that is so, it suffices that, Given 
certain conditions, the present of consciousness should be 
(1) Hilda Oakley, op. cit. 
(2) LIEnergie Spirýituelle, Paris, Alcan, 1920, pp. 101-2. 
I 
limited to the content of past cand immediate experience for 
the mind to experience a veritable totum simul. The 
-condition required is the elimination of the prospective sense - 
"une conversion. brusque de I'attention", such as the threat of 
imminent and sudden dealth, "quelque chose comme un changement 
d1orientation de la conscience qui, jusquIalors tourneje vers 
Ilavenir et absorbele par les ne"cessite's de llaction, subite- 
ment slen desinteresse. Cela suffit pour que mille et mille 
details toublie"sl. soient rememores, pour que 11histoire 
entiere de la personne se deroule devant elle en un mouvant 
panorama. " So that Bergson concludes that "une attention a 
la vie qui serait suffisamment puissante, et-suffisamment 
degagee de tout interet pratique, embrasserait ainsi , 
dans un 
present indivise Ilhistoire passee tout entiere de la 
personne consciente (1). 11 
Thus, what appeared'in the preceding analysis as a 
self-sufficient and at every moment novel instant of time n= 
appears as a strictly non-temporal instant or eternal present. 
And it appears so for, at bottom, the same reasons, namely 
because the perception of time excludes, in Bergson's defini- 
tion, numerical succession, discrimination or simultaneity 
even; without thes-e, the present of experience will be devoid 
of temporal characteristics. "Bliminons le nombre de la 
dure*'e 7 interne, " 
'writes Jacob, 'let la pre'tendue Iduree vraiel 
devient l'absonce reelle de dure/c, se confond avoc lleiternite 
,I (1) La Pensee et le IvIouvant, pp. 192-3. My italics. 
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intemporelle des the"Ologions. En effet., si, par nature, les 
evenement-s se penetrent, tout est dans tout; le passe et 
avenir resident tout entiers dans le present... La ou falt 
defaut toute distinction numerique, il nly a p. as plusieurs 
choses qui coexistont, mais une seule chose. Or si le 
succdssif et le simultane ne repondent-a rien de reel, clest I ;; 
. Lui perd 
toute re le temps q 'alite; etsi le temps nlest quIune 
illusilong cue devient ce monde sensible auquel onattachait 
tant de prix (1)? 11 1,,: 
Professor Lovejoy is thus perfectly right in asserting 
that "Bergson-is at once a thorough Eleatic and a thorough 
Heraclitean; that the essence of his philosophy consists in 
an analysis of the time-concept iVaich leads him to just this 
contradictory combination of doctrines; and that he is a 
radical anti-int ell ectualist because, while thus led (in fact, 
if not in intent) to describe the temporal as self-contra- 
dictoryq he, unlike Bradley, is unwilling to call it 'mere 
appearance' 
It is noteviorthy that a similar dualism, involvinS the 
two at first sight contradictory forms of instantaneism,, is 
to be found in Heidegger's doctririe of time.. Teiýporallity, 
it may be recalled, constitutes for HeideGger the "ontoloGical 
sense" of dread. In daily existence (Dasein), man, is the prey 
of ennui or "preoccupatioiv, (Sorae). This latter is linked 
J1 La-philosophie d1hier et celle dlaujourd'hui, Rev. de Mlet., 
8ý 'P . --197. (2) A. 0. Lovejoy, The Problem of Time in Recent French Philo- 
soPhyl-II, Philosophical Review, New York, Vol. XXI, 1912, 
P, 329- 0 
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with his subjection to toinrporal f1iC_ht and decay (his dere- 
liction or Geworfomheit). Ile is unable to grasp his being 
as a "presence" , ti-iat is in its inner recality; his aims are 
all denied realisation and his being constantly thrown into 
the past. His sense of the future is me: ýe preoccupation, 
the conviction that all to which he aspires will be eaten up 
by time. Thus the being of man becomes like that of "things" 
(Vorhanaen)- vfjaich are "in-sistent" in time and exist in the 
mode ofthe "having been!, (Gewesenheit). 
tencell is made possible by dread. Dread Human 11 ex-aLst 
is the experiencing to'the limit this preoccup-ation, this 
sense of Geviorfenheit, this impossibility of realising being 
in the present; in it man sounds the immovable rock of his 
finite condition. Experienced at this. deep level, dread meets 
the revelation of death. Death transcends all succession, 
it is the one end which is absolute and which it is given 
finite man to realise, the one "possibility' among impossibi- 
lities. Confronted by the "existential of, death, " man may, 
by the "resolute decisioi2l, ass=O "being-for-death" and 
recover; throuGh the exercise of his. Seinhonnen, the sense of 
"possibility' and so secure his being as a presence. This 
- he does in anathrough , frecaom-for-deatla! ', that is by 
accepting his death and-infusing into his'present the sense 
385. 
of death, so taking upon himself his finite destiny (1). 
Infused with this sense of death, man's life ceases to 
be* anonymous and becorles- a "pro-ject" , having now, in each 
of its-moments, a sure end and purpose, in conformity vvith 
which he realises his true being as a finite creature. 
Temporally, the passage from. anonymity to existence, 
from ! )as Elan to the Ich, signifies the substitution of 
"historicity' (Geschichtlichkeit) for "history-of-the-viorld" 
(Zeitlichkeit). 
_ 
But it, is here that the equivocal nature , 
of the doctrine becomes apparent. It is indeed open to two 
interpretations. Either each moment is to be transformed by 
the ever-present menace of death, thus delivering the self 
over to an extreme of temporal discontinuity. In this case 
we would have an example of the f ormer type of instantaneism. 
But a more careful scrutiny of the doctrine and its implica- 
tions suggests another quite different interpretation. 
In dread the individual experiences the inner reality of 
time; ' he finds that the constant lapse of being into a past 
has an ontological significancel it is the very e-%-perience of 
the human reality in its ultimate finiteness. This indeed 
is death and what death means. Death is the infinite 
(1) "Elle raet la roalite' htunaine dans la simý e', u 
cLestin, ae0 
de son 
Par-1 nous d"signons lthistorial originel de la 
r5all-ce-hi, maine, l'historial qui consiste aans la decision- 
re , solue authentiaue, e*'L-# dans le ýuel libre ýour la mortt la realite-humaine transmet elle-meme a ello-neme, dans une 
possl*bilit0 dont eIle Edrite, mais quo pourtant elle choisit. 11 
' Gutest-co quo la Meta-P4-Ysique? suivi d'extraits sur lle"tre et 
z. tem , transl. by E. Corbin, Paris, Gallimard, 1938, p. 188: 
iSein und Zeit, Vt P. 74. ) 
n 
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concealed vrithin the f inite. But it is linked Nvith 
Gewesenheit, which the individual can conceive novit no 
longer as a more fact of a beinG past (Vorgangenheit), but 
as the "havinG-been-a-Presence" (Da-Gowesen) (1). This 
Gewesenheiltj is the temporal expression of-Being itself: it 
means "Being-havinS-ýbeeVl. 
If we look now at the future as it appears in the mode 
of historicity, we find that its "being4consists likewise in 
a llhavins-beeiýl (Geviesend), for the future that the self 
anticipates in, the present of its new freedom is death, and 
deat-h is the metaphysical reality experienced'at the core of 
becoming as lapse or collapse into the "having-been! '. 
Thus, the newly found present is a-state of "ex-sistencelg 
in the precise sense of the term, namely a total tran cending 
of time as process; it is the release from temporal conditions 
whereby the self enters into a being which is a sort of "past". 
Heidegger calls it an "ekstatic unity" (2). This is made 
perfeotly clear in a passage such as the following: I'Seul 
un existant qui dans son 8tre est essentiellement Avenir, tel 
(1) "En un sons ontologique riroureu. ýc, une realite-h=aine 
qui nlexsiste plus nIest pas simplement passe/e; elle est un 
'Ayant-gte' une iteýsencel (Da-Gewesen). " (Ibid., p. 182. ) 
(Sein und Zeit V, P. 73. ) 
". üladver. L--ir a moi-meme nIest possible qu'en tant quo ja 
suis ayan-u-e'tg ýich bir. Leviesen). (Gewesen- 
Egelz) nait de 1 7v-cuir, en ce sens quo clost l'Averi: -, r 
3tFaý- 
ayant-ete (gewesend) qui ddgage de lu--1-mýme le -ore'sent. Tel 
est co quo 2-e: ýcLee-, ger nom=e l'unite' ekstatique cLes ezrjases de 
la temporalit0. ýinsi, 
', 
l'HistoriaT-"i--E-e7 ý=Etre nIest pas 
tant dans une unite supýrieure je stasis (repos) et de kinesis 
(mouvement , quo dans le phenomene Ar- ilekstasis de la s*t; asis. " (Corbin, 
Id., 
p. 183, n. 1. Cf. Sein7-u-n-1-Zeit, Vp. 65. ) 
*. 
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-que, libre pour sa mort, il puisse, en se brisant sur elle, 
se laisser rejeter sur la presence qulil realise en fait, 
en'dlautres tormes: seul un existaxit'qui, en tant qulavenirt 
est en une simulta-ne"ite initiale un existant qui lest' Ayant- 
ea Aet (Gewesend) peut, en se transmettan-C"a' lui-mCMe 1 
posSibilite'dont il he'rite, assumer sa propre dereliction et, 
dans llinstant, -8tre pour Isb-n temps'. Seule une temporalite*' 
authentique, qui est a la fois une temporalite finie, rend 
possible quelque, chose comme un destin, ctest-a-dire une 
historicite authentique (1). 11 IThen, therefore, Heihegger 
speaks, as here, of a "finite temporality', he refers to a 
sort of eternal present, a present of "recollection", where 
past and future no longer exist as autonomous states. "Pas 
plus quIelle ne slabandonne au passeq la repeýtition ne tend 
a un 6 xistance authentique, passe et progres . pro gre s. 
Pour lle 
sont, dant 11instant, indifferents (2). 11 
111hat he'is affirming is that at the core oL "finite' 
temporal succession, as experienced in dread, there is an 
"infinite", a non temporal that in fact the finite is but 
the obverse side of this infinite. Lioreover, this temporal 
formula is simply an explicitation of his central ontological 
affirmation. For the ultimate "ground" 'which he seeks and 
finds he describes as a "not-beinIg' (un-wesen) (3). This 
un-wesen is simply the inmost non-temporal core of the' 
(1 Ibid-j p. 190 (Sein und Zeit, V, P. 74. ) 
(2 Ibid: j p. 191: 
* (Ibid. ) 
(3 Vom 1,7esen des Grundes, III. 
Gewesenheit - the absolute uhaving-beeV1. VIhat Heidegger 
. 
discovers at the core of Being is, in fact, Nothing. "LlEtre 
pur et le Ne'ant pur sont done identiques. 1 Cette these'de 
01 Hegel reste vraie. Etre et . 1ýeant se co=-. posent relciproque- 
=ent, non point parce clue tous deux - envisa es par le concept 9 
hegelien de la Pensee - concordent dans leur indetermination 
et leur immediatete, mais parce que ltEtre lui-meme es1-0 fini 
dans son-essence' 0 ne se revele que dans la transcendance 
de la-realite-humaine quiq dans le Neant, emerge hors de 
l1existant (l). 11 The root of Heidegger's philosophy is the 
German doctrine, of ! fight, the philosophy of the Indeterminate 
One, common to Eckhart and Boehme (2). 
The raD-orochement between, Heidegger and Bergson is of 
interest. Both present a doctrine of time vehose concealed 
premises seem to be Eleatic. So that we can interpret their 
11 instantýl both as an atom of time' and as an "atom of etPernitY1. 
Their thought seems to demonstrate-that a failure to integrate 
time and eternity within a properly conceived process 
condemns the metaphysician to a state of equivocation where he 
oscillates between an explicit Immanentism and temporal 
instantaneism on the one hand, and a more implicit Trans- 
cendentalism and non-temporal instantaneism on the other. 
To revertto the main discussion, it has to be affirmed 
that the instant of recollection, wholly transcending time, 
, 
(l) QuIest-ce que la I'vietaphysi2ue? op. cit., pp. 40-1. 
ý2) 0ý. A. 21e Viae ens, 1ja Phiiosophie de 1. 'artin Heider-ger, 
Louvain, 1942, p. 360 sqq.. 
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has no place in Iviarcel's philosophy. The latter denies 
vfýoleheartedly any possibility of a total tran cending of 
process in a so-called totum simul. It is on-this score 
that he criticises the metaphysical optimism associated 
with Leibniz: 
En derniere analyse, lloptimiste en tant que 
tel prend toujours son point d1appui dans une 
experience non point dii tout saisie au plus 
intime et comme au plus vecu dlelle-me^me, mais 
au contraire considere'e a une distance 
suffisante pour que certaines, oppositions 
slatt&ýiueHt ou se fondent dans une certaine 
harmonie generale. L'optimiste nthesite pas 
a e-xtrapoler les conclusions auxquelles, on., est 
conduit our peu quIon veuille bien considerer p 
'Iles choses" avec un recul suffisant et sur un 
II-espace de temps! ' assez ample. (H. V. pp. 45-6. ) 
Such an instantaneism can have only one issue -a mysticism 
or transcendentalism claiming arbitrarily and, it would seem, 
impossibly the existence of privileged moments when Time comes 
miraculously to a stop (1). 
I 
It is largely against the Platonic or semi-,.; Platonic 
version of the eternal present that 2,11arcel, follovring in the 
footsteps of Kierkegaards reacts. The conception of an 
i. 
extra-temporal instant of recollection has of course its 
source in Plato. No doubt Plato introduces movement into 
logic by overt1hrowing the principle of non- contradiction, 
whose rigorous application led to the Parmenidean doctrine 
ý1) We may note that Clauael can envisage no otaer eternity 
han thio,, the mere end or stopping of time. lLors le Teraps 
'If seraferme sur nous et le Present en sera le centre dternel. ll 
(Art Poetioue, Paris, I. Tercure de France, 19159 P. 192. ) 
ýIr 
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of the One, and by substituting for it a dialectic that 
exhibits a participation of contraries - the One and the 
Many, Being and non-Bein, ýS - in one another (1). Nevertheless, 
the progross of this dialectic accomplished'in time is 
directed to no other end than the suppression of dialectic; 
that- is, by the discovery and isolation, over and above the 
present of becoming (to nu of the Ilizastant' (exaiphnes), 
a temporal absolute. or differential that is neither one nor 
many, movement nor repose, being nor non-being. Indeter- 
minate and beyond all designation, it is the medium for a 
revelation of the indeterminate, Eternal Being (2). In the 
instant so conceived movement and dialectic are suspended and 
give way to recollection or contemplation. Time comes to a 
stop. In it is exhibited, in the words of M. Wahl, 'Ila 
necessite de la dialectique et pourtant llevanouissement dans 
10% 11instant de cette dialectique meme (3). 11 1 
KierkeSaard, in a note on the Parmenides, has explained 
how the Platonic instant fails to fulfil the requirements of 
a synthesis between eternity and time and Slides from time 
to eternity. "Eternity and the instant are the extreme terms 
of the contradiction, whereas otherwise conceived the 
dialectical i,. ritchcraft makes eternity and tho instant signify 
the same thing. It is only with Christianity that the 
(; ) "De la. sorte, lo mouvement et !a spiritualite' seront 
retablis, la' oýL il y avait immobilite et mate"rialite. 11 
J. 111ahl, Etude sur le Parmenide de Platon, Paris, Rieder, 
926, P. liT47. ) 
ý2ý Cf. Ibid., pp. 169-70. 
3 Ibid. I p. 210. 
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-emporal, the instant are to be understood, sensuous, -the t 
precisely because it is only vvith it the eýernal becomes 
essential (1). " The Platonic depreciation of time cannot 
conceive the instant of process, seen as the meeting-place 
of immanonce and transcendence, time and eternity and as the 
medium f or the realisation of the eternall in time. 
"Hellenism! ', he says, "did not understand the instant; for 
even if it-Comprehen4ed the atom of eternity, it did not 
comprehend that it_ was the instant, did not define it with a 
forward orientation but with a backward, since for Hellenism 
the atom of eternity was essentially eternity,, a-ad so neither 
time nor eternity had true justice done it (2). 11 The 
consequence ýis a doctrine of contemplation and recollection: 
"The Greek eternity lies behind, as the past into w1aich one 
enters only backwards In contrast zith it is 
repetitions vfaich-is to recollection as process is to 
contemplation, for "repetition and recollection are the same 
movemeizt, only in opposite directions (4). 11 And the 
in strument of all repetition or self-realisation is the 
instant of process, that is the instant which unites and yet 
preserves the autonomy of both past and future, so making 
possible the spiritual growth and salvation with its ret-ro- 
spective and prospective sense, its perspective of repentance 
and redemption. "The concept around which everything turns 
1 Conce2t of Dread, p. 74, n. 1. 
2 Ibid. s T. -Tg--. ý3 Ibid., p. 80. 
41 Repetition, p. 
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in Christianity,, is the fulness of time, is the instant as 
eternity,, and yet this eternitr is at once the future and the 
past. If one does not give heed to this, one cannot save 
any concept from heretical and treasonable admixtures which 
destroy the concept. One does not get'-the past as a thing 
for iýself but in simple continuity with the future - arA 
with that the concepts, of conversion, atonement, redemption, 
are resolved in the significance of world-history, and 
resolved in the, individual historical development. One does 
not get the future as a thing for itself - and with that the 
resurrectioii ana the juagment come to naught''(1). If 
In his views llarcel echoes these passages of-Kierkegaard, 
although he has been less systematic in his criticism of 
Platonism itself. In contemporary thought, the doctrine of 
recollection still plays a considerable r6le, in such philo- 
sophers as Santayana for example (2). In French thought, 
its claims have been powerfully voiced in recent times by 
Proust) whose doctrine on this point comes-into clear conflict 
with that of Marco"'. Proustts aesthetic involves a deprecia- 
tion of time as mere appearance, as when, referring to 
Vinteuills sonata, he*writes: "Pour n1avoir pu aimer quIen 
des temps successifs tout ce que mlapportait cette Sonate, je 
I%- 1ý ne la possedai jamais tout entiere: elle ressemblait a la 
vie (3). " He envisages, however, an issue from temporal 
(I Conce2t of Dread, p. Blo 
(2 Ue2. eaim of Essencea, P. 61. 
(3 A la týecncrche du erdu, A 110mbre des Jeunes Pilles 




discontinuity and pure succession by means of the memoire 
involontaire, in the manner -already described, when, at 
certain privileged momants, the present becomes instinct. -with 
the past so as to eliminate the temporal and prospective 
consciousness: IILIý*Stre qui alors goUýtait--en moi cette 
__impression 
la gou^tait en ce quIelle avait de co-m-mim dans un 
jour ancien et maintenant, dans ce ciulelle avait dlextra- 
temporel, un e4tre qi; i n1apparaissait que, quand, par une de 
ces identite"s -entre le present et le-passe, il pouvait se, 
trouver ... jouir de llessence des choses, clest-a-dire en 
dehors du temps (1). " Vrnat he envisages here-is a veritable 
liberation from the contingencies of time, a state of 
"indifference'. Thus , in, the f amous passage on -the madeleine 
1 11 instant'm^me o" la gorg " m9le"e des miettes we read: "Alais aeU ee 
du ggteau toucha mon palais, je tressaillis, atlt-sentif a ce qui 
se passait cll. extraordinaire en moi. Un plaisir dellicieux 
mlavait envahi, isole, sans la notion de sa cause. 11 mlavait 
aussitOt renau les vicissitudes de la vie indiffe'rentes, ses 
desastres inoffensifs, sa brievete illusoire de la meme facon 
qulopere llamour, en- me remplissant dlune essence precieuse 
, Time has simply ceased to flo,.,.,,. Uha-t vie have is what 
Fernandez calls a state of"contemplation esthe'tique" (3), or 
what Cremieux, with even more penetration, terms a state of 
Le Temns Retrouve'. Vol- 119 p. 14. 
Du W66 de chez ann, Vol. 1, P. 67. 




abstentiov, or t, atara: v 
Against this form of instantaneism, no less than against 
the previous one, 1,. larcel reacts in the same strong fashion, 
for in both he sees a like, although contrary, errorg namely 
the failure to all'ow for that "trianGmlation" vinich gives its 
due value both to the past and'to the future, eachg to employ 
Kierkeg, aard's phrases as "things for themselves", and without 
I vihich time as a s--oiritual*category, as the medium of self- 
realisation or existence, is inconceivable. 
The recognition of this "triangulation" in temporal 
experience, so stressed in Marcel's philosophy, is tantamount 
to the recognition, such as we have In Alexander, of a spatial 
element inseparable from time (2). The rejection of the 
Bergsonian "instantanei=l means nothing less than that; for, 
as vie have seen, Bergson ends up in such an "instantaneism! l 
precisely because he fails to allow for the spatial element 
Of cliscriminatiOni for "distance, (and this because he sees 
pace simply an ideal construction, neglecting the space in s0 
of pure experience which is just as much an "immediate datud' 
as the pure temporal). 
T4e reco6nition of such a spatial element as inseparable 
from temporal experiencet that Time is indeed "intrinsically 
(1) I'Llide"al de sagesse clulil 
to, ýt simplement llabstention. 
Rres, et llon verra que cette 
a la f6is de ilatorazcie stole: 






nous *oro-oose. clest -oeut-etre 
Elais que lion y reýarde de 
abstention est proche parente 
ienne et du renoncement chretien. " 
Is pp. 142-3. 
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spatial (1)", is essential to a philosophy of existence. which 
seeks to safeCuard both Immanence and Transcendence, as does 
Marcell. q. It is in the light of a spatio-temporal philo- 
that the latter presents human destiny as a dialogue 
-between the self's present -and its past, as process and drama. 
/ 
(1) Ibid., p. 143. 
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VII. Essence and Existence. 
What is perhaps most significant in 1.1arcells theory of 
time, and what suffices to classify him as an Existentialist, 
is that Timo is rehabilitated as the means and the sole means 
by vhlich eternity may be experienced. -The ideal eternity of 
U -'-he Platonic schools is recognised f or WIlat it is -a mere 
-possibility - and Time ceases to be mere appearance to become 
the very mode in ilhich eternity becomes actuality. ', 1.1arcel 
claims to hold within his grasp a "positive notion of eternity". 
In a passa[Se that bears the stamp of Bosanquet, he vrcites: 
Et ici on sle/leve, je crois, 'ia une-notion 
I absolument positive de 114ternite. LI univer sI 'tant pas et ne pouvant pas en tant qu ,e 
tel, nle 
6tre pense comme objet... est entierement 
transcendant a ce que ilai appele une, representa- 
tion cinematographique quelconque. Et il en 
est exactement de m8me du moi: ý. un certain 
plan, je ne peux pas ne pas m1apparaitre comme 
contemiprain de 11univers (coaevus universo 
clest-a-dire comme 4ternel* (B. A. p. 2-4.5 
His view of Time comes nearest to that of Von Hiagel, výho 
distinguishes between succession, duration and eternity: 
clock-time, historicity and simultaneity., Von H-agel sees 
in duration "not a barrier against Eternal Life, but the very 
-stuff and means in and by which we vitally experience and 
apprehend that Life (l). 11 This view is related, as in 
1,1arcel, to the recognition of the bodily and physical factors 
conditioninG the apprehension of the spiritual. For both, 
the transcending of Time can be accomplished only in Time 
itself by virtue of vfaat is most real therein. 
Eternal Life, P. 386. 
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A Marcel, likeVon Ddgelt seems to conceive a sort of 
continuity between duýation and simultaneity. The element 
of pure successivity, which acUleres to the present instant 
of duration, gives way at a certain level to the element of 
simultaneity, and, by virtue of this process of a-oprofond- 
issement, some measure of eternity and of absolute experience 
is achieved, its degree depending upon the effort of will 
involved in the re-oetition. Expounding the doctrine of time 
in the philosophy of Jaspersq Marcel de6lares, in terms 
applicable to his own theory: 
Ainsi l1existence, pas plus. clulelle nlest isolable 
de la communication, clest-a-dire d1un certain .1 
coesse spirituellement appr4hende, ne - se laisse 
'gaisir en dehors d1un certain enracinement dans 
la auree. Celle-ci cesse alors dletre ecoulement 
pur, pour. devanir manifestz: ýtion de I'Existence 
a. se conquiert par ses decisions. Clest par qi, .0 1ý 9ýe le temporel peut ýetre'transcende, non au benefice d1un inte-riporel abstrait, "mais de telle 
facon que dans le temps je sois au-dessus du temps 
sa: ýLs Sýre en dehors de lui. 11 En tant que jI argis 
et que j'aime inconditionnellement dans le tezps, 
c: est lleternite elle-mCurae qui y prend place... 
L eternfte' nlest ni 11inteinl3orel. ni la, duree 
perpeltuelle, mais la profondeur du temps en tant 
que manifestation historique de llexisten6e. 
(R. I. pp. 294-5. ) 
The consciousness of eternity is procured, in a word, not by 
any flight from time, but by a certain deepening of the 
consciousness of time. "Pas de reniement, " exclaims 1.1arcel 
in his essay on Rilke: "ohl bien au contraire, une adhesion 
infinie 'a l1exister (Z-LiptimnunG zum Da-sein). 11 (H. V. P. 322. ) 
This conception of eternity as the "depth of timdl is 




rhythm. He notes with approval that in Rilke "the sense of 
being and the sense of becoming are intimately fused" (H. V. 
. 
jioted he defined the P. 309. ) In passages previously q 
existential consftousne= as the consciousness of process 
OLibodying an , apL)el a l1existence d1une certaine creativite' 
dans le monde"; as being one vrith the "ardeur, a vivrel which 
is the very "substance of life". In his essay on LIEtre en 
-definition of the cosmos situation he-develops ! ý-l 
as a , primitive aynamisn2l and relates the consciousness of 
this cosmic rhythm to the consciousness of tirae; remarking 
on his own account that 11il est clair... que nous-ne prenons 
pas'une conscience e"galement vive ou intense %a chaciue moment- 
de notre duree de ce Idynamisme primitif"'. (H. V. p. 111. ) 
1,7hat is most siFnificant in the modern, *and particularly 
Existentialist, view of time is the substitution for the 
traditional equation of eternity vrith timelessness of a new 
equation. of eternity with what ive might call timefulness. 
Now, this -assertion in its turn involves a reversal of the 
Hegelian conception of the Absolute. The Absolute and the 
Eternal are no longer synonymous i7ith the totality. The 
eternal present vfnich Marcel Is philosophy envisages constitutes 
an I' image of eternity, in so f ar as it grasps ý, rlthin an b 
actuality reraembered past and anticipated future. But this 
past and future, operative in the present, are certainly not 
a whole past arid a whole future made actual 7ýrith one single 
degree of actuality. It is not possible, in 111arcel's viow, 
,Z 
without quitting actual experience and'converting reality 
into. an object, to have a view of the whole of time, as Hegel 
and, it would seem, even Leibniz %7muld suggest. It is 
undoubtedly t1iis vievrpoint that determines Llarcel's use of 
the term totum simul to describe the successivity character- 
istic of the objectified real. What he is criticising is 
the to-l-um simul of Royce. VIJ V 
There is, in Royce's definition of the specious present, 
a curious misapprehension which has been pointed out by 
Gunn (1). He defines the latter indeed as a totur. simul. 
He takes as an analogy the hearing of a musica-1-composition, 
where all the notes are grasped as a vLole and at once, the 
length of the time-span varying, itithin limits, from. 
individual to individual. And he proceeds from this 
conception of the specious present of human consciousness to 
define the nature of the Divine present as one where the 
Absolute Consciousness is"aware simultaneously of the vrhole 
time-series 
There are here, it vould seem, two flaws. First, in 
conformity vrith his Absolute iaealism, Ro. jyce, far from dis- 
tinguishing, as do the I-Jediaevalists and lalarcel himself, 
between Time and Eternity, conceives eternity as simply the 
ý1) For a study of Royce's theory of time, cf. Gabriel'Larcell 
a TvIdta-pý: y-sique de Royce, Paris, Aubier, 1945, first published 
in the Revue de 11ý: 13tapnysique, 1918-1919. (2) The World and the Individual, Second Series, London and 
New York, lvlacr-illan;. 1901, p. 139 sqq. and The Concept-ion of. 
Immortality, Boston and New York, Houghton 1900, 
po 84, n. -T. 
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whole of time. His conception of time is, quantitative 
rather than qualitative; ras Gunn remarks: "All such 
arguments aim at establishing a quantitative'view of the 
Eternal, ýthey at-tempt to Grasp what they confess to be 
infinite in limits that ax-c finite. They would be better 
employed in clucidatin., further the conception of the 
Eternal as qualitative, as truly timeless, ', 'not as totum or 
stretch of the whole of Time, which whole they ao not, know 
Here, as 3-n other cases, it is quality not quantity that 
matters (1). " 
Seconaly, t1he analogy of the Divine prese. nt-with the 
specious present is surely not valia. The Divine consciousness 
may be conceived as Imowing simultaneously the wholo of the 
time-series, because in the Divine ,,,, una there is nothing- 
which is not. actuality. In the-specious present of 
human consciousness, on the contrary, as already stressed, 
however much the vi'liole ran. ý-e of the past and future may be 
immanent t-herein, they emerCe with varyin,,,. -, deSrees of 
actuality or possibility, the present itself being a 
selective point. As Gunn sur,, gests, the hearino of a Diece 
of music does'not imply that there are present to us at once 
all the totes of a melody; we are aware of an actund whole 
only if that whole is no longer a present but completely a 
past. ' The reality will then have been'converted into an 
object detailed in succession. The so-called totun simul 
(1) 
. 
Op. cit. o I) - 361. 
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is purely quantitative, it is in strict f act less a 
simultaneity than a synthesis. I suggest that it is this 
, xiew of a totum simul as an actual whole which Marcel is 
'criticising, and that that. accounts for his use, at first 
'sight 
so curious, of. the term t, otum simul to describe 
objective succession (1). It is indeed. a similwý ctiticism 
that he mak6s of Royce's assertion that. the consciousness 
I have of my self is identical . with that wýjch God has of me: 
Mais qulest-ce qui l1autoriseq encore une fois., ý. ' 
a affirmer que saisir totalement, expliciter 
sans reserves clest encore avoir conscienceT 
En croyant affranchir la conscience des 
conditions, soi-disant contingentes qu: L limiteýt 
sa'piiissance-d'appre"hensiong, est-ce qulil ne 
tend pas 'a la depouiller precise"ment de ce qui 
fait d1elle une r. ealite' positive? (2). 
It is : ýor the same reasons that Marcel rejects the 
point de depart of a metaphysician such asM. Lavelle whog 
he says, "pretend se. transporter au coeur de 3, letrell orl 
in Lavelle's own wordst"retrouver ýIacte primitif dont 
dependent a la fois mon etre propre bt lletre*du monde (3)9" 
precisely because, he claims that the mind may, in some 
privileged way, grasp the totality. Against this assertion 
Marcel reacts vigorously: 
AuOune demarche ne me semble metaphysiquement 
plus iraportante que celle par laquelle je 
reconnais que je ne puis sans contradiction 
penser l1absolu comme un observaýoire contra 
dlotL l'univers serait contemple dans sa tot, ite, 
au lieu dletre apprehende d1une fagon partielle 
ct latdralog comme il llest par chacun do nous. ' 
(R. I. p. 8. ) 
(1) Cf. Journal Metapýyysiaue III (FraMents)q Confluences 
No. ;6s Jan. 9 1945 9 P. 14 sqqe (2 La 1.16taphysique de goyce, Rev, do L-let, 9 1919, p. 241. M





And he adds that it is the merit of Kierkegaard, Jaspers and 
Heidegger (of Marcel also, we may say) to have recognised 
that I'llexistence (et a fortiori la transcendance) ne se 
laisse reconnwttre ou e"voquer que par dela le domaine d1une 
pensee en general procedant par reperes sur-les co aux 
du monde objectif. " (Ibid., P. 9. ) 
Ic 
The whole of thiS problem centres on the relation- between 
transcendence and imimanenceg. essence and existence. For 
Marcel, the instant of existential experience is the point 
of emergence of the eternal, but this-eternal cann be a 
mere actual object sprqad out in time. To believe so is to -- 
fall into the error of Immanentism and hypostatise the 
temporal order_itself, or into the error of Transcendentalism 
and depreciate unduly that order. , 
Both transcendence and 
immanence must find their place in what claims to be a, meta- 
physical and a religious doctrine. Present experience must 
contain within it an, element of operative possibilty not 
wholly ýexplicited. which is the part of the 'mystery" in 
immediate existential experience and at the'same time the 
guarantee of the transcendent. 
This is simply to assert that essence and existence 
remain distinct in the human being. Royce, indeed, accepts 
the cardinal thesis of Hegel that essence is existence and 
that existence is "essential BeinEý, (1). On the contraryp 
Q Cf. Hegel, pp. 252', 258-0 1389 1399 140,142). 
lie influence oT lechner's world soul philosophy is apparent 
on Royce. In both, w6 see a MonisM*cohabiting with a 
personal pluralism., 
-1"-.... 
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, -the, creature differs precisely thereby from the Divine Beingg 
in whom essence and existence, possibility and actuality are 
one (1). And such distinction, albeit not separationg is 
(1) Tillich describes the viewpoint common to the Existent- 
3. alists and to the Mediaovalist as follows: "The Unconditioned 
cannot be conditioned by a difference botween-its essence and 
its existence. In absolute Being, there is no possibility 
which is not an actuality, it is pure actuality. In all 
finite beings on the other hand, this difference, is present: 
in their existence as something separated from-essence is the 
mark of finitude.,, (The Existential Philosophy, Journal of 
the History of Ideas, Zran., 1944, pp. -47-8 distinction 
it, of. course, common in classical philoso; 
ýy; 'Le"ibniz,. 
for 
example, affirms the creature's resemblance to Ood, in respect 
of his essence, -his difference in respect of his existence. 
. 
(Monad. § 429 45. )- 
Historically, the distinction between essence and 
existence is the fundamental principle of Christian theology 
and is common to all the Scholastics, although Saint Thomas 
has given it its most systematic expression. 11 In Deo idem 
est esse et essentia. 11' "In omnibus autem, aliis, etiam in 
substantiis intellectualibus, differt esse et quod est., ' 
(Contra. Gent. Lib., 19 c; XII; Lib.. 111 c. LII.. ) 
In Christian theology the distinction serves mainly as a 
'guarantee against the Pantheism or Monism of the Eleatpj, which 
posits being univocally as a genus, thereby attribiltfiit reality 
solely to the One. Allied with the principle 'of the 
"analogy' of being, it serves to explain the multiplicity of 
beings in relation to the single Divine Being. Being, it is 
affirmed; is not a genus g ! Ens enim. non est genus, sed 
multipliciter dicitur de . 1versis. 11 Saint 'Thomas, In Meta- pUsica I Lib. I, C. 5' lect 9); it is an "analogue", that is 
a transcendent attribute thýt may be, predicated of the 
Necessary Being and of the contingent being alike, of the 
Ens subsistans, in-whom essence is identical with existence, 
and*the Tn--spRýticj2ans , whose'being is composed of the two separate principles R essence and existence. (Cf. L. Rougier, - La Scolastique et le Thomisme, pp. 128-9, -Of 1,33-4; 469-75. 
Of. also lu. de Wulfq Hist. de la ýhil. medievaleg Louvaing 1900, p. 264 sqq. ) It becomes, therefore, possible to posit 
a single Necessary Being on the one hand, and a diversity of 
contingent beings on the other, deriving their degree of being from the former by way of analogy or participation. "Non 
enim ens de multis aequivoce dicitur,. sed per analogiam, et 
sic oportet fieri reductionem in unum. 11 (Saint Thomasj 
Contra Gent. Lib. IIl c. XV. Cf. E. Gilson, 'The Philosophy 
of Saint Thomas., -p, 273. ). -I 
: 
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for the creature, in so far as he follows out its implications 
in hi's experience, the very guarantee, of his transcendent 
nature, as Marcel himself recognises: 
Dabord il est efvident quIun etre ne re. /alise ,- 
pas dans ltimmediat,. dans le pur maintenant 
'Ila plenitude de ce* qulil est' ' par exemple 
un sentiment tres profond. (J. M. 
ý. 
pp. '194-5-) 
The type of "participationa he may experience in moments of 
self-realisation must fall'short of a merging--Of self and 
essential being. 
The implications of this distinction are fruitful with 
regard to the temporal problem. It is clear that the type 
of eternal life or totum simul cap6le of being experienced 
on earth diff ers f rom the Divine eternity ý and perhaps f rom 
that which man himself may hope to enjoy after deaths 
"Eternal Life, in a real, though not in the fullest sense, " 
vwites VonlHagell "is attributable to man. This lesser 
eternal life appears. to have its range betweeii ýhe pure 
I Simultaneity of Gods and mere Clock-time, and to have its 
(Note (1) contd. from previous -page. ) 
In Existential philosophyl the distinction between being 
and essence is preserved in so far as it accounts for the 
characteristics of contingent beings and notably the funda- 
mental temporal experience of eternity within time, unity 
within multiplicity. Needless to say, the complex ontolo- 
gical structure of Scholasticism founded thereon, with its 
hierarchy of beings, goes by the board. We may say that the 
traditional problem of the one andthe manyq which the 
distinction involves, is in the Existential philosophy no 
longer treated as a problem of speculative theology, but as 
one of Exilstential experience; it, is concerned with the 
relation not of existence to Being in generall but rather of 
the existent self to the essential self in "passionate" 
experience. 
%I 
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true form in Duration - anever, more or less overlapping 
succOssiong capable of being concentrated into quasi- 
simultaneities. And this lesser eternal life, although 
unending, is never'boundless; nor does it (here below at, 
least) ever become entirely actual (1). 11- 
This inferiority, as already, sUggestedg.. -is not one 
in 
respect of quality - in the sense of plenitude but in 
respect of scope a, nd breadth. 'The present, of existential 
experlence, while enduring from apast into a future, none 
the less remains contracted' within -the limits of a present 
which constitute6q-. to use Whitehead's term, 'ari'llepoche", 
Not all past and future immanent therein is actualised, with 
one single degree of actuality; only those parts relevant 
to present action emerge as fuily actualisedg leaving a 
, 
remnant of what we might call operative possibility. We,. 
must, on the other handq conceive the Divine Being as 
existing in a present which actualises'the mhole of his 
possibilities With one single degree of actuality. It is 
precisely this notion of the existential present as ' 
constituting a contraction that Alarcel offers us in a passage 
desetibing theirelation of past and present., - 
Disons encore que cette challne de rapports 
temporels, spatiaux, spatiaux-temporels, peut 6tre contract4e par mon imaGinati6n jusquýa 
ce que llexistant pense me devienne co-pr sent. 
Llespec2 de champ magnotiqpe ou' se distibuent 
ces chaines toutes ordonnees par rapport bL mon 
existence actualle est ce quo jtappellerai 
1forbite existentielle. (R. I. pt 28. ) 
op. Cit--9 PP. 383-4. 
11 . '. * 11$, . 10 1 .. I..... .I..... . .... -. I, i-l - ". . -V I- 0'. ..... .... I 
406. 
We see from this that Marcel-does not consider the instant in 
the manner of Saint Augustine as an expansion of the present 
into the past and future, but rather in the manner of 
Aristotle as the point of emergence of past and future 
possibility within the contr . acted foca point of the present. 
What has here taken place-is a reversal of the Hegelian 
identification of the Absolute with the Whole. The*Absolute 
is no Longer the, Whole or the'Infinite, but rather finite 
experience'ref. lecting and projecting the Whole and the 
Infinite within its limited range and characterised 
subjectively by, fulness and intensity of f4ei , ing (1).. 
The distinction between the totum simul of human and 
Divine experience involves thatq already discussed, between 
the types of substanti ality and self-causation attributable 
to them respectively. But there is a more important aspect 
of the matter Which deserves full discussion,. as it throws 
(1) M. Wahlj in his article on Whiteheadq relates this new 
absolute to Bradley's "finite centrell or 11centre of feeling19 
the unit of being which he eventually designates as the 
"absolute, ' (EssMs on Truth and Reality, pp. 189-909 246, ) and 
which he distinguishes from the selfg the latter being 
"appearance" (Ibid., pp. 248-9; Apl2earance and Realityq 
pp. 103-20)o 
It may be recalled that the reaction against the identi- 
fication of the Absolute with universality is a common feature 
of the Romantic philosophies. The latter, developing the 
Leibnizian thesis that the best possible world is the one 
where no possibility is left unrealisedg proclaimed that the 
harmony. and rationality of the universe manifest themselves 
in the maximal differentiation'of the creatures and are made 
actual only in so far as each individual, by the maximum 
exploitation of his finite possibilities, finds a measure of 
absolute being within his finiteness itself (Cf. A. 'Lovejoy, 






light on a central problem of Existentialism and'one which 
has become perhaps the major problem confronting French 
Existentialism in its most recent stage, namely the problem 
of Value. 
To assert that the present of existential experience is 
the fOcal-point of selocted possibilities i-s to stress the 
fact that value is conditional on choice or. selection and 
that it-involves a measure of', limitation. "Realisation 
therefore, " writes Whitehead, "is in itself the attainment 
of value. But there is no such-thing as mere value. Value 
is the I outcome of1limitation. , The definit'e-Tinite entity 
is the selected mode which is the shaping of attainment; 
apart from such shaping intoindividual matter of fact there 
is no attainment. The mere fusion of all that there is 
would be the nonentity of indefiniteness (l). 11 
It would seem, then, that value is inseparable from a 
condition where self-realisation is never full and complete. 
Brehier has raised this problem in, an important article of 
which the conclusion deserves quotation: "Pourquoi l1homme 
'ne croit-il pas, au fond, que les valeurs se realiserOnt?, 
Pourquoi renvoie-t-il dans le domaine de llutopie la cite' 
parfaitement juste, la connai. ssance parfaitement exacteg 
l'oeuvre d1art porýeuse de toutes les beautes? Est-ce par 
une sorte cle de"couragement, par la conscience d1une imperfec- 
tion radicale? 
' Nta-t-il pas, aus*si le sentiment qu'une 
(1) Science and the 1-Tod. World,, Cf. lbid.,, _pp. 
115-17. 
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realisation parfaite aurait un, aspect deflnitifq mecanique, 
qui lui enleverait tout son prix et qui detendrait les 
_* 
/ 
re'ssorts de la volonte/ et de l1action? Slil en est ainsi, 
clest qulil y a, present dans les valeurs, un absolu qui 
nlest pai lui-meme valeurg mais qui interdit de ýrendre' I 
aucune valeur co=e se suffisant. A elle-m6me. La philosophie 
des valeurs ne peut done -pas etre aut on6me: 1ef ait qu e le s 
valeurs evoquent des aspirations humaines, la maniýere memeg 
heurteý, - impreývisible dont nous aspirons, aux valeurs et dont 
. les valeurS se de/terminent dans"cette aspirationg sont- 
inexplicables ees"que llon pose les valeurs en. absolus (1). " 
We should have, therefore, to infer-that value is bound 
up with that'specific type'of existence we call human, 
involving properly human conditions of consciousness where 
-the essential possibilities of the self are never wholly 
realised. Value would imply necessarily, as the condition 
II of of its appearance, what M. Le Senne has termed the "obstacle 
and whichq according to Brehier and himselfq is present only* 
in human existence,. This, howeverg raises an important 
problem that is only t: ýeated. by implication in Marcel's worksv' 
ýut which we might proceed to clarify. 
This conception of value as being inherent in human, 
existbnce and consciousness alone on the lines suggested by 
Bre"hierg has been developed by Vale'r'y and, more especidlly, 
by the Idealism that passes under the name of Existentialism 
(1) Doutes sur la philosophie des valeurs Rev. de Met,, 1939, 
pq 414. 
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evolved by Jean-Paul Sartre; leading to the apotheosis of 
a. 
existence pure and simple 9 that is of the unconditionec 
aspirations, and exercise of the human will at the -expense 
of essence. Sartre distinguishes between the, en-soig the 
self-contained necessity'of"'the reali"ded object9 and the 
pour-soi, typified-by human consciousness,.. where alone, by 
virtue of the "alterite or subject-object relation it 
involves, a 19n&nVI intervenes between the s'elf1s`%ideals and 
its acts and-so gives room for freedom. The outcome of such 
a do etrine is the - rej e cti on of any typ e, of 'et ernal 
iif e as 
appertaining wholly -'to necessary and compidt6 ,d "things", in 
favour of existence, which is through'and through non-comple- 
tion and temporal striving, 
We may suggest, however, that from the point of view 
of temporal theory there. is no justification for that type 
of opposition which the Idealist of the voluntarist sort'sets 
up-between human and Divine experience and existence. '- And, 
if we interpret his works correctlyq Marcel would reject such 
an opposition. For if the type of eternity enjoyed by man 
differs from that-which God enjoys or which he himself-may 
enjoy in a fully realised state, the difference need not and 
must not be one, of quality. The present of realisation, for 
man, is the point of emergence'of selective possibilities; 
\, 
it does not'realis6 all in one single degree of actuality. ' 
The present of fully'realised. being is one 'whose Whole range 
6f possibilitiesape-actualised in one single degree. But 
z 
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this -latter eternity is still, qualitatively of the same 
character. It is also pure act where, in one single instant, 
Being realises its essence by a simple act of its will. Here 
too there is then choice and selection, but this chqice and 
selection involve a 11 liinitatior2l that -is at -one and the same 
time an infinite fullness, 
If this is so, eternity - meaning, in particular, the 
Divine eternity itself - is not, as Sartre or BrelAer would 
suppose, non-temporalg nor is it necessityg nor is it 
external to value, It is freedom, self-creationg temporal 
fullness and value, but, all these in an infinite deGree. Is not 
this what -Descartes means when 
he says the Divinity "fait en 
lI egard de sof-meme que la quelque f aeon la mýme chose a 
cause efficiente "a lle"gard do-son effet (1)119 namely that- 
God's eternal existence is a self-creation? * It is certainly 
what Kierkegaard signified when he declared that 11 eternityý is 
the true 'repetition (2)11; or wheA. ho called attention to the 
temporal. character of God's eternal created activity (3). 
We may say that the Divine existencel no less than human 
existence, is self-creation and self-realisation, an, infinitý 
"fidelity" or infinite "repetition! ', 
1) Prim. -Resjý., Oeuvr_es' compl"e'tesi ed. Adam and Tanneryq 
P. 
2ý Conce2t of Dread, p. 17 note. R 
III: U God Himse-It'lmd not willed repetition, the world 
* would never 
have come into existence. He would either have 
followed the light plans of hope, or He would have recalled 
it all and conserved it in recollection. ' This He did not do, 
therefore the world endures, and it endures for the fact that 




These views are everywhere implicit in Marcelts, 
definitions of value. 
La valeur ne pout 6tre pensee comme rAlitel... 
quo si elle, est refdree a la. conscience d1une 
dostin4e immortelle. (H. V. p. 211. ) 
QuIontendre par la sinon que-la. valeur est le, 
miroir dans lequel il nous. est donne' de lire 
toiijours-imMarfaitement, toujours a travers 
une bu6e d6formante, le visage authentiqae de, 
notre destin6e, ce "plus vrai,, que nous-memes" 
auqIiel il ne sera donne'de slepanouir dans sa, 
pljn'itude que dans un monde dont le propre de 
notre expgýience terrestre, semble, consister a 
nous ouvrir, a nous enýre-bailler, et peut-Stre 
dans -des cas extremes a nous interdire ltacce's. 
(Ibid. 9 p. 213. ) 
When, therefore, he defines value as he does in such passagesq. 
he is placing-value neither in a non-temporal state which is 
I 
indifferent to the process of self-realisation on earthq nor 
in a finite temporal activity which is indifferent to eternity. 
He is stressing the fact that existence is the meeting-place 
of time and eternity, that it exhibits eternity, freedom and 
value in so far as it participates in that fuller eternity, 
freedom and value which is the infinite eternal life or 
immortality. 1rhis is the fuller, inner significance of the 
phrase Marcel wrote at the beginning of the Journal Meta- 
physique: "Il ya liaison'ii3manento entre la re/alite' de Dieu 
et la, relalisation de Dieu dans le saint; maia la realite'de 
Dieu ne peut apparaltre au saint que 
pwýticipe. ll (J. M. P. ' 5. ) 
comme ce dont il 
I 
This conclusion, moreover, is of the utmost importance 
for our subject. For it involves the view ihat eternal life 
- 
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is not, in the strict senseq non-temporal; rather is it a 
fullness of time or time-fulness. To dwýy this would be to 
refuse the Divine Being and, indeed, immortal being in general, 
existence, freedom and purposive evaluation - in fact 
spirituality itself, if we define-the latterg as does M. Wahl, 
as movement in opposition to the immobility that is 
materiality (1). 
For what is perhqps most interesting in Marcelts theory 
of time is the continuityq albeit distincýbionq estab2Ishedq as 
in Von Hugell between successiong duration and eternity as 
corresponding to varying degrees of reality; for-we must 
I 
assume there are "des niveaux temporels distincts de re"alite 
L 
ou de viell. (J. Al. P. 195. ) They constitute an ascending 
hierarchy,. of*orders, each infinite with regard to the inferior 
one, and each infinite within its own limits, as is the whole 
coiýtinuum. Thus, durationq*at one pole, merges in succession, 
at the other in eternity, while in between infinite degrees of 
simultaneity are to be found. Eternity is , then, from. the 
(1) Etude sur le Parme"nideq p. 104. It is therefore perfectly 
just to declFre thaZ Existentialism, as opposed to Platonismq 
I 
does not separate essence and existencel even if it distinguishes- 
between them. (Cf. J. Wahl, Existentialism, a Prefaceg New 
Republic, October, 1945. ) What is being a1: JTFmeZ1 is that 
value is the product of a union of essence and existence, each 
being of equal importance in its constitution, the one as 
providing the ends, the other the means of realisation. 
"Recto et verso d1une meme lvaleurl, llessence et llexistence 
sont coordonnees et domine"es par llacte, mais non llune par 
11 autre-. AGir clest faire exister ce qii me'rito dletre, etq 
rdci roquementg la prefiguration de ce merite est dQa une 
mani3re dlexisteri-i Clest en ce sens que... nous pouvons nous 
hausser 'a-limiter Dieu'. " (R. Bertrand, Note sur llessence, 








p oint of view of our contingent, immanent experience, the 
ever-fleeting "limit" of time; from the transeendental. point 
of view, time is the'llimage, or "appearance's of eternity. 
Yet this conception of eternity as transcending*9 and at the 
, same., 
time a promotion of, time'excludes-the Platonic and 
Llediaeval definition of eternity-as pure Immutability. 
Marcel himself has declared that it is only in terms of 
-duration that we can attain a "positive view" of eterfiity. 
Duration and-eternity have in common the feature of dynamismg 
although differing infinitelyq as-the relative to the absolute, ' 
in the degree of'simultaneity obtaining. So that the 
realised essences, in so far as they can be conceived as 
transcending duration, are not accurately describe 
Id 
as time-' 
less, if by that is meant that they are devoid of all the 
activity which characterises time. They are'rather to be 
conceived in terms of the actus purus of Aristotle, or the 
God Causa Sui of Descartes whose existence does not preclude 
activity or self-creationý but only-that activity which 
comprises grovrth, or deperition (1). 1 
What is more significant still is that Marcel's theory 
of Time (and of Space) is bound up with. a theoKy of orders of 
10 
reality. This latter constitutes the central intuition of 
his metaphysics, no less than that of Pascal with whose 
Q) On Descartes' theory of time, in many respects, similar to 
hat of Marcel, cf. the highly interesting interpretation of 
J. ViGier, Les ideas de temps, de durde at d1d(ternitd dans 





conceptions the similarity is striking (1). Reality is seen 
as comprising an infinitely complex hierarchy of infinite and 
convergent orders situated at varying levels of depth; so 
that the ultimate being of things is obscurely hidden. 
It is this structure of the real which conditions the 
type ýf dialectic employed by, both Marcel and Pascal. The 
principal reproach bloth would direct against the &#cursive 
method of -Descartes, and -its universal application 
to., "realities! ' 
is that it -is valid only for a reality which is, in its 
essence, clear and distinct. And-if Descartes applies it 
alike to physics and metaphysicsq believing reality can be 
deduced more geometrico, it is because he considers it to be 
ultimately intoiligibleg to constitute in its esseiiee a clear 
and distinct whole; the contradictions or obscurities it 
seems to contain havJng a subjective source and being capable 
of being dissolved by the introduction of order and method 
into the inquiry. Spinoza's geometrical Monism has its 
source in such an intuitiong so different from that of Marcel 
or Pascall expressed in the familiar formula: idea adequatio 
rei. 
Moreover, to say that the real is thus a clear and 
distinct wholegis to say that it exists on one level; only 
then can the use of a discursive method be justified. Given, 
(1) On Pascal's theory of orders and dialectiog cf. F. 
Strowski, Pascal et son tempsq, Paris, Plon, Vol. 111 (1913), 
Chp. XVI; V. Delbos La Philosophie frangaise. Paris, Plon, 
19219 Chp 'III; J. 6h= 
I 
ev ier, PaFc-all Pari-s-, -Plong*192-2, Chp. 
V1. -The theory of time involve7d=as certain analogies with J-Wý Dunne's theory of the Serial Universe. 
e- 
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however a reality whose structure is complex, riddled with 
contradictions and obscurities, adaitting varying levels of 
being, the application to it of the discursive method can 
only distort itq transforming the realities it contains into 
abstract concepts (the process of generalising. being. at 
bottom a process of levelling), decanting them of their 
concrete and qualitatively distinct caiitent. There is 
therefore required, as Marcel and-Pascal have both c6mpre- 
hended, a typa of dialectic which, avoiding such distortiong 
consists in llsubmittinEý' to the real-and, through sensation 
and feeling, -by a sort of absorption, penetrating into ever 
deeper levels of experience, probing ever ddeper layers of 
reality; approaching through the medium of duration, although 
without ever wholly attaining, complete one-ness with the 





There remains one final point to stress. It is the fact 
that the moments of self-realisation or commiinion procured by 
the transcending of time in depth are dis. continuous. And 
this is where, whatever points of similarity obtain between 
them, Marcel parts company'with a Whiteheadq for instanceg 
whose thought is rooted in and rarelytranscends a philosophy 
of nature a-ad where Marcel reveals himself'as a strict 
Existentialist. The rift in existence is a central theme of 
"" 
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his thought. He sees it subject to an irrevocable "law of 
intermittencul (R. I. P. 53. ) A wholly continuous trans- 
cendinG of objectivity and the realm of "havinol is impossible 
for the finite creature: 
Une condemnation sans appel deil-lavoir dqui- 
vaudrait au f ond ý la plus temeraire repudia- 
tion de l1existence finie par 116tre fini 
lui-meMe.. si., nous restons, si faiblement que, 
ce soit, p; rmeables a llesperance, ce ne'peut 
6tre quIa" la faveur des breches, des-fissures 
qui subsistent dans l1armure d1avoir qui nous 
recouvre. -(H. V. p. 83. ) 
.. "1 
Fidelity is no "preliminary datual, for "the faithful soul is 
doomed to undergo the experience of night"'and "it is-through 
these errors -and those vicissitudes that we are-given to see 
the intermittent gleam of the indefeotiblet. (Ibid., p. 210. ), 
It cannot constitute the "permanence of an- essence", meaning 
by that the sort of continuity obtaining in the field of logic 
or even, we may add, in the field of organic nature. (and it 
, is this latter type of continuity that, Whitehead-ts doctrine 
stipulates). 
Taken with the fact that in moments of realisation and 
commiiýion man cannot enjoy possession in its fullest senseq 
this still more fundamental fact of his incapacity to achieve 
a continuity even of such moments of plenitude condemns himl 
not, as we shall see, to despair but to the condition of homo 
viator, of searcher, and endless searcherl after that life 
- and that final communion which immortality alone can bring. 
His life is a transcendent movement towqrds a state of trans- 
cendence whose, image, he bears within his immortal soulq but of 
" ". . 
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which the full vision will not be vouchsafed on this earth. 
- 
I 
In conclusion, the central., fact in Marcel's doctrine of 
,, Time 
is the claim that time may be transcended-only by a 
deepening of temporal experience and not by any relief from 
temporal conditions (1). Emerging from Objectivity into 
Existence the selfq in moments of profound personal experienceg 
tran cends the successivity characterisitic of objective 
thinking and-recovers the "instant" or point of Intersection 
between time and eternity; - and by'the exploitation of what 
is most real in time, -workingthrough the powers of i immediacy 
sensation, memory and premonition - it realises by ever deepdr 
penetrations, 'although fragmentarily and partially, the 
transcendent essence, immanent within it, or commiines, no less 
partially and fragmentarilyt with the transcendent esseýces 
of other selves and things; building, as far as it may a 
stable order of personal relationships by that "sp#it of 
metamorphosis which, from our fleeting world, can extract the 
changeless.,, (H-V- Pe' 358. ) 
In this view Marcel is in line with the positive mysticism 
of-Saint*Augustine and Von Hagel, and no less with the temporal 
theories of Phenomenology and Existentialism. Being is 
(1) Cf. Jaspers: "Existieren ist die Vertiefung des Augen- 
blicks , so dass the zeitliche Gegenwart Erfi11lZLnrt, ist-. --U-e Výerganýeriheit and Zukunft in. el-M tragen2C. " TIE3:.: 




revealed only in Existence, and for this reason only I'dans 
le drame et"a' travers le drame (1). " The Existentialist 
starts from the union of. general and particularg the point 
of interaection between Time and Eternity. The instant of 
duration, which is the temporal mode of existential experience, 
alone provides a gateway to the Eteriuil: the"o- 
pathiques" , 11. Jean Grenier calls them, in:, which' we become 
"temoins dlune presende (2). " , It is in this sense that Max 
Scheler'has defined the aim of metaphysics as the discovery 
of ýhe "Eternal in mad' and adds: - I'Darum darf das Ewige kein 
Asyl seing-in das. man flieht, weil man Leben und Geschichte 
nicht mehr ertragen zu kO%nnen meint. Und das wären schlechte 
1 
'Aeternistenlg die nur aus Geschichtsflucht sich der Idee des 
Ewigen hingäben, Die Geschichte anerkemlen, sie sehen in 
ihrer harten Realit&t - aber sie zu speisen aus dem Borne des 
Ewigen, ist angemessener als sie fli ehen (3). ", 
In conformity with those directives of Existentialism, 
the metaphysics: -, of Gabriel Marcel-is concerned with the 
realisation and the revelation of Being in and through 
(1) Cf. Von HtLgel: "For man's soulq though it does not 
energise in more Clock-time, cannot grow if we attempt to 
eliminate Duration, that interpenetrativeg overlapping kind 
of Succession, which is already, as it were, halfway to the 
Simultaneity of God.,, (The Mystical Element in Religion, 
Vol. II, p. 235. ) 
2ý L'Individu et l'Absolu, Fontaine' Feb. 9 1942. 3 Vom 271gen im Menscheng Erster Bandl Halbband I*, Leipzig, 
, 
er Neue GeistVerlag, J. 9'239 "p. 2. 
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concrete, partiquiar situations (1). Fo-- hir-, Ifetaph7sics 
is Grounded in history and drama; it is the philosophy of 
'the concrete andq as such, sees in Time the sole avenue of 
approach to Eternal Being. The reality of Time, not as 
itself a substance, but as the essential mode of realisation 
and apprehension of substances, that is the very cornerstone 
of Marcel's metaphysics. For Existence, in the words of 




(1) In this respect, Marcel's philosophy reveals itself once 
more in opposition to Thomism and faithful to the phenomeno- 
logical method as practised by the Existentialists. The 
"essences" are not attainedq as it were, in themselves, thanks 
to a process of abstraction whereby the contingent conditions 
of time and space are dissolved. On the cohtrary, they are 
"revealed" in the concrete spatio-temporal situations in which 
they are involved. 
*4 
CHAPTER VIII 
SPACE9 TIME AND EXISTENCE 
/ 
1. . Space. 
Hitherto, we have dealt only with the temporal instant. 
But Alarcel's analysis of the "instant,,, which is the unit of 
existenti: bLl experience, is richer and more complex than might 
at first appear. - In common with philosophers such as White- 
head and Alexander, he affirms the inseparability of Time and 
Space. He conceives the instant of living experience not 
only as temporal but spatial, identical with the spatio- 
temporal event of contemporary physics., In fact, his theory 
of Time has an almost exact parallel in his theory of Space. 
As we-have already seeng such a. doctrine of Space was already 
anticipated by #is doctrine of, Time. -, Now, p let us see how it 
is'developed in terms of his conception of presences and 
participations. This development follows on naturally from 
his recognition of the "spatiality" of time.. For to say that 
temporal experience involves a varying element of "distance" 
as between present and past is to say that the relation 
b6tween'the two-is that of a "dialogue" where each preserves 
its distinction within co=union. The relation of the self's 
present to its past in its "pure' spatiality is the prototype 
of the relation between self and'other selves and things. 
Spatiality is, in Marcel's philosopi-ly, if we may put it this 
--22S 
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way, simply temporal experience seen in depth: it is the 
medium for communications and presences: ý it is that 'which, 
gives spiritual substance and volume to subjective experience 
developing in time. 
In speakinG of, the distinction between the orders of. 
"Beinlgl and "Having19 we have already noted. that both Time and 
Space are modes of"having". Reflective thought, indeed, in 
, 
order t9 analyseits objectl requires to situate any given 
reality, in 'successive points of Space as of Time: 
J* % Avoir et spatialite. -Wavoir se refere au 
prendreg mais il semble qulil nty ait de prise 
qu e de - ce qiAi I est 
dans ilespacel'ou'de ce qui- 
est assimile a du spatial. (B. A. p. 209. ) 
The objectifying activity of thought consists essentially in 
the alienation of the self from the real. And the degree of 
this alienation may be said to vary in exact proportion to 
the degree in which the self adheresi-in space, to the reality, 
whether it be its own essential self, or some'other self or 
thing: 
Chacun de nous devient ainsi le centre d1une 
sorte dlespace mental qui se dispose suivant 
des zones concentriques d1adherence decroissantel, 
-d'interet decroissant, et a cette adherence dderoissante correspond une indisponibilite 
croissante. (Ibid., p. 102. ), 
Ne pourrait-ong d1autre part, soutenir que ce 
que nous appelons 11, espace au sens ordinaire 
du terme West en realite qa1une sorte de 
traduction de ce systeme aux zones concentriques 
que je ddfinissais tout & 11heure? (Ibid., p. 104. ) 
In other words, objective, conceptual'Space, with its implied 
dispersiong separation and division may, in moments of 
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Existence and participation* be transcended and immediate 
'contact in Space secured with Being. Thus in death itselfq 
which seems to be the very triumph of Space, in so far as it 
implies radical separation. Yet, when properly understood,. 
when experienced, death is seen to be*the annihilation of 
Space; for the dead whog to rpflectiong appear separated and 
lost, 'are "presents in-the minds of those who love intensely 
and grieve, for them. In such experience, Space is t: qanseended 
in so far as it means separation*and lle'loignementllqýandyields 
to the feeling of some one who is immediately present in 
Spaces 
Le mort nlest plus "nulle part", mais seulqment 
en moi.. (E. A. p. 430 
Negation de llespace - ne"gation de la mort. 
(Ibid. 9 p. 42. ) 
This transcending of Spaceq in moments of'olistential 
experience and in the participations of sensation and feeling$ 
like the transcending of Time, is not accomplished by a 
destruction of Space, by any gratuitous release from spatial 
conditions (1), but rather by virtue of a return to what is 
most real in Space; that is, to the concrete "spatial 
instant" of immediate experience. The vision, and possession 
(1) As is involved, for example, in the mystic experience of 
the Platonic type., Cf. Rousseau: "Alors tous les objets 
particuliers lui echappent; il ne voit et ne sent rien que 
dans le tout. Il faut que quelque circonstance particuliere 
resserre ses idees et circonscrive son imaginationg pour qulil 
puisse observer, par parties cet univers qulil slefforgait 
dtembrasser. 11 , (Reveries du 2romeneur solitaire, Me 
R8verie. ) 
I 
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of Being is secured, not outwith, but within the limits of 
deep experience with its irradicable spatio-temporal structure. 
There is here involved a distinction, parallel to the 
temporal--distinction betweon succession and duration, between 
objective, conceptual space on the one hand and real, concrete 
space on the other. As modern psychology teaches, there 
exists, in contrast with the homogeneous, uniform, conceptual 
space, which is an intellectual constructp a qualitative 
sentiment of space, as much an immediate datum of experience 
as is the "specious present" of duration, and differing 
entirely from the homogeneous, uniform, geometrical spaceg in 
that it exhibits qualitative differences of direction. such 
is the "spatial inst6ait", the unit of concrete 'spati'al 
experience (what Mareel*calls the "here", corresponding to 
, 
poral ll, noWl), the tem 
It is by'virtue of this "spatial instant, (inseparable 
from the temporal "instant") that objeýtive space may be 
transcended in sensation and feeling. As long as we remain 
within objective space, in which realities are isolated as so 
0 
many "objects'! in fixed points of a continuum which serves as 
a receptacle for our representations, we convert the universe 
of selves and realities into a system of irreversible and 
fixed relations expressinG, --in quantitative terms of distance, 
the qualitative spatial relationships obtaining in immediate 
experience between selves and between selves and our self. 
In immediate experience alone, in moments of Existence, we 
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recapture the 11 spatial instant' which, like the temporal 
llinstantýlj permitsj to a greater or less degreeg a prise de 
conttLet with reality; the self, other selves and things 
becoming, --to a greater or a less deGree, "present, to us: 
**oil ya deja dans le, fait de penser a quelqu'un (1) 
une active negation de i'lespace, cTestood-odire 215 
ce qulil ya de plus materiel et aussi de plus 
illusoire dans l1avec,. (B. A. p. 4?. )- 
This theory of Space, in keeping with the theory, of Time, 
makes . room for all varieties of meta-Psychical phenomena. 
What memory, for example, is with regard to Time, telepathy 
is with regard to Space. Both constitute "indices 
ontologiques" by virtue of which realities'are grasped 
outwith the -seeming limits of normal spatio-tempol4al, 
experience: ... la telepathie ne serait-elle pas par rapport 
a llespace, co quo la memoire est au temps? " (Ibid.. q p. 1409 
n. 1. ) We said before that Marcel's doctrine of communica- 
tions betvýeen selves depends upon the validity-of-such meta- 
psychical and seemingly supra-normal experiences. He admi, 6s 
the claims of telepathy, he allows too for I'materialisations" 
in space from the future or the past, or from distant points 
of sPace. His dramas are full of such "meetings" (in the 
I 
spatial as well as the temporal sense), such contacts and 
occult influences from beyond the grave or from distant 
spheres, putting us in communication with "'presencest'; 
contacts which transcend the conditions of'normal space-time 
g) Marcel employs the term "penser a! ' (or andenken) to 







experience and localised in the spatio-temporal "instant'. 
Nor must such experiences be considered, in Marcel's viewq 
abnormal. All personal relationships involve, however little 
it may be- realised, telepathic communication and even 
I'materialisations". As do memory and premonition, they 
knourish 11fiddlity" and make possible personal-attachments, 1V 
It is worth while underlining once again, in passing, 
that this theory of participations and communi cations'-is 
"magical" in character, bearingg-as before suggested, 
considerable resemblance with-the "idealisme magiqueP1 of 
Novalis and other German Romantics: 
Pexprimerais cela en disant que le Andenken ýI 
est magique en son fond; qulil va 1ý 116tre 
meme par dela les interme"diaires dits psycho- 
logiques (dont la nature oijýqlogique demeure 
d1ailleurs pour nous impenetrable). (Ibid., p. 43. ) 
Although denying that whatis essentially a "metaphysical dot, 
is a mere imaginative construction, as Proust and the Idealists 
declare, he yet notes that it always presents 11une face 
correspondant 'a llactivite*' de la pensee prise comme edification 
ou-comme reconnaissance". (Ibid. ) Such a passage suffices to 
show that Marcel's Realism, as already stressedg is not of the 
naive typeg aiming at the seizure of an object which is, so 
to''speak, already therv, . The revelation of the Transcendent 
is accompanied by a transforming activity of the subject mind; 
there is novelty in every act of participation, novelty on 
both sides of the "relatiod' of immediacy. The two terms of 
Transcendence and Immanence'are intertwined in the theory of 
participation. 
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The "suppression of distancev, in such supra-norMal 
experience is 'llie"e a* une transformation de la notion 
11 physique dlespace, l (Ibid., p. - 104); moreover, the possibility 
- of. such-experience depends upon a theory of orders. We must 
assume that Space, like Timeg, admits of-varying levels of 
reality (corresponding to the varyinG levels ai which the 
reality may be experienced). Space comprises a hierarchy 
of "zones concentriqued' of diminishing reality. At one pole 
it is pure Objectivity and quantitative relationg at the other 
it is pure Subjectivityq pure concreteness and quality. 
, 
Bet-vveen these two poles there is room for infinite degrees of 
, concreteness. In so far as. reality or essences exist in the 
, fully realised state, they would have the spatial character- 
istic, of absolute concreteness (a spatial simultaneity 
analogous to temporal simultaneity; a "spacelessness! ' which 
is none-other than a "space-fulnessit, as "timelessness!, -Is in 
'fact. a "time-fulnesol). This absolute spatial concreteness 
is of course denied to the'creature; -but, in so far as he 
exploits the "instant' of immediate spatial experienceg he 
can approach it and participateg to a greater or less degreet 
in the "space-lesdl essences of the real;, establishq to a 
greater, or less degree, allone-ness" witý his self or other 
selves, and abolish quantitative spatial relation. In' 
relation to another self, he may dissolve theýspatial obstacles 
set between them, penetrating beyond the intervening 
"concentric zones" which form about him a sort of core of 
resistance protecting him as allsoillf and*attain'spatial 
I)- 
4 
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intimacy with the other: 
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Il a pu arriver a certains Ventre nous do 
faire telle ou telle rencontro, ', qui brisait 
en quelque sorte les cadres de cette topo- 
C; raphie personnelle et igocentrique; je peux 
comprendre par experience que d1un inconnu 
rencontre par hasard monte un appel irresistible 
au point de renverser soudain-toutes., les 
perspectives; ce qui paraissait inimediatement 
proche semble soudain infiniment ; ointain, et 
inversement, Ce sont 1ý-des experiences 
transitoires, des breches qui se referment 
auss, it5t; je crois cependant que ces 
experiences - si decevantes soient-elles. 'et 
-elles le-sont au point f 
de. laisser au fond du 
coeu; une impression d amere tristesse et co=e 
de derision - ont cot avantage inappreciable do 
nous faire prendre brusquement conscience du 
caractere continsent de ce que itai appele notre 
, espace mentalg et despristallisations qui en 
fondent la possibilite. (Ibid., pp. 102-3. ) 
The condition. -, of such a transcending of Space, is a 
"deepening! ' of experience, by virtue of a "deepening' of the 
"spatial instan: tll; a progressive penetration of what is 
"most real,, in Space; an unremitting extraction'of its 
inmost concreteness, permitting a corresponding participation 
in Being at its varying levels og'reality. 
Vie see then tlýat the structure of the real, for Alarcelg 
on its spatial side corresponds exactly-with that on its 
temporal side, and likewise how sue]! a structure conditions 
the "dialectic in depthlý employed by Marcel in his ontological 
enquiry. 
Moreover, it is such a I'deepeninol of Space and its 
instpnt" that ac. counts for the possibility of the supra-normal 
experiences described above. As long as we take objective 
space as. reference, they are unaccountable. Ift, on the 
It: 
I, 




contrary, we admit a qualitative view of space and, varying 
qualitative levels of space, we can comprehend how space may 
be "annihilated" in deep existential experience. For the 
a 
Spatial instant' itself contains implicit within it the 
whole" of Space; all thingsq. -in iiLediate experience, are 
virtuallZ, present to us in space (and at-all times), as is my 
body. And at, certain momentsq by virtue, for example, of 
telepathy which,, like memory and, premohition, is a uniquq 
type of parti-cipation allowing a peculiarly deep penetration 
of reality, "distant' realities may-become actually-. present in 
the "spatial: -instant,. ' The self,. descendi: ng-into ever 
deeper levels of space,, approaches progressively nearer the 
ultimate "space-lessness" or absolute spatial simultaneityv. 
which is the ideal realm, of transcendent essences and where 
all I'distance" is abolished. The more it descends in depth 
of spatial experience, the more'it may attain "one-ness" with 
the-reality it experiences; it becomes possible for 
such a reality, over and beyond all distanceg-, death and. 
0 
separation (contingent in character as they are), to 
communicate directly with the self. 
As-in the case of Time, the means of'such a transcending 
of, the objectiveýcategories of Space and of entering tho 
"space-lesof order is provided by Space itself by what is 
most real in it, a concrete Space of immediate feeling, which 
opens on, in proportion to the level of experience attained, 
14 
?I 
to the transcendent, "space-less" realm, For the "time-less"I 
77, 
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lvspace-less! 'ý realities are realised and made manifest only 
. 
in Space and Time, of which the complex structure of 





In his last two works (Homo Viator and Du Refus a 
l'Inv6cation) Marcel has taken up in greater'detail ýhe 
problem of spati, al experience in a series of phenomenological 
studies aimed at clarifying the content of "being-in-situation! ' 
(etre-en-situation). In his already publishe. d. article on 
Jaspers he had noted that "the representation which we form 
of a situation is essentially spatial". (R. I. P- 301-) Being. 
is always flen qituatiodl (Da-sei ), subject'to limiting 
conditions, of space no less than of time. The existential 
experience of the subject, as lived in the primitive ontic 
experience or cogito, is experience of'a subject with which 
the universe isIco-present, although. this compresence may be 
distorted or denied. And it is this co-presence of things 
with self which gives experience its volume and density. 
Experience reveals 
II 
l1existence non seulement d1un soi, mais d1un' Z le soi se reconnalt, slexerce, se monde ou 
r6pand; monde intermddiaire entre le clos et 
11ouvert, entre Vavoir et 113tre, et dont mon. It necessairement comme le symbole corps apparai 
ou le noyau materialisd. Mais il est permis 
de supposer que nous sommes-dupes des plus 
grOssieres apparences lorsque nous, hypostasionsg 
loriýque nous traitons comme une realite 
independante et-refermee sur soi ce qui niest 
o*-ý, 4r-A'A'ýA; kAi Imul ý"4* 4ylipý 
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peut-etre que le chrkmp d1affleurement d1un 
certain royaume inde 'fini dont nous ne pouvons 
que reperer accidentellement et comme par 
eclairs les zones immerGeesq les prolongements 
sous-marins. Le fait m6me de vivre, au sens 
ploin que nous conferons a ce mot lorsque nous 
-parlons 
de notre vie, do la vie humaineg N nlimpliquerait-il pas, pour qui le penserait a 
fond, l1existence d1une sorte d'Atlantide meta- 
physiqýie, inexplgrable par definition, maiý, dont 
la prj'. -, ence en realite confere a notre-experience 
son volume, sa valeur, sa mysterieuse densite? 
'(R. I. p., 124. ) 
--It is the presence of this "Atlantide metaphysique" which is 
the fundamentum of spatial experience. 
This is borne-out, declares Marcel in his essay on 
Moi et Autrui in Homo Viatori- by the analysis of the conditions 
in which the individual posits itself as a self or person. 
Taking as an example the child that offers flowers he has 
gathered to his mother and who exclaims: "Regarde, clest moi 
que les ai. cueillies, " he notes that, therwis implicit in the 0 
-positing of self a type of exclusion: "it is I and not 
another; " but, paradoxicallyq an exclusion which is at the 
same time an inclusion, f or the very act of excluding others 
includes at least one otherg a "toil' to whom the child 
addresses himself and whom he takes*as witness of. his very 
selfhood. In every such act of affirmation 11je me produis, 
clest-a"-dire'je me mets, en avant". (H. V'. P'. 17. ) Mor eo ver 
there is a reference not only to'a "toil, but to the flowers 
held out for admiration, to a whole, complex which is posited 
with the self: 
Poursuivant notre 4nalyse, nous, constaterons 
que ce moi, ici present, traite comme centre 
--. '. -r.. t fl- 
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dlaimantation, ne se laisse pas re'duire 'a un 
contenu specifiable qui serait llmorý corps, mes 
l l ;c ? st une presence mainsq mon ce3veaW 
ifi l l fi que ee par e magn ori globale. Presence g 
bouquet que moi j'ai cueilli, que moi je 
. . 
t1apporte; et je ne sais pas si tu devras ii N_ admi3er davantage le [-, oUt dont il temoigne ou I 
I 
la generosite, dont je ; Cais preuve en te le %_ i 
donnant, moi qui aurais si bien pu le garder 
' dute de 11objet pour moi. Clest ainsi que la be 
rejaillit en quelque fagon sur moi, et si je " 
I 
'a toi, encore une fois, cles; t comme fais appel 
a un temoin qualifie que jlinvite**a stemerveiller 
de l1ensemble. que nous formons le bouquet et moi6 
(H. V. 'PP. - 16-17. ) 
In shortg there. is at the root of all experience a compresence k, 
of 'the 'world in space with t6. self: 
Presence signifie plus et autre chose que le 
fait dletre l1a; en-toute rigueur on'ne peut 9 1 . pas dire d1un objet qulil soit present. 
oujours sous-tendue Disons que ;a presence est t 
-par une experience a la fois irreductible et 
confuse qui est le sentiment meme d1exister, 
dletre au monde. (Ibid., p. 18. ) 
But a compresence which, becoming fully conscious, leaves 
the self free to alienate*in space-to a greater or less 
degree. the autrui which is given with it: 
De tres bonne heure slopere chez 11'etre humain* 
une jonction, une articulation entre cette 
conscience d1exister que nous n1avons sans l doute-pas de raison valable de denier a llanimaljý i 
aj. tre par et la pretention de se f aire reconn 
l1autre - ce temoin, ce recours, ou ce rival, ou 
cet adversaire quig quoi Q1on ait pu dire, fait 
partie inte/grante de moi-memeg mais dont la I 
position peut varier presque indefiniment dans 
mon champ, de conscience.. (Ibid. ) 
It is thus impossible to assign to the self precise, defined 
frontiers; the self is but an"accent" v&ich is'conferred 
upon some, particular aspect of an experience whichAs global: 
a_, _, -. 
----- 
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Si cette analyse est exacte dans son ensemble, 
il faudra voir darýs ce., que ilappelle moig non 
pas du tout une realite isolableg que ce soit 
u 514ment ou un principe, mais un accent ne-; 
re, non pas, bien eptendug IL mon _' 
qu e 
je conf % experience dans sa totaliteg mais 5 telle 
portion ou tel aspect do cotte I experience que j1entends sauvegarder particulierement contre 
telle atteinte ou telle 
'' 
infraction possible. 
CI est- en ce sons qu I on 'a souvent i- et juste 
titre, fait resprtir 11impossibilite qulil N% yaa assigner a ce moi-des frontieres precises. 
(Ibid. 9'pp. 18-19. ) 
--It becomes possible to practise localisations in-space, whicli 
J. are more or less arbitrary. For if I'moi ici present, (the-, 
self present to self in the spatio-temporal instant of self- 
realisation), implies necessarily a reference'to the "other'19 
, this very localisation of the self in a spatio-temporal 
present may, by a gratuitous disjunction operated by 
objective thouF,, htg lead to an exclusion from this "here" and 
"now" of the global realities of-which it is the focal point. 
That'is, the ici maintenant is taken to be a point in spatio- 
temporal succession, a discontinuous moment of the space-time 
nexus, and at one anath'e same time the real self is 
alienated and the other selves with %hich it is compresent 
disjoined from it. For it cannot be too strongly emphasised 
that the ici maintenant of immediate existential experience 
is but a focal point wherein, temporally, is mirrored both 
past, present and future of. the self and of the others with 
which it has sustained relat ions and also, spatially, the 
multiple intricate spatial contacts which these enjoy with 
the point wherein each other. It is a whole within a whole 
---:... . ý- -.. . -- - .. 
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the essence of self and selves achieve realisation and 
I 
communion within. the framework of space-time. 
IncarnatioxiP , the 11 donne"e-pivot" is of course , the 
central fact governing the mode of spatial representation-or- 
rather the mode of existence in space. . 
For it is by our. 
manner of experiencing our body that we are, or, are not 
spatially in contact with the univer6e. and others. Por, wek 
-can "opposer le J'appartiens a dans un monde clo's au 
i1appartiens a dans un monde ouvert, et montrer que'le second 
seul comporte, une Justification positivell. (R. I. p. 129. ) 
We can admit or accept the "cohesion fondamgntale! l implicit 
in the experience of the body or not, and on this'acceptance 
or non-acceptanceg which is'the foundation-stone of libertyq. 
depends the transcending of objectivel quantitative spaceg. 
and thus self-realisation or communion viith others: 
De m6me Vlil est de mon essence on tant que 
vivant dletre en situation, il est de llessence 
de mon corps en tant que mien'dletre la substance 
de 11' reuve qui est a la. lettre constitutive de ?p 
mol-meme, puisqulau terme je serai ou ne serai 
I point. (Ibid., p. 136. ) 
And in this acý of'adhering to my body (J'appartiens"**a morl 
corps) lies the only "authentic liberty,, ' as opposed to the 
ne - Sation of the body (and thus of the transcendent) 
represented in the extreme case by Kirillov in Dostoievski. ts 
Possessed, for whom suicide is proclaimed the true freedom, 
rW (Ibid. *, p. 137. ) Herein lies thb-inbial mystery, whose j 
% connection with spatial e. xperienco is manifest 'Ile mystere 











If 11 ý reel (Ibid. P. - 12-3. ) For therein the-self is grasped as 
It le porteur de certaines energies mystdrieuseq cosmiques Ou 11 
spirituelles, dont lui-meme sent obscurement la transcendance". 
(Ibid. $ p. 127. ) Upon this attitude adopted towards the body 
cLepencLs, in z: acz, our qua-Li-ua: uiye experience oz space: 
11 eat trop evident que lorsque nous disons: 
le propre de l1homme eat dletre en situationg 
nous ne visons ni exclusivement, ni meme 
principalement, le fait qa1il occupe une place 
dans llespace; mais il y aurait lieu ici de 
proceder en quelque sorte par graduations et 
de montrer comment des determinations en 
apparence purement spatiales sont susceptibles' 
de se qualifier d1une fagon de plus en plus 
interne. (Ibid., pp. 113-14*') 
. 0- 
Thus, for example, the-situation where one lives-bi a valley 
. 
between two mountains, a situation expressed spatially by the 
preposition between (entre); for the man living in that 
valley this preposition presents"if not a dynamic at least 
a pre-dynamic schema! '(Ibid., p. 114): he can feel as if he 
were held in a vice or'as if he were occupying a meýdiatory 
Position, etc. Such situations-for the living and existing 
being are no mere "spatial det erminat ions" but "qualified 
situations": 
Clest seulement au prix d1une abstraction 
vicieuse quo nous dissocionz ce vivant, le 
fait qulil vit, et les schemes dyn=iques par 
lesquels slexprime sa situation. , En realite", tout cela est rigoureusement inseparable. (Ibid. ), 
All sorts of other seemingly external relationshipsg such as 
influences and'environment can-likewise be expressed in terms 




Dans 11un et 1, autre cas, certaines connexions 
quton serait tente au premier abord de juger 
purement. externes Slinteriorisentg se qualifient 
par consequent, et du meme coup Valifient a 
leur-tour une certaine maniere dletre ou do se 
sentir. (Ibid. t p. 117. ) 
They are all functions of a certain consciousness of that 
"primitive, dynamisrfl or spatio-temp6ral cosmile rhythm alreaO 
spoken of. 
But the most important point is that this communi on 
admits of qualitative degrees: 
Il est clair, d1autre partt que 'nous ne prenons 
pas une conscience e5galemexýt vive ou intense a 
chaque moment de notre duree do ce 11dynamisme 
primiti: 01. (Ibid., p. 111. ) 
It varies, parallel with the consciousness of time, 'from the 
consciousness of an. objectiveg'quantitative space to that of 
I'llespace interne" q the spatial ici or instant wherein self 
and things are present and realised and which corresponds to 
the temporal maintenant. 
Marcel has clarified his notion of this 'real Eipacell in' 
his article on Rilke. There he relates Rilke's "passion for 
space" manifested in his'cult of the Russian steppe, to his 
cult of "lintimac; rl: 
Je ne pense pas quIon puisse se'Parer 11impression 
profonde et durable que devait lui laisser son 
, 
Voyage en Russie en 1899, de cette passion de la 
distance et des lointains, mais il faut ajouter 





chez lui ivec son cu_lte do 11intimite. 
(. H. V. Pp. 302-3. ) 
The intimýLqy of Which Marcel speaks is, that of the. "presence, " 
of self or selves. And it is essentially spatialr 
II 
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Peut-8tre pourrait-on dire sans paradoxe quo 
11intimite"jour lui nlexclut pas la distance, 
mais peut-etre en quelque fagon llexige. 
Abstand, Entfernun5l Ferne - voila des mots 
essentiellemeryt; rilkiens. (Ibid. P. 303. ) 
In a passage whi ch f urther clarif ies Marcel Is views he 
comments on Rilkels concept of the 'loped,: 
L'ouvert, c1qt ce qui entoure'la cre"ature 
mais non pap a la fagon de llesp'ace vide ou' 
d1un fluide dans lequel. baignent lea choses'; 
clest le fait que la creature est finie, 
ulelle a une limite, ou plus exact9ment, q 
I. ctest 
l1autre aspecto l1aspect correlatif de 
celui la. 11 ne slagit done pas de la limite,, 
relative d1un etreo clest-a-dire en somme de 
ce qui ntest quladjacento mais de sa limite 
absolueg de l'Autre pur et simple, de ltAutre 
en taht qu'Ai3tre, clest-a-dire de Dieu, de la. 
puissance creatrice de Dieu. Ceci sleclaire 
du point de vue psychologique s''llon songe 
qulil ya des actes qui sont determines par 
un objet: le fait de considerer une chose,, 
de lleprouver, de la faqonner, etc.; mais 
qulil en est aussi d'autres qui n1ont pas a 
proprement parler d1objet mais, qi; i consistent % I. soit a slenfoncer dans lletre, a explorer ses 
profondeurst soit a rayonner hors. de lui et 
au-dessus de lui comme pour le survoler.., 
Dans les'deux cas, la limite est depassee, 
mais non pas en ce quIon la franchit pour 
-passer, a cote: elle est d6assee absolument. 
Cet absolument (uberhaupt),, clest dans un cas 
le mystere de 111THE6riorite, d6ms l1autre, celui 
de la transcendance (Enthoberheit , et de llespace 
absolu (absolute Weiýe),, Dans lea deux cas, 
11homme se laisse lu eme derrie're soi en 
tant quIetre particulier qui observe e, 
cOnvoite, etc., 9t accomp'lit ainsi son etre 
U13 
de pure creature. Lletre se distend, commence 
a fleurir, et devient ainsi lui-meme. WoUvert, 
clest la direction dans laquelle ceci se r&lise. 
Nous avons vu la semaine derniere que, pour 
Rilke, la religion ou Dieu lui-meme est une 
direction du cQeur. 1ýous voydns ici que 
ýtouvert peutQtre conqu en hauteur et en 
etendue,, 'mais aussi selon la perspective de 
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Marcel adopts for himself this definition of, the 11open! 1j 
inasmuch as it fits in with his opposition between "the 
closed" and "the operY1 derived from Bergson. From, the 
is 
point of view of space-theory what is important*is the 
conception of a real or absolute space - what is most, real 
in. space---ý the ici whose very localisation exhibits. the 
presence of the transcendent and is its, means ofrealisation 
and revelation. "Ltouvert clest la direction dans:. laqýLelle 
'ceci se re"alise, 
biC) - in every 
respe . ct comparable in 
function with the temporal 11noW1. ! 
id- This space is what Marcel calls"llespace, internel ard 
he'alSo calls it "cosmic'spacell (and al6o. Weltinnenrauml* 
It is the locus of that co smi c rhythm" wherein all realities 
exist and energise in space and time. 
Rilke has restored this consciousness-of Posmic space 
; Is and rhythm, of the presence-of our selves to the universe. 
and of it-to us: 
,... cet amour reverentiel du cree que les hommes de ma generation auront ; vu se tari3Z sous leurs 
xeux en tant d1ames vouees au dessechement ot 
a la plus miserable adulation de soi. (Ibid. , P. 356. ). 
The condition of such restoration of presences and of 
their'realisation and revelation is the return to immediate 
existential, experiencog to the spatial instant of such 
experience, by a. sounding of what Rilke calls the"Idimensions'' 





In the importance given to concrete space, Marcel 
)f 
differs considerably from Bergsoh, and is more in conformity 
As 
with psycholOGical fact. VIhereas Bergson makes an absolute 
L 
opposition between Space and Time, the one pure objectivityl 
the other pure subjectivity and concreteness, Marcel 
distinguishes rightly between conceptual, objective Time and 
Space on the one hand and concrete Time and Space on'the 
other (1). Psychology discerns, indeed, in immediate, 
experience-a qualitative sentiment of Space, which is as 
much a I'donnee absolue de, la consciencellas tempo3ýal duration. 
ad 
In fact; even Bergson is led to recognise what he calls a IV I 
Itspatialite deschoses" (2). There is thus a Spcýce as there 
' ' opposed to each other, -but to i sa Time, not therefore to be 
be contrastedtith the conceptual, objective Space. ýand Times 
which are a product of the analytic intelligence. 
But Marcel goes furthers in that for him Space and Time 
1ý 
are inextricably conjoined. Vie were obliGed to ti? eat-them 
separately to. facilitate our analysis. But in actual fact, 
' the unit of existential experienceg which serves as-a portal 
to the Tran cendent, is neither a wholly temporal nor a 
wholly spatial instant, but a spatio-te=oral instant. The 
structure of the real is through and through spatio-temporal: 
a conception identical with that of Whitehead and Alexander. 
Moreover, if we bear in mind that the spatio-temporal inbtant dl 
is the locus of all spiritual essences, thoir point of inter6- 
ýl Cf. Von, Hagel, Eternal Life, pp. 297ý-8- 
2ý Bergson Evolution cr6atrice, p. 2219 
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section with the space-time order of created life, when it' 
Df 
is stressed that all such essences may be defined as "Forms!, 
in'týe, sense of forces or centres of spiritual energy, 
manifested and actualised in space-time, it is seen that- 
J 
Marcel's universe of selves, with its contacts, communica-;. 
tions and participations, all of them "energisingl- in Spac(ý- 
----Time, - closely resembles the universe 
-of spatio-temporal 
1ý events" and 11centres of energy" familiar to contemporary 
physical 'science and to' the philosophies derived therefrom. 
tio- 
But the conception -of, space outlinedq especially related 1, 
rid 
to that of an infinite, Absolute-Spacej has perhaps a deeper 
significance and source. It brings to mind the religious 
space-philosophie's developed in the 17th century, notably 
Thozas-More's dbetrine-of space as the Divine Presence (1), 
and more esýecially that, of Thomas Traherhe. In the latter 
S 
We find the Divine Space assimilated to "internal space" and 
what is, at bottom, -"intimacy". "It surroundeth ud continually 
on every side, it fills us, and inspires us. It is so 
mysterious, that it is wholly within us, and even then it 
' wholly seems and is without us... Our bodies themselves are 
-not so much ours, or within us as that is (2). 11 The 
similarity is no less striking in the way in which'Traherne 
. d 
links-Space and Time, Absolute Space and Eternityq as together 
constituting an infinite duration which is simultaneously an 
(1) Cf. E. A. Burttg, 'The kletaphysical Foundations of Modern 
Physical Science, p. 
_ _ _ _ - '(2) Cen _t q r'J e so Y 11ed London, Dobell, 19349 P. 3061 2. 
-.. 1. .1 ýý . 1. .6... ... I... 
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infinite compresence and which is the focal point of the 
' of mystic experience of c ommiinion. "This is the space that is 
at this moment only present before-our eyes, the only. space 
that wasj. or that will be, from everlasting to everlasting.. 
This moment exhibits infinite spaces, but there. is a space 
iilso wherein all moments are infinitely exhibited', and the 
everlasting duration of infinite space is another region, and 
-room of joys. Wherein all ages appear togethert"-all 
occurrences-stand up at once, and ... give aninivard infinit'y-- 
ýtio- to this moment, 
-and 
compope-an eternity'that. is. seen by all 
, nd 
comprehensorp and en'joye; s 
, 
(1) Ibid. 9 P. 3099 
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Spatio-temporal Situation. 
Taken togetherg Space and Time as modes of objective 
thought are "modes conjugue"s de'llabsencell. (P. A. p. 172. ) 
They involve'the alienation of reality and its conversion 
into an "object". They are, for this reasqn, the fundamental 
forms of"Itemptatioi2l and"treasoV1. (E. A. P. ýO-)' On the 
one hand, *they deliver over I s-elf and selves to an -infinite 
spatio-temporal succession. On the other, by reaction. as 
it wereq they harden the self in that attitude of pride, 
possessiveness and "indisponibilite" v&ich is the negation of 
metaphysical and ontological'consciousnessO 
'Dans le fait do reconn, -&tre son insignifiance 
par rapport I 11infini du temps et de llespace, a 
se combinent 11orguoil ot la fausse humilitd. - 
car on pretend 
' 
coinc; der idealement ave 0 oe 
double infini r4alise comme objet du connaltre. -. 
(E. A. P. 30. ) 
It is in this attitudeq suggests Marcell that. we have the 






representative is Spinoza - I'God-drunIcl or, more appropriately 
"drunk- with the Infinite". 
ents of Yet. if Space and Time as "phenomenal" are the ag 
dispersion, sin and despair, they provide, by ývhat is real in 
them, the instruments of our salvation. As such, they are 
"conjugated,. moded' of presentification and partigipation. 
For, in the qualitative spatio-temporal instant of immediate 
experience, Being - self, selves and things - is realised and 
revealed. It constitutes a point of intersection between 
the 11 time-lesdl 11 space-less" (or better 11 time-full' I ¼ ... .a a ". ' '... ' .. 
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'space-full, essences of things and the cont ingent forms of 
Space-Time; It provides thus the Gateway to and the means 
of realising or apprehending the Transcendent. Salvation 
is only by way, of immanent subjective experience, with its' 
irradicable concrete spatio-temporal struct 'by virtue ure, 
of a return to the "here" and the "novel: 
Vertigineuse proximite de Dieu. Reto'ur a' 
cc- au maintenant, qui reprennent une 
V; 
ieý, 
une-Ugni[T? ýans analogue. (Ibid'. ) 
In proportion as the "herd' and "novel of concrete sýatio- 
temporal experience is-exploited,. is penetratedt widened and 
deepened, as the subject transcends the residue of 
"objectivity" it contains, he experiencesq at ever deeper 
levels, ' the "Time-lessness" and "Space-lessnesdl ýharacter- 
istic of essential Being; "he realises correspondingly hýs 
Essential Self, participates correspondingly in other selves 
and things, in their spatio-t6mporal simultaneity, in a 
"Time-lesdl, "Space-less" presentq albeit without ever 
attaining wholly this ideal limit, 
Thus the "instant" of immediate experience is through 
and through, neither wholly temporal nor wholly spatial, but 
spatio-temporal. What gives it its "depth" and its 
I'substahcell is precisely this union within it of the ici and 
the maintenant: 
Le passe et llavenirg ýLu sein du ýrofond, -se rejoignent dans une zone qui est a ce que ýIappelle le pre'sent ce quo 111ci absolu est 
a llici contingent; et cette zone oý le - 
maintenant et le alors tenden-b a se confondre, 
comme tout 11heure le proche et le lointain, 
.I, i. ,"-*, 
. '' .:.. .., ", - *'$ . .,.. 4.6 .60. - .. ý 
W"W. Apý*ý -- 
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cl en pas douter ce que nouo appelons 
, 
gst a n, 
1.6ternite. (1). 
Finallyq the spatio-temporal structure of experience 
is, in Nlarcel's philosophy, function of a system of orders 
or levels of reality which, in its turn, conditions the 
"dialectic in depth" of existential and subjective thinking, 
which aims, through'sensation and feeling and the allied, 
semi-occult powers of immediacyj at probing the hard core 
of immanence, and-at participatingg cýt ever deeper levels, 
in the Transcendent Essences actualised in Space-Time (2). 
0- 0- 0- 0- 
In its spatio-temporal structure, human e: kistence 
appears to Marcel as essentially dramatic. His main 
criticipm of Kantism is direct'ed against its "anthr. oPo- 
centrisme" (R'. I. p. 45) and the principal feature of this 
"anthropocentrisme" which is to posit the self asq in'a 
sensel creator of a reality in terms of its own constitutive 
and purely formal space-time laws: 
I, ." 
.I 
Il ne sI agit pas ici do f aire appel 
'aý rien qui 
ressembýe aux postulats kantiens, puisque ceux- 
(1ý Le Sentiment du profond, loc. cit. 
(2 I'll faut qulil y ait il. ordre de l'univers comme il'y a 
une dialectique de llexperie'nce intime, comme il ya une .1 hierarchie des faions devouloir et. dlaimer... En sorte qutil 
est bien vraig au sons metaphysique le plus substantiel du 
mot, que clest aux cimes de l1action personnelle, dans les' 
espaces transparents de la conscience prophetique, quo se 
r6v6le 'ý 
l0ame militante-Pultime secret, de sa nature, de sa 
'. destinee,, ". 
_(Hocking, 
Rev., Phil., 19199 P. 54. ) 
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ci n1interessent qu'un su3et pur, considere 
autant qulil est possible en dehorsd? ses 
conditions d1insertion dans une experience N .0. concrete qui presente un degre de specifica- 
I., I tion en quelque sortd infiIii. Ces postulats .I ne se laissent pas concevoir erý deýors d1un. 
formalisme moral qui semble pre. cisement 
mcconnaitre ce qulil ya dlixeductible dans 
le drame -humainq dans.. le fait que toute vie humaine se d4veloppe'a'la facon Vun drame. 
pp. 
This denial'of any but a subjective, formal're'ality to space, 
and time is the'necessary accompaniment of a puie: Idealism 
wh ich takes as its premiss a self detached from reality and 
isolated from the transcendent of selves and things and, no 
Iess, from the 2rocess or "drama! "wherein. and wherebi this 
transcendent is progressively revealedg affirmed and brought 
to consciousness. - For a philosophy, on the 
starts from the primitive fact of "incarnati, 
infiniment mysterieux par lequel ute essence 
for such, a philosophy the dramatic structure 
becomes central. 
contraryg which 
ov, the Ilacte 
prend corps", 
of existence 
Marcel has come to employ the,, image of the "voyage" to 
describe this character of existence and to stress most, fully 
and clearly its spatio-temporal characteristics: 
Rienne saurait de prime abord-sembler plus 
irrationnel que cýe lier l1existence dtun ordre 
terrestre stable a la, conscience d1une position Of 4, 
qualifiee dlitinerante, ctest-la-dire a la 
. situation 
fondamentale du. voyageur. (H-V- P. 6. ) 
And yet such it: is,. he believes: and in such. 'terms may be 
described-the ýIfundamental situatiox2l of "being-in-situatiorv,. 
of which all other situations are but variations. So much 
a '-f 14 X, Aý, ý 
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so, that we may says 118tret clest etre en route". For by 
such a description we underline the essential spatio-ýemporal 
conditions Which govern spirituality and the process of 
realisation and participation in Being: 
Reste a savoir siq lorsque nous cherchons a 
penser notre vie.. 9 nous pouvons jamidis nous 
affranchir tout a fait dtun mode de figuration 
spatial ou quasi-sýatial. Il ne le semble pas... 
Ltidee do voyage, qui nlest pas habituellement 
'1 consideree comme offrant une valeur. ou une portee 
specifiquement philosophique, pre's e. ýt e. ', '. 1 'inestimable 
avantage de rassembler en soi des determinations qui 
appartiennent a la fois au temps et a llespace; 
et il vaudrait la peine de rechercher comment 
slopere en elle une semblable syntbýese. (Ibid., p. 8. ) - 
Existerice is the mode of living wherein the.. transcendent 
manifests itself both in space and time; by virtue of the 
spatio-temporal Minstant" or. 'sici-maintenant" of real 
experience, focal point of past, present and future and focal 
point of "presences". 
-Mcistenceq defined as a "voyage" or a 11 P/1 erinage"t in 
conformity with Rilke's conception (H, V. P. 31459. is then 
essentially transcendence, a movement of transcendence 
tending towards the future of full self-rrealisation,. of fully 
realised presences , with its term in God -a movemenli which, 
however discontinuous and broken in fact, is yet continlious 
by the intention by which it is supported and driven. A 
movement which is at once temporal and spatials "Dieu ctest 
I une direction donne"e 'a 1.1amour. 11 This movement, this elan, 
ft I which Marcel defines as-11hope" has, for its mode of actiong 
the spatio-temporal I'liere and- now,, acquired by ah tabr4low. 
%mill 
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of "fidelity' or the I'voeu cre"ateur, which makes of the 
present a focal-point, of pastg present and future and of 
past, present and future presences: "Je ne puis comprendre 
les natures religieuses. qui accueillent et dprouvený Dieu 
comme le donne, sans slessayer"a lui productivement (6hne- 
0 
sich an ihm produktiv zu versuchen). " (1) 
'Finally, it must not be omitted, to stress in Marcel Is,, 
space-time doctrine the role played by the*extra-sensory and 
meta-psychical powersl premonition on the one hand and 
telepathy on the other. For it As these "magical" powers' 
which play. a considerable role in the space-time experience 
of the existing subject to enable him to gather up along, ýhe 
road'of his pilgrimage, within the "existential orbit" of 
spatio-temporal durationg the presences vdiich accompany him 
upon his journey and which, compresent with his own self, 
constitute that"communiov, of family and tradition beyond- 
t4e grave itself, without which no self-realisation, no 
destirq'is possible: 
Je citerai ici en-le modifiant leg'erement, 
mais sans en alterer le sens veritable, un 
-texte de la premiere partie de mon Journal MdtapýZsiýue: "Quand je dis: Cesar a 
exi-stO... je ne veux pas seulement dire que 
Cesar aurait pu etre percu par moi; Je veux, 
dire qulil ya ent 
* 
re llex""istence de , 
Cesar et. 
la mienne,, clest-a-dire ma presence organo- 
psychique a moi-mgme, une continuite' 
temporelle objectivement d6terminabl. e; 
cette presence est le repýre par rapport 
auquel slordonne la multiplicite infinie de 
ce qui peut 8tre pens4 par moi-meme comme 
existant; toute existence peut etre 
(1) Rilke, quoted Ibid. j. P- 314. 
1+ UA A-nj': ý 
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rapportee a ce repere et ne saurait 6tre 
pensee en dehors de'cette reference que par 
pure abstraction. " Disons encore. que cette 
challne de rapports temporels, spatiauxl., 
spatiaux-temporels, peut 6tre contractee par, _,: mon ýmagination jusqula ce que 1ýexistant 
If I% pense me -devipnne p-present. espece de 
champ magnetic; ue ou se distribuent ces chaines 
toutes ordonnees par rapport a mon existence. 
actuelle est ce que jappellerai-l'orbite 
existentieýle. (R. I. p. 28. ) 
The spatio-temporal instant as susceptible of providing 
zomminion with the dead is a notion stressed byRilke in a 
oý 
passage quoted with evident approval by Marcel: e Si ftendu 
que soit le Idehors! avec . toutes ses dimensions side"rales, 
clest'a peine slil se laisse comparer aux-dimensions en - 
profondeur de notre dedansg qui poiir etre presque insondables, 
. 
ntont'pas besoin-de la spatialite du cosmos. Si done les 
m6rts ou ceux qui sont *' n1 a aitre ont besoin d1un asile, cot 
espace imaginaire nlest-il pas le sejour le plus agreable et 
le plus approprie qui puisse sloffrir a eux? Je me figure 
de plus en plus que notre conscience usuelle habite le sommet 
d1une pyramide dont la.. base en nous (et*en quelque maniere '4 
, au-dessous de nous-memes) sletend si loin quo plus nous nous 
voyons capables de nous y 
entraline's en des zones de 
cosmique qui. ne sont plus 
Lýes ma prime jeunesse, JI, 
enfoncer, plus nous paraissons Stre 
l1existence terrestre ou meme 
soumises au temps ou a espace. 
I U forme cette conjecture (sur 
laqqelle 'ma vie ulte"rieure a dans la mesure du possible tentel 
I 
de se regler)'qu, la proximite de la base do-ceVte pyramide de 
conscience, itetre dans sa simplicite pouvait devenir 
"=%I 1! 1.4 1ý. -1 -- ý-II ýý 4 
448. 
dvenement pour nous, la pre"sence infrangible et simultanee. 
de tout ce quIa la pointe supe'rieure et normale'de la 
#4 to conscience do soi, il ne nous est donne dleprouver quIa 
lletat-d'ecoulement. ", (H. V. P. 350. ), It'is iýter6stingto 
see in this qýotation-a sort of parallel to Marcel's views 
on. a, Space-Time which is esseýtially "internal"'-or cosmic,, 
and-the. field, wherein-t#e personal substances energise. ' 
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III. Dread and the "OntoloE;, -ical Weirhtll of Human Ex2erience,, 
In the li(-,, ht of, the spatio-temporal structure of 
existence the situation of man in its metaphysical and 
ontological aspect stands fully revealed. This situation 
bears the mark of division and contradiction. Existential 
experience exhibits the empirical self as an"irreducible" 
fact (an irrefductible, ) existing only in relation to the 
essential self, experienced as an. "au dela'! 'Il immanent dnd 
transcenýde4ý to the empirical self: 
Et Jq pense que la. double existence de'cet 
irreductible et de cet aiý-delZL tend justement 
a definir la. condition metaphysique de 11homme. 
(E. A. p.. 227. ) 
This empirical self or "irreducible" is but the, expression 
of 'Ila deficience ontologique qui est propre 'a la creature, 
tout'au moins a la creature dechue". (Ibid. 9 p. 255. ) It is 
in essence an 11 inertiell or at least a "negative activity" 
expressing. itself in the various praqtical operations proper 
to'ordinary living; as opposed to the essential self whose 
activity is manifested in the spheres of religiong art and 
metaphysics, activities directed upon "mysteries", not 
"problems" and culminating in a revelation of the Transcendent.: 
Given this, metaphysical situation of cleavage, it follows 
that Existence is no facile achievement, nor least of all a 
continuous state. It is of the very essence of our freedom 
that we may lack "fiddlityl and'fail to, realise the essential: 
Dans 11ordre de la philosophie concrete, 





a ces eiititefs-, a ces ousiai inalterables, que 
la metaphysi ue classique immobilisait kca ciel 5c 
pur ulation, se mettant pdr la en de la sp 
dehors des conditions qui peuvent seules nous -I 
permettre de comprendre l1existence humaine II 
et la place quly occupe llechee sous toutes ses 
formes. (H. V. p. 163. ) 
The world of Marcel is a "monde casse", *as is the world of 
Pascal and Kierkegaard. 'At the centre of man's spiritual 
nature is this fact of division, duality, this 11duplicitell 
which Pascal has so uncompromisingly analysed, and the source 
of a constant anxiety or "metaphysical need". It is this 
inner cleavage which constitutes 'Ile poids ontologique de 
l1existende humaine" and which makes despair-the I'donnee 
centrale de la metaphysique". (E. A. p. 149. ) Ontologically, 
the situation of man involves an element of peril and risk 
inasmuch as, delivered over to time and spaceg he is alienated 
from Being and driven back on those negative, autonomous 
activities appertaining to the 'order of "Havine: '; and in 
that the brief moments of Existence WLch he achieves cannot, 
owing to the very "irreducible!, nature of the empirical self,, 
be prolonged into a continuous*state: 
Il'faudrait dire alors que le besoin ontoloSique 
slaccentue ou slaiguise autant que lIhomme se 
ýrouve place dans une situation qui met dýavantage 
a nu 11irtat (%e peril qui fait partie integrante 
de sa r6alitd m6me. Ceci rejoindrait sans doute 
, la lignee de pensee qui va de Kierkegaard a "I Heidegger. (B. A. P. 55, n. 
Repeating the words of Pascal, Marcel sees life as a wager 
of Which the. -stake 
is man's soul itself, its damnation or 
salvation. So that, as for Pascal, the final solution (or 
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rather cure, for the situation ofTnan is not a probleml but 
rather a "malady' of Which metaphysics provides the cure) is 
in the form of a* moral viager of which fidelity, and beyond 
fidelity, faith, 'are the instruments. Marcel, again like 
Pascal, tends to stress the voluntary character of fidelity, 
faith-and belief in general. Inasmuch as Being or Existence 
can be accepted or denied, fidelity and faith constitute the 
mark of liberty; they are-an adherence to BeinSt just as the 
negation of Being is a rupture of this adherence. In both 
cases we are in the presence of a free decree of the vital- 
subject:, 
L'ordre ontologique ne peut etre reconnu que 
personnellement par la totalite, dlun etre 
. 
engaýdýdans un drame qui est le sien tout en 
le debordant infiniment en tous sens - un etre 
auquel a dte imparti la puissance singuliere de 
slaffirmer ou de se nier, selon qulil affirme .. 
1'Etre et slouvre 'a lui - ou qulil le nie et'dii 
mgme coup se. cl^t- car clest en ce dilemme que 
Po ieme de sa liberte. (B. A. p. 175. ) reside llessence 
The ontological structure of human existence is the same 
for Yarcel as for a Pascal or a Kierkegaard. Vie find in all 
the recognition of an essential Parado, , productive of an 
inner anxiety, itself the source of an "ontological need". 
Further, the recognition that this vital'need must be 
satisfied, inasmuch as man is, to employ Pascal's term,,. 
Itembarq tion where it is a question ue" , is 'engaged" in a situa 
of life and death for the soul. Finallyl recourse, in dire 
need, to will and faith. All such experiences as hope, love, 
etc., are themselves forms of fidelity or-faith: -fidelity is 
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their common denominator; it is the essential instrument 
of the realisat-ion of the essential -Tbcistence. 
A, t tile centre of L"ar I cells philosophy is the sense of 
anguish, inspited by the consciousness, obtai4ed in 
existential experienceg of the finite, empirical nature 
within us in conflict with an eternall infinite,. Self (1); 
and the recourse to fidelity and faith as solvents'of thý 
anguish this conflict inspires and as instruments. 
I 
ofýthe 
recovery of true Being on the plane of I-xistence. - 
__.. -o-o-o-o-- 
'""..;.. 
Most worthy of note in this analysis of whab Marcel 
calls the "ontological weight of h=an existence!, is the 
isolation of an element in affective experiencel-namely dread, 
which is, psychologically, -a priori andq ontologicallyl the 
motive principle of Being and Existence. - -Marcel's philo- 
sophy, indeed, contains a phenomenology of dread and despair, 
as a counterpart to a phenomenology of hope, the two at bottom 
inseparable. 
(1) Cf. the following description of Heidegger's starting- 
point: 'Llho=e est 118tre fini qui a conscience de sa nature 
finie et pour qi#, par suite, l1existence me^me est un proble'me 
- Un probleme vecu. Il slensuit que,, d1une part, il se voit 
se dresser derriere lui ltombre d'un'letre", d1un Sein infini 
et createur, que sa conscience interroge., et cherche A 
If p en6trer, et que, d'autre part, il ressent'aa contact et 
devant le spectacle du monde infini, dans lequel. il est lui- 
m6me in3er6, les sentiments caracteristiques de l1angoisse ' 
(Angst) et du souci 0 -1-ef 
P11iisorRe) 
11 (E. von Aster, Les Aspect. 
PrIncipaux de la sopH! e allemande contempOraine. Revs de 
I 
i! 
"$. 1. " ."......... . . '..; 
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Uhat must first of all be stressed in this phenomenology 
is thO affirmation of a fundamental element in human 
experience prior to despair itself - an-a priori of the 
affective life defined as dread ýIlinquie'tudell*or "angoissell) 0 
Aude co=e disgra'ce,, fondamentale, cOmme donnee I'llinquie 
universelld'. (E. A. p. 107. ) Its a priori character is 
emphasised by'the use of-the term 11inespoiV1, borrowed from 
Hardy, to define it. This primary inquieftude or dreadq 
fundamenial. to the human creaturej. has its raison d'Zýre 
in man's duplicity and the inner tension which he experiences 
as a being situated on the double plane of 11beinV1 and 
11havinol. Marcel relates it to the Christian doctrine of 
the fall and the ensuing sin, in that dread is the mark of 
sin upon man. But, by this factq dread is essentially 
related to the consciousness of time. In itself an a priori, 
dre4d, when directed upon particular-objects, localised in 
the emotions, infused with representative elements, becomes 
A despair. And as such, despair is, 1,11angoisse meme de la 
temporalite, 11angoisse de se sentir livre au temps". (E. Ai 
. P. 
106. ) In short, it becomes the expression of the 
conflicts of a self which aspires to realise the eternal 
I 
within, to remain identical with itself, while subject to 
change and flux. 
We have already analysed fully the relation between 
despair and temporal consciousness. Suffice to stress 
certain aspects necessary to its present clarification. 
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mere lldonn6l to be detailed in succes'sioný, as a mere 
"inventoriableFl: 
Le donne** se prosentera toujours a nous co=e 
inventoriable en droit, co=e ce dont, par un 
procede quelconque, on doit bien pouvoir finir 
par faire le compte: sans doute y a-t-il ici 
11id6e implicite que ce compose a d! lui-meme 
so constituer par voie d'addition ou de juxta- 
position, et que je dois pouvoir reproduire 
on idee le processus par lequel cette addition 
ou cette juxtaposition slest operee en fait. , (R. I. p. 96. ) 
L'inventoriable est le lieu du desespoir.... 
observation pour moi fort importante, car%j I y, 
vois la racine de ce que je serais porte a 
appeler la tragedie de l1avoir. (Ibid., p. 97. ) 
An attitude v&ich itself derives from the 11avidite, of a 
i, subject seeking power of manipulation over-the real. 
Despair is, at bottomg linked with the idea of a "collection! ': 
Ici encore, clest bien la collection qui est 
au centre. Je constitue en moi ou avec moi 
une sorte de bibliotheque ou de museum, ý quoi 
il slagit d1incorporer les elements inte'ressants 
qua j'aurai pu retirer de ma conversation avec, 
I'autre. Conversation OZU je ne donne rien, ou 
je ne livre rien; - que ce qulil faut pour declencher les reponses que je souhaite. 
Autant dire que mon interlocuteur ici nlest en 
sucune facon traite comme un etre; il nlest 
meme pas, a vrai dire, un autreq car moi-meme, 
dans cette relation fictive et non vivante, je 
n1interviens pas comme Stre, comme quelqu'un 
de reel". (Ibid., pp. 98-9. ) 
Ig 
But the adoption of this attitude is' the adoption of a certain 
attitude towards time whereby for't4c sense of process is 
substituted a monotonous succession or recurrence which 
suppresses the forward-looking pre'sent vecu in favour of a 
present transformed into a pastq source of that. " ennui" and 






je suis depuis que1que temps dans un endroit 
dont les ressources*m1ont d'abord paru indpuisables: 
r-ais peu 'a peu Jai parcouru tous les chemins, 
vu. toutes les "curiosites"; voici que Je suis V, saisi d1une sorte d! impatience, dlennui; de 
ýegoqý. Je me sens en prison. Wendroit ou - ? 
Je seJourne ne mlest apparu. que comme le lieu 
d1une certEýiýie collection Vexperiences a faire, 
et ces experiences ont eu lieu., (Ibid., p. 97. ) 
Il*est certain qula la racine de cette avidite I il ya avant twit ' 
la conscience du temps qui 
passe, de 11irrevocable; la vie est courte; 
il faut ajouter ceci et encore cela. (. Ibid., --p. 98. ) 
Anxiety, indeed, is inseparable from'. the loss of that 
"disponibilitel, characteristic of true, -, passionate -living. 
When the artist clings to his work already accomplishedg 
anxiety appears: 
Il importe au plus haut point de distinguer 
entre l'oeuvre a faire et l'oeuvre deja" 
realisee. A partir du moment o1i je me crispe 
sur non oeuvre accomplie, OU elle devient pour 
moi le centre du monde, oU clest par rapport 
hL elle que je juge soit les oeuvres des autres 
lui compare, soit ceux qui llont que jp el 
. apprecide de telle fa5on qui me satisfait ou 
au contraire me deplalt. - elle se transforme 
en un,, avoir sur lecluel ma pensee est anxieusement 
braquee, quelque chose sur quoi je referme une 
main raidie. Par la je me mets en dtat 
J. d1indisponibilite radicale. (Ibid. 9 P., 75. ) 
The very contrary of the sens. e of hope and achievement which 
he experiences in active creation: 
Precisement parce que l'oeuvre est a accomplir, 
il est impossible de la traiter comme un avoir. 
Remarquons aussit6t que ceci peut se transposer 
sur un plan qui nlest plus du tout celui de 
ltoeuvre Wart, jýais celui otu., Jje me pose moi-meme 
comme etant a accomplir, a creer. Une opposition 
analogue a celle que je viens de souligner entre % JI l'oeuvre faite et l'oeuvre a., realiser existe entre 
moi com=e ensemble de qualites donnees et moi comme 
creation continue. (Ibid. q: P- 76. ) 
4 




Once the lived present of self-creation within process is 
lost, anxiety appears to paralyse the subject: 
Cotte anxiete, clest le souci comme rongeur, 
com: ie Ailaent paralysant-, qui vient arrOter 
tous les dlans, toutes les initiatives 
Eenercuses. Ce qulil faut bien voir, clest 
quo llany. ijte ou le souci peut se resorber 
dans un dtat dlinertie interieure au sein 
duquel le monde est vecu comme stagnationg 
comme putrescence. (lbid. 9 PP. 76-7. ) 
-The extreme limit of thisdespairihS consciousness of time 
is the CoAt du neant accompanied, as in Baudelaire for 
example, by the sentiment du vertige, the sentiment du 
, gouffre (1). All of Which are manifestations of the 
fascination of death. For the exclusion of the future and 
the conversion of the present into a past has for, its term 
the suppression of all consciousness of movement, the 
nihilistic awareness of a fatum org as Baudelaire calls it, 
an "irreversibility" which empties time of its siGnificance 
and'substitutes a vacuum, a void, a sense of neant or death: 
% Cet inesPoir qui s' oppose a llesperance comme 
la crainte sloppose. au desir, clest vraiment 
la mort dans la vie, la mort anticipee. (lbid. tP. 77. )-_'_v_ 
At this limit dread takes on its most positive character as 
the supreme limiting situation -, the mystery of death. For 
Marcel as for Jaspers and more especially Heidegger, death is 
the final ontolosical situation: 
Gertains pourront 6tre surpris de la place que tiennent la mortg le suicide, la trahison, dans 
tous mes ecrits; ilestime que cette place ne 
sera jamais trop considerable, et que toute 
philosophie qui cherche a -luder ou les les ea 
Cf. B. Fondane, Baudelaire et llexperiencedu Eouffrel, 
aris, Seghers, 1947. 
____ 
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escamoter se rend elle-memý coupable de la 
pire trahison qui soit; e le en est. dlailleurs 
ine'ývitablement punieg en ce sens quIelle manque I Ges p. -ises, pour parler comme un alpiniste. 
(Ibid. 9 p. 100. ) 
For "La circonstance extrema par excellence, Clest la. 
proximite i=ediate de la mort, et aucun dlent3ýe nous ne 
peut etre suAr que sa mort West pas, en effet, imm i nente" 
(Ibid. 9 p. 105. ) 
At its term dread becomes as it were an-absolute: but 
as such it opens the portal to Being and to the tran cending 
. of 
dread. * Confronted by the supreme menace of his death, 
made consciousq in this final moment of dread#, of a fate 
which robs time of its significýance, the individual gains 
the necessary recul, the necessary breathing-space to 
readjust himself to Time and to'regain control over the being 
which is lost to him. "Fate is the nothinG of dreadg" says 
Kierkegaard (1). For dread apprehended in all its reality 
is. the mean of recovering that "possibility" whereby fate 
may be transcended, so that dread may become'the "nothing of 
fato. 
*It is here that the ontic function of deapair and death 
is fUlly revealed: 
Au lieu que pour un alpiniste le vertige 
I constitue un empechement dirimant, je ne serais 
pas gloigne de dire que le vertiE,, e est une 
condition positive de toute pensee mitaphysique 
diE; ne de ce nom. En effet, une certaine 
conscience, une certaine attirance du vide est 
peut-dtre ndcessaire pour que l1affirmation de 
Ilet 
, 
re dans sa pl&iitude puisse se produire 
dans toute sa veh4mence. (Ibid. *, p. 100. ) 
(1). The Concept of Dread, p. 87. 
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Death is the supreme instance of "absence". Now absence 
in general has an. ontic function. * Both it and death are 
. 
"epreuves". (Ibid. ) This latter term has to be takon in its 
temporal signification as "put to the test of time',. Marcel 
elucidates fully in Une nhilosonhie concrete (in Du Refus a% 
l'Invocation) the corollary notions of "test' and "obstacle'. 
in the liGht of Le Genne. 's Obstacle et Valeur. He takes, 
as usual, a concrete instance of two young people who, unsure 
of their feelings, separate for a time. In short, they put 
their love to the "test' of time. . At 
the end of this period 
of absence they will be-in a position to tecognise, their 
feelinGs. It is obvious that this "test' is something more 
than an "obstaclo. - It is not in itself*a source of value, 
as Le Senne the Idealist would suggest (1), but a condition 
of evaluating: 
Le temps et la separation ne sont pas seulement 
ici obstaclej resistance; ou plut6t cette 
resistance sera ici utilisdoe, une valeur 
fonctionnelle lui sera conferee; cette valeur 
consiste a rendre possible ce quIon pourrait 
appeler une confrontation interigure. (Ibid., p. 101. ) 
Ne soyons pas dupes des mots; le temps par 
lui-rýeme ou la separation nejugent pas, ils 
no decidelit pas; mais ils eclairent la 
conscience, ils lui permettent de se reperer 
par rapport a elle-meme; les jeunes gens se 
rencontrent un an plus tard; ils reconnaissent... 
(Ibid. ) 
(1) The Idealism of a Le Senne or a Sartre suggests that value 
is inherent solely in the fact of self-consciousness, duality 
and non-immediacy (what Sartre calls the "pour-soil'). But 
this is to mistake the condition of value for value itself. 
Reflexion, with its implicit duality, negation or "obstacle" 




In short, the"test" of time provides a sort of 
suspeiision of the immediate existential experience in favour 
of an objective mode, a voluntary lapse from temporal 
duration into the plane of more succession, productive of 
desp'air: "A la base de lteprouve, nous trouvons une 
recusation-de l1experience imme'diate. 11 (Ibid. ): 
La fon-etion propre de llepreuve sera de rendre 
possible un jugement reflichi qui permettra de 
qual , 
ifier., par rzýLpport au-reel, l1affirmation 
-immediate emise'a 11origine. (Ibid., p. 102. ) 
But by the very introduction of this test" and "obstacle" 
the individual finds the conditions for a more willed and- 
purposive adhesion to existence: he gains in this interval 
the freedom of movement necessary to xevalue his situation 
and feelingsl and to make the necessary "leap" of existence, 
recover on a higher plane the lost immediacy,, procure a new 
consciousness of time as the agent and instrument of this 
recovery. 
If now we apply these remarks on the, nature of the "test" 
to death, the supreme 11teet"s we discern howo in the 
consciousness of'the proximity of death dread may come to act 
not only as the-. fascination of*despair but as the supreme 
motive-power to unlock and unleash the possibilities of 
existence. 
For death is the final limiting situation, the final 
Ii Ilobstacýell, 11tes. t41 or IfecheO. It is , above all, the final 
affirmation of "absence". In the experience of the neant, 




succession but, bythe fact this temporal succession is 
experienced at its very li=it, consciousness of succession' 
itself is lost even to the transcending of'all temporal 
consciousness. In this type of "absence! ' the suspension 
of duration is absolute: it -constitutes a veritable 
d J# etachemcnt whose releasing force and power is. correspondingly 
absolute. It creates a total void or gap v&erein th6 
subject Gains a moment of complete, as it were unconditioned 
freedom: his very enslavement to fate and the determinism 
I, 
of successiong experienced at its term, procures a moment 
of release, an all-decisive interval which he may utilise 
and whose utilisation depends solely upon an act of will- 
power 
Herein lieS for Marcel the ontologicbl import of. - 
suicide. At this limit the subject is confronted with a 
choice - the choice of "to be or not to bell. , 
The choice 
of suicide is not the acceptance of deathg, for death is as 
nothinG, but rather the refusal of being: it is the supreme 
negation, the ultimate "refusal". As such, it must be 
distinguished from self-sacrifice, which 'is the limiting case 
of the acceptance of being, the supreme response to 
"invocatiov': 
Q). It is just because it accomplishes a release from time hat it provides the possibility of an unconditioned freedom 
as distinct from the motivated freedom B17 existFn--ce and . fidelity, v4dich springs from this choice. ' There is thus in 
LI'arcel's philosophy a double freedom or a double moment of 
freedom: there is in it place for a "freedom of choice" as 





Il nly apasq il ne peuty avoir de sacrifice- 
sarm. esperancet et llesperance est suspendue 
a Ilontologique. Ilais le suicide est, au 
contraire, 'a base de negation... Le suicide 
est essentiellement-un refus; clest une 
deýaiszion. Le sacrifice est essentiellemenV 
une adhesion... (Ibid., p. 106. ) 
But leavinG aside the special case-of self-sacrificeg 
the choice before the individual confronted by death is a 
choice of beinG or a refusal of being, On the one hand 
dread at this supreme point may 6? cercise such -a fascination 
as to paralyse all initiative: 
I 
La pensee de notre mortg. clest-a-dire du seul, ýVý-dnement a venir que nous'puissions regarder 
comme certaint peut exercer sur nous une 
fascination telle quIelle envahisse en quelque 
sorte notre champ dlexpe"rience tout entier, If eteigne toutes nos joies, paralyse toutes nos initiatives. (lbid, &l p. 224. ý 
The "obstacle?, or'leched, may have this fascinating and 
hypnotic effeet. But note that the "fascination!, is only. 
the ground-work of this final despair: by virtue-of the 
release from determinism described aboveg dread offers a 
Possibility of choice: and the fascination of death. and 
despair itself gives way to an act of freedom constituted 
by the refusal of being and the acceptance of death and' 
suicide. 
And, for the same reason, dread of death offers the 
possibility of choice of being: the affirmation I am rýY lifelp 
Which liberates the individual finally and decisively from 
the "pessimisme objectif de la mort". (Ibid.., p. 225. )- 
Death is transf ormed "par la f ideflite' (ld lil ml appartient de 
4 
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temoigner, en une rd'alite' positive. " (Ibid., p. 310. ) 
Thereupon, in fact, by the acceptance of being, of-my being 
transcendinS my life yet realised only, by my life and my 
livinr,,, the individual assumes in this first act of fidelity 
the responsibility for its realisation. He recovers*the 
vista of hope and, by the further exercise of fidelity, 
infuses hope into his life. In short, 'he recovers. the 
consciousness of time as process, -to be utilised as an 
instrument of self-realisation and communion with others 
by the willed purposive activity centred on the forward- 
looking present - which is hope; a process. inseparable from 
the assumption of. responsibility towards the past - which is 
I 
repentance. 
In conclusion, dread in its culminating f orm - the dread 
of death - operates as the supreme "test" or "obstacle", but 
an 11 obstaciel whicii is not an enct : Ltse=, ratiler -wie 
condition and means of transcending all dread: 
Je suis pleinement d1accord avee 1J. ' Le Senne 
pour reconnaltre une valeur positive, stimu- 
lante de 11obstacle en tant que tel; et il 
slaG: ýt precise"ment de savoir comment ici peut % sloperer cette conversion a la faveur de 
laquelle llobstacle se changera en tremplin. it 
(Ibid. 9 p. 233. ) 
And this precisely for the reason thaV dread affords the 
possibility of freedom and choice by the privileged and 
indeed paradoxical place it occupies in the economy of human 
existence. By dreadg the individual grasps his self as 
. 
"possible existened', to use Jasper's term -a possibility 
which is. pure freedom and choice. -Implicated and made 
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conscious of his implication in a situation where trans- 
cendence is evei! ywhere revealed, he can accept or refuse 
the tramscendent: 
Ici tout est fonction de la liberte et de la N. .1 liberte seule. (Ibid., p. 102. ) 
Ici appar I a*t une solidarite, entre la philosophie I 
de 118tre et la philosophie'de la liberte, que 
le metaphysicien ne saurait a* mon sens affirmer 
trop vigoureusement. (Ibid. ', p. 222. ) 
And herein, in the possibility of betrayal and refusal*which 
is eilveloped in the act of freedom, lies-the essence of the 
human situation, the raison d18tre and, at the same time, t6e 
ontol6gical import of dread: 
Cette possibilite-de subversi6n ou meMe de 
destruction par la rdfle'xion est enveloPpee I 
dans llessence meme de llacte-libre; clest 
dans la mesure ou' nous so=es libres que nous J% 
sommes exposes a nous trahir et a voir dans 
la trahison le salut; et elest ce qulil ya 41 de vraiment tragiquedans notre condition. 
(Ibid. q p. 213. ) 
I-ý 
0- 0- 0- 0- 
In his analysis of dread L-Tarcel seems inspired by 
Kierkegaa d mainly.. In fact the essential moments oý 
Kierkegaard. Is dialectic of dread are repeated in that of 
Marcel. First, the relation of dread to sin, dread being 
the "presupposition of original sin! ' (1). Secondly, the 
definition of dread as the "possibility of freedom-(2). " 
The ConceDt of Dread, p; 41.. 2 Ibi2l. 9 p. 139. - . 11 




For in it fate and determinism are tran formed into a 
"nothinUl, and fate is seen to be the "nothinr, of dread". 
ProducinG a sort of hiatus or vacuum, it makes a place for 
the "qualitative leaVIj the emergence of "possibility". 
Lastly, the relating of dread to the temporal consciousness. 
For dread annuls fateg in so far as it annuls the irr evoca- 
bility of temporal succession. Fate is the "nothing of 
dread". "Dread and nothing regularly correspond to one 
another. *-So soon as the actuality of. freedom 
I and of the' 
spirit is posited, dread is annulled (1) Dread discovers 
fate, but when the individual would put his. confidence in 
fateg dread turns about and takes fate away;, for fate is 
like dread, and dreajd is like possibility.. . 
'bL wiich's letter 
When, in fact, dread"posits sin? ', that is assumes the 
responsibility of past and* future 9 it - banishes the temporality, 
in which sin is rootedg the enslavement to the "instant 
abstracted from the eternal the meaningless discrete 
present. It recovers, by its choice, the full instant of 
salvation and faith, in which the past is enclosed as what 
may be redeemed through repentance in the present, and from 
-which the future, rectified and ordered towards the ends of 
hope and providence, emerges. #'rate then is. the nothing of Iff; 
dread. It is nothing, for so soon as the spirit is posited 
Ibid., p. 86. 
2 Ibid., p. 143. 
3 Ibid., p. 83-- 
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dread is anmilled; but fate is too, for thereby providence 
also, is posited (1). 11 "When the discoveries of poosibility 
are honestly administered, possibility will then disclose all 
finitudes and idealize them in the f oria of infinity in the 
individual who is ov6rwhelmed by dread-, until in turn he is 
victorious by the anticipation of faith (2). *. 11 In such 
manner, the "possibility of freedow, which drea& introduces 
into hiýuan life becomes the 11springboard", as Marcel calls 
it, for those activities, of didelity and'hope, repentance and 
faith which permit the synthesis of the eternal and the 
temporal. - 
Outwith this instant whose recovery dread makes possible, 
no salvation, no sense of providence'nor of guilt or 
repentance - the essential categories of the Christian faith 
are capable of emerging. Only in the domain of existence 
can they operate, by way of the, initidl "qualitative leap". 
And they are inseparable from a consýiousness of time as 
process. As long as the subject is located on the plane of 
mere succession where there is strictly no past, ýpresent or 
future, he is incapable of assuming responsibility for his 
past, for any. such responsibility must operate in the present 
and it cannot s'o operate when the present is a point divorced 
from the past. He cannot then know repentance;, , at most 
remorse such as Baudelaire has described, the mere weight of 
a dead past, which clogs and annihilates 611 initiative, 
(1) Ibid., p. 87. 
(2) Ibid. 'p, . 141. 
.011,. 
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Nor, on the other hand, can he kna; i the counterpart of 
repentance wlAch is the sense of providence, for this sense 
is conditional on the future becoming the hope and possibility 
of salvation by means of the present directed towards ends 
of self-realisation. But here again. the present is divorced 
from the future. 
Only with the instant of temps vecu,, where the present 
is conditioned by a past whose evil is accepted and utilised 
for the purposes of present purification and where the'same 
, present is the means of realising the good which the future 
holds out as a goal, can the sense of guilt. and sin become 
fruitful for the purposes of salvation. Time then becomes 
not a babrier but the very means of spiritual puiificatýon 
and salvation: 
La-purete d1ame, clest ' 
la vdrit6 de l1existence 
qui, an faitq ose at realise 11impurete dans le 
monde pour saisir dans la conscience continue de' 
sa culpabilite la realisation de lapurete comme 
I 
tache infinie dans la teiision de la vie temporelle. 
(Ibid. 9 P. 320. ) (1) 
Then and then alone does dread fulfil at long last its 
primary metaphysical and religious function, as befits its 
(1) Na one has experienced more deeply than Baudelaire the 
critical moment in the dialectic of dread where dread 
destroys itself, giving way to possibility; discontinuity 
and irreversibility yield to the consciousness that the 
present may become by repetition the means of the soul's 
IIrepairinE: I and rebirth. "Que de pressentiments at do 
signes envoyds deja par Dieut qulil est grandement temps 
d1agir, de-considdrer la minute presente comme la plus I importante des minutes, et, de faire ma perpetuelle volupto 
de mon tourment ordinaire, clest-a-dire du Travail. -.. Tout 
est reparable... (Oeuvred, Vol. 119 pp. 668p 670. ) 
S 
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ý, place in the structure of the human cituatton, and at the 
same time reveal its "presupposition! ' the fact of original 
sin (1). 
(1) Marcel's concept of dread must be related to the 
remarkable study of M. Ren4 Lacroze: L'Anpoisse et emotion 
(Paris, Boivin, 1938). M. Lacroze seeks to prove that tHe- 
emotions are not primary but derived from an a priori of the 
affective life, namely I'llanGoisse". "Il ya un fond 
d'emotivite qui predede toute experience et qui coincide 
avec l1eveil de la conscience de soi; au commencement, on 
ne trouve pas llactiong mais la peur. Clest d'elle quo % pFocedent les terreurs enfantines et que slalimentent nos 
emotions. 11 (p. 111. ) It is "une disposition permanente de 
la sensibilite, un theme fondamental et premier qui se 
confond avec lletre meme". Penetrated with representational 
elements, it is transformed into emotion, but in itself it 
has for its sole object the being of the individual. 
Moreover, it becomes explicit only in its relation to 
temporalityg as the expression of a conflict between a being 
which seeks permanence and is subject to change. "Clest 
pourquoi 1,1anE_,, oisýp nlest plus dans notre vie une inquietude 
continuellemýnt presente bL nos coeurs; elle est la'douleur 
soudaine, qui emeut ltetre jusqulau fond de lui-m&me, 'toutes 
les fois que pour vivre, il doit renier ce qWil a aimer. " 
'(p. 271. And precisely it is this moment when dread 
assumes its:, m6st intense form, as the field of freedom, 
choice and possibility with its persp'ective, of fidelity or * infidelity that it assumes an import and function no longer 
merely psychological but ontological. 
This major work constitutes a remarkable phenomenology 
of dread -which "anticipates a dialectic of - dread. And-the 
moments of'this dialectic have been enumerated by G. Marcel. 
